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Abstract 
Globalization has affected the economic activity of the countries across the world through 
liberalization of trade and exchange regimes. Moreover, the enhancements in information 
technology in turn have made it possible for firms to coordinate their activities in a more 
efficient way, in recent decades. In this setting it is easier for firms to outsource their 
activities to other countries through Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in order to gain 
competitive advantage. FDI has been considered as one of the factors that significantly 
influence the economy of countries through affecting the balance of payments, increasing 
employment, transfer of technology and resources. Since FDI is generally considered as 
one of the factors that has a great potential to contribute to economic activity of the 
countries, particularly in case of developing and less developed countries, the disparity in 
the level of FDI flows observed in case of many developing countries has led to plethora of 
research on the subject relating the inequalities to macroeconomic factors, institutional 
factors, and economic geography. In spite of the fact that the literature on FDI, is well 
developed on a number of areas, the literature on the effect of institutional factors on FDI 
activity, and in particular the effect of civil and political liberties on FDI flows remains 
limited and subject to contrary results that renders it inconclusive. 
This research explores the effect of civil and political liberties on FDI flows. In doing so, 
we review the literature on determinants of FDI, and establish the firms’ motivations as 
factors that affect their FDI behaviour. Furthermore we introduce, and conceptually bridge 
the Varieties of Capitalism of Hall and Soskice (2001) into IB literature, in order to 
distinguish between the behaviour of firms from various market economies (i.e. LMEs, 
CMEs, and Nordic) based on the labour law policies of the firms’ home countries. 
Consequently the incorporation of VoC into IB literature allows us to build on the works of 
Due et al (1991) and Gold (1993) and Hall and Soskice (2001), and explore the effect of 
the differences that exist in the way firms in different market economies coordinate their 
activities, and afford us the possibility of explaining the firms coordination of their FDI 
activity in the light of their market structures, and underlying institutional differences that 
influence their behaviour with regard to FDI. 
We also review the literature on institutional determinants of FDI in order to enrich our 
understanding of the institutional factors that influence FDI activity. In reviewing the 
literature on institutional determinants of FDI, we specifically adopt meta analysis methods 
in order to examine whether there are systemic biases introduced to the literature through 
the common choices made in terms of scale and study properties (i.e. the choice of country 
level analysis, data range and decade influences; etc.).We find that firms’ motivations 
influence the type of relationships found between FDI and the existing level of civil and 
political liberties in countries. The use of composite measures such as democracy instead 
of their disaggregated individual constructing sub measures such as civil and political 
liberties generally leads to provision of distorted results. We also find that the choice of 
host country influences the relationship between FDI and democracy as well as political 
liberties. Similar to the arguments put forward by Busse (2004) we find that FDI activity 
has been subject to changes in different decades as a result of changes in the firms’ 
motivations and market structure. 
 Moreover, we theoretically explore the effect of civil liberties and political rights on the 
initial cost of FDI and thereby FDI activity. The models provided build upon the works of 
Grout (1984); Hart and Moutos (1995) and Adam and Filippaios (2007). It is assumed that 
the decision of FDI is influenced by the initial cost of investment into the designated host 
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country. Therefore, firms are considered to bargain with employee representatives (labour 
unions) in the host country before deciding upon their investment abroad, in order to obtain 
full information with regard to the initial costs of investment. Our theoretical model 
demonstrates that the effect of civil liberties channelled through union power in the 
bargaining processes over wages and employment, on aggregated FDI flows is negative, 
while the effect on sectoral FDI flows is non-linear where the non-linearity stems from the 
level of labour to capital share of production of specific sectors considered. Furthermore, 
our theoretical model shows that the effect of political rights channelled through taxes on 
income and profit tend to be positive on FDI flows irrespective of the level of aggregation.   
Our empirical investigation of the theoretical findings using the data on the FDI from 8 
host countries into 140 developed, developing and less developed host countries for the 
period of 1990-2009, show that the effect of civil liberties on aggregated FDI flows is 
negative, while a positive effect is reported for the effect of political rights on aggregated 
FDI flows. In contrast, considering the effect of civil and political liberties on sectoral FDI 
(manufacturing and services sectors) we find a non-linear effect reported for both factors, 
indicating that the effect of civil and political liberties on sectoral FDI flows are non-linear 
across sectors. Our sensitivity analyses explores the effect of civil and political liberties on 
aggregated and disaggregated FDI flows into two main group of countries: countries with 
high and moderately high level of civil liberties; countries with moderately low level of 
civil liberties. The results provide further empirical evidence on the non-linear effect of 
civil and political liberties on sectoral FDI flows into host countries with various levels of 
civil liberties. However, the effect of civil liberties is shown to be linear and negative on 
aggregated FDI flows into all countries, irrespective of their level of civil liberties. In 
contrast a non-linear effect of political rights on aggregated FDI flows into host countries 
with various levels of civil liberties is observed. 
This research contributes to the literature in several ways: Firstly, it contributes to the 
theory by bridging the IB literature to the literature from political science on Varieties of 
Capitalism. Secondly, it provides a theoretical framework, and empirical analyses that 
explore the FDI activity in the sectoral level. Thirdly, it demonstrates that the use of 
aggregated data leads to findings linear relationships where the in reality the effects of civil 
liberties and political rights on FDI are not linear. Fourthly, it provides a number of 
recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
Globalization has affected the economic activity of the countries across the world 
through liberalization of trade and exchange regimes. The enhancements in information 
technology in turn have made it possible for firms to coordinate their activities in a more 
efficient way. In this setting it is easier for firms to outsource their activities to other 
countries (through direct and indirect investments) in order to gain a competitive 
advantage. The investments abroad in general can be divided into two main types of 
investments, namely the foreign direct and indirect investments.  These movements of 
capital influence the economy of all countries, in particular the economies of host countries 
attracting foreign investment. This research focuses on Foreign Direct Investment1 (FDI).  
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been considered as one of the factors that 
significantly influence the economy of countries through affecting the balance of 
payments, increasing employment, transfer of technology and resources. While the effect 
of FDI on economic growth of countries is still debated (Alfaro et al. 2005) both in 
aggregated and sectoral levels, the existence of its effect on economies is widely accepted. 
The empirical evidence provided by UNCTAD2 indicates that the global FDI has increased 
from 697,913 million (USD) in 1980 to 22, 812,680 million (USD) in 2012, while the level 
of FDI into developing economies (excluding china) has increased from 295,206 million 
(USD) in 1980 to 1,401,725 million (USD) in 2012. The disparity in the level of FDI flows 
observed in case of many developing countries has led to plethora of research on the 
subject relating the inequalities to macroeconomic factors, institutional factors, and 
economic geography.  
1.2. Research Problem 
The determinants of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), both in terms of the level of FDI 
as well as its composition have been of great debate over the past seventy years. Examples 
of such works are Root and Ahmed (1978) and Asiedu (2006) that mainly focus on the 
                                                          
1 The definition of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and related concepts, considered in this research are provided in 
Appendix 1.1. 
2 http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=89 
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level of FDI, and Javorcik (2004) and Gwenhamo and Fedderke Gwenhamo and Fedderke 
(2010) who take into account the composition of FDI. The first instances of the scholarly 
work on FDI can be traced back to the post World War II in the works of Hymer (1960) 
and Aliber (1971). Since then determinants of FDI have been explored in a number of 
disciplines, mainly; Economics, International Business, Finance, Business and 
Management, and Political Economy. Consequently, one can approach the topic from a 
variety of angles. North (1990) is one of the first scholars who establishes a link between 
institutions and investment, while mainly considering the influence of institutions on the 
economic activity and investment. However, an overview of the literature on FDI shows 
that the literature has been greatly neglecting the influence of institutional factors on FDI 
up until recently.  
The definition of institution adopted in this research is in the same wave length with the 
one adopted by Dunning and Lundan (2008), Hall and Soskice (2001) and is mainly drawn 
from the works of North (1990, 1994, and 2005). This definition considers the institutions 
as “a set of rules, formal and informal, that actors generally follow, whether for normative, 
cognitive, or material reasons, and organizations as durable entities with formally 
recognized members, whose rules also contribute to the institutions of the political 
economy”. Adopting this view of institutions, we consider ‘Democracy’ to be a product of 
well-functioning, high quality institutions that provide an environment in which there 
exists high level of political and civil liberties. Therefore our premise following Adam & 
Filippaios (2007) is that it is possible to view the level of democracy as a composition of 
the level of political and civil liberties in a state, where all these elements are products of 
institutions in that state.  
In recent years, the literature on determinants of FDI has shifted its attention towards 
the institutional factors. The studies that consider the effect of institutional factors on FDI 
include the works of Fathi, et al. (2008), Méon and Sekkat (2004), and Mottaleb and 
Kalirajan (2010) who generally find evidence supporting a significant positive relationship 
between FDI and institutions. Other studies considering the influence of the level of 
democracy in host countries on inward FDI have reported contrasting results. The first 
group of these studies including Harms and Ursprung (2001) found a positive significant 
relationship, while the second group including Huntington and Dominguez (1975), 
Wintrobe (1998), and Greider (1998) have reported a negative relationship.  
3 
 
The recent strand of literature on the effect of institutional quality of the host countries 
on their FDI inflows has focused on the disaggregated measures that constitute the 
institutional quality of the host countries, mainly civil liberties and political rights. 
However, in spite of existence of numerous studies on the topic, the literature on the effect 
of political and civil liberties on FDI is far from being conclusive. For instance, authors 
such as Huntington & Dominguez (1975), Wintrobe (1998), Greider (1998) provide 
discussions and evidence in favour of the idea that multinational enterprises (MNEs) tend 
to invest in countries with low level of liberties (countries with high levels of repression) 
while others such as Olson (1993), McGuire & Olson (1996), Ursprung and Harms (2001) 
provide discussions and evidence contrary to the later arguing that MNEs invest more in 
countries where democratic rights of people are respected. Others such as Przeworski, 
Limongi and Voigt (2003) argue that none of the two arguments are convincing. Recent 
studies including Li and Resnick (2003), Adam and Filippaios (2007), Asiedu and Lien 
(2011) tend to provide evidence in favour of existence of non-linear relationships between 
the two.  
1.3. Research Aims and Research Questions 
This research aims to explore the effect of civil liberties and political rights on FDI, in 
order to better explain the FDI activity. Accordingly we aim to identify the effect of Civil 
Liberties and political rights on aggregate (total) FDI flows. Furthermore, authors such as 
Blonigen (2005) have emphasised the importance of considering sectoral FDI by 
discussing that various variables have different effects on FDI in different sectors and 
industries. Proponents of this view argue that the use of aggregated data generally leads to 
provision of results that embody a composition of effects from various sectors in one 
aggregated effect reported for aggregated (total) FDI, leaving the researchers with often 
non significant and misleading results. Therefore authors suggest that using disaggregated 
FDI data provides a more clear evidence of how variables impact FDI flows in certain 
industry level.  
Considering the latter, this research aims to explore the effect of the level of civil 
liberties and political rights of host countries on their FDI activity both in terms of total 
FDI, and sectoral FDI. In other words our aim is to investigate the effect of civil liberties 
and political rights on total FDI, manufacturing FDI, and services FDI, in order to examine 
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whether the effect of civil liberties and political rights on FDI is sensitive to sectoral 
composition of FDI. The latter helps in distinguishing between the way civil liberties and 
political rights affect aggregate FDI activity in comparison with sectoral FDI activity, and 
in turn provide information with regard to the determinants of FDI in both aggregate and 
sectoral level. Thus our second set of aims is to identify the effect of Civil Liberties and 
political rights on sectoral (disaggregated) FDI. Furthermore, we are interested in 
exploring whether the effects of civil liberties and political rights on disaggregated are 
linear across sectors. 
Moreover, this research aims to examine the effect of institutional quality of the 
countries on their FDI activity. In order to do so, we incorporate the constructs provided in 
other branches of social sciences, mainly political economy, to inform our own. In 
particular we review the Varieties of Capitalism framework of Hall and Soskice (2001), in 
order to distinguish between different types of institutions.  
Hall and Soskice (2001) provide a new framework for understanding the institutional 
differences and similarities amongst developed economies in order to bridge the business 
studies and political economy. Building on earlier works on the “theory of the Firm” by 
Coase (1937) as well as further works inspired by the latter, mainly, the works of 
Williamson (1976; 1985) on “Transaction Costs Theory” (TCT), they locate the firm as the 
main building block of the analysis.  By doing so they place the firm as the central unit of 
analysis in their work, similar to microeconomics, while exploring perspectives that 
traditionally have been viewed as the ones central to macroeconomics3. Furthermore, 
authors adopt a perspective in ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ that considers markets as the 
institutions that support relationships of particular types, “marked by arm’s length relations 
and high levels of competition” (Hall and Soskice 2001, pp.9-10). Furthermore, authors 
consider the legal system to be the concomitant to the markets as they support and 
maintain the formal contracting as well as encouraging relatively complete contracts.4 
The VoC (Varieties of Capitalism) framework is an actor based approach that adopts a 
relational view of the ‘Firm’, in which firms are expected to seek to develop their core 
competencies by undertaking different types of activities and strategies. Therefore the 
                                                          
3 Namely the types of economies, characteristics and qualities of institutions, their structure, as well as the social and 
cultural characteristics of the nations, and the way they affect the markets, and their participants. 
4 For further reading refer to Teubner(1995, 1996, 2001) and Casper., S., (1997, 1999) 
5 
 
success of the firm is significantly related to its ability to coordinate with a range of actors 
that it is involved with (such as employees, clients, suppliers, other businesses, 
shareholders, etc.). In order to distinguish between the types of relationships that a firm 
generally coordinates to function, Hall and Soskice (2001, p.6) provide a five spheres 
classification in which the relationships that a firm has to develop in order to resolve its 
coordination problems5 are divided into; industrial relations, vocational training and 
education relationships, corporate governance, inter-firm relations, and finally the sphere 
of employees. 
From the perspective of VoC, national political economies can be categorized based on 
the ways in which firms address the coordination problems that they face with their 
relationships in each of the five spheres. In this perspective, Two types of political 
economies are introduced which are at the poles of the main spectrum where all nations 
can be arrayed. The first of these political economies is the Liberal Market Economies 
(LMEs) and the second is Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs).6 By incorporating the 
VoC framework into our conceptual arguments and theoretical framework we distinguish 
between home countries that belong to different types of market economies and explore 
whether there are significant differences between the way firms from LMEs and CMEs 
coordinate their activities with regard to FDI. Therefore our set of aims with regard to 
institutional factors go beyond the traditional institutional approaches, in that we not only 
aim to consider the effect of institutional factors on FDI in a country level, but also we aim 
to explore the effect of the types of economies that the foreign firms originate from on their 
FDI activity. Therefore our third set of aims is to investigate the effects of institutional 
quality on FDI flows, and to explore whether there are differences between the ways firms 
from various market economies coordinate their FDI activity.   
The objectives of our research are as follows: Firstly, we intend to explore the effect of 
the level of civil liberties, and political rights in host countries on the level of aggregated 
(total) and disaggregated (sectoral) FDI flows into them. Secondly, we aim to explore the 
linearity of the effects of civil liberties and political rights on FDI flows. Thirdly, we 
would like to whether the consideration of the type of market economy from which MNEs 
originate provides some information with regard to their FDI activity. 
                                                          
5 which are related directly to its core competencies 
6 Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) framework will be introduced and incorporated into IB theory through discussions 
provided in 2.6.2, and further on incorporated in a mathematical manner into the theoretical model of chapter 4. 
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Collectively, our research aims to provide a valuable contribution to the existing 
research through an analysis of the effect of civil and political liberties on aggregated and 
disaggregated FDI flows, and offers a new insight into a research area not yet fully 
explored by the academic community. 
1.4. Research Justification and Research Contributions 
We have been prompted to research the effect of civil liberties and political rights on 
FDI flows due to paucity of research on the subject and inconclusiveness of the findings of 
the literature. Furthermore, we believe that our research makes significant contributions to 
theory and practice. 
1.4.1. Paucity of Research and Inconclusiveness of the Findings 
As mentioned in section 1.2 the literature on determinants of FDI which has been 
traditionally populated by studies that strive to explain the FDI activity through neo-
classical economics and economic geography type models have fallen short of provision of 
credible explanations. Thus the recent literature has shifted its attention toward the 
institutional determinants of FDI. The most recent strand of literature includes the works of 
Busse (2004), Busse Hefeker (2005), Asiedu and Lien (2011), Adam and Filippaios 
(2007), and Li and Resnick (2003) who explore the effect of civil and political liberties on 
FDI. However, the findings remain inconclusive. 
The thorough review of the literature on the effect of civil and political liberties on FDI 
provided in chapter three shows that the literature on the subject is rather scarce and 
inconclusive. For instance the studies that have considered both civil and political liberties 
fall into two groups. First group including the studies of Busse (2004), and Busse and 
Hefeker (2005), generally have found a positive relationship between civil and political 
liberties and FDI. The second group including the works of Asiedu and Lien (2011), Adam 
and Filippaios (2007), and Li and Resnick (2003) have found a non-linear relationship 
where the non-linearity is introduced through different factors7, or by the consideration of 
different aspects of democracy8 or institutional elements. Therefore the literature that has 
                                                          
7 i.e. the level of natural resources in the host country. 
8 i.e. Based on arguments put forward by Li and Resnick (2003), democratic governments have a positive effect on FDI 
by strengthening property rights and have negative effects on FDI through provision of democratic constraints on elected 
politicians; reducing the host government’s ability in providing the MNEs with generous financial and fiscal incentives; 
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considered the effect of civil liberties and political rights on FDI is populated by a handful 
of studies that have produced mixed, contradictory, and inconclusive results. A number of 
studies that have considered the effect of either civil liberties, or political rights on FDI 
flows similarly are populated with only a handful of studies that remain inconclusive.  
Therefore, considering the short comings of the current literature on the effect of civil 
and political liberties on FDI, this research aims to attempts to investigate the effect of civil 
liberties and political rights on FDI flows in a novel manner. Furthermore, there are no 
studies, to the best of our knowledge that have explored the effect of civil liberties and 
political rights on sectoral FDI, thus we aim to explore the effect of civil and political 
liberties on both aggregated and disaggregated FDI flows.  
1.4.2. Contributions to the literature  
The paucity and inconclusiveness of the literature on the effect of civil and political 
liberties on FDI flows has an impact on our research. Firstly, we review the literature on 
the effect of civil and political liberties on FDI, and conduct a Meta analysis in order to 
explore whether there are intermediating factors that affect the findings of the researches in 
the literature on the subject. The latter informs our research design and formulation of our 
theoretical, as well as empirical analysis. Secondly, we develop a theoretical model which 
bridges traditional theories in the Economics and Finance (Transaction Cost Theory), and 
International Business (Behrman (1974) taxonomy of firms’ motivations) with Political 
science (Theory of Varieties of Capitalism). Through our theoretical framework we 
provide a set of arguments based on which we theoretically explore the effect of civil and 
political liberties on FDI. Furthermore our review of the literature and conceptual 
arguments allow us to establish the environmental aspects that affect FDI activity. The 
theoretical model draws on the knowledge from various branches of social sciences in 
determining the effect of civil liberties and political rights on FDI flows in both aggregated 
and disaggregated levels. In particular we internalize the VoC framework into the heart of 
our model and provide theoretical discussions on both aggregated and disaggregated levels.  
Furthermore, our empirical analyses contribute to the literature by examining the effect 
of civil and political liberties on aggregated and disaggregated FDI flows. Sensitivity 
                                                                                                                                                                                
and finally provision of protection for the indigenous business through provision of wide access to elected officials and 
political participation. 
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analysis of the empirical findings allows us to further explore our theoretical and empirical 
findings and avoid provision of results that are prone to various biases.  
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to theoretically internalize VoC 
framework into analysis of the effect of civil and political liberties on FDI, and to 
theoretically examine the effect of civil and political liberties on FDI in sectoral level.  
Considering our empirical contributions, our empirical investigation uses Quantile 
Regression Modelling (QRM) and analysis that has not been used in examining the effect 
of civil and political liberties on FDI. Furthermore, our empirical investigation is the first 
study that examines the effect of civil and political liberties on FDI flows at country level 
as well as sectoral level. Finally, this research provides the first Meta analysis of the 
literature that has considered the effect of civil and political liberties, institutional quality 
and democracy on FDI flows, which on its own, contributes significantly to the general 
knowledge in the field.  
Finally, since the literature on the effect of host countries’ level of civil liberties and 
political rights on FDI is still in its infancy, provision of studies such as ours sheds more 
light on the topic and by doing so elevates the level of understanding, and promote further 
considerations and policy related discussions that can potentially provide a basis for 
practical policy decision making in the future. 
1.5. Thesis Overview 
In this section we review the process and structure of this thesis. This study consists of 
two main research blocks: a theory building (theoretical model) component and a theory 
testing (empirical) component. The theory building part of this study entails a review of the 
literature on FDI (chapter 2), a thorough review of the literature on the effect of civil and 
political liberties on FDI accompanied with a Meta analysis of the literature on the subject 
(chapter 3), followed by introduction and discussion of arguments that lead to construction 
of our theoretical model (chapter 4). The theory testing component of our study consists of 
data mining and preparation (chapters 5 and 6) and empirical investigation of theoretical 
findings using regression analysis (chapter 7). A brief review of each of the chapters is 
provided below. 
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Chapter 2 – The literature review of chapter 2 mainly focuses on a broader topic of 
determinants of FDI and provides some information with regard to theories put forward to 
explain FDI activity. Moreover, the VoC framework introduced by Hall and Soskice 
(2001) is reviewed in order to conceptually categorise different types of economies, as well 
as providing a basis for conceptual developments in chapter four. Consequently the 
incorporation of VoC into IB literature allows us to build on the works of Due et al (1991) 
and Gold (1993) and Hall and Soskice (2001), and explore the effect of the differences that 
exist in the way firms in different market economies coordinate their activities, and afford 
us the possibility of explaining the firms coordination of their FDI activity in the light of 
their market structures, and underlying institutional differences that influence their 
behaviour with regard to FDI. 
Chapter 3 - The review of the literature that explores the effects of civil and political 
liberties on FDI. This chapter reveals a gap in our research area and justifies the need to 
create a new theoretical framework/model. Furthermore, a Meta analysis of the literature 
on the effects of civil and political liberties on FDI is conducted in order to investigate 
whether there are specific aspects of the research design that might influence the results of 
this research. 
Chapter 4 – The theoretical model is constructed and sets of comparative hypotheses are 
consequently provided for empirical investigation. This chapter is the theory building 
component of this thesis. 
Chapters 5 and 6 - Outlines the methodology we adopt in order to empirically test 
our theoretical findings. It provides discussions on the philosophical standpoint of the 
thesis and within this context carry on deliberating the methodological perspectives. 
Following the latter we review the sample description, data characteristics, data collection, 
and data manipulation. Subsequently we discuss the methodology of data analysis that 
includes: review of variable based approach; data set and its characteristics; regression 
analysis and discussions on research legitimacy which encompasses a section on the 
limitation of this research. Finally, using ANOVA method we proceed to preliminary 
analysis of data. 
Chapter 7 – Empirically tests the theoretical findings of chapter four by exploring the 
effect of civil and political liberties on aggregated and disaggregated FDI flows, and 
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provides discussions on the findings. Furthermore, the sensitivity analyses of the results are 
conducted by provision of regression analyses over groups of host countries with various 
levels of civil liberties and relevant discussions.  
Chapter 8 – Outlines the key research outcomes and proposes recommendations 
concluded from our study. Furthermore the discussions on the contributions of this 
research to literature and practice, as well as research limitations are provided. 
Subsequently, we provide a number of recommendations for future research on the field.  
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Chapter 2 : Literature Review 
2.1.   Introduction 
This chapter aims to review the International Business (IB) literature on FDI and 
discuss the development, context and coverage of each theory, in order to inform the reader 
of the existing theories on the FDI activity. This is a rather standard task given our 
deductive positivist approach which by tradition emphasises the review of the existing 
theories and literature on a subject in order to inform the researcher of the existing work, 
and hence enable him/her to deduce a set of hypotheses that should be tested. The general 
methodological considerations are covered in chapter six.  
The review of the literature is provided in a chronological manner, in order to follow the 
progression of the literature on the subject. The chronological organization of this chapter 
allows provision of developments made in each decade since the birth of IB theories on 
FDI flows in parallel to the general consensus and developments made in comparative 
capitalism, and institutional and organizational views of social structures, in particular 
firms.  
In particular, this chapter reviews the literature on FDI by focusing on the developments 
made with regard to MNEs’ motivations rather than OLI paradigm of Dunning (1980), and 
by doing so considers the micro drivers of FDI activity, namely the firms’ incentives and 
motivations of FDI introduced by Behrman (1974). The latter is related to the design 
adopted by this research that builds on the Organization Theory of Coase (1937) placing 
firm at the centre of analysis. Moreover, we discuss the Varieties of Capitalism ideas 
mainly developed in political science and political economy arena, in order to familiarise 
the reader with such ideas. This task is mainly motivated by our consideration of VoC 
framework in relevance with our research question that investigates the effect of the level 
of civil and political liberties (rights) on the FDI activity. In particular, the varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) framework introduced by Hall and Soskice (2001) is reviewed in order 
to conceptually categorise different types of economies, as well as providing a basis for 
conceptual developments in chapter four. The firms’ motivations of FDI introduced by 
Behrman (1974) and affiliation of firms to a particular type of market economy following 
VoC framework, are later on used for provision of the theoretical model of chapter 4 that 
assumes a transaction cost type of construct (it only considers the monetary drivers of FDI 
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activity and shies away from non-monetary incentives) in exploring the effect of civil and 
political liberties on FDI. 
The structure of this chapter is follows: in the section 2.2 we review the search strategy 
that is considered for provision of the material for the literature review. Sections 2.3, and 
2.4 review the IB theories on FDI activity, from their early origins prior to and in 1960s 
and early1970s, and further developments made in IB theory in explaining the FDI activity 
during 1970s-1980s and the taxonomy of firms’ motivations from FDI activity provided by 
Behrman (1974). Since this research mainly builds on the firms motivations of FDI, 
Behrman’s taxonomy of firms’ motivations is discussed in length in order to inform 
subsequent developments made in future chapters. Section 2.5 reviews the developments 
made in IB theory in explaining the FDI activity in 1980s and 1990s, in particular it 
reviews the OLI paradigm of Dunning. Subsequently, in section 2.6, the IB literature on 
FDI in post 2000s era is reviewed. However, it is worthy to note that our research mainly 
builds on firms’ motivations to investigate FDI activity. Consequently, we shy away from 
provision of lengthy reviews of the recent developments made in OLI paradigm and keep 
the discussions fairly brief. In turn the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) framework provided 
by Hall and Soskice (2001) is reviewed and discussed in section 2.6, allowing us to 
distinguish between the ways firms from Liberal Market Economies (LME) coordinate 
their activities in comparison to their Coordinated Market Economy (CME) counterparts. 
Section 2.7 incorporates the VoC framework into IB theory by discussing relational view 
of VoC framework and the coordination spheres of firms. The arguments developed in this 
section will be further developed and used in the construction of the theoretical model in 
chapter4, and the empirical analysis of chapter 7, in order to better explain the FDI activity 
of the firms. Finally, section 2.8 provides an overview of the developments discussed, from 
the origins of the literature on FDI flows up to date. 
2.2. Search Strategy 
The process of literature review is a continuous process in provision of current academic 
research. This notion is well represented by the diagram of Booth et al. (1995) provided in 
the figure below:  
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Figure 2-1: A Flow Diagram of a Literature Review – Source: Booth et al. (2005) 
 
The main goal of the literature review of this section is to; First, identify and review the 
existing theories on determinants of FDI; second, investigate the strands of literature on 
factors affecting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); third, to find the existing gaps in the 
literature on FDI and MNEs motives, behaviour and factors affecting them. The literature 
sources available can be divided into three main categories. First, is the primary sources 
which are rich in terms of detail but hard to collect (the examples of the latter are; reports, 
conference reports, company reports and etc.). Second, the secondary sources that in 
general aim at a wider audience than primary sources, and are easier to collect and better 
covered by tertiary literature. Finally, the tertiary literature sources that according to 
Saunders (2003, p.51) are “designed either to help to locate primary and secondary 
literature or to introduce a topic”. Saunders (2003, p.55) recommends that before 
commencing the literature review, researcher should undertake three main elements, 
namely; defining research parameters, generating search words and finally, discussing the 
ideas as widely as possible.  
In defining the parameters of a research the following elements are of importance; 
language of publication, subject area, business sector, geographical area, publication period 
and literature type. (Bell, 1999) 
 In this thesis, the language of the research is the English language; the subject area is 
the determinants of FDI decision, motives, and behaviour and FDI movements as a result 
of them. The sectors taken into account are all sectors. The geographical area is all areas. 
The publication period is from 1970 to 2013. Literature is mainly extracted from secondary 
sources, namely; Academic journals, books, conference papers. However, this thesis 
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considers briefly the primary sources by reviewing some unpublished papers in order to 
provide a greater scope of the standing literature on the subject. Finally, a number of 
tertiary sources are used that are cited accordingly. 
Moreover, this chapter reviews the established theories of FDI in IB literature, 
Organization theories and VoC theories. The process of data collection is conducted in four 
main steps: First, the primary sources of data reviewed are the two main reference books of 
Dunning and Lundan (2008) on theories of FDI, and Hall and Soskice (2001) on Varieties 
of Capitalism. Second, in order to expand on the existing literature reviewed in the core 
text books, the relevant studies mentioned in the text are collected and reviewed. Third, in 
order to enrich the review of the literature a snow ball sampling method is adopted using 
the core text books and relevant studies mentioned therein in identification and collection 
of relevant literature. Fourth, a further search is conducted by searching the ECONLIT, 
NBER, REPEC, ECON PAPERS and JSTOR databases, on the Internet using keywords 
such as “FDI and civil liberties”, “FDI and political liberties”, “FDI and democracy”, “FDI 
and institutions” and “FDI”, and through review papers on determinants of FDI. The 
selection of these databases for extraction of the articles is mainly driven by the fact that 
they tend to provide the most extensive set of articles, with some concentrating more on 
the printed papers (i.e. JSTOR) and others more focused on the provision of working 
papers and white papers (i.e. REPEC, EconLit). Out of the thousands of articles briefly 
reviewed, the overall number of papers extracted for the analysis at the first stage was 
about 239 papers. The search criteria adopted in the fourth step takes into account the 
following criteria in filtering the relevant literature to our research question; (1) Dependent 
variable of the papers is FDI. (2) Papers have considered one or multiple of the factors 
(institutional, political, and civil) in their analysis either exclusively or inclusively. (3) 
Papers examine the effect of one of the factors (Institutional, Political, Civil Liberties) on 
FDI.  
After explaining the research criteria, research parameters and the data collection 
method applied for provision of the sample, in the next section, we start the chronological 
review of the literature.   
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2.3. Overview of the developments made in 1960s and early 1970s 
Prior to 1960s there was no established theory of MNE or of FDI (Dunning and Lundan 
2008). However a number of scholars explored the different aspects of MNEs’ activities. 
For instance investigating capital movements, scholars such as Iversen (1935) put forward 
theories of portfolio capital movements, others including Southard (1931), Marshall et al. 
(1936), Barlow (1953), and Dunning (1958) explored the effect of country specific 
influences on the location of FDI, a third group of scholars including Lund (1944) 
considered the internationalisation and capital movements in the light of firms’ 
competences, and finally authors such as Plummer (1934), Penrose (1956), and Bye (1958) 
explored the internalisation processes of vertical and horizontal activities undertaken by 
firms, as well as neoclassical theories of trade. 
During and post 1960s, the emergence of the capital flows between the post-World War 
II developed countries, underlined the importance of theories that could explain the 
motivations, and reasons behind international production of many corporations 
(enterprises). The earliest theories on the subject putting forward some explanations in this 
regard, often came short of explaining the cross investments in the same sectors by/from 
countries that were at different stages of development, as well as cross investments 
between similar developed countries9.  Amongst these works is the work of Bain (1956) 
who explained the competitive structure and ownership of a variety of U.S. industrial 
sectors according to market imperfections (a number of factors namely; entry barriers, 
proprietary rights, scale economies, privileged access to markets and absolute costs10) that 
provided firms in certain industrial sectors with competitive advantages. Other scholars 
such as Hymer and Vernon developed theories based on firm specific assets and ownership 
advantages, and developed models such as product life cycle to explain this phenomenon11.  
Moreover, considering the organization theory of the firm, in 1960s and early 1970s IB 
literature generally adopted the neoclassical economics with the neoclassical definition of 
the firm provided by Yarborough and Yarborough (1988) as “a unitary profit-maximising 
entity defined by a technologically determined production function” (p.2). This view 
focuses on two main points: the quasi-contractual arrangements claimed to rationalise the 
                                                          
9 developed countries with the similar level of development 
10Oxford Hand Book of International Business (2001, Chapter2, p.38) 
11 Firms investing abroad in a manner that had not been observed before 
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existence and operation of the firm, and the separation of ownership and pursuit of 
alternative ‘realistic’ goals, referred to as ‘managerial theories of the firm’. Thus the 
general neo classical approach of the IB literature during 1960s and early 1970s, considers 
firms, as profit maximizing entities and place them as the main building block of the 
economy, aspired by the works on neoclassical theory of the firm and modern organization 
view put forward by Coase (1937), Hayek (1945), and Arrow (1969). The early European 
researches on FDI from Dunning (1958), and those of American business schools, assume 
firms as the profit or asset growth maximising entities and the institutional component of 
managerial decision making, and motivations and behavioural issues, are rather omitted 
from the most scholarly works including the Vernon’s (1966) product life cycle model 
(with the exception of Aharoni (1966) with brief behavioural considerations). In 1970s, 
when the focal of attention was deviated more towards MNEs, a number of scholars [i.e. 
Behrman (1974), Buckley and Casson (1976), Johanson and Vahlne (1977)] adopted 
organization perspectives in their scholarly works on the subject, however in this period 
the behavioural component of the entities were the subject of attention and the term 
‘institutions’ was not explicitly used, and certainly not developed to great length that is has 
to this date. The overview of the developments made in 1960s-1970s in IB literature, 
comparative capitalism and organization theory were discussed above. The following 
section reviews the earliest IB theories on FDI.  
2.3.1. Theories of FDI (1960-70s) 
As discussed in previous chapter, two influential theories of FDI were developed by 
Hymer and Vernon in 1960s and early 1970s with the intention to explain why firms invest 
abroad. In this subsection, these theories are reviewed and their contribution to the FDI 
literature is discussed. 
2.3.1. A. Hymer (1960/1976) & Market Power Approach  
Hymer a PhD student at MIT in 1960 under the supervision of Kindelberger was 
searching for an explanation for the engagement of the enterprises (corporations) in 
international production (going overseas). Building on the theory of the firm, Hymer 
argued that firms at their early stages grow (as firm’s market power, profits, and 
concentration increases) in size as well as complexity within their national boundaries, and 
that this growth continues up to the point where the concentration of a number of firms 
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within the national boundaries results in an environment where firms have no possibility 
of, or gain no profitability from, increasing the concentration within their national 
boundaries. It is at this stage that firms become interested in investing abroad as a way of 
extending their operations, markets and networks. 
In his view FDI was undertaken not as a result of the difference in interest rates in 
foreign markets relative to the home market, but rather, in order to finance the international 
operations of the firms. Therefore he considered that in order to explain FDI, it was 
essential to understand the reasons why the firms found it “profitable” to control other 
firms/assets across border in coordinating their international operations. Consequently, he 
argued that in order to explain FDI, it is necessary to explain the international operation of 
the firms rather than other aspects of MNEs i.e. the growth of MNEs. In terms of the costs 
of international operations of the national firms, he considered two types of costs: first, the 
fixed costs (i.e. different language, market, political and economic environment, etc.) and 
second, recurring costs (i.e. exchange rate risks, discrimination by governments, 
consumers, etc.). Given the higher costs of operating abroad, he argued that the firms 
undertake FDI to operate in foreign markets for two main reasons: first, removal of 
conflict, and second, possession of advantages. On the latter (possession of advantages), 
Hymer, being influenced by the ideas of Bain (1956), he noted that firms have different 
types of advantages, that they might use in order to operate internationally, however, he 
does not specifically focus on the types of advantageous.  
In contrast to his earlier work (Hymer 1968), Hymer (1972) adopts a different approach 
in explaining international production by adopting the Coase’s theory of firm, and explores 
mainly the boundaries of the firm, rather than the organization of the MNE and the 
organizational aspect of MNE as a distinctive organization form (Yamin and Forsgren 
2006, pp.168). Coase (1937) introduced firm as the building block of analysis which has 
been a popular organizational view adopted by many studies throughout the years. Hymer 
(1972) basing his arguments mainly on the view point previously developed by Coase 
(1937), explores the reasons why firms engage in vertical expansion and integration 
(vertical and horizontal integration of firms) and acknowledges that MNEs’ activities 
might lead into a better allocation of resources in an international level, by circumventing 
market failures. However he pays little attention to the strategic and managerial related 
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issues.12 The latter did contribute immensely to the internationalisation theories which 
were developed in next decades.  
In general Hymer’s work for the most part (Hymer 1968; Hymer 1972) focuses on 
Multinational corporation (MNE) as an institution that engages into international 
production rather than engaging mainly in international exchange, by doing so he 
constructs his arguments in a way that allows him to explore MNEs’ behaviour, based on 
their industrial organization (in the context of industrial organization theory) and ask 
questions regarding “how can a foreign company compete successfully in an unfamiliar 
market, where it must be at disadvantage compared to local firms”. In order to answer the 
latter he argues that “for firms to own and control foreign value-adding activities, they 
must possess some kind of innovatory, cost, financial or marketing advantages- specific to 
their ownership – which is sufficient to outweigh the disadvantages they face in competing 
with indigenous firms in the country of production”. (Dunning and Lundan, 2008, p.84)  
The works of Hymer (1960; 1968; 1970; 1972; 1976) on the explanations of the foreign 
value added activities of firms using the theory of indirect capital provided four main 
contributions for the literature on FDI. These contributions are: first, FDI is a result of 
market imperfections. Therefor, the explanations provided on FDI activity based on the 
predictions of classical portfolio theory incorporating factors such as risk, uncertainty, 
exchange rate volatility, transaction costs and the costs related to obtaining information, 
became generally invalid. Second, was that FDI involves the transfer of more than funds 
(finance capital) as the portfolio theories of Iverson (1935) subscribed it to. He argued that 
FDI involves the transfer of not only monetary resources, but also the managerial skills and 
human capital, entrepreneurship, technology and in a sense a package of resources. The 
third contribution of Hymer’s work, is the way the ‘international firm’ is viewed as the 
firm that ‘internalises or supersedes the market’ boundaries. “The latter provided a useful 
prologue to the theory of internationalization as a means for transferring knowledge, 
business techniques and skilled personnel”. (Dunning and Lundan 2008, pp.82-84)  
The fourth contribution of Hymer’s work13 is the introduction of the concept of firm 
specific assets. Hymer noted that firms’ international operations in foreign countries are 
expensive for the MNE relative to costs local firms bear in coordinating their activities due 
                                                          
12 Oxford Hand Book of International Business (2001, Chapter2, p.38) 
13 1960s dissertation published in 1976 
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to the existence of market imperfections and added costs of coordinating their activities 
abroad as a result of barriers to language, culture, higher costs of communication and 
governance, etc.). He demonstrated that the firms have to possess certain propriety 
advantages that help them to compensate for the disadvantages that they face in foreign 
markets.14 In other words MNEs need to possess inherent advantages in order to be able to 
compete in host markets whilst bearing higher costs relative to the local firms. Noting the 
importance of firm specific assets for MNEs, he introduced and emphasised on the 
Ownership advantages of MNEs.  
Kindelberger (1969) interpreted the Hymer’s explanation of international operations 
which was more based on the theory of the firm, in an industrial organization theoretical 
context in which the MNE was viewed as a result of the monopolistic competition in 
differentiated products in contrast to the more theory of the firm view of the MNE, which 
viewed it as an agent involved in oligopolistic interaction with other firms. A number of 
works by Hymer (1976), Kindelberger (1969) and Caves (1971) have used the market 
imperfections in explaining the international production activities of the firms. 
2.3.2. B. Vernon (1966) & PCM   
Vernon (1966) building on the works of Linder (1961) and Posner (1961) introduced the 
Product Life Cycle Model (PCM)15 in order to explain foreign activities of US MNEs16 
after the Second World War, by proposing that apart from the human resources and natural 
endowments, a country’s propensity to engage in trade is mainly depending upon its firms’ 
capability in upgrading these assets as well as provision of the new ones (mainly 
technological capacity). Vernon’s (1966) main idea is as follows: in the first stage the 
products are produced for domestic consumption in the proximity to the innovatory 
activities and markets. At a second stage in product life cycle when the combination of the 
innovation and production advantages of the U.S. firm is favourable, the firm starts to 
export to other countries. In the third stage of product life cycle, the product matures and 
its competitive advantages which were once of uniqueness and innovation, change into 
minimisation of the costs of value adding activities as well as their marketing expertise. At 
this stage due to the higher pressure on the firm to compete with its imitators, the increases 
                                                          
14 Kotha, S., Rindova, V.P. and Rothaermel, F.T. (2001)  
15 a microeconomic concept 
16 a concept that has a macroeconomic nature 
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in price elasticity, and increase in the cost of labour results in choosing a location for 
production or value added activities across borders, rather than domestic. Thus, Vernon 
(1966) argues that “if the conditions in the host country were ‘right’, the affiliate might 
replace exports from the parent company or even export back to it.” (Dunning and Lundan, 
2008, p.85) 
The setting developed by Vernon (1966) has the firm as the unit of analysis and 
explains the foreign production using an extension of neo-classical theory of spatial 
distribution of factor endowment with intermediate products. However Vernon (1966) 
assumes the factor endowments as country specific, and therefore does not considers other 
factors that might be benefiting firms such as the ones suggested by internationalisation 
theory. Therefore the product life cycle model introduced by Vernon (1966) refers to 
efficiency seeking production of the firms, where the firms are benefiting from certain 
ownership advantages17. 
The efficiency seeking activities of firms are a product of the Efficiency Seeking (ES)18 
motivations of firms. These motives as Dunning and Lundan (2008, p.78) describe are to 
“rationalise the structure of established resource based or market seeking investment in 
such a way that the investing company can gain from the common governance of 
geographically dispersed activities”. Therefore based on Vernon (1966) it is possible to 
view the relocation of the firms into foreign markets which is mainly with the main 
objective of sharpening the cost efficiency of the operations, a result of the ES motivations 
of the firm that result in turn to ES FDI. Therefore firms undertake such investments (and 
as a result become MNEs) in order to enhance/defend their competitiveness in (usually 
higher-income) markets where they are already well established [Dunning (1993), Hood 
and Young, (1979), Caves (1971)]. Vernon (1966) considers such strategies to be 
considered at later stages of the product life cycle, when the product matures and its 
competitive advantages which were once of uniqueness and innovation, change into 
minimisation of the costs of value adding activities as well as their marketing expertise, 
therefore, the firm would have undergone through the two first stages of innovation and 
production for domestic market, and exports to foreign markets. As Vernon (1966) and 
later on Dunning and Lundan (2008) note firms that undertake ES FDI are usually 
                                                          
17 Ownership advantages in the view of Vernon (1966) are country specific and therefore, in this case for the U.S. firms, 
this could be interpreted as a certain combination of innovation and production advantages enjoyed by these firms. 
18 ES states that production of specific existing goods is relocated to a particular country with the main objective of 
sharpening the cost-efficiency of operations. 
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experienced, diversified and large firms that have undertaken other forms of FDI such as 
Resource based and market seeking FDI, and are at a certain stage where they have 
become sufficiently large, and therefore undertake ES FDI in order to sustain their 
activities in a competitive manner.  
Efficiency Seeking FDI is mainly undertaken by firms either in order to take advantage 
of differences between the availability and relative cost of traditional factor endowments in 
different countries19, or is in order to take advantage of economies of scale and differences 
in consumer tastes and supply capabilities. The former is the case where the MNE operates 
both in developed and developing countries, while the latter is the case where the MNE is 
operating in countries with similar economic structure and income levels. In this type of 
ES FDI, competencies and capabilities of the MNE, incentive structures and availability 
and quality of supporting institutions, characteristics of local competition and the nature of 
consumer demand as well as macro and micro policies of the governments are of greater 
weight in influencing the decision of MNEs, in contrast to the less significant factors such 
as factor endowment. 
Vernon similar to Hymer explores the foreign activities of U.S. firms. However, in 
contrast to Hymer is more trade and macro oriented. He emphasises on country specific 
factors. In fact he argues that the advantages of the U.S. firm relative to their rivals are the 
country’s (United States’) factor endowment, market structure and patterns of demand, and 
relates these country specific factors to both the origin of the competitive advantage of the 
firms and the location of their value added activities. Therefore Vernon’s analytical 
framework shies away from three main factors: first, he pays minor attention to the 
“organizational structure of firms”20; second he only considers the case where firms engage 
into FDI as a mean to access the means of production in a pro-active manner and shies 
away from other types of FDI production such as licensing; third, he does not consider the 
implications or gains that result from the organizational form of the firm as MNE. In 
contrast Vernon (1983) considers the organization institutional risks as one of the factors 
influencing outward FDI of the firms.21  
                                                          
19 The example of the latter is the type of MNEs that conducts its production in both developed and developing countries, 
where it concentrates its capital intensive, technology and information intensive value added activities in developed 
country and the labour and natural resource intensive activity in the developing country. 
20 Oxford Hand Book of International Business (2001, Chapter2, p.38) 
21 Oxford Hand Book of International Business (2001, Chapter2, p.38) 
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Therefore in comparison, Hymer adopts a micro view to analyse a macro phenomenon, 
considering firm as the unit of analysis, and arguing that the ownership advantages of the 
firms are the drivers of the firm in its investment abroad. He considers the issues of control 
and ownership visibly in his analysis. Vernon, adopts a more macro view and considers the 
country specific factors as the comparative advantage of a firm relative to its counterpart in 
other countries, and considering the case of United States post WWII, discusses that firms 
in U.S. start with a comparative advantage but in time as the product matures this 
advantage erodes as a result of imitators and therefore firms have to relocate abroad to 
maintain the competitive advantage (take advantage of cheaper labour and higher 
volumes). Thus, he refers to efficiency seeking motives of the multinational firms.  
Our research similar to Hymer’s, adopts a micro view and places firm at the centre of 
analysis and explores the effect of civil and political liberties on FDI activity by 
considering the micro drivers (firms’ incentives and motives) that inform firms’ FDI 
activity. In contrast to the work of Hymer, however, our study does not emphasis on the 
ownership advantageous and instead considers the motivations of the firm as the drivers of 
their FDI activity. Amongst these motivations we consider the efficiency seeking motives 
introduced by Vernon, and consider the firms to be profit maximising entities that are 
sensitive to costs, and view the effect of civil and political liberties on FDI activity of the 
firms mainly thorough a transaction cost view. In particular in our theoretical model the ES 
motives are modelled through cost of production (mainly wages). In our empirical model 
the ES motives are similarly accounted for by provision of wages per hour and employee 
compensation indices that reflect the cost of production in a host country. 
2.4. Overview of the developments made in 1970s to the early 1980s  
In 1970s and early 1980s, the concept of market failures seemed to be exhausted in an 
economic sense as the idea put forward by Coase (1936) had been well extended and the 
works of scholars such as Williamson (1976) were interpreting such concepts in the 
behavioural context.  
Since early 1960s the works of a number of heretic economists such as Simon (1959), 
Cyert and March (1963) and other behaviouralists who were questioning the main 
assumptions of neo-classical economics were at one extreme, and the works of more 
conventional economists who were trying to internalize the criticism of these heretics into 
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the traditional structure of the neo-classical economics were at the other extreme. A 
number of economists of this area, including Alchian and Demsetz (1972); and Williamson 
(1973, 1976) diverted from these extremes and either focused on industrial organization 
tradition, others including Akerlof (1970), Spence (1976) explored of the realm of 
information and uncertainty, or similar to Furbotn and Pejovich (1972) explored the 
institutional structures and property rights. The general aspect of the works of these 
scholars is internalization of the market activities, and their emphasis on the role of 
‘institutions’. 
Due to such contributions in terms of the way firms and markets were perceived, in the 
context of organization theory and transaction costs economics as well as neo-classical 
economy as a whole, the institutional view of the firm as MNE became increasingly 
popular. In contrast to the view that emphasises on the ownership aspect of the firms, 
which views MNEs as firms who own foreign production facilities that are used and 
controlled in producing internationally, and considers their role as one of the ‘producers’, 
the institutional view of the firm as MNE which was adopted by McManus (1972), 
Buckley and Casson (1976), Hennart (1977, 1982), and Swedenborg (1979), considers 
MNEs as an institutions that coordinate the use of intermediate assets produced in one or 
several foreign locations and therefore view the MNEs’ role as one of ‘transactors’,  
These developments therefore led to the view of MNEs as transactors in comparison to 
producers, and the adoption of the neo-corporatism view of comparative capitalism which 
viewed the capacity of the states in the light of their capability in negotiating durable 
bargains with employers and trade unions, on wages, working conditions, and other social 
and economic policies, raised two main questions: first, what is the process through which 
firms internationalize their activities; and the second, why do firms invest abroad rather 
than engaging in the contractual transactions or arms’ length . The exploration of the first 
question led to development of  Uppsala School of thought that mainly focus on the 
processes through which the firms internationalize their activities, by Johanson and Vahlne 
(1977), and Luostarinen (1979) of Helsinki School of Economics and the introduction of 
market seeking activities. The exploration of the second question led to emergence of the 
internationalization theory and consequently internationalization advantageous, that were 
introduced by Buckley and Casson (1976) and further developed in the works of Nelson 
and Winter (1982), Kogut and Zander (1993), and Dunning (2000), building on the 
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previous works of Penrose’s (1958), Bye (1958) and later on Hymer (1968)22. The next 
section reviews the main IB theories that were developed in 1970-80s, namely the Uppsala 
School of thought and internationalization theory.  
2.4.1. Theories of FDI (1970-80s) 
This section reviews the theories developed by Uppsala School of taught developed by 
Johanson and Vahlne (1977), and Luostarinen (1979) of Helsinki School of Economics and 
the introduction of market seeking activities, and Buckley and Casson (1976) and others 
who worked on internationalization theory and Internationalization (I) advantages. 
Moreover, since this research build on the work of Coase (1937), we place the firm at the 
centre of our analyses and attempt to explain the FDI activity through exploration of the 
firms’ motivations of FDI as well as other factors. Consequently, we introduce the 
taxonomy of firms’ motivations of FDI introduced by Behrman (1974), at the end of this 
section. 
2.4.1. A. Uppsala school of thought 
During the 1970s and 1980s, a more international business oriented group of scholars 
viewed the firms undertaking FDI, as the institutions investing abroad and explored the 
reasons of such value added activities undertaken by these institutions and shifted away 
from the earlier views of FDI. Two main strands of literature are developed in this era. 
First is of the Scandinavian Researchers known as the Uppsala school of thought mainly 
developed by Johanson and Vahlne (1977), and Luostarinen (1979) of Helsinki School of 
Economics. This group of researchers mainly focus on the processes through which the 
firms internationalized their activities, by adopting a sequential approach through which 
the firms learn about the foreign markets (their market structure, supply and demand 
behaviour, etc.) and commit to them by investing in those markets. The main idea of 
Uppsala school of thought is that the firms first enter the foreign markets which they are 
familiar with (though exporting to these foreign markets or investing in them); second, 
capitalize on their knowledge of the foreign markets gained from the learning process that 
occurs through exporting to/or investing in the foreign markets; and third, move onto other 
unknown territories. Therefore the Uppsala school of thought mainly explores the market 
                                                          
22 Hymer (1968) in Casson (1990) 
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seeking activities of the MNEs and provides a number of models of entry into foreign 
markets. 
Uppsala model contributes to the literature by underlying the role of the level of 
knowledge and learning capacity that exists within firms in their behaviour and decisions 
on investment abroad. It considers that firms commit to the market by investing in them 
rather than other types of investment such as investing as means of diversification of the 
portfolio. It provides an incremental exploration in the analysis of FDI and considers the 
market characteristics in the heart of analysis. However, it can be argued that it has the 
following short comings: first, considers the small firms and countries, i.e. Sweden; 
second, focuses mainly on the businesses rather than direct investment; third, does not 
consider the factors such as risk, and distance; finally it does not provide any 
considerations on the firm’s first step abroad nor provides extended discussions on 
opportunity seeking behaviour or development of the firms.  
Another significant contribution of the Uppsala model remains the introduction and 
exploration of the Market Seeking (MS) activities of MNE. The MS motives of the MNEs 
refer to the motives that lead to undertaking MS FDI and activities by MNEs. It is possible 
to categorise such motives into seven categories; first is that of market size; second is the 
market growth; third is the case when the suppliers of customers of a firm establish foreign 
production facilities and the firm follows them into those markets in order to retain their 
business; fourth is increasing the exposure to the foreign market in order to provide more 
frequently adapted, and better products and services, more adequate for the tastes and 
needs of the host market; fifth is the increase in the exposure to the foreign market in order 
to learn about the foreign market, and therefore through the learning process decrease the 
disadvantages that the firm has relative to its domestic counterparts in the host market; 
sixth is that producing from a plant adjacent to the consumer market is far less costly than 
supplying it from a distance. Although the latter is very product/service, and country 
specific, for the types of goods and services that are highly costly to be transported to the 
target markets, there is a higher probability of MS FDI for the enterprise than others; 
Finally, MNEs as a part of their global production and marketing consider it necessary to 
have a physical presence in the leading markets served by their competitors and hence 
view MS FDI as a strategic activity through which they maintain their global market 
position relative to their competitors. Although the strategic element of competition is of 
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immense importance to the MS motivations of FDI, however it is possible to regard the 
actions of host governments as one of the most important reasons of MS FDI. Behrman 
(1974) includes MS motives into taxonomy of firms’ motivations of FDI. In this research 
as discussed before we mainly emphasise on the motivations of FDI rather than 
Ownership, Location and Internationalization advantageous that later on were incorporated 
into Dunning’s OLI paradigm. Consequently we have provided a detailed discussion of 
MS motives, and MS FDI in section 2.4.2. 
Before proceeding to the pioneers of internationalization theory, Buckley and Casson 
(1976), perhaps it is beneficial to organize the main advances that provided new platforms 
upon which many scholars based on their main assumptions. The first in the twentieth 
century would be Coase (1937) who contributed to the literature in two ways: first, was his 
view of the firm as the unit of analysis in organizational theory context; second was his 
criticisms of neo-classical theory based on market imperfections that later on influenced 
the works of Hymer and others. This line of thought led to literature that mainly considered 
the market imperfections and their influences on the way firms behave.  
The second influential progress was the consideration of the international operations of 
the firms by Hymer. Hymer (1960) using the market imperfections, and the firm as the unit 
of, following Coase (1937) and Bain (1956), explained the competitive structure and 
ownership of a variety of U.S. industrial sectors according to market imperfections. This 
line of thought led to the literature that mainly considered the international operations of 
the firms. Finally the third influential progress is the internationalization theory put 
forward by the Buckley and Casson (1976), which will be discussed in the next section. 
2.4.2. B. Internalisation Theory - An introduction to firm and industry level 
analysis 
The second strand of literature developed in this era, 1970s-80s, was the one proposed 
by international economists23. The works in this strand of literature mainly explore the 
reasons why the firms invest abroad rather than engaging in the contractual transactions or 
arms’ length. The idea put forward by the internationalization economists such as Buckley 
and Casson (1976), Nelson and Winter (1982), Kogut and Zander (1993), and Dunning 
                                                          
23 These authors were mainly from Canada, Sweden, UK, and US. 
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(2000) was mainly developed from the earlier works of the Penrose (1956), Bye (1958) 
and later on Hymer (1968)24.  
Buckley and Casson (1976) were the first of the international economists who 
introduced the transaction costs into international operations of the firms, and argued that 
MNEs coordinate their activities in the way that helps them to develop and exploit firm 
specific advantages in intermediate products as well as knowledge. Taking advantage of 
the arguments on ownership, they extend the latter by demonstrating that under the 
propriety ownership, knowledge is no longer a public good, as it is costly to obtain it, and 
thus the ownership of knowledge serves as ownership of a firm specific asset that can be 
developed and exploited. In presence of market failures, firms internationalize their 
activities in order to gain, develop and exploit firm specific assets (i.e. knowledge), as an 
alternative to obtaining them indirectly from the external markets. 
The main idea of international economists is that the investment activity undertaken by 
the firms is a function of their comparative cost benefit analysis of organization of the 
transactions of their intermediate services and goods in their home market relative to the 
foreign markets. The main difference between this idea and the one put forward by Hymer 
is that internationalization economists assume firm specific assets as exogenous. The origin 
of such arguments could be traced to the failure of arm’s length transactions in that they 
either were not providing firms with benefits or did not do so as efficient as the firms could 
do, and hence referring to Internationalization (I) advantages of firms as MNEs. The 
internationalization advantages are reviewed in section 2.6.1, as one of the pillars of the 
OLI paradigm introduced by Dunning (1980). 
One of the contributions of the work of Buckley and Casson (1976) is that they consider 
the industry-level, and firm level analysis, as well as the mostly covered country specific 
analysis, and thereby shifted the focus of the International Business (IB) literature to firm 
and industry level analysis. Their novel theory is developed on three main assumptions: 
first, firms are profit maximising entities in imperfect markets; second, the imperfection of 
the markets of intermediate products and knowledge, provides motivations and incentives 
for the firms to bypass them by internalizing markets which in turn means creating 
common ownership and governance structure for firms in markets in order to coordinate 
                                                          
24 Hymer (1968) in Casson (1990) 
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their activities; third,  “internationalization of markets across national boundaries generates 
MNEs”. (Buckley and Casson, 1967, pp.33) 
In spite of the fact that Buckley and Casson (1976) introduce the transaction cost to the 
international operation of the MNEs, their internationalization theory is not based on the 
transaction cost economics of Williamson (1975). Instead their work mainly builds on the 
firm specific assets concept introduced by Hymer (1960, 1976) as they argue that the 
capacity of the firm to innovate (ability to innovate) is the main firm specific advantage of 
the firm that leads to internationalization. In more general terms, they argue that the firms 
with high capacity for innovation (firm specific asset) have a higher propensity to 
internationalize as they have the ability to develop and exploit their firm specific assets in 
order to overcome the disadvantages they face in foreign markets. Subsequent research 
including the works of (Buckley and Casson (1976; 1998), Dunning (1977), Hennart 
(1982), Zaheer (1995), Caves (1996), Dunbar and Kotha (2000) has focused on identifying 
those sources of advantage that compensate for the “liability of foreignness”.  
Whilst our research design mainly develops on the motivations of FDI, rather than 
Ownership, Location and Internationalization advantageous, our study is considerably 
influenced by international economists such as Buckley and Casson (1976), in that they are 
the first to consider the industry-level, and firm level analysis, as well as the mostly 
covered country specific analysis, and thereby shifted the focus of the International 
Business (IB) literature to firm and industry level analysis. This research similarly 
considers the industry and sectoral level of analysis, as well as country specific analysis in 
order to explore the FDI activity of the firms (a macro concept) through the micro drivers 
of firms’ coordination of their FDI activities. Furthermore, our set of assumptions to some 
extent are inspired by the authors’ work, in that we also assume firms to be profit 
maximising entities functioning in imperfect markets, where the imperfection of the 
markets of intermediate products and knowledge, provides motivations and incentives for 
the firms to bypass them by internal markets which in turn means creating common 
ownership and governance structure for the firm in markets in order to coordinate its 
activities. Finally, our research has a number of fundamental similarities with 
Internationalization theory of Buckley and Casson (1976), in that while we adopt a 
transaction cost view to explain the international operation of the MNEs. However, in 
contrast, our main set of arguments throughout the thesis are not chiefly based on the 
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transaction cost economics of Williamson (1975), and rather rely on the works of Hymer, 
as we develop on the firm specific assets concept of Hymer.  
The next sub-section introduces the taxonomy of firms’ FDI motivations provided by 
Behrman (1974). This research building on the works of Coase (1937) considers the 
motivations of firms’ FDI to act as micro drivers that influence firms’ FDI behaviour, and 
consequently the macro FDI activity. 
2.4.2. FDI Motivations  
In this subsection we discuss the motivations of FDI activity drawn from the works of 
Jack Behrman (1972) and Dunning and Lundan (2008). The general taxonomy of the 
motivation of FDI is as follows: Resource Seeking motives (RS); Market Seeking Motives 
(MS); Efficiency Seeking Motives (ES); and finally Strategic Asset Seeking Motives 
(SAS). As discussed in the previous section, the motivations of firms from their investment 
abroad are drawn from the earlier works reviewed in the previous sections namely the 
work of Uppsala School of Thought on Market Seeking motives, work of 
Internationalisation theorists such as Buckley and Casson (1981) on strategic asset seeking 
motives, and Vernon’s (1966) efficiency seeking concept that was further developed by 
Williamson (1973, 1976).  
2.4.2. A. Resource Seeking (RS) Motives and Resource seeking FDI 
Firms’ with resource seeking motives are classified as resource seeking firms or 
resource seekers. These firms broadly speaking invest abroad to obtain specific resources 
of higher quality at a lower price or cost in comparison to their home country. Thus their 
motivations inherently follow a profit maximising nature. The acquiring of the resources 
with lower costs also promotes their position in a competitive market with respect to their 
rivals. We25 classify the resource seekers into four main categories. First, are those driven 
by the incentive to minimise their costs and secure their supply through acquiring physical 
resources of a certain type. The physical resources include minerals (fuel minerals as well 
as industrial minerals), agricultural products and metals. Specifically, these resources26 are 
the ones, for whose production demands a particular kind of “complementary capabilities 
                                                          
25 Dunning and Lundan (2008) classify the resource seekers into three main categories. Namely the first three types of 
resource seekers provided in this section. 
26 These resources include: Gas, Coal, Oil (Fossil Fuels), Diamonds, Zinc, Copper, Tobacco, Rubber, Sugar, Pineapples, 
Bananas, Palm Oil, Coffee, Tea.  
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and markets that MNEs are especially well equipped to provide” (Dunning and Lundan 
2008, pp.67-69). In general the resource intensive FDI of this type demands a high level of 
expenditure. The location based and location bound resource seeking also entails FDI in 
service sectors such as construction, education, tourism, and oil drilling. This type of RS 
motives is observable in firms from both developed and developing countries. The 
example of this type of RS investments is the Chinese and Indian firms’ recent investments 
in Africa. (Dunning and Lundan 2008, p.68) 
The second type of RS FDI entails firms that are interested in rich supply of cheap 
labour. Since labour force is one of the factors determining the profitability and cost 
structure of the firms, it naturally follows that firms mainly in manufacturing and service 
sector would be interested in obtaining plentiful unskilled or semi-skilled labour for lower 
cost. The distinction between the levels of skill is made based on the idea that the high 
skilled labour force has the propensity to be more sensitive to wage differentials than their 
low or semi-skilled counterparts. This type of RS motives is observable frequently in the 
firms from more advanced and industrialized countries. The example of this type of labour-
seeking investment is the USA and EU firms’ investment into South East Asian countries 
such as Taiwan, and Malaysia. (Dunning and Lundan 2008, p.69) 
The third type of RS motives includes firms that aim to acquire management expertise, 
organizational skills, or technological capability through collaborative alliances. Example 
of this type of FDI is observable from Korean and Indian firms’ collaborative alliances 
with firms from EU and USA. (Dunning and Lundan 2008, p.69) 
The fourth type of RS motives includes firms that aim to acquire specific type of 
resources that exist only in certain regions. These types of RS motives are not considered 
in the context of this research, since their consideration would be case specific and in 
contrast to the aim of this research. Our empirical model takes into account all three types 
of resource seeking motives by provision of two main models. In our first model we take 
into account the resource seeking motive that is stimulated by abundance of resources and 
labour. However, the cost comparison are not made, due to the fact that RS motives are 
included as explanatory variables that would explain the FDI activity in the way that they 
provide the opportunity for our empirical model to explore the effect of civil and political 
liberties on FDI. Similarly the abundance of human capital (management expertise, 
organizational skills, or technological capability) is explored through consideration of 
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research and development index in the second model, in the presence of the other two RS 
motives’ variables, allowing us to capture RS motives in full extent.  
It is also possible to distinguish between firms who place emphasis a certain type of FDI 
activity. For instance firms that mainly undertake RS activities include those who populate 
the commodity sector, as well as those in manufacturing sector. The contrast would be on 
the type of RS FDI undertaken. Thus a sectoral consideration would possibly provide a 
greater view of the type of activities that firms in the sector undertake, as well as the types 
of FDI that are normally considered in the sectors.  
2.4.2. B. Market Seeking (MS) Motives and Market Seeking FDI 
Firms with MS motives generally invest in a particular country with the intention of 
supplying goods and services to the country itself or its adjacent countries. In most cases 
these regions have been supplied through exports by the firm and the undertaking of FDI is 
mainly to reduce the cost of export, other related costs or in many cases the changes in 
tariffs and import policies of the designated countries. Therefore, since the aim of firms is 
to supply the local or adjacent markets, the market size and the prospects of market growth 
are of importance for firms motivated by MS motives.  Dunning and Lundan (2008, pp.70-
72) classify the MS motives into five subclasses. First, is the type of MS FDI that takes 
place due to changes in the location of firms’ suppliers or buyers. For instance if the buyers 
of a firm set up a foreign production plant,  firm would be interested in following them 
through MS FDI in order to supply the demand of a currently engaged buyer. The example 
of this type of MS motives is the MS FDI of many Japanese auto-component 
manufacturers in U.S. through establishment of subsidiaries or joint ventures with the 
intention of supplying the U.S. auto manufacturers (Dunning and Lundan 2008, p.71).  The 
second type of MS motives that leads to MS FDI is that firms need to adapt their products 
and services frequently in order to meet the local expectations in terms of “cultural mores”, 
“indigenous resources and capabilities” as well as local tastes. Therefore it is imperative 
for firm to familiarise themselves with the language, legal requirements, business customs 
and marketing procedures of the local markets. Otherwise they would be in disadvantage 
vis-à-vis local firms.  
The third type of MS motives that leads to MS FDI is that in many cases where a certain 
government policy in terms of export, import, or trade policy limits the activity of the firms 
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from a certain country, MS FDI is undertaken in order to circumvent such laws and ensure 
the supply of the designated market. The example is that of Canadian Telecom MS FDI 
into U.S. in late 1980s with the intention of securing Japanese contracts in an era where 
Japan due to political reasons favoured U.S. telecommunication industry for its source of 
telecom equipment (Dunning and Lundan 2008, p.73).  
The fourth type of MS motives that leads to MS FDI is that in many cases the 
production and transaction cost of supplying a market through exports are generally higher 
than supplying the market within.27 This type of motivation is highly case specific since 
the production and transaction costs are industry and country specific. In general this type 
of motivation leads to MS FDI in case of the countries that are geographically removed 
from their markets. For instance the MS FDI is commonly used by U.S. firms when 
investing in Germany and rarely undertaken by their French and Dutch counterparts  
(Dunning and Lundan 2008, p.73).  
The fifth type of MS motives is that of a strategic nature; where an MNE undertakes 
MS FDI in order to ensure its presence in markets where its competitors have established 
their physical presence. Many of the “leader and follower”, and “bandwagon” type of 
investments are driven by strategic MS motivations and are implemented through MS FDI. 
Our empirical model only considers the type of ES motives that are stimulated through 
market size (first type of MS motives). Our proxy for market size is Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), which is chiefly considered as a reliable proxy for market size of the host 
countries in the literature. By doing so, we try to avoid multicollinearity between our 
measures, since the other types of MS motives explored above have commonalities with 
other motivations such as ES motives and SAS motives. 
2.4.2. C. Efficiency Seeking (ES) Motives and ES FDI 
The ES motives are those concerning governance structure of the dispersed activities of 
MNEs’ resource based or MS based investments. Firms conduct ES FDI in order to adopt a 
certain coordination structure between their entities via ‘economies of scale’ and ‘risk 
diversification activities’ in order to take advantage of different factor endowments, 
institutional agreements, and demand patterns in a way that leads to higher return on 
investment. There are two main types of ES motives. First, are the ES motives that lead to 
                                                          
27 This type of motives is viewed as MS motives by Dunning and Lundan (2008). 
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ES FDI in countries with similar income levels and in general economic structures with the 
intention to take advantage of ‘economies of scale’. The second type of ES motivations 
leads to ES FDI with the aim of taking advantage of differences in relative cost of 
traditional factors endowments in various countries. For instance an MNE in electronic 
equipment sector would undertake an ES FDI in U.S.A or EU with the aim of production 
of the high tech designs of the product, while it would undertake another ES FDI in India 
or China with the intention of manufacturing the equipment in a much more cost efficient 
manner.  
Furthermore in many cases, the distinction between the motivations is not transparent, 
due to the general taxonomy of motivations provided by Behrman (1974), or in other cases 
due to the fact that firms’ motivations overlap, leaving the determination of the type of 
motives up for interpretation. For instance in the previous section (MS motives) we 
explained the type of MS motives that leads to MS FDI in cases where the production and 
transaction cost of supplying a market through exports are generally higher than supplying 
the market within. This type of motives can easily be interpreted as ES motives, due to the 
fact that the incentive of the firm from their investment is mainly based on their intention 
to reduce their costs in supplying the host country’s market or adjacent markets. Thus it is 
possible to argue that the main intention of the firm from their FDI activity is increasing 
the efficiency of their activities and lowering their costs in supplying foreign market(s), 
and thereby to review these types of motives as ES motives. 
A similar line of reasoning can be applied to the first three types of RS motives 
discussed in section 2.4.2. A, namely: the RS motives that intend to acquire resources at a 
lower cost; RS motives that intend to take advantage of wage differentials and aims at 
acquiring cheap labour; and finally the type of RS motives that aim to acquire management 
expertise, organizational skills, or technological capability through collaborative alliances. 
These types of motives can easily be interpreted as ES motives due to the fact that the main 
incentive of the firm from the investment is lowering their costs by acquiring cheaper 
resources through FDI. Finally, considering the sectoral analysis in our research, it is 
possible to view the firms’ motives in acquiring cheap labour in sectors with high level of 
human capital (i.e. services) and lower level of human capital (i.e. manufacturing), as ES 
motives of the firms, since the main incentive of the firm in these cases is lowering their 
costs through FDI. The latter indicates that provision of a distinction between the firms 
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investment into high knowledge intensive and lower knowledge intensive sectors requires 
further considerations in order to determine the boundary conditions of the wage setting in 
various sectors.  
In our analysis, while allowing for the presence of reservation wage and unemployment 
in the market, we argue that the wage setting process between foreign firm and labour 
representatives in most cases bounded by a range that revolves around the average wage 
paid for labour in certain sector. Furthermore, we consider the effect of repression of 
wages on labour productivity in a conceptual manner, arguing that in sectors in which the 
labour share of production supersedes the capital share of production, and the nature of 
labour contribution to the production is knowledge intensive the ES motives would be 
more in line with lower the cost of production whilst the strategies that are undertaken in 
this regard are more in line with provision of higher wages in comparison to the average 
sectoral wage in the host country in order to ensure higher productivity of labour. In 
contrast we argue that in sectors in which the production is mainly capital intensive and the 
labour contribution to the production is not knowledge intensive (and due to less 
knowledge intensive nature of labourer’s input to production, they are easier to replace), 
the ES incentives generally tend to be followed through strategies that ensure that the cost 
of labour is sufficiently low in comparison to home market and other possible host 
locations in which FDI could take place, in order to provide firm with higher return on 
investment and thus contribute to the firms’ financial competencies in comparison to its 
competitors. 
Moreover, in this study, the variables that are considered to proxy for ES motives 
include employee compensation and wages per hour that ES motives explained above. 
Since our research is founded on a transaction cost premise that explores the effect of civil 
liberties and political rights on FDI through examination of their effect on the wage setting 
process, and taxes, respectively, our theoretical exploration mainly focuses on firms that 
are stimulated by ES motives and considers the distinction between low and high 
knowledge intensive sectors by exploring labour share of production. However, our 
empirical analysis provides a number of explanatory variables that proxy for all motives, 
and by doing so affords us the possibility of exploration of the effect of civil and political 
liberties on FDI in a less restricted manner, by allowing the investigation of the effect of 
civil and political liberties in the presence of explanatory variables that proxy for RS, MS, 
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ES and SAS motives of the firm. The distinction between high and low knowledge 
intensive sectors in our empirical setting is made through provision of a variable that 
indicates the investment in research and development in the host country and thus provides 
the opportunity to provide a cross country comparison between the same sectors in various 
host locations. Therefore, our theoretical model explores the effect of the level of human 
capital on ES FDI through examination of the differences within sectors, whilst our 
empirical model explore the effect of the level of human capital on ES FDI through 
examination across country differences in the same sectors.  
2.4.2. D. Strategic Asset Seeking (SAS) Motives and SAS FDI 
SAS motives are those relating to acquiring assets of foreign entities, with the intention 
of pursuing MNEs’ long-term strategic objectives, specifically objectives that are related to 
issues of sustainability and advancement of MNEs’ competitiveness. Therefore the SAS 
motives are more related to the type of FDI that leads to obtaining firm specific assets that 
lead to a greater competency of the MNE in contrast to its competitors. Therefore the 
motives of SAS FDI are in general in line with strengthening the firms’ competency by 
acquiring firm specific assets in comparison to its competitors, rather than exploiting 
market advantageous of specific costs. Considering the definition and properties of SAS 
motives, their classification is heavily reliant on the Hymer (1960) work on firm specific 
assets, where the firm specific assets are acquired with the intention of ownership specific 
advantageous and/or weakening competitors’ competences. Therefore, in the case of SAS 
FDI, similar to ES FDI, firms tend to aim to take advantage of common ownership of their 
diversified assets, with the distinction that the former tends to follow strategic incentives 
and hence strengthening firms’ competency in comparison to its competitors, while the 
latter mainly focuses on lowering the costs and achieving higher returns on investment, and 
therefore strengthening the financial position of the firm.  
In general the SAS FDI is conducted through mergers, and acquisitions, and joint 
ventures that are aimed to contribute to the core competency of the firm.  In this sense SAS 
FDI is undertaken using one of the three methods just mentioned in order to elevate the 
core competency of the firm in comparison to its rivals. A few examples that indicate the 
dominant strategic incentives of FDI include: first, SAS FDI that is undertaken by firm in 
order to forge a collaborative alliance with another firm, with the intention of diminishing 
the chances of the competitors to do so; Second, SAS FDI that undertaken in the form of 
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merger with a foreign competitor in order to elevate the core competences of both entities 
vis-à-vis more powerful competitors; third, SAS FDI that is undertaken to procure a 
number of suppliers with the intention to corner firms’ competitor; fourth, SAS FDI that is 
undertaken to procure a number of distributions outlets in order to gain a better 
distributional capability in comparison to its rivals; fifth, SAS FDI that is undertaken in 
order to acquire a host market entity in order to be able to obtain government contracts that 
are not accessible to the foreign firms; and six, is the SAS FDI that is undertaken in order 
to procure a firm that produces complementary goods and services with the intention to 
offer its customers a more diversified range of products (Dunning and Lundan 2008, p.73). 
Finally, as discussed earlier in many cases it is difficult to separate between SAS, ES, 
and other types of FDI. In most cases the taxonomy of the motivations provided allows 
interpretation of overlapping motives in various ways. However, empirical IB literature has 
provided a series of explanatory variables that are conceptually related to each of the 
motives discussed. For instance variables such as GDP and GDP per capita have been 
extensively used to indicate the market size and MS motives of FDI. ES motives have been 
mainly represented by labour related variables such as wages, employee compensation, and 
other variables including taxes and cost of export and import. The RS motives have been 
generally represented by variables that indicate the level of resources in a host location, 
which include: estimate of natural resources’ reserves (i.e. crude oil, oil, natural gas, etc.) 
and production of natural resources. Finally, SAS motives have been mainly represented 
by research and development related indices (i.e. expenditure on R&D, number of R&D 
researchers, etc.), high technology exports, export and import platform indicators including 
quality of transport system variables (i.e. air freight transport, rail lines, paved roads, etc.), 
and logistics performance. The discussion on the variable selection will be provided in 
chapter 6.  
2.2.3.4. E. Overview  
The four main types of motivations covered in this section are one of the corner stones 
of our empirical analysis as we consider the MS, RS, ES, and SAS motivations as the 
micro drivers of FDI activity. In post 2000s era, three motivations are added to the 
discussed set of motivations which include: escape investments, support investments, and 
passive investments. These motivations are not discussed due to the fact that our 
theoretical and empirical investigation chiefly builds on the four established motivations 
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provided by Behrman (1974). The next section reviews the developments made in 
literature on FDI, during 1980-1990s.  
2.5. Overview of the developments made in 1980-90s  
During 1980-90s, due to the globalization and technological advances that have 
widened the options for behaviour of firms as well as governments, and the increases in the 
uncertainty complexity and volatility of the environment in which MNEs operate, the 
institutional factors and institutions started to become an integral part of the explanations 
provided for determinants of FDI activity. A number of scholars in this era did incorporate 
the institutional issues in their works, however did not distinctly labelled them as such or 
either have not considered them as the main objective of their research. At national level 
works of a number of scholars including  Eden and Potter (1993) working on the 
international political economy, international relations, and business history have been 
amongst those taking into account the institutional factors. At firm level, works of Kogut 
(1992), Kogut and Zander (1993) and Westney (1993; 2001) on the role of culture, and 
sociological analysis of culturally related patterns have helped to introduce the institutional 
considerations into mainstream theorizing28. 
Moreover, in this era  a number of approaches were incorporated by Dunning (1980, 
1981) into a holistic approach that embodies all the seemingly separate theories of why 
firms’ undertake FDI activity (i.e. Ownership advantageous, Location advantageous and 
Internationalization Advantageous). Dunning (1981) building on the previous theories of 
FDI, provided an eclectic framework of FDI (O-L-I), in order to provide an explanation for 
the international investment position of a country. The eclectic nature of the OLI paradigm 
has allowed the continuous revisions and enhancements in the framework, consequently 
OLI framework has been one of the main IB theories that can be adopted to explain the 
FDI activity to date. However, our research does not adopt the OLI paradigm in order to 
explore the effect of civil and political liberties on FDI. Therefore in this section the 
original OLI framework and in section 2.8 the recent revision of OLI paradigm will be 
briefly reviewed in order to familiarize the reader with the framework. The next section 
provides a review of the main theories of FDI developed in 1980-90s. 
                                                          
28 A number of studies on culture, such as the ones building on the works of Hofstede (1980; 2001) as reviewed by 
Graham (2001) Graham, J. L. (2001). Culture and human resources management. The hand Book of International 
Business. A. M. rugman and T. L. Brewer, (Eds.). Oxford Oxford University Press: 503–36. 
 can be added to the latter. 
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2.5.1. Theories of FDI developed in 1980-90s 
2.5.1. A. Dunning (1980) – incorporates the Internationalization advantages (I) to 
the Eclectic framework (O & L) -  
Dunning (1980) incorporates the approaches of Hirsch (1976) and Buckley and 
Dunning (1976) on the effect of ownership and location on both the composition and level 
of FDI, in order to explore the issues that studies such as internationalization considered 
previously in Buckley and Casson (1976), in a greater context and provides some empirical 
contribution in this regard. He argues that the ownership and location endowment 
approach, by themselves, fall short of providing explanations for all forms of trade, and 
that while using one of these approaches leads to provision of successful explanations for 
particular types of trade (Hirsch 1976), they do not provide explanation for all international 
production. He continues by stating that while the “ownership endowment approach is 
necessary, it is not a sufficient condition for explaining international production”. By 
exploring the motives of internationalizing ownership endowments of MNEs (avoiding 
disadvantages or capitalizing on imperfections of either “market or price system and the 
public authority fiat”) he discusses that a MNEs’ international involvement is a product of 
ownership, location, and internationalization advantages and therefore incorporates 
internationalization advantages into eclectic theory. He shows the latter by the empirical 
examination of US MNEs in fourteen manufacturing industries in seven countries.   
2.5.2. B. Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm – A synthesis of prior theories of 
International Investments  
The origins of the eclectic paradigm of Dunning can be traced back to Dunning (1958). 
Dunning’s notions of ownership and location advantages of the firms where built on the 
role of MNEs as the organizing entity, and were inconsistent with the general neoclassical 
international production theories provided by others such as Leontief (1953), Hymer 
(1960), and Posner (1961). The emphasis of Dunning is on the view of MNEs as the 
organizing entities as well as the consideration of mobile factor endowments of firms that 
only existed in imperfect form, is inconsistent with the general views of the scholars of the 
time such as Vernon (1966; Vernon 1971; Vernon 1979) whose work emphasises on 
MNEs life cycle, the works of Keesing (1966), Magee (1977) and Johnson (1970) that 
emphases more on the role of trade, production and investment in knowledge, the works of 
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Hufbauer and Adler (1968) and Hufbauer (1970) that emphasises on the role of technical 
lags,  and the works of  other such as those of Baldwin (1970) and Knickerbocker (1973) 
on the role of structural factors and McManus (1972) on managerial aspects of MNEs. 
However, the main difference between the works of Dunning with the other theories put 
forward on the subject [i.e. works on international trade and investment Caves (1971; 
1980), and other works on industrial organization theories and Bain type advantages]29  is 
the emphasis that he puts on the imperfect transferability of ownership advantages of firms.  
Dunning (1979; 1980; 1981) builds on the previous works on International Business 
toward a more holistic approach that can provide the most extensive set of explanations for 
various types of investment activity undertaken by firms as MNEs. The ingredients of 
eclectic paradigm are the Ownership advantages drawn from the works of Hymer 
(1960/1976), Kindelberger (1969), Caves (1971), the Internationalization advantages 
drawn from the works of Buckley and Casson (1976), and the Location advantages drawn 
from the works of Vernon (1966), Dunning (1974), and Thrift and Taylor (1982) were 
introduced by a number of scholars prior to Dunning.   
According to the eclectic paradigm of international production, three main factors of 
Ownership, Internationalization and Location can be used to explain the investment 
activity of MNEs. The first factor, the ownership-specific advantages in general relate to 
the ownership of intangible, or tangible assets that provide a firm (an entity) the 
comparative advantage over its competitors. Such advantages can be categorised in three 
main types.  The second, Location specific advantages (L), relates to the locational 
characteristics of regions and countries i.e. well-developed infrastructure, presence of 
skilled and productive labour force, innovatory capacities, investment capacities, low input 
prices, and how these advantages might provide locational advantages for the firms from 
these regions and those investing in such regions. The third factor is the 
internationalization (I) specific advantages which are best visible under the light of market 
failures. The I advantages consist of a number components which include lower 
negotiation costs, lower search costs, and those that compensate for the absence of future 
markets and those that lead to control for market imperfections. Dunning (2000) discusses 
that the eclectic paradigm is “an envelope for complementary theories of MNE activity”, 
and thus emphasises that the not only these factors on their own, but also their combination 
                                                          
29 Dunning and Rugman (1985) 
40 
 
is of importance in explaining the MNEs international production activities. We refrain 
from extensive explanation of OLI paradigm in this section and leave the provision of a 
more extensive review to the section 2.6.1. 
Another approach by Jack Behrman (1974) provided the taxonomy based on which the 
international investment activity of firms are categorised according to their motivations, 
namely; market seeking, efficiency seeking, resource seeking and strategic asset seeking 
motives. Our research follows this taxonomy, namely firms’ motivations in exploring the 
firms’ FDI activity. It is imperative to note that Behrman (1974) taxonomy specifically 
considers the firms’ incentives and motivations from FDI in a rather micro manner, in 
contrast to eclectic paradigm that provides a macro framework in which FDI is viewed 
with to host countries’ Location, Internationalization behaviour of the firm and the 
Ownership advantageous first introduced by Hymer (1960, 1968). Therefore, our research 
that follows the organization theory of Coase (1937) by placing firm at the centre of 
analysis, chiefly uses Behrman’s taxonomy of the motivations in explaining FDI activity. 
Consequently, our intention is to use the micro drivers of FDI in order to explain FDI 
activity rather than the macro based approach of Dunning’s OLI. The next sections review 
the developments made in the post 2000s era, which mainly include the revisited OLI 
paradigm, provide the review of the view of institutional factors and their effect on FDI 
activity, and the discuss the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) framework of Hall and Soskice 
(2001) that is chiefly used by this research in provision of theoretical and empirical 
analysis. Subsequently the incorporation of the VoC framework into IB literature is 
discussed in detail. 
2.6. Theories of FDI post 2000s 
The recent IB and economics literature has  shifted its attention towards institutional 
factors both in empirical (Filippaios, Kottaridi et al. 2004) as well as theoretical (Mudambi 
and Navarra 2002) context. In macro context, a number of studies including the works of 
Henisz (2003), Mudambi and Navarra (2002), and Mudambi, Navarra et al. (2003) have 
explored the effect of institutional factors on the behaviour of domestic and foreign firms 
and therefore their FDI behaviour, while in micro level studies such as Kostova (1999), 
and Xu and Shenkar (2002) have explored the effect of elements such as institutional 
distance on FDI.  The micro and macro level analyses being drawn from conceptually 
different traditions, and institutional traditions, take into account different views of 
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institutions and as a result different types of institutions. Dunning and Lundan (2008) argue 
that consideration of institutional influences inside the firm and those between the firm and 
the external environment simultaneously provides a greater standing point from which one 
can observe the determinants of MNE activity and its effects (Dunning and Lundan 2008, 
pp.128). In the spirit of adopting a unified framework that considers both firm and country 
specific considerations Dunning and Lundan (2008) use and extend the framework put 
forward by North (1990; 1994; 2005).   
IB literature exploring the way affiliates communicate and function in the context of a 
foreign host country as well as dealing with the parents, includes the works of authors such 
as Kostova (1999) who have mostly started to frame the institutional distance in order to 
reveal the influence of institutions on the ‘incentive structure’ and ‘enforcement 
mechanisms’. Others such as Kostova and Zaheer (1999), and Kostova and Roth  (2002) 
consider the effect of  location, motivations and conduct of MNEs’ affiliates in foreign 
markets in the light of institutional distance between the home and host countries. Other 
studies that consider the effect of institutional factors on FDI activity include the works of 
authors such as Guler, et al. (2002) who consider the transfer of Organization Specific 
advantages from parent to the affiliate; those who similar to Xu and Shenkar (2002) 
consider the interaction between the entry mode and locational choice; and those who 
similar to Davis, et al. (2000), Chang and Rosenzweig (2001), Lu (2002), and Guillén 
(2003) consider the effects  that of the imitation of MNEs entry choice on FDI activity 
using the firm-level institutional variables. The resurgence of the institutional factors in 
analysis of the determinants of FDI has led to their inclusion in the studies of Dunning 
(2002) and Dunning (2004) that consider the exploration of the ‘relational’ capital of the 
firm in order to incorporate the institutional variables into OLI framework. Consequently 
noting the importance of institutional factors in explaining FDI activity, Dunning (2005; 
2006) attempts to incorporate the institutional variables with OLI paradigm by arguing that 
FDI activity is majorly influenced by the analysis of national level institutions. 
Subsequently authors such as Rondinelli (2005) have explored the institutional 
characteristics of seven types of national institutions.  
In business and management literature most of the works on firm-level institutional 
analysis have been drawn from either Scott (1995; 1998; 2001)  who identifies three types 
of institutions namely; normative, regulative and cultural-cognitive, that rely on different 
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understandings of the role of institutions in different disciplines, or based on the typology 
put forward by DiMaggio and Powell (1983)30 who identifies three mechanisms of 
institutional diffusion namely; coercive, normative and mimetic that can be mapped to the 
types of institutions put forward by Scott (1995; 1998; 2001). Acknowledging the 
importance of firm level analysis in provision of more detailed information with regard to 
FDI activity, a number of studies including Meyer  (2001), Yiu and Makino (2002), Delios 
and Henisz (2000), and Delios and Henisz (2003) have taken into account the effect of 
both firm and national level institutions on MNE’s entry mode as well as its behaviour.  
Furthermore, the recent developments in the comparative capitalism arena which mainly 
develops on the institutional characteristics of the economies in exploring the similarities 
and differences between the ways firms coordinate their activities have become 
increasingly relevant to the recent IB literature that incorporates the institutional factors at 
the heart of the analysis of FDI activity.  The recent theory of comparative capitalism 
provided by Hall and Soskice (2001) puts forward the Varieties of Capitalism framework 
(VoC) which is developed on the previous works of scholars including Due et al. (1991), 
Gold (1993), Hall (2004). The VoC framework is introduced, discussed in section 2.6.3, 
and incorporated into IB literature in section 2.7. By doing so we provide in a sense a base 
for further arguments that connect the theories on Organization theory, and Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) framework into the IB literature. This in turn allows this research to 
bridge these traditions and incorporate the organization theory and VoC framework into IB 
literature, and in doing so provide a holistic framework that should help explaining the FDI 
activity of the firms. The reviews here thus are the backbone of the further arguments 
developed in chapter four, which in turn enables us to provide a theoretical model of FDI 
by considering not only country level factors, but also the market structure, difference 
between the way firms coordinate their activities in different types of market economies, 
and finally allows us to extend the existing frameworks further by bringing the ideas with 
regard to sectoral analysis of firms in different market economies. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter we do not provide the review of literature that is 
mainly on the institutional factors, civil liberties and political rights. Instead the purpose of 
this chapter is to review the main IB theories that have been developed to explain FDI 
activity, comment on their characteristics, structure, and to provide information with regard 
                                                          
30 The typology put forward for institutional diffusion is mainly used by the scholars in management science. 
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to the IB theories that are used as foundations for our research. In this respect, our research 
mainly builds on the motivations of firms, develops theoretical and empirical models that 
take into account both sectoral and country level analysis in order to provide both 
disaggregated and aggregated analysis of the FDI activity. As noted above, the 
investigation of FDI activity using lower levels of analysis can provide detailed 
information of the way various factors affect FDI activity. Furthermore, our consideration 
of institutions will be further discussed and the arguments based on which the adoption of 
civil liberties, political rights, and ICRG institutional variables will be provided 
accordingly in the following chapters. The following section provides some information on 
the developments made in IB theory in post 2000 era, mainly the revisited OLI paradigm 
that incorporates the institutional aspects of FDI into Ownership, Location and 
Internationalization advantageous. However, as discussed earlier this research chiefly 
builds on motivations of the firm in explaining FDI activity, therefore, the review of the 
revisited OLI paradigm is kept to minimum under the considerations of the length of the 
research and provision of information that is most relevant to our research.  
2.6.1. The Eclectic Paradigm (OLI) Revisited (2008) 
As a result of the recent focus on institutional factors affecting FDI activity, Dunning 
and Lundan  (2008) revisit the OLI paradigm and provide an extended version of the OLI 
holistic approach that includes the institutional factors. The revisited OLI paradigm 
considers further breakdown of the once aggregate category of incentives. The Ownership 
advantages are consequently considered to be consist of; first, the intangible assets 
advantages or ownership of property rights (Oa) that includes production innovations, 
production management, organizational and marketing systems, innovatory capacity, ‘non-
codifiable knowledge’(accumulated experience in finance, marketing, etc.). Second, 
ownership of specific advantages that are resulted from common governance (Ot) which 
refers to both advantages enjoyed by the branches plants of an enterprise, and those 
advantages enjoyed as a result of multinationality. Third, ownership specific advantages 
that are related to owning firm specific institutional assets (Oi), (formal and informal 
institutions that govern the coordination activity of the firm in internal and external 
environment). Examples of the latter are the codes of conduct, norms and corporate 
culture, incentive systems, leadership and management system, etc.  
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The Location (L) specific factors relate to locational characteristics of regions and 
countries (i.e. well-developed infrastructure, presence of skilled and productive labour 
force, innovatory capacities, investment capacities, low input prices), and how these 
advantages might provide locational advantages for the firms from these regions and those 
investing in such regions. Similar to ‘Oi’ (institutionally related ownership advantageous), 
the ‘Li’ (institutionally related location advantages) of countries are influential on FDI 
activity. Dunning and Lundan (2008) consider the institutionally related location 
advantageous to be considerably different between developed and developing countries 
and among developing countries, due to differences between the institutional aspects of 
these countries.  
The Internationalization (I) advantageous relate to “firms’ propensity to internalise 
market failure” (Dunning and Lundan 2008, pp.140-141). The learning process and the 
knowledge acquired through the Internationalization incentives of the firms’ are 
institutionalized within firm, and will be influential on firms’ behaviour. The latter is 
mainly due to the fact that the internationalization process influences the process of 
understanding and assessing the benefits and costs of alternative modes of exploiting O 
and L specific advantageous. The revisited OLI paradigm considers that the type of 
internalization process that is adopted is mainly determined through the Oa and Oi of the 
firm, in contrast to the view that equates ownership with internationalization, the revisited 
OLI paradigm then considers MNE “as a collection of activities, both internal and external 
to the ownership boundary of the firm, that are controlled and coordinated by it” Therefore 
the revisited paradigm considers that the “costs of motivating agents within the firm, even 
if lower than the costs of transacting in the marketplace, are dependent on the incentive 
structures and enforcement mechanisms devised and implemented by the firm, and thus the 
formal and informal institutions therein”(Dunning and Lundan 2008, pp.140-141). 
Therefore the revisited paradigm relates the internationalization activity of the firms to 
their incentive structures and institutions of both MNE and the foreign market. 
2.6.2. Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
In this section, we introduce Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) framework introduced by 
Hall and Soskice (2001) in order to lay the ground work for the incorporation of VoC 
framework into IB theory both in a theoretical and empirical manner, in the following 
chapters. The incorporation of VoC into IB theory is carried out in a theoretical model of 
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chapter four by provision of arguments that leads to distinction between the way types of 
market economies influence the wage bargaining process between foreign firms and labour 
representatives and thus affect FDI activity. Moreover, in the empirical context, we use the 
VoC framework in distinguishing between the FDI activities of firms from various types of 
economies investing abroad. This section starts by introducing the VoC framework from 
the previous theories of comparative capitalism and then distinguishes the VoC framework 
from other theories by discussing the framework under the light of institutional economics, 
organization theory and transaction cost theories. Furthermore, we discuss the properties of 
VoC framework and its approach in distinguishing between firms based on the types of 
market economies they are affiliated to. The characteristics of firms from Liberal Market 
Economies (LMEs) and Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) are discussed, and 
subsequently, the way the VoC framework is incorporated into IB theory is reviewed. 
2.6.2. A. Varieties of Capitalism; introduction and a critic of previous theories 
Hall and Soskice (2001) provide a new framework for understanding the institutional 
differences and similarities amongst developed economies in order to bridge the business 
studies and political economy. VoC (Varieties of Capitalism) is an actor based approach in 
which multiple actors (such as producers, firms, unions, governments, etc.) are those 
populating the greater environment of political economy. In other words political economy 
is viewed as a “terrain populated by multiple actors, each of whom seeks to advance his 
interests in a rational way in strategic interaction with others” (Scharpf 1997).  
Adopting a relational view of the firm, Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that the success 
of the firm is significantly related to its ability to coordinate with a range of actors that it is 
involved with (such as employees, clients, suppliers, other businesses, shareholders, etc.). 
In order to distinguish between the types of relationships that a firm generally coordinates 
to function, we follow Hall and Soskice (2001, p.6) by providing a five spheres 
classification in which the relationships that a firm has to develop in order to resolve its 
coordination problems31 are divided into; industrial relations, vocational training and 
education relationships, corporate governance, inter-firm relations, and finally the sphere 
of employees. 
                                                          
31 which are related directly to its core competencies 
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The industrial relations sphere relates to the coordination problems related to the 
bargaining processes with employees, unions and organizations that represent labour force, 
over wages, working hours, and working conditions. The second sphere, vocational 
training and education, relates to set of skills and the level of human capital. In this sphere 
the workers have the problem of deciding on the type and level of skills that they have to 
invest on, while the firms have the problems of securing the labour force with suitable set 
of skills. The third sphere relates to corporate governance, in which the coordination of the 
relationships with investors, financiers and other sources of finance are considered. The 
fourth sphere relates to the inter-firm relations, which accounts for the relationships with 
the other enterprises such as suppliers and clients. The fifth sphere relates to the 
relationships with the firm’s own employees which includes the problems of adverse 
selection, moral hazard, and other problems of information flow and information sharing in 
an organization.   
It is worthy to mention that the theoretical model of chapter four mainly focuses on the 
industrial relations sphere by exploring the effect of civil liberties on the bargaining 
processes between foreign firms and labour representatives (unions) in the host country, 
over wages and employment. Moreover, our theoretical consideration of the effect of 
political rights on FDI is captured through the taxes applied to foreign firms in the host 
markets. The latter indicates that the influence of the political rights on FDI activity 
through taxes would be considered in the corporate governance sphere (in particular its 
subset corporate finance).  
Based on the VoC framework economies can be categorized into a number of more 
homogenous clusters of economies where each cluster shares more similar characteristics 
with the others in the cluster. In order to expand on the different types of economies, and 
the way their characteristics influence the structure and characteristics of their institutional 
systems, we refer to the basic framework provided by Hall and Soskice (2001) on types of 
economies, namely Liberal and Coordinated Market economies. Moreover, the national 
political economies can be categorized based on the way they address the coordination 
problems that they face with their relationships in each of the five spheres32. In this 
perspective, Two types of political economies are introduced which are at the poles of the 
                                                          
32 Reminder: Hall and Soskice (2001, p.6) provide a five spheres classification in which the relationships that a firm has 
to develop in order to resolve its coordination problems32 are divided into; industrial relations, vocational training and 
education relationships, corporate governance, inter-firm relations, and finally the sphere of employees. 
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main spectrum where all nations can be arrayed. The first of these political economies is 
the Liberal Market Economies (LMEs).  
Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) are the ones in which firms coordinate their 
relationships and activities through competitive market arrangements and hierarchies. In 
LMEs, market relationships are coordinated under a context of competition and formal 
contracting while the relationships are characterised as arms’ length exchange of goods and 
services.33 In such markets supply and demand is adjusted by the actors, mostly in a neo-
classical economics fashion, in response to price signals generated by markets. 
Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) are the ones in which the firms depend more 
heavily on non-market modes of coordination that generally entail extensive relational, 
incomplete contracting, more reliance on collaborative as opposed to competitive 
relationships, and network monitoring based on the exchange of the private information 
inside the networks. CMEs therefore tend to use a more extensive set of organizations in 
coordinating their activities relative to LMEs. 
The contribution of VoC into our empirical investigation is the provision of the ability 
to distinguish between the way firms from LMEs and CMEs coordinate their activities and 
relating their behaviour to their types of economies. The latter allows one to group the 
countries with similar types of economies, and investigate whether there are significant 
differences between the ways firms from different types of economies coordinate their FDI 
activity. Furthermore, our sectoral investigation of the FDI activity of the firms from 
LMEs, and CMEs allows us to investigate whether the affiliation to the specific type of 
economy has any effect on the way firms in similar sectors coordinate their FDI activity.  
In order to expand more on the ways in which firms from LMEs and CMEs coordinate 
their relationships, we explore types of activities that firms generally undertake in each of 
the five spheres.  
                                                          
33 Williamson (1985) provides a great discussion of the characteristics of such markets. 
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2.6.2. B. Liberal Market Economies, and Coordinated Market Economies 
coordination activities in relational spheres 
In LMEs, firms emphasis more on the current profitability as a result of the markets for 
corporate governance (financial systems). In financing firm’s activities, the valuation of 
the firm is of vast importance, in case of financing through equity, in forms of bonds and 
shares as well as bank lending. In such competitive markets the investors speculate their 
investment based on semi-publicly34 available data and information to value a company, 
and thus, in LMEs firms generally are encouraged to attend to the semi-publicly available 
dimensions of their performance that influence their share price.35In contrast, CMEs’ firms 
do not rely on publicly available data and valuations for their financing and instead 
coordinated market economies generally provide them with access to finance. The latter in 
turn leads to a main difference between the activities that firms in CMEs and LMEs 
persuade in their development and growth as well as the coordination of their activities. 
CMEs having access to ‘patient capital’ generally tend to invest and undertake projects that 
have a more long-run view on generating returns and thus, having access to capital they 
tend to retain workforce with more specialized set of skills. Therefore, we expect firms 
from CMEs to be less sensitive to the host countries’ lending interest rate, in contrast to 
their LME counterparts.   
On the other hand the independent financing activity that is not based on the balance 
sheet and quarterly performance of the firms, leads to a different monitoring system in 
these markets. In order to evaluate the performance of the firms to safeguard the 
investments of the investors in CMEs, investors have access to more ‘private’ and ‘inside’ 
information on the operation of the companies through the networks that link managers 
and technical personnel inside the companies to their counterparts in other firms in the way 
that it provides them with the possibility of sharing reliable information on the progress of 
the firms in these economies. Also in some cases firms share their information with a third 
party (such as business associations in which the officials have extensive knowledge of the 
industry) that is in the position to monitor the firms’ activities and sanction them if there is 
any misleading on their part. A third element that is also often used for monitoring of 
firms, is the ‘reputation’ of the firms which is an influential factor for firms as it facilitates 
                                                          
34 We refer to publicly available data as semi publicly available data due to existence of the of information asymmetries  
35 For this reason in LMEs to provide finance more independently on quarterly balance sheet and publicly available data,  
the networks that could provide the investors with inside information about the firm’s progress are heavily undermined 
and next to non-existent. 
49 
 
the access to finance by validating their membership in different networks36 that are 
valuable to them in many respects. Therefore, in order to avoid bad reputation, most of the 
firms try to provide the right information on their progress and performance. Consequently 
firms from CMEs are less concerned with the quarterly performances as the access to 
capital is determined through networks that project the performance of the firms. In CMEs 
firms have close relationships with their suppliers and clients. Consequently, firms’ 
information is available in a secure form from the networks of cross-sharing and joint 
membership in active associations with other companies that gather and provide 
information on the companies in order to secure a better coordination in terms of standard 
setting, vocational training and technology transfer amongst the companies. (Hall and 
Soskice 2001, pp.23)  
Considering the differences between LMEs and CMEs, we expect the firms from LMEs 
to be more sensitive to host countries’ lending interest rate in financing their project in 
comparison to CMEs. Since the foreign market financing would improve the financial 
position of the firm in short run and lead to better evaluation and other sources of financing 
in short run. In contrast, we expect the firms from CMEs to be less sensitive to foreign 
market interest rate lending since their investments are generally funded internally and in 
most cases the evaluations are not the sole determinant of the financial health of the 
organizations, since the investors have access to ‘private’ and ‘inside’ information on the 
operation of the companies through the networks that link managers and technical 
personnel inside the companies to their counterparts in other firms in the way that it 
provides them with the possibility of sharing reliable information on the progress of the 
firms in these economies. In our empirical section we investigate the effect of interest rate 
lending, as a proxy for host country financing available for MNEs in financing their FDI 
activity, on their FDI behaviour. 
Furthermore, since the evaluation of the firms in LMEs and CMEs vary significantly, it 
is possible to investigate whether firms from LMEs are more sensitive to foreign market 
taxations. As mentioned earlier our theoretical model considers the effect of political rights 
on FDI activity chiefly through taxes applied to foreign firms in the host country. This 
indirect effect of political rights on FDI activity is investigated in our empirical model by 
                                                          
36 This type of CME monitoring systems, is referred to as  ‘network reputational monitoring’ Vitols, S., C. Steven, et al. 
(1997). Corporate Governance in Large British and German Companies: Comparative Institutional Advantage or 
Competing for Best Practice. London, Anglo German Foundation. 
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provision of ‘taxes on income and profit’ as one our explanatory variables, allowing us to 
explore the effect of taxes on firms from LMEs in comparison to their CME counterparts. 
In terms of industrial relations, firms in LMEs generally rely on market relationship 
between the top manager37 and the individual employee (labour force). Therefore, the firms 
wither and lack an established representative body for employees or the representative 
bodies of employees are generally less powerful than the ones observed in CMEs. Due to 
the less cohesive relationship between trade unions and employer association, the 
coordination of economy-wide wage is very difficult and thus, LMEs rely on 
macroeconomic policy as well as market competition to control the inflation as well as 
wages (Hall and Franzese 1998).  
In contrast to LMEs, managers in CMEs rarely have the capacity for unilateral actions 
and mostly secure the agreements for decisions through supervisory boards that include 
other managers, shareholders and representatives of the employees. The internal structure 
of the firms in CMEs reinforces the network monitoring systems, and structural bias 
towards the consensus decision making leads to greater information sharing as well as 
development of reputations which in part contribute to the provision of reliable information 
to facilitate network monitoring. In such systems the incentives of the managers are more 
in line with the operation of business networks (rather than profitability), and long term 
performance of the firm as well as maintenance of their reputation in order to be able to 
secure consensus for the projects. The specialized employees are recruited via provision of 
long-term contracts and consequently, as Sorge and Warner (1986) and Dore (1986) 
discuss, the firms in CMEs tend to employ production strategies that demand highly skilled 
and specialized labour force which is expected to share the information it acquires to 
generate continuous improvements in product lines and processes. While firms are 
vulnerable to  problems of ‘hold up’ by labour force, and ‘poaching’ of the employees, in 
many cases the complementary effect of the industrial relations in such economies seems 
to suffice such potential problems. For instance in Germany the industry level bargaining 
between the trade unions and employers’ associations leads to types of settlements that 
ensure employees receive a good deal. On the other hand the existence of employers’ 
association bodies that bind their members to a number of agreements, and the equal wage 
system for the certain set of skills in an industry reduces the probability of poaching to a 
                                                          
37 Top Management generally has the unilateral control over the firm and a substantial freedom to hire and fire 
employees. (Hall and Soskice 2001, p.29) 
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very low degree. Therefore the complementary effects of institutions and formal and 
informal constraints in CMEs ensures that the firms are functioning well and by applying 
coordination bargaining across industries and in the economy as the whole, limit the 
inflationary effects of wage settlements and poaching.  
In order to investigate the effect of the differences that exists between the way firms 
from LMEs and CMEs coordinate their activities in industrial relations sphere, on their 
FDI, we explore whether the provision of higher level of civil liberties that affords the 
employees to establish labour representative entities, would influence the FDI activity of 
the firms from LMEs in a more significant manner, in comparison to their CME 
counterparts. 
Firms in LMEs, relying heavily on a fluid labour market, benefit from a complementary 
education and training systems that mainly focus on offering general skills to labour force. 
The latter is beneficial for the firms as they do not intend to invest on a number of 
programmes to gain employees with special set of skills, in a highly fluid labour force 
economy where there is no guarantee of keeping the employees. On the other hand a 
greater set of skills means the greater bargaining power for the employees, and also that 
employees themselves prefer to be generally marketable in such economy and therefore the 
provision of the general set of skills by vocational training is complementary to the 
structure of the economy. In contrast to LMEs’ firms, their CME counterparts generally 
use skilled and specialized work force. The provision of such labour force requires 
investment on both employers, by provision of higher salaries and long-term contracts, and 
employees who have to invest heavily on their skills both in terms of time and bearing the 
risk of un-employability in many other sectors that demand other sets of skills. The 
industry wide employer associations and trade associations in CMEs contribute to the 
provision and recruiting the highly skilled workforce by supervising more or less publicly 
subsidized training systems as well as pressuring the major companies to take apprentices 
and monitoring their participation in such schemes. Such associations in turn limit free-
riding on the training efforts of other, as well as ensure that the training fits the firms’ 
needs and that there will be external demand for graduates that have been apprenticed and 
are unemployed, by negotiating industry wide skill categories and training protocols with 
firms in each sector.  
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The effect of vocational training and education relationships sphere of each type of 
economies on FDI activity can be investigated through consideration of the influence of 
level of education on level and composition of FDI activity of firms from LMEs and 
CMEs. In our empirical exploration, ‘investment in research and development’ has been 
considered as the variable that would capture the effect of educational disparity in the host 
countries on the FDI activity of the firms from LMEs and CMEs.  
As for inter-company relations, in LMEs, firms rely on standard market relationships 
and enforceable formal contracts. The formal contracting and law system tends to provide 
a support for markets and hierarchies in such economies. In some extreme cases of LMEs, 
relationships are mediated by antitrust regulations designed to prevent firms collaborating 
in order to control, market power, or prices, which in a sense is in line with the idea that 
these markets as competitive markets are robust and other characteristics of the markets 
such as corporate governance that renders firms sensitive to profitability hinders the 
informal contracts and non-market coordination. By provision of long term contracts and a 
more secure employment, CMEs do not rely on the work force mobility for the transfer of 
technology as the firms in LMEs do. Instead they tend to facilitate technology transfer by 
inter-company relations that are supported by a number of networks through which the 
business associations with public officials determines where firm competencies can be 
improved and by orchestrating publicly subsidized programs do so. This sphere of firms’ 
coordination activity is not considered in this research, due to the fact that it is out of the 
scope of our research question, which is to investigate the effect of civil liberties and 
political rights on FDI activity.  
2.7. Incorporation of VoC into IB Literature   
This research builds on the organization theory of Coase (1937) and by doing so places 
firm at the centre of analysis. This allows us to incorporate the VoC framework into IB 
literature by adopting a relational view of the firm. The latter in turn affords us the 
possibility of distinguishing between the coordination activities of firms based on their 
types of economies.  
Establishing the basic foundations of our research we consider the institutional factors 
(external and internal) to affect the FDI activity of the firms. Furthermore, we consider the 
motivations of the firm, namely; MS; RS; ES; and SAS, motivations to be the drivers of 
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the FDI decision of the firms. Our theoretical model mainly develops on ES FDI by 
considering the FDI decision of the firm in the light of labour costs in various host markets 
and sectors. In this respect our disposition is similar to the transaction cost terminology, in 
that we chiefly consider the monetary analysis of FDI decision to provide informative 
information with regard to FDI activity of the firms. 
Therefore, considering VoC taxonomy of the spheres of firms’ coordination activity, 
this research incorporates VoC framework into IB literature by drawing on the differences 
between the ways in which firms from different market economies coordinate their 
activities. The spheres of firms coordination activity that have been considered in 
explaining FDI activity are industrial relations, vocational training and education 
relationships, and the corporate governance, leaving incorporation of the sphere of 
employees  and inter-firm relations sphere to future research.  
The emphasis of our theoretical model is on the industrial relations by investigating the 
effect of civil liberties through wage bargaining processes between foreign firms and 
labour representatives. The incorporation of industrial relations sphere of VoC is carried 
out in our theoretical model by distinguishing between different types of labour law that in 
turn translate to various types of labour representation. In particular we develop on the 
works of Due et al. (1991), Gold (1993), Hall (2004), and Hall and Soskice (2001) in 
distinguishing four main types of unions, namely: (1) LME type unions; (2) CME type 
unions; (3) Northern unions; and (4) other unions. These distinctions allow us to explore 
the effect of the firms’ internal and external institutional influences on their FDI decision, 
by exploring the behaviour of firms when bargaining over wages and employment.  
In our empirical investigation we incorporate the analysis of industrial relations sphere 
through analysis of the effect of level of civil liberties, and its indirect effects through 
wages, and employee compensation on FDI from LMEs and CMEs. The analysis of 
vocational training and education sphere is considered by examining the effect of the level 
of investment on research and development on FDI activity. Furthermore we explore the 
corporate governance by considering the effect of taxes and host country’s interest rate 
lending on FDI activity of firms from different types of market economies.  
Furthermore, the VoC is incorporated in our empirical investigation by considering the 
firms from LMEs, CMEs and Northern countries as firms affiliated with considerably 
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different market economies. This aggregate consideration of the firms from various types 
of economies in turn allows us to distinguish between the various factors that affect firms 
from a certain types of economy and thus, allows us to provide comparison between the 
ways various factors affect the FDI decision of MNEs affiliated with different types of 
economies.  
Therefore, our research contributes to the current knowledge by incorporating the VoC 
framework into IB literature in both theoretical and empirical manner, and thus allows us 
to explain FDI activity of the firms in the light of not only their external institutional 
factors (i.e. home or host countries institutional properties) but also in the light of the 
firms’ institutional characteristics. The next section provides concluding remarks to this 
chapter, leaving the specific literature review of the effect of institutional factors, civil 
liberties and political rights to the following chapter.  
2.8. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, in a chronological manner, the literature on FDI is reviewed. This is 
accomplished by provision of the information with regard to developments made in 
comparative capitalism as well as literature on foreign direct investment. The comparative 
capitalism arguments are nested in older traditions of economics and political science and 
in a way provide information with regard to the paradigms that affect the scholarly 
thinking and movements throughout the life of the rather newer tradition of International 
Business.  
 The chronological setting is designed with the intention to provide the reader with the 
information about the constructs that existed at each period of time and how the scholars 
have developed the literature given the knowledge at any given decade. The chapter has 
strived to provide parallel contextual narratives on the developments of both comparative 
capitalism and IB literature with the intention to underscore the effect of the philosophical 
views of the firm and the effect of consideration of different designs in the line of scientific 
inquiry. For instance we find that the organization theory of the firm and markets 
influences the level at which scientific inquiry is conducted and results in different 
constructs. Furthermore, the chapter, in a timely manner, reviews the developments on the 
IB theories with regard to FDI, from the earliest theories on the reasons why firms invest 
abroad (Hymer 1960) up to date.  
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In the first section the theories of Hymer (1960; 1968; 1970; 1972; 1976) on firm 
specific assets and ownership advantages, Kindelberger’s interpretation of Hymer’s work 
under the industrial organization context, and the works of Vernon (1966; 1971; 1979; 
1983) on product life Cycle were discussed. The second section reviewed the theories of 
Uppsala School of thought based on works of Johanson and Vahlne (1977) and 
Luostarinen (1979), theory of internationalization based on the works of Buckley and 
Casson (1981; 1988), and the motivations of FDI based on the work of Behrman (1974). 
The third section introduced Dunning’s (1980) Eclectic theory and IDP theory. The fourth 
section reviewed the post 2000s theories of FDI by provision of a brief review of the 
revisited OLI paradigm and subsequently introduced and discussed the Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) framework in order to provide the platform for its incorporation into IB 
literature.  
Finally, the last section explained the way that varieties of Capitalism approach is 
incorporated into IB literature both in terms of theoretical and empirical contexts, building 
on the earlier works of neoclassical theory of the firm and modern organization view put 
forward by Coase (1937), Hayek (1945), and Arrow (1969) and the institutional view put 
forward by North (1990; 1994). This construct will be used in the chapter four, in order to 
act as the corner stone of our theoretical model.  Moreover, the VoC is considered in 
explaining the FDI activity of firms from LMEs and their counterparts from CMEs. The 
latter in turn allows us to make comparison between the FDI activities of firms from 
different market economies, as a whole, and also affords us the possibility of comparing 
the FDI behaviour of firms from different market economies investing in the same sectors. 
The latter provides us with a great set of tools in explaining the FDI activity of the firms 
and their affiliated countries based on the way in which firms coordinate their activities in 
various types of market economies. The next chapter provides a detailed review of the 
literature on the studies that have explored the effect of institutional factors, civil liberties 
and political rights and FDI. 
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Chapter 3 : Literature Review and Meta-Analysis 
3.1. Introduction 
The determinants of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), both in terms of the level of FDI 
as well as its composition have been of great debate over the past seventy years. Examples 
of such works are Root and Ahmed (1978) and Asiedu (2006) that mainly focus of the 
level of FDI, and the works of Javorcik (2004) and Gwenhamo and Fedderke (2010) who 
take into account the composition of FDI. The first traces of argument can be traced back 
to the post World War II in the works of Hymer (1960) and Aliber (1971). Since then 
determinants of FDI have been explored in a number of disciplines, mainly; Economics, 
International Business, Finance, Business and Management, and Political Economy. 
Consequently, one can approach the topic from a variety of angles. This section focuses on 
the effect of political and civil liberties (factors forming the general democratic 
environment of nations) on FDI and sets out to investigate the literature that examines the 
effect of political and civil liberties on FDI activity.  
This research investigates the effect of civil liberties and political rights (liberties) on 
FDI activity. Therefore, after having reviewed the main IB theories on FDI activity in the 
previous chapter, this chapter aims to provide a focused review of the literature that have 
explored the effect of institutions, democracy, and civil and political liberties on FDI 
activity. For instance, authors such as Huntington & Dominguez (1975), Wintrobe (1998), 
Greider (1998) provide discussions and evidence in favour of the idea that multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) tend to invest in countries with low level of liberties (countries with 
high levels of repression) while others such as Olson (1993); McGuire & Olson (1996); 
Ursprung & Harms (2001) provide discussions and evidence contrary to the later arguing 
that MNEs invest more in countries where democratic rights of people are respected. 
Others such as Przeworski, Limongi and Voigt (2003) argue that none of the two 
arguments are convincing. Recent studies including Li and Resnick (2003) , Adam and 
Filippaios (2007), Asiedu and Lien (2011) tend to provide evidence in favour of existence 
of non-linear relationships between the two. The studies mentioned above, amongst many 
indicate that literature on political and civil liberties as determinants of FDI is far from 
being conclusive. 
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 Since the literature is providing mixed results38, we use a meta-analysis 
methodology to trace the similarities and differences in terms of study properties (both 
with regard to data used and methodology followed) in the existing literature with our key 
aim being to identify the key factors that influence the direction of results. We follow the 
methodological approach of Gorg and Strobl (2001), and Meyer and Sinani (2009) to 
examine whether there are systemic biases introduced in the literature through the common 
choices made in terms of scale and study properties (i.e. the choice of country level 
analysis, data range and decade influences; etc.). This chapter contributes in the current 
debate in two main ways. First, we introduce the firm’s investment motivations as one of 
the elements that have been considered in the design of the papers examined.  Second, 
following the arguments put forward by Busse (2004) we examine the decades included in 
the samples investigated as one of the factors determining the types of relationships 
reported. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Next section provides a review of the 
existing literature. In section 3.3 we develop a conceptual framework and derive 
hypotheses for the relationship between political and civil liberties and foreign direct 
investment. Section 3.4 presents the methodological approach and the empirical findings. 
Finally, section 3.5 concludes the paper by offering research implications. 
3.2. Literature Review 
The older literature on economics have often adopted a Schumpeterian [introduced by 
Schumpeter (1942)] view of democracy that conceives democracy as a one dimensional 
concept that is mainly elated to the existence of political rights that allow for free elections. 
A recent example of such works is that of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) who consider 
democracy to be “the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s 
vote” (Acemoglu and Robinson , 2006, p. 48). Adopting this view political economy 
literature has explored effects of democracy on investment (see Barro, 1997, for surveys) 
and often shown that political institutions influence the investment and growth. Examples 
of studies that mainly explore the effect of democracy and democratic institutions on FDI 
                                                          
38 A brief classification of the literature on the effects civil and political liberties and democracy on FDI is provided in 
Appendix 1. 
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activity include the works of Busse (2003), Jensen (2003), Li and Resnick (2003), and 
Choi and Samy (2008) amongst others.  
The political scientists have generally viewed this one dimensional view of democracy, 
with a certain degree of scepticism, and have often provided alternative views of 
democracy that deviate from the latter. For instance Plattner (2002) views democracy as “a 
more ample degree of protection of political and civil liberties”.  In this research a view of 
democracy is adopted that is in line with work of Tilly (2007), by considering a regime to 
be democratic “to the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens 
feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultations” (Tilly 2007, p. 14), and 
that “political rights correspond to broad, equal, mutually binding consultations, whereas 
civil liberties refer especially to protection” (Tilly 2007, p.45). Following this view we 
consider the political rights and civil liberties to be two dependent dimensions of 
democracy, the presence of which “generates in principle a wide variety of possible 
patterns in the evolution of democracies by themselves or in combination with other 
factors” (Ariel BenYishay & Roger Betancourt, 2013).  
In recent years, the institutional aspects of host countries as a group of factors that affect 
FDI activity have gained popularity. Consequently some of IB scholars have turned to 
political science in provision of their conceptual distinction between different aspects of 
institutional environment of the host countries. These studies in contrast to the older 
tradition of economics that commonly views democracy as a one dimensional concept, 
view it as a multi dimensional concept that is influenced through a number of contributing 
factors such as civil liberties, political rights, and institutional characteristics of the host 
countries. The examples are the studies of Li and Resnick (2003), Busse (2004), Busse and 
Hefeker (2005), Adam and Filippaios (2007), and Asiedu and Lien (2011) who consider 
the effect of both civil and political liberties on FDI activity, the studies of Méon and 
Sekkat (2004), Pournarakis and Varsakelis (2004), Ahlquist (2006), Daude and Stein 
(2007), Aizenman and Spiegel (2006), Ali et al. (2008), Mottaleb and Kalirajan,(2010) and 
Aleksynska and Havrylchyk (2012) amongst others, who consider the effect of institutions 
on FDI activity, and finally a third group of studies including the works of Wheeler and 
Mody (1992), Asiedu (2001), Jensen (2003), Addison and Heshmati (2003), Sethi, et al. 
(2003), Li and Resnick (2003), Click (2005), Chen and Funke (2007), Coates et al. (2010), 
and Baek and Qian (2011) who mainly consider the effect of political factors on FDI 
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activity. Finally the fourth group of studies that have mainly focused on the effect of civil 
liberties on FDI activity includes the works of Coughlin, et al. (1991), Pournarakis and 
Varsakelis (2004), Blanton and Blanton (2007), and  Coates et al. (2010).   
This research in line with the new generation of studies on FDI activity considers civil 
and political liberties to be two dependent sub-components of democracy that influence the 
patterns in which democracy evolves. Furthermore, we consider the institutions to be the 
formal and informal rules of the societies. Therefore, in this study we mainly regard civil 
and political liberties, along with institutional environment of the societies as the factors 
comprising democratic processes of nations and consequently set to explore the extent to 
which civil and political liberties affect the FDI activity.  
North (1990) is one of the first scholars who establishes a link between institutions and 
investment, while mainly considering the influence of institutions on the economic activity 
and investment. The literature has been greatly neglecting the influence of institutional 
factors on FDI up until recently. Before proceeding to provision of the brief literature 
review it is fruitful to provide some definitions. The definition of institution adopted by 
Dunning and Lundan (2008) is in the same wave length with the one adopted by Hall and 
Soskice (2001) and the one that is mainly is drawn from the works of North (1990; 1994; 
2005). Hall and Soskice (2001, p.9) following North (1990; 1994; 2005) define institutions 
as “a set of rules, formal and informal, that actors generally follow, whether for normative, 
cognitive, or material reasons, and organizations as durable entities with formally 
recognized members, whose rules also contribute to the institutions of the political 
economy”. Adopting this view of institutions, we consider ‘Democracy’ to be a product of 
well-functioning high quality institutions that provide an environment in which there exists 
high level of political and civil liberties. Therefore our proposition similar to those of 
Adam and Filippaios (2007) is that it is possible to view the level of democracy as a 
composition of the level of political and civil liberties in a state, where all these elements 
are products of institutions in that state. Finally, we consider corruption as institutional 
deficiencies or ill functioning institutions. Having established the way democracy, 
institutions, civil and political liberties are reviewed in this research, we turn into the way 
effects of these factors on FDI activity are structured and reviewed in this chapter in the 
following paragraph.  
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The literature that is reviewed in this chapter as mentioned earlier is mainly focused on 
the studies that have considered the institutional factors, democracy, and civil and political 
liberties in explaining FDI activity. It is worthy to note that most of the studies that have 
been considered in this chapter share a common characteristic, that is, they have 
undertaken empirical analysis of the effect of the aforementioned factors on FDI activity. 
These studies are categorised into two main categories: first, are the studies that have 
exclusively considered the effect of these factors in explaining the FDI; second, are the 
studies that have included these factors as auxiliary explanatory variables in their analysis 
while mainly exploring the effect of economic factors on FDI activity. Therefore, based on 
this classification it is possible to argue that the first group of studies explore the effect of 
institutional factors, democracy, civil and political liberties on FDI activity in a direct 
manner, while the second group of studies constitute the literature that have considered the 
indirect effect of these factors on FDI activity by providing them as auxiliary explanatory 
variables in exploring the effect of economic factors on FDI activity.  
Based on this proposition, it is possible to review the findings of the literature in a 
spherical manner in which papers considering the influence on quality of institutions (in a 
general sense), those considering mainly political aspects of institutions, those mainly 
considering civil aspects of institutions, and finally those studies that only include 
institutional factors as a side independent variable, are reviewed in different groups. 
3.2.1. FDI and Institutions 
A number of scholars adopt a rather general view of institutions in their analysis and 
explore the influence of different aspects of institutional environment of host and home 
countries on FDI activity. These studies that include the works of Lipsey (1999), 
Pournarakis and Varsakelis (2004), Ali et al. (2008), Méon and Sekkat (2004), Mottaleb 
and Kalirajan (2010) generally find evidence supporting a significant positive relationship 
between FDI and institutions.  
Pournarakis and Varsakelis (2004) in an empirical attempt using the sample of countries 
with transitional economics find a positive relationship between institutional factors and 
decision investment of foreign firms and add that existence of high quality institutions 
strengthens the location advantageous of host countries and leads to higher FDI. Méon and 
Sekkat (2004) examine the impact of “ill-functioning institutions” on participation of 
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MENA countries in the world economy and empirically39 investigate the impact of the 
quality of institutions on FDI and find a significant positive relationship between the 
quality of institutions and FDI attractiveness. Similarly, Abdul Mottaleb and Kalirajan 
(2010) explore the determinants of FDI inflows to developing countries and find a positive 
significant relationship between quality of institutions and FDI. Lipsey (1999) investigates 
the determinants of FDI activity in ten Asian countries, from 1989 to 1994, considering 
factors such as market size, growth rate, per capita income, distance, export orientation, 
taxes and quality of institutions. He finds that countries with highest measures of 
institutional characteristics were those attracting most FDI. Thus, he considers that the low 
quality of institutions. However, he argues that the inference based on institutional 
measures (institutional characteristics of a country) seems to be problematic as they tend to 
be correlated with economic characteristics of the countries. Similarly, Ahlquist (2006) 
through empirical investigation of a data set on 90 developing countries from 1985 to 2002 
finds that direct investors are sensitive to political institutions, and that stable and 
democratic institutions attract more FDI. Daude and Stein (2007) investigate the effect of 
institutional variables as determinants of the location of FDI using a sample of unilateral 
FDI stocks from 1990-2000, and find that higher quality of institutions has an overall 
positive and significant effect on FDI. Furthermore, authors add that some institutional 
aspects (in particular: unpredictability of laws, regulations and policies, excessive 
regulatory burden, government instability and lack of commitment) have a greater 
influence on FDI activity than other institutional factors.  
Furthermore a number of scholars including Aizenman and Spiegel (2006) explore the 
effect of institutional efficiency on FDI flows through cross sectional analysis of a sample 
of 97 developed and developing countries from 1989 to 1999 and find that institutional 
efficiency is positively associated with the ratio of subsequent foreign direct investment 
flows. In an empirical attempt, Ali et al. (2008) investigate the impact of institutions on 
FDI using a panel of 107 countries from 1981 to 2005, and find that institutions are a 
robust predictor of FDI and that the most significant institutional aspects are linked to 
propriety rights, the rule of law and expropriation risk.  
The more recent literature on the effect of institutional factors on FDI includes the work 
of authors such as Aleksynska and Havrylchyk (2012) who explore different aspects of 
                                                          
39 using panel data from 1990-1999, covering a number of countries (34 to 107 countries) 
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host countries’ institutions such as the institutional distance between the home and host 
countries. Aleksynska and Havrylchyk (2012) exploring the role of institutional distance 
on the FDI show that institutional distance has an asymmetric effect on FDI depending on 
whether investors choose countries with better or worse institutions. Authors add that 
while institutional distance dampens FDI, the discouraging effect is diminished in case of 
host countries with substantial resources. 
The overall view of the studies40 exploring the effect of institutional environment on 
FDI activity indicates that most studies have found evidence supporting a significant 
positive relationship between FDI and institutions. In line with the way institutional 
aspects of host countries are viewed in this chapter, we further explore the studies that 
consider the direct effect of the civil and political aspects of institutional environments of 
the countries on FDI activity in subsections 3.2.3, 3.2.4 and 3.2.5.  
3.2.2. FDI and Democracy 
The findings of the strand of literature that explores the influence of the level of 
democracy in host countries on FDI varies from studies such as Rodrik (1996), Harms  and 
Ursprung (2001), and Busse (2004)  who have reported a positive significant relationship, 
to the works of authors such as Huntington & Dominguez  (1975), Wintrobe (1998), 
Greider (1998) who find a negative relationship, to a non-linear effect reported by Li and 
Resnick (2003), Adam and Filippaios (2007), and Asiedu and Lien (2010).  
 For instance Harms and Ursprung (2001) explore the relationship between democracy 
and FDI with the main intention of examining whether the popular view that “political 
repression boosts FDI” holds. They consider the panel data of 62 developing and 
transitional economies for 1989-1997 and find that in contrary to the mentioned view, 
MNEs tend to be attracted by the countries in which civil and political liberties are 
respected.41 Using both aggregated and disaggregated measures of democracy and civil and 
political liberties, Busse (2004) investigates the impact of the level of civil and political 
                                                          
40  [i.e. Fathi, A. Norbert, F. and MacDonald, R. (2008); Pierre-Guillaume Méon and Khalid Sekkat (2004); Abdul 
Mottaleb, K. and Kalirajan, K. (2010)]. Others considering the influence of the level of democracy in host countries on 
IFDI have found either a positive significant relationship [i.e. Harms, P. and Ursprung, E. H. (2001)] or a negative 
relationship [Huntington, S. P., & Dominguez, J. I. (1975); Wintrobe (1998); Greider, W. 1998]. 
41 They find that indices of political rights and civil liberties (both extracted from Freedom House), and institutional 
factors (bureaucracy, rule of law, efficiency, corruption; average of measures extracted from ICRG) have a significant 
influence on foreign direct investment per capita and that this influence is positive. This result emerges both from a cross 
section and panel analysis. They add that “a greater unionization among workers seems to attract, rather than deter 
foreign investors”.  
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liberties, as well as the quality of institutions on FDI considering two main specifications, 
and different time spans. In a time series setting he finds evidence of a positive significant 
relationship between democracy and IFDI. Therefore his empirical findings support the 
findings of Rodrik (1996) and Harms and Ursprung (2002) that TNCs appeared to be 
attracted by countries where democratic rights are protected. However using cross section 
methodology for 1970s, he finds a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between democracy and FDI. Busse (2004) argues that in 1970s, TNCs were much more 
likely to invest in countries with repressive regimes, with significantly lower political 
rights and civil liberties for the population”. Considering cross section analysis for 1980s, 
he finds positive insignificant effect of democracy on FDI. Finally, considering the cross 
section analysis for 1990s, he finds positive significant effect of democracy on FDI.  Busse 
and Hefeker (2005) in a similar attempt explore the linkages between institutions, political 
and civil rights and FDI inflows (IFDI) using a panel of 83 developing countries from 1984 
to 2003 and finds that “government stability, internal and external conflict, corruption and 
ethnic tensions, law and order, democratic accountability of government, and quality of 
bureaucracy are highly significant determinants of foreign investment inflows”.42  
Other studies including Asiedu and Lien (2010); Adam and Filippaios (2007), and Li 
and Resnick (2003), investigating the effect of the level of democracy in host countries on 
FDI generally find non-linear relationships where the non-linearity is generally introduced 
through different factors.   For instance Asiedu and Lien (2010) examine the relationship 
between democracy and FDI under the light of the share of natural resources in exports of 
the countries and find that democracy’s effect on FDI is conditional to the host countries’ 
share of natural resources in total exports.43 Including institutional factors; corruption, law, 
and bureaucratic quality of the host country, in their specification, they find that corruption 
and bureaucracy influence FDI in a significant and negative manner while rule of law has a 
positive significant impact on FDI. Their measures of political instability however provide 
puzzling results as measures of political instability, conflict, and government stability 
appear significant in all specification but with opposite signs44. Their empirical 
investigation covers panel data of 112 developing countries for 1982-2007, and speculates 
                                                          
42 The indices of civil, political and institutional measures are extracted from ICRG provided by PRS (Political Risk 
Services) and are incorporated into the study as the twelve indicators provided by the institution capturing different 
aspects of institutional quality and political risk. 
43 Democracy has a significant positive influence on FDI in countries where the share of natural resources in total exports 
is low and a significant negative relationship in countries where the share of natural resources in total exports is high. 
44 ‘Conflict’ appears with a positive sign which is in contrast with the expected sign. ‘Government stability’ appears with 
a positive sign as expected. 
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that expansion of democracy in 90 countries may enhance FDI, while an increase in degree 
of democratization might have negative influence on FDI in the other 22 countries.  
Another example of such non-linear relationships reported when democracy and FDI 
are considered is the work of Adam and Filippaios (2007) that explores the effect of the 
level of democracy on FDI by decomposing democracy into two main elements of civil 
and political liberties45. Using panel data of 105 developed and developing countries for 
1987-1997, they find that there is a negative relationship between civil liberties and FDI, 
which is hump shaped (there is a threshold level below which repression of civil liberties is 
associated with more FDI). With respect to political liberties, they find that there is a 
positive significant relationship between political liberties and FDI. Therefore, they 
conclude that MNEs tend to invest in countries with low civil but with high political 
liberties. The final example of the studies that have found a non-linear effect between 
democracy and FDI is the study of Li and Resnick (2003).  In an empirical46attempt to 
investigate the influences of existence of democratic institutions on IFDI, Li and Resnick 
(2003) find that both property rights protection and democracy-related property rights 
protection encourage FDI inflows, and that democratic institutions improve private 
property rights protection. On the other hand they find that democratic institutions reduce 
FDI through other channels, i.e. provision of capital controls. 
3.2.3. FDI and Civil & Political Liberties 
In this section we consider the handful of studies that have considered the effect of both 
civil and political liberties on FDI. These studies differ from the group of studies reviewed 
in the previous section in that they consider the effect of sub components of democracy on 
FDI. Therefore the effect of each of these factors is separately investigated on FDI while 
the overall model has covered both components that influence the evolution of democratic 
processes in the countries.  
Studies that have considered both civil and political liberties fall into two groups. First 
group including the studies of Busse (2004) and Busse and Hefeker (2005) generally have 
found a positive relationship between civil and political liberties and FDI. The second 
group including the works of Asiedu and Lien (2011), Adam and Filippaios (2007), Li  and 
                                                          
45 Indices of civil and political liberties are extracted from Freedom House. 
46 using panel data (TSCS) of fifty three developing countries 
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Resnick (2003) have found a non-linear relationship where the non-linearity is introduced 
through different factors47, or by the consideration of different aspects of democracy48 or 
institutional elements. 
3.2.4. FDI and influence of Political aspect of institutional Environment  
Scholars exploring the political influences of the institutional environment on FDI 
generally have found results supporting four main perspectives. These perspectives range 
from studies that include the works of Jensen (2003), Addison and Heshmati (2003) who 
have found a significant positive relationship between FDI and institutions. The second 
perspective is provided by the studies such as Wheeler and Mody (1992) and Sethi, et al. 
(2003) who have found an insignificant positive relationship. The third perspective is the 
one provided by studies such as Asiedu (2001) and Coates et al. (2010) who have found an 
insignificant negative relationship. Finally a fourth perspective is resulted by the works of  
Li and Resnick (2003) who have reported both positive and negative influences. 
For instance Jensen (2003) empirically explores the effect of political condition of a 
country on the FDI inflows (FDI attracted) using both cross section and panel analysis for 
114 countries49 and finds that democratic governments attract higher levels of FDI 
(Democratic institutions have a large positive effect on FDI inflows). Others such as 
Addison and Heshmati (2003) investigate the determinants of FDI inflows to developing 
countries (72 developing countries), using the data from 1970-1999 and find that 
democratization leads to increase in FDI inflows to developing countries. Asiedu (2005) 
empirically investigates the influence of political risk, institutional framework and 
government policy on FDI using a sample of 22 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from 
1984 to 2000 and finds that an efficient legal system and a good investment regulatory 
framework promote FDI, whereas, political instability discourage FDI.  
Sethi, et al. (2003) explore the trends of U.S. FDI and the factors influencing it, using 
the data on U.S. FDI into western Europe and Asian countries for the period 1981-2000, 
authors find a positive insignificant relationship between political and economic stability 
                                                          
47 i.e. the level of natural resources in the host country. 
48 i.e. Based on arguments put forward by Li and Resnick (2003), democratic governments have a positive effect on FDI 
by strengthening property rights and have negative effects on FDI through provision of democratic constraints on elected 
politicians; reducing the host government’s ability in providing the MNEs with generous financial and fiscal incentives; 
and finally provision of protection for the indigenous business through provision of wide access to elected officials and 
political participation. 
49 The cross section analysis considers data from 79 countries, while panel analysis considers the data from 114 countries. 
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and U.S. FDI in case of Western European countries, and a negative insignificant 
relationship between political and economic stability between U.S. FDI in case of Asian 
countries. Similarly Wheeler and Mody (2002) focus on manufacturing U.S. MNEs in 42 
foreign countries for the period of 1982-1988, and empirically show that the socio political 
risk has a positive insignificant impact on U.S. MNEs’ manufacturing FDI, while geo-
political risk has a significant positive impact on U.S. MNEs’ FDI.  
Asiedu (2001) explores whether the factors that affect FDI inflows in developing 
countries affect Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) differently. Using panel data from 1988 to 1997 
covering 71 countries and considering number of assassinations and revolutions measure 
of Barro and Lee (1993) as measure of political risk, she finds that political risk has an 
insignificant negative effect on FDI. Demirhan and Masca (2008) explore the determinants 
of FDI inflows using a sample of 28 developing countries over the period of 2000 to 2004, 
in a cross sectional setting and find that political risk has an insignificant negative impact 
on IFDI. Click (2005) empirically investigate the sample of 59 countries over the period of 
1982 to 1998 and finds that political risk has a deteriorating effect on FDI unless the return 
on investment for direct investors is sufficiently high. Other scholars such as Bandelj  
(2002) adopt a more holistic approach and consider not only the political risk but also the 
effect of social relations on FDI and finds that “while political alliances, cultural ties, and 
the presence of networks between countries shape FDI flows”, political risk50 is only a 
significant influential host characteristic in the absence of relational factors and 
insignificant when relational predictors are added to the model. Finally Baek and Qian 
(2011) investigating the effect of political risk on FDI using a sample of 116 countries over 
the period of 1984 to 2008 finds that political risk is a significant determinant of FDI in 
both industrialized and developing nations. Furthermore authors add that in recent era 
political risks have become more important and significant determinants of FDI flows, 
especially in industrialized nations. 
Finally, a number of scholars have considered the effect of political rights on FDI 
activity through its effects, such as existence of interest groups, in host countries. Coates, 
et al. (2010) investigating the effect of existence of interest groups on FDI activity using an 
unbalanced sample of 128 countries from 1985 to 2004, over three time periods finds that 
                                                          
50 Measure of political risk is extracted from Ernst & Young (Dunning & Rojec 1993) 
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higher political liberties that leads to existence of interest groups is negatively related to 
investment.   
3.2.5. FDI and influence of civil aspect of institutional Environment  
A number of papers have also focused on the influence of civil aspects of institutional 
environment. These studies have found results supporting a range of outcomes on the 
relationship between the civil aspect of the quality of institutions and FDI. These outcomes 
range from studies who similar to Coughlin, et al. (1991) and Pournarakis and Varsakelis 
(2004)  have found a positive relationship between the level of civil liberties and FDI, to 
those who similar to Blanton and Blanton   have found a positive insignificant relationship, 
and a third group of studies including Coates, et al. (2010) who have found a negative 
relationship. 
Pournarakis and Varsakelis (2004) investigate the factors leading to uneven allocation of 
FDI in economies of transition. Considering the period of 1997 to 2001, they find that the 
higher level of civil rights in a country, and the better the quality of institutions have an 
indirect positive effect on FDI.51 In a more detailed study Coughlin, et al. (1991) 
investigate the factors influencing the location decision of foreign investors when investing 
in various states of United States, using data from 1981-1983, and find that higher 
unionization rates are associated with increased FDI.  
Blanton and Blanton (2007) examine the impact of human rights on FDI inflows (both 
direct and indirect), and empirically52 show that human rights has both direct and indirect 
effects on FDI, with repression negatively related to FDI inflows. They find “human rights 
significantly related to human capital”, and that through human capital, human rights have 
a significant indirect effect upon FDI. In regard to the influence of democracy, and 
democratic institutions on IFDI, they find a positive insignificant relationship. In contrast, 
Coates, et al. (2010) investigate the effect of interest groups and their activities on FDI by 
considering panel data of 126 countries for 1985-2004, and report their findings that are 
                                                          
51 The reasoning is that the higher the level of civil liberties and institutional factors contributes to the location 
advantages and also help a country to become a more attractive location for FDI. “Countries that are distinguished by a 
more equitable system of rule of law, lower corruption and more freedom in economic activity, achieve much better 
performance than countries that are characterized by significant deficiencies. Countries that suffer from limitations in 
economic activity either by governmental institutions or non-governmental agencies (that is, the mafia, armed groups) 
exhibit the worst performance in attracting FDI.” Their instruments in measuring the level of civil liberty (index of civil 
rights) and the quality of institutions (Freedom of press, corruption perception index and index of political rights) are 
extracted from Freedom House and Transparency International (TI). 
52 using panel data for 1980-1997 of a number of countries 
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consistent with Olson's hypothesis; “the number of interest groups in a nation is negatively 
correlated with investment, consistent with a sclerotic effect due to rent-seeking by interest 
groups.  
3.2.6. FDI and indirect effect of institutions  
The studies that have explored the direct effects of institutional factors on FDI were 
reviewed in the previous section. The section reviews the studies that investigate the 
indirect effects of institutional factors on FDI. The indirect effect of institutions are the 
effects found by the studies that mainly explore the effect of economic factors in 
explaining FDI activity and have institutional factors as inexplicit determining factors of 
FDI activity. The examples of such studies include: Mauro (1995), Mody and Srinivasan  
(1998), Globerman and Shapiro (2002), Noorbakhsh, et al. (2001); Kaufman, et al. (1999).  
For instance Noorbakhsh, Paloni and Youssef (2001) explore the effect of the level of 
human capital in host countries on geographical distribution of FDI. In their specification 
they have included the indices reflecting the quality of institutions53 and factors reflecting 
the level of host country risk (this factor is extracted from Euromoney) which in a way 
reflect the effect of political instability on FDI.  Their empirical analysis covers 36 
developing countries over the period of 1980-94, and does not find a significant 
relationship between political instability and FDI; however they did find evidence 
supporting an inverted U-shaped relationship between FDI and democracy similar to Barro 
(1996; 2000). In contrast Noy and Vu (2007) investigate the effect of capital account 
policies on FDI inflows (IFDI) using annual panel data for the period of 1984 to 2000 from 
a set of developed and developing countries and find that level of political risk have a 
significant negative influence on the IFDI.54 They conclude that liberalizing capital 
account is not sufficient to lead to an increase in IFDI unless there is a decrease in the level 
of political risk. Campos and Kinoshita (2003) explore the effect of “agglomeration 
economies and institutions vis-à-vis initial conditions and factor endowments in explaining 
the locational choice of foreign investors”, using a panel data set of 25 transition 
                                                          
53 indices were extracted from Freedom House 
54 Their measure of corruption, financial risk rating and political risk rating are extracted from PRS group’s International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
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economies for the period 1990-1998, and find that institutional factors have a positive 
significant effect on FDI. 
Click (2005)  investigates the impact of the perceived risk of FDI for U.S. FDI and the 
allocation of FDI for the period 1982-1998 in 59 countries and finds that some cross 
country differences in terms of FDI are explained by the reported level of financial risk 
(i.e. Euromoney country risk, institutional investor risk) and that the unexplained country 
risks are related to unobserved political risk. He also finds that ICRG ratings on 
financial/economic risk and political risk, influences the return on investment both in short 
and long run, but a change in the political rating has no effect. Brunetti, et al. (1997) and 
Lambsdorff (2003) find that the predictability of corruption has an impact on inward 
capital flows that is distinct from the impact of the level of corruption. Institutional 
deficiencies may also have an indirect effect on FDI flows through their impact on other 
variables. A similar observation was made by Campos, Lien & Pradhan (1999) reports that 
the predictability of corruption is a significant determinant of the investment ratio. Bellak, 
et al. (2008) explore the determinants of FDI in Central Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs) specifically the effect of labour costs on FDI. They consider bilateral FDI net-
flows from 1995-2003, between seven home, and eight host countries and find that “higher 
unit labour costs as well as higher total labour costs affect FDI negatively, whereas higher 
labour productivity impacts positively on FDI”. In their specification they take into 
account the political risk of the countries extracted from EUROMONEY, and find a 
negative insignificant relationship between political risk and FDI. 
3.3. Conceptual argumentation 
The previous sections provided the review of literature that has explored the effect of 
institutions, democracy, and its sub components civil and political liberties on FDI. 
Furthermore, in our review we distinguished between the studies that have exclusively 
considered the effect of these factors on FDI from those who have used these factors as 
axillary explanatory variables in exploring the effect of economics factors on FDI. The 
overall view of the findings indicates that the literature on the effect of each of these 
factors on FDI remains inconclusive. Considering our research question that aims at 
exploring the effect of civil and political liberties on FDI, this section provides the 
argumentation for the meta-analysis and provides a number of hypotheses to be tested in 
the following sections.  
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3.3.1. Meta-Analysis – Motivations & Hypotheses 
In the context of FDI literature, the determinants of FDI have been the subject of 
investigation for a long time encompassing a variety of studies from its earlier origins in 
the works of Hymer (1960) to the recent times. The general methods of analysis either 
have considered sole host or home country factors that push or pull FDI (level of growth, 
exchange rates, taxes, institutions, policies, legal systems, cultural distances, etc.), both 
host and home country factors (type of countries, the host country factors, the home 
country factors, the difference between endowment or other country level characteristics 
picked up by interaction terms of other means), and in some cases not only the country 
level factors but also the global movements of capital, and other external influences on the 
flow of capital and its elasticity.  
In this context, the inclusion of firms’ investment motivations and the use of firm and 
sectoral level data have been generally scarce. This is primarily due to two reasons. First 
the lack of integration between the international economics and international business 
literatures and second the scarcity, until very recently, of data that could capture firms’ 
investment motivations and foreign direct investment at the sectoral level. Building on 
international business literature arguments we therefore consider not only the host country 
factors (locational characteristics) but also the motivations of firms investing in those host 
countries. We argue that firms invest in different locations following a number of 
motivations and that the effect of civil and political liberties on FDI is moderated by these 
motivations.  
The motivations of FDI are covered in the previous chapter in section 2.5.2, thus we 
refrain from reviewing them here. RS, MS and ES represent ways in which MNEs seek to 
enhance the benefits they can secure from their mature competitive technologies, as 
embodied in successful established products.  By contrast the fourth motivation, strategic 
asset seeking (SAS), relates to the internationalisation of the ways in which these 
companies pursue the medium- and long-term regeneration of their competitive scope.  
This reflects a second development (alongside freer trade) that has conditioned the 
strategic evolution of globally-competing enterprises, i.e. the greatly increased dispersion 
of the sources from which they can acquire key inputs into their creative/learning 
processes, market heterogeneity and technological heterogeneity (Papanastassiou and 
Pearce 1999). In the existence of this motivation a high repression of civil liberties is 
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expected to exert a negative effect on the productivity of the workforce. In such an 
environment workers are not accustomed to taking initiatives, cannot co-operate 
effectively, and have lower incentives to be productive. This could hinder the strategic 
asset seeking motivation. 
Based on the arguments above we develop the following set of hypotheses:  
H1: The effect of civil and political liberties on FDI decision and behaviour is 
moderated by the firms’ motivations. 
Following from the above arguments, there have, also, been a number of changes in the 
way businesses coordinate their activities in different decades and there has, also, been 
significant changes in market structures. These changes lead to shifts in the composition of 
firms undertaking FDI as well as changes in the motivations of firms. Therefore, different 
FDI behaviour can be observed in different decades. We consider changes in FDI decisions 
as indicating patterns in the strategic expansion of MNEs' operations, as they approach 
globalised competition through organisational structures configured as 'dynamic 
differentiated networks' (Filippaios, Kottaridi et al. 2004).  Thus, at a point in time, an 
MNE's competitive posture is activated through a range of different types of subsidiaries 
addressing different facets of its strategic needs. Across time this network is subject to 
continual expansion (new operations) and restructuring (changing roles of existing 
subsidiaries) as competitive needs alter and the potentials of different host countries 
develop (or are reinterpreted). Firms’ behaviour is a result of their motives, therefore, the 
incorporation of firm level data, and a deeper understanding of the micro level processes 
that lead to MNEs behaviours are a detrimental part of the analysis in explaining the FDI 
activity. It is possible to argue that the consideration of sectoral level data could also be 
proved useful. Unfortunately, there is not enough information to base these arguments 
under empirical scrutiny since in our meta-analysis sample only four papers have 
considered sectoral analyses.  
With this in mind we put forward our second hypothesis: 
H2: Due to changes in markets and industries over time, the investment incentives of the 
firms change over time and as a result the moderation effect of civil and political liberties 
on FDI is affected.  
72 
 
A final argument on the relationship between civil, political liberties, democracy and 
FDI can be put forward relative to the construct of variables. Generally, democracy is 
disaggregated to its constructing elements which are commonly considered as civil and 
political liberties. An example of the latter is the way FREEDOM HOUSE constructs 
democracy indices based on civil and political indices. Since the results both on the effect 
of democracy on FDI, as well as its constructing sub-elements civil and political liberties 
are inconclusive55, this research aims to investigate the separate effect of civil and political 
liberties on FDI. Even though higher civil and political liberties of course imply better 
democratic institutions, there is no reason to expect that these two types of liberties affect 
the investment motives of the MNEs alike. Civil liberties refer to the workplace 
environment and the organization rights of the workers and to various economic rights. In 
contrast, political liberties refer to the decision-making process in the country and the way 
the government chooses which policies to implement. We therefore put forward our final 
hypothesis: 
H3: Civil and political liberties could moderate FDI in different ways. 
H4: The overall level of democracy could moderate FDI, however this effect is less 
pronounced in contrast to civil and political liberties, and often provides mixed or counter 
intuitive results due to the aggregate nature of the measure. 
 To empirically evaluate the above hypotheses we conduct a meta-analysis that 
includes the MNEs motivations, decades, and other study characteristics56 (publication 
year, type of data used, frequency of the data used, etc.), in exploring the literature on FDI. 
This paper to the best of our knowledge is the first meta-analytical attempt to explore the 
factors influencing FDI considering both firm-level (micro) as well as the commonly 
explored country level factors (macro-level factors; both in partial or general equilibrium 
sense). The consideration of such elements is based on the proposition that firms’ 
motivations have some bearing on the MNEs decisions, following earlier discussions by 
Hymer (1976), Dunning (1981) and Dunning (2008).  
 
 
                                                          
55 Examples of papers producing mixed results are provided in table.1. 
56 The full list of variables considered is provided in Appendix 3.2. 
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3.3.2. Research Design & Data  
The sample of studies is collected by searching the ECONLIT, NBER, REPEC, ECON 
PAPERS and JSTOR databases, the Internet using keywords such as “FDI and civil 
liberties”, “FDI and political liberties”, “FDI and democracy”, “FDI and institutions” and 
“FDI”, and through review papers on determinants of FDI. The selection of these databases 
for extraction of the articles is mainly driven by the fact that they tend to provide the most 
extensive set of articles, with some concentrating more on the printed papers (i.e. JSTOR) 
and others more focused on the provision of working papers and white papers (i.e. REPEC, 
EconLit). Out of the thousands of articles briefly reviewed, the overall number of papers 
extracted for the analysis at the first stage was about 239 papers. Table 3-1 tabulates the 
data sources and number of articles that were extracted using the search engines. 
This research based on the arguments provided above, considers the following search 
criteria in provision of its sample; (1) Dependent variable of the papers is FDI. (2) Papers 
have considered one or multiple of the factors (institutional, political, and civil) in their 
Figure 3-1: Overview of the conceptual framework 
74 
 
analysis either exclusively or inclusively. (3) Papers examine the effect of one of the 
factors (Institutional, Political, Civil Liberties) on FDI. In the second review of these 
papers the sample was trimmed down to those papers that considered political and civil 
liberties either implicitly or explicitly and met the search criteria in greater detail. The 
second review therefore, resulted in provision of sample that consists of 69 empirical 
studies57instead of the initial 239 papers. The following section expands more on the data 
collection and treatment for the first part of the analysis. 
Table 3—1: Data sources and number of articles that were extracted using the search engines 
 ECONLIT NBER REPEC ECON papers EBSCO JSTOR 
FDI 
Journal 
Articles 
2571 
Working 
Papers 
692 
Working 
Papers 
692 
Journal 
Articles 
1439 
Working 
Papers 
2572 
Journal 
Articles 
1600 
Working 
Papers 
2000 
Journal 
Articles 
3907 
Working 
Papers 
28 
Journal 
Articles 
2380 
FDI + 
Political 
Liberty 
All sources:1 
Working 
Papers 
102 
12 5 All sources:39 All sources:5 60 
FDI + 
Democracy 
All sources:25 
Working 
Papers 
54 
13 2 
Journal 
Articles 
11 
Working 
Papers 
18 
All sources:0 478 
FDI + Civil 
Liberty 
All sources:2 
Working 
Papers 
57 
3 7 All sources:12 All sources:2 47 
FDI + 
Institutions 
Journal 
Articles 
31 
Working 
Papers 
17 
All 
sources:630 
All sources:359 All sources:100 All sources:9 1139 
 
 
The overall number of papers identified and included in the analysis is 64 papers. Table 3-2 
provides an indicative classification of the papers included in our analysis. 
Table 3—2: Indicative table of papers included and identified relationships 
Determinants 
of FDI 
Positive Negative Insignificant Nonlinear 
Democracy Fathi, A. Norbert, F. and 
MacDonald, R. (2008); Pierre-
Guillaume Méon and Khalid 
Sekkat (2004); Abdul 
Mottaleb, K. and Kalirajan, K. 
Huntington, S. P., & 
Dominguez, J. I. (1975); 
Wintrobe (1998); Greider, 
W. 1998 
  
                                                          
57 Five of the empirical papers have been dropped in the second part of the Meta analysis due lack of provision of number 
of observations for the estimations. Therefore the final sample covers 64 papers. 
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(2010); Harms, P. and 
Ursprung, E. H. (2001) 
Civil and 
political 
liberties 
Busse, M.(2004); Busse M., 
Hefeker C., (2005) 
  Asiedu, E. and D. Lien 
(2010); Adam, A. and F. 
Filippaios (2007);  Li, Q. 
and A. Resnick (2003) 
Political liberty 
& political 
aspects of 
institutions 
Jensen, M., N., (2003); T. and 
Heshmati, A. (2003); Sethi, 
D., Guisinger, S. E., Phelan, S. 
E. & D. M. Berg (2003) 
 Sethi, D., Guisinger, S. E., 
Phelan, S. E. & D. M. 
Berg (2003) ; Wheeler, D. 
and Mody, A. (2002); 
Asiedu, E. (2001) 
 
Civil liberties  Coughlin, C. C., J. V. Terza 
and V. Arromdee (1991) 
Coates, D., J. C. 
Heckelman, et al. (2010) 
Blanton, R. G. and 
Blanton, S. L.(2005) 
 
 
3.4. Methodology 
In this section we have carried out two sets of analysis. The first analysis assumes that 
the effect sizes are all equal (and dichotomous) and therefore captures the difference in 
results in terms of direction and type of the relationships reported. This fixed effect 
approach helps one to find whether there is an effect reported and if so what type of the 
relationship it is.  
The analysis of fixed effect sizes is provided in Appendix 3.3. The main findings of the 
fixed effects analysis are as follows: (1) we find that civil and political liberties provide 
more information about the FDI activity in comparison to aggregate measures of 
institutions and democracy, underscoring the arguments of Blonigen (2005) that advocate 
the use of disaggregated measures, in order to allow the researcher to pick up the 
influences on FDI activity; (2) Investigating the direct versus indirect relationship reported, 
we find that for institutional context, the decade of analysis (decade from which the data is 
extracted), is a significant factor. The latter is in line with the argument provided by Busse 
(2004) on the effect of the decades on the results and the time line shifts in the way MNE’s 
conduct their businesses. As for Political liberties, we find “number of years taken into 
account” is a significant factor, while we find no significant factors influencing the direct 
versus indirect relationship between civil liberties and FDI; (3) Investigating the factors 
that influence the results in terms of a significant versus insignificant relationship reported, 
we find that for Political liberties context, Number of Host Countries (No_HC) is a 
significant factor. Whilst there are no significant factors reported for institutional and civil 
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liberties; (4) Investigating the Positive Versus Negative relationship reported, we find that 
three factors of firm Motivations (Motiv_T), Type of Host Country (Type_HC), and 
Journal Cluster (JCE),  significantly influence the type of relationship reported (positive 
versus negative). However, we find no significant factor influencing the type of 
relationship (positive or negative) reported in political and civil liberties context. As it was 
discussed before, firms’ motivation was expected to influence the decision theory of the 
firm in undertaking their FDI activity. Type of host country is also another factor that has 
been shown to be influencing the type of relationship, which is in line with the arguments 
put forward in the literature, examples of which is the study of Adam and Fillipaios (2007).   
In general there are more evidence from the factors influencing the type of relationship 
reported between institutions and FDI, in contrast to the relationship between civil and 
political liberties and FDI. The latter might very well be the result of the number of studies 
that have considered institutional factors in comparison to those considering political and 
civil liberties. Since the investigation of political and civil liberties as elements comprising 
the general democratic quality of a society which are rather both an element that leads to 
better quality of institutions and also are a product of good institutions in a society, has 
only become fashionable in recent year, thereby the number of studies considering these 
elements are less than the more fashionable institutional factors. The same argument can be 
made for the number of factors found influencing the relationship between political 
liberties and FDI (two factors reported), and civil liberties and FDI (no factors reported). 
The second analysis relaxes the assumption of equality of the effect sizes, and uses the 
regression coefficients of the studies (effect sizes) instead of dichotomous values reflecting 
the effects of the; Institutions, Democracy, Civil Liberties, and Political Liberties, has been 
reported. This random effect approach will provide the opportunity to relax the assumption 
that the true sizes of effects are similar across studies and thereby allows one to provide a 
more detailed analysis of the effect of different variables on the relationships reported. The 
analysis of the fixed effect sizes, and related discussions are provided in the following 
sections.  
3.4.1. Analysis using Actual effect sizes (random effects): 
In the this section the regression coefficients of the studies (effect sizes) are used 
instead of dichotomous values reflecting whether an effect from one of the factors; 
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Institutions, Democracy, Civil Liberties, and Political Liberties, has been reported. This 
random effect approach will provide the opportunity to relax the assumption that the true 
sizes of effects are similar across studies and thereby allows one to provide a more detailed 
analysis of the effect of different variables on the relationships reported.  
3.4.1.1. Data collection 
We build on an earlier data collection methods used in the Meta-analysis by Gorg and 
Strobl (2001), and Meyer and Sinani (2009). Our database encompasses all papers used in 
the first part of the analysis. However, in this part, according to the different models and 
specifications provided in papers, data for coefficients and number of observations of each 
of main following factors; Institutions, Political Liberties, Civil Liberties, from the 
regressions that considered the dependent variable FDI and had one or multiple of the 
mentioned factors as explanatory variables were extracted. Therefore, the main data set in 
this part does include three main columns for effect sizes (regression coefficients reported), 
and number of observations for each of the mentioned factors (Institutions, Political 
Liberties, Civil Liberties).  
Other columns of data provide the information reflecting the study characteristics. The 
studies characteristics include information with regard to: type of data used for empirical 
analysis; the publication year; span of time that is analysed in the research; and a number 
of other factors (provided in Appendix 3.2) in order to allow investigation of possible 
effects of research design on the results reported. Furthermore, in cases where a study has 
adopted alternative analysis using different data types, ranges or different specification 
and/or alternative models, new observations are created and are treated as independent 
observations in the sample [similar to Meyer and Sinani (2009)], in contrast to the first part 
of the analysis that only provided one observation per paper, in this section we have about 
289 observations based on studies covered in the first part of the analysis.  
A number of points should be made about this sample. First, is that a number of 
observations are dropped as in some cases the number of observations used in regressions 
could not be retrieved. The latter has led to provision of the 289 number of observations 
from the 64 studies in contrast to the first part of the paper that had considered 69 studies 
overall. Second, as it was mentioned above, the number of observations does not 
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correspond to the number of paper as there are several observations created for different 
specifications and regressions provided in papers.  
Third, in a number of occasions studies shy away from provision of information about a 
certain aspect of the paper implicitly or explicitly by default58. This is the case in some 
parts of the sample and therefore in some cases calculation is suffering from low number 
of observations. In this regard we have tried to report data that is produced based on a 
legitimate sample size, based on the estimation technique.  
Fourth, overall, our sample is not extensive as the number of studies investigating the 
determinants of FDI considering the quality of institutions, political liberties and civil 
liberties are not numerous and this research has covered almost all the possible studies 
available from the resources mentioned.  
3.4.1.2. Methodology: Schmidt and Hunter method 
This section consists of three parts. First part provides the mean weighted average effect 
sizes reported for each of the factors considered. The second part provides the results of the 
split analysis as well as comments on them. Final part conducts a set of Ordinary Least 
Squares estimations and reports the results. 
Calculation of mean weighed average effect sizes  
The meta-analysis method used here is based on Hunter and Schmidt (1990). The effect sizes 
are calculated using the sample discussed above and the results are provided below in table 3-3 
where; “?̅?” is the sample weighted (by observations) mean effect size, N is the number of 
observations used,  “𝑆𝑟
2” the variance of sample weighted mean effect size,  the sampling error 
variance is reported as “𝑆𝑒
2”   and the biased population variance is represented by “𝑆𝑝
2” . 
  
?̅? =
∑ 𝑁𝑖 . 𝑟𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
?̅?
 
Average effect size. 𝑁 is the number of 
observations and ?̅? is the average of all 𝑁and 𝐾 
                                                          
58 For instance in case of investigation of the factors determining Inward FDI in certain states of United States, authors 
might only look at the state characteristics and shy away from provision of detailed information about the investors in 
which case this research would not have any information regarding the source countries investing in U.S. and thus, the 
sample in this regard may miss some observations. 
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number of observations. 
𝑆𝑟
2 =
∑ 𝑁𝑖(𝑟𝑖 − ?̅? ) 
2𝑘
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑁𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
 
 
variance of sample weighted mean effect size 
𝑆𝑒
2 =
(1 − ?̅?)2
?̅? − 1
 
 
the sampling error variance 
𝑆𝑝
2 = 𝑆𝑟
2 − 𝑆𝑒
2 
Variance in population effect (biased 
population variance) 
 
The general insignificance of results reported for the regressions might be due to the 
existence of moderating effects. Taking the latter into account this research investigates 
regression analysis as well as ANOVA type analysis and split analysis to investigate all the 
possible effects that might otherwise not be taken into account. If the regression analysis 
would only be taken into account, the results would not be extensively informative and 
rather generally insignificant and discounted in the magnitude because of the existence of 
the moderating effects. The effect sizes are calculated using the sample discussed above 
and the results are provided below: 
Table 3—3: Results of the regular calculations 
Regular Calculations 
 
 
  
Institutions 0.1532 127 
Democracy 0.6432 50 
Political 
Liberty 
0.1862 91 
Civil Liberty 0.5199 51 
 
The results show that as expected, the overall effect of institutions on the FDI is 
insignificant and positive. The effect of democracy on FDI seems to be positive and we 
also observe that it has the second largest magnitude. The effect reported for political 
liberties is positive, indicating that the higher the level of political liberty the higher the 
level of FDI reported. Although the magnitude is significantly lower than that reported for 
?̅? 
?̅? 𝑁 
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civil liberty which also has a positive sign. Finally, considering the effect of Civil Liberties 
on FDI, we find a positive insignificant relationship reported, with the magnitude that is 
the second largest after democracy.  
Overall, all the factors have reported expected intuitive signs. However, all the results 
are insignificant. The insignificance might be a by-product of the existence of moderating 
effects. Therefore, we will perform an ANOVA type split analysis in the following section 
to investigate existence of such relationships. In terms of magnitude of the effect sizes 
reported, Democracy, political liberties, institutions and civil liberties have the largest 
positive effects on FDI, respectively. The lower effect size reported for civil liberty might 
be an indication of the difficulty to pin down the effect of this measure compared to other 
factors such as political liberties, or the aggregate measures such as democracy which itself 
is a composition of other factors.  
The overall insignificant and the magnitudes reported lead one to suspect the existence 
of moderating effects and thus they are investigated below. It’s worthy to mention that 
calculation of the overall effect size considering the average effect sizes however provided 
results that suffered from low degrees of significance and magnitude and thus are not 
reported here.59 
3.4.1.2. A. Split analysis  
The results of the regular and average calculations were intuitive, however they were 
mainly insignificant. Therefore in order to investigate the influence of different elements 
on the relationships reported, we conduct split analysis. In the first part we use 
standardised mean differences in order to investigate the pair-wise contrasts using 
ANOVA type tests. 
The “split analysis” is considering all the groups related to the same factor and takes the 
observations related to a certain sub group and finds the effect size and the probability 
assigned to such effect size. Conducting this task will help one to compare the effect sizes 
and probabilities across groups in order to examine whether there are some distinguishing 
patterns in the context and whether such patterns reflect an intuitive argument or else 
                                                          
59 The main idea in the average calculation method is that the average effect of all the observations related to the same 
study is calculated and then weighted by average number of observations. The results of average calculations are 
provided in Appendix 3.4. 
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project a new finding.  The results of split analysis and the related discussions are available 
from appendix 3.5. 
3.4.1.3. Analysis using OLS estimator 
Since collection of effect sizes has led to provision of continuous dependent variables, it 
is possible to conduct a linear regression analysis to explore the moderating effect of 
different study characteristics on the type of relationships reported between institutional, 
democratic, political and civil liberty factors considered in the studies. A second reason for 
conducting the linear regression analysis is that the results provided earlier on in this 
section, although generally intuitive, were largely insignificant. Thus this section aims to 
shed more light on the effect of political and civil liberties as individual measures, as well 
as their aggregate forms on FDI. Therefore this section reviews the results of the effect of 
institutional factors, democracy, political liberties, and civil liberties on FDI, respectively.  
3.4.1.3. A. Institutions and FDI – a linear regression analysis 
Considering the effect of institutions on FDI in different decades, we find that during 
1980s, existence of sound institutional environment has had a negative and significant60 
effect on the inflow of FDI. This effect seems to have reversed during 1990s, where one 
observes a positive significant effect of institutions on FDI at a much higher level of 
significance. The latter might be the effect of the shift in industries from a more resource 
intensive set of motivations, perhaps the remainder of such effects from 1970s, to a more 
efficiency seeking motivation in late 1980s, and throughout 1990s.  
Apart from the explanation provided above, there might be a number of other factors 
that have had effects on such shift (i.e. policies). For instance during 1980s (Reagan 
Administration) changes in tax laws mainly in United States as documented by Scholes 
and Wolfson (1989) led to a “first-order effect on merger and acquisition activity in United 
States”, increases on the reliance on the institutional arrangements in order to reduce the 
non tax costs of organizations, as well as changes in the composition of the American firms 
investing abroad61. Since U.S. FDI comprises a high proportion of overall FDI 
                                                          
60 Level of significance considered is 10%. 
61 Due to the Tax reform Act of 1986 and higher tax costs as a result of it, transaction between many U.S. firms and their 
subsidiaries became highly costly, and demand for merger and acquisition transactions increased.  The latter also led to a 
change in the composition of U.S. FDI, as many of small firms investing outside of U.S. did not afford to do so 
afterwards. 
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documented, a shift in the composition of U.S. firms’ conducting FDI might lead to 
observation of such effects.  
Table 3—4: Moderating factors affecting the relationship between institutions and FDI flows.  
Variables Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
Dec_70s 0.002 
  
1.323 
 
(0.305) 
  
(1.091) 
Dec_80s -0.678* 
 
0.357*** -2.108 
 
(0.381) 
 
(-0.053) (1.531) 
Dec_90s 0.985*** 
 
-0.319** 2.110+ 
 
(0.305) 
 
(-0.13) (1.32) 
Dec_2000s -0.226 
 
-0.321*** 0.666 
 
(0.382) 
 
(-0.052) (0.912) 
RS 
 
3.301 -0.176*** 3.851+ 
  
(2.308) (-0.048) (2.641) 
MS 
 
-0.264** 0.343*** 1.121 
  
(0.104) (-0.074) (1.214) 
ES 
 
2.023+ -0.048+ 2.527+ 
  
(1.396) (-0.032) (1.671) 
SAS 
 
-0.79 0.054 -0.159 
  
(0.59) (-0.045) (0.461) 
Type_of_Host_C 
 
  
 
0.052 
    
(-0.119) 
_cons -0.164 -0.793 0.079 -4.808+ 
 
(0.382) (0.845) (0.143) (3.298) 
N 126.000 126.000 284.000 125.000 
F . . 7.717 . 
Ll -361.434 -354.946 -37.899 -351.098 
aic 730.869 717.892 91.799 718.196 
Asterisks remark the level of significance: 15%, * 10%, ** 5% and *** at one percentile level of 
significance. 
Considering model 2, the analysis of the effect of solely firm’s motivations on the effect 
of institutions on FDI shows that market seeking motivations (MS) and efficiency seeking 
motivations are the only two motivations significantly affecting the relationship between 
institutions and FDI. Efficiency seeking motives show a positive significant effect on the 
relationship as expected. Therefore it appears that firms tend to invest more in host 
countries where good institutional environment and as a result a high level of civil and 
political liberties for the employees exists. This finding while similar to those of Fathi, et 
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al. (2008), Méon and Sekkat (2004), Mottaleb and Kalirajan (2010), who indicated the 
existence of a positive relationship between high institutional quality and FDI, is rather 
more specific as it underlines that such a significance positive effect is mainly specific to 
firms with efficiency motives.   
On the other hand the significant negative effect of Market Seeking (MS) motives on 
the relationship between institutions and FDI is rather counter intuitive. We find no 
significant effect of resource seeking (RS) motives and Strategic Asset Seeking (SAS) 
motives on the relationship between institutions and FDI. The results indicate a positive 
insignificant effect of RS motives on the relationship and a negative effect of SAS motives 
on the relationship between institutions and FDI, which are rather counter intuitive as one 
would expect firms with RS motives would prefer the host countries with higher level of 
repression ex ante, or would lead to an increase in the level of repression in host countries 
ad hoc. 
In an effort to provide a better fitted model, a number of regressions are performed and 
the most satisfying two models are model3 and 4. The model3 takes into account both 
decades of data considered in the studies as well as the motivation of the firms undertaking 
FDI. The results show a significant positive effect of consideration of data from 1990s, a 
significant positive effect of RS motives, and a significant positive effect of ES motives on 
the relationship between institutions and FDI.  
3.4.1.3. B. Democracy and FDI 
Considering the factors affecting the relationship between the existing level of 
democracy and FDI, we find that similar to the arguments provided by Busse (2004) there 
is effect of shifts in the way MNEs behave in different decades. As it is expected, the more 
resource seeking activities of firms in 1970s seems to have favoured the choice of host 
countries with lower level of democracy, as we observe a significant and negative effect of 
the data from 1970s on the relationship reported between democracy and FDI. On the other 
hand we observe a positive significant relationship between democracy and FDI when the 
data from 1980s is considered.  The data from other decades seem to have had no 
significant effect on the relationship between democracy and FDI. Thus the main 
destination of the firms considered in the literature as the main proportion of FDI 
destination during 1970s seems to have been from developed to less developed or 
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developing countries, while it would have been mainly from developed to other developed 
countries in 1980s. A general example of such FDI is the Japanese FDI into U.S. in late 
1980s which would count for a staggering amount of the capital flows considered.  
Another perspective, through which the flow of FDI could be reviewed, would be from 
the composition of the firms (or their incentives) that have conducted FDI activity and 
have been considered in the literature. The results of model2 show that RS motives of 
firms have a positive and significant effect on the relationship between democracy and 
FDI, underlying the view that firms with RS motives prefer to invest in more democratic 
countries and support a certain level of democracy in host countries in order to assure their 
protection and reduce the level of uncertainty. On the other hand we find that MS motives 
have a significant negative effect on the relationship between democracy and FDI, 
underlying the idea that democratic markets are rather more carefully protected. Since 
firms with MS motives by nature would be aiming for some market share, more protection 
in their target markets would have a negative effect on their decisions toward FDI. While 
the effect of RS and ES motives of MNEs on the FDI activity and behaviour is extensively 
documented in the literature, the effect of MS motives on their behaviour is scarcely 
reviewed. Thus future researches are advised to review the latter more in length. 
A similar argument can be made for the effect of ES motives on FDI. The observed 
negative significant effect of ES motives on the relationship between democracy and FDI 
results from the cost consideration activity of the firms with ES motives. Since in more 
democratic markets the level of civil and political liberties are higher (since the level of 
democracy is generally decomposed to the level of civil and political liberties in the 
literature, similar to this research), the costs would be higher in such markets and hence the 
relationship as expected would be negative and significant. Finally, we find a minor 
negative and non-significant effect of SAS motives on FDI. 
Table 3—5: Moderating factors affecting the relationship between democracy and FDI flows.  
Variables Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
Dec_70s -1.911** 
 
0.115 0.226 
 
(0.839) 
 
(0.241) (0.326) 
Dec_80s 1.678* 
 
-0.402 -0.487 
 
(0.855) 
 
(0.296) (0.384) 
Dec_90s -0.852 
 
-0.861 -0.568 
 
(0.92) 
 
(0.623) (0.695) 
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Dec_2000s -1.231 
 
0.993* 1.050* 
 
(0.983) 
 
(0.573) (0.56) 
RS 
 
0.676* 0.771** 0.624** 
  
(0.366) (0.319) (0.298) 
MS 
 
-4.676*** -4.897*** -4.778*** 
  
(1.578) (1.664) (1.711) 
ES 
 
-0.915* -0.351 -0.006 
  
(0.482) (0.394) (0.308) 
SAS 
 
-0.093 -0.704+ -1.099** 
  
(0.212) (0.447) (0.507) 
Type_of_Host_C  
  
-0.141+ 
    
(0.088) 
_cons 1.481* 5.734*** 6.432*** 6.583*** 
 
(0.849) (1.649) (1.763) (1.794) 
N 50.000 50.000 50.000 48.000 
F 2.031 4.131 2.711 2.337 
ll -112.227 -100.149 -99.653 -96.466 
aic 234.454 210.299 217.306 212.932 
Asterisks remark the level of significance: 15%, * 10%, ** 5% and *** at one percentile level of significance. 
Considering model 3, that takes into account the combination of these factors leads to 
provision of a better fit and consistently shows that the data from post 2000 era and RS 
motives have a positive and significant effect on the relationship between democracy and 
FDI while the consideration of MS motives still carries a significant negative effect. 
Examining all the variables including the effect of type of the host country on the 
relationship between democracy and FDI (model4), we find that the data from post 2000s 
and RS motives have a positive significant effect on the relationship, while MS and SAS 
motives along with type of host country, have a negative effect on the relationship. The 
“introduction of type of host country” variable to the model has led to a change in the level 
of significance in the SAS motives variable, which in turn underscores the effect of 
considering the type of host country on the relationships reported.  
3.4.1.3. C. Political Liberties and FDI 
Analysing the effect of decades on the relationship between political liberties and FDI, 
we find no significant effect (model1). On the other hand analysing the effect of firms’ 
motives on the relationship between political liberties and FDI shows a significant and 
negative effect of MS and SAS motives on the relationship (model2). As it was discussed 
before in previous section, higher level of political liberty generally leads to higher level of 
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protection in the market and since firms with MS motives would prefer to operate in 
markets with low level of protection this significant and negative effect is expected. 
Exploring model3 that includes both sets of variables (decades and motives) we find that 
the use of data from 1980s has a negative effect on the relationship between political 
liberties and FDI while a similar model taking into account democracy indicated a minor 
negative insignificant effect. The differences between the effects of sub measures of civil 
and political liberties and main measure, democracy can be traced back into interpretations 
of disaggregated measures versus aggregate measures.  
Analysing different models based on the set of variables available lead to provision of 
the model4 that underscores the importance of the type of host countries taken into account 
in the studies. Type of host country taken into account shows a positive and significant 
effect on the relationship reported between political liberty and FDI. Considering the effect 
of motivations on the relationship we find that MS motives have a negative significant 
effect on the relationship between political liberties and FDI. Reviewing the result of the 
decade variables we find the significant negative effect of data from 1980s on relationship 
between political liberties and FDI.  This finding is of great value since it indicates the 
importance of the type of host country taken into account.  
In the previous sections, we discussed how various firms from different backgrounds (in 
the sense of the way they conduct and coordinate their activities- varieties of capitalism) 
differ in their decisions on FDI and their behaviour both ex ante and ex post, in host 
countries. It was also discussed that firms do behave differently in different types of host 
countries; namely their behaviour seems to be pro-democratic environment in developed 
countries, while it seems to vary in developing and less developed countries based on the 
types of the firms investing in those countries and the level of natural resources and market 
structure existing in them. The finding above underscores and confirms the previous claim 
that type of a host country and its level of political liberty have an effect on the level and 
composition of FDI. 
Table 3—6: Moderating factors affecting the relationship between political liberties and FDI flows.  
Variables Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
Dec_70s 0.549 
 
1.727 2.107 
 
(1.132) 
 
(1.92) (1.914) 
Dec_80s -1.605 
 
-2.512* -2.087+ 
 
(1.148) 
 
(1.503) (1.293) 
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Dec_90s 0.944 
 
2.164 -0.02 
 
(0.857) 
 
(1.49) (1.024) 
Dec_2000s 0.49 
 
1.263 0.073 
 
(1.086) 
 
(1.579) (1.331) 
RS 
 
-0.208 0.997 0.265 
  
(0.449) (1.294) (1.145) 
MS 
 
-2.873** -4.463** -3.750** 
  
(1.339) (1.955) (1.828) 
ES 
 
0.018 1.874 0.799 
  
(0.609) (1.37) (1.085) 
SAS 
 
-3.335+ -3.081* -2.394+ 
  
(2.016) (1.738) (1.541) 
Type_of_Host_C  
  
0.560*** 
    
(0.208) 
_cons -0.3 3.182** 1.675 1.709 
 
(0.874) (1.451) (1.909) (1.8) 
N 91.000 91.000 91.000 85.000 
F 1.976 2.412 1.656 1.92 
ll -240.471 -234.955 -231.259 -215.19 
aic 490.942 479.91 480.519 450.379 
Asterisks remark the level of significance: 15%, * 10%, ** 5% and *** at one percentile level of significance. 
In general the models analysed in this section suffer from low power which is natural 
considering the cross sectional nature of the data and small sample, and is quite common in 
Meta-analysis literature. 
3.4.1.3. D. Civil Liberties and FDI 
Analysing the effect of decades on the relationship between civil liberties and FDI 
(model1), we find that the data from 1990s and post 2000s have a significant effect on the 
relationship, with data from 1990s having a significant positive effect on the relationship 
while the data from post 2000s having a negative significant effect. The latter shows a shift 
in the last decade from a rather positive effect in 1990s to a negative one in this decade. 
Perhaps one would be able to refer to the changes in markets as the result of introduction 
of information systems and internet which has resulted in outsourcing many activities of 
MNEs to places where they would not have a comfortable or an efficient control over 
before.  
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Examining the effect of the firms’ motivations on the relationship between civil liberties 
and FDI (model2), we find that ES motives as expected have a significant and negative 
effect on the relationship while SAS motives have a positive significant effect on it. 
Table 3—7: Moderating factors affecting the relationship between civil liberties and FDI flows.  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dec_70s 0.158 
 
0.544 0.883 
 
(0.776) 
 
(1.020) (1.128) 
Dec_80s 0.32 
 
-0.176 -0.415 
 
(0.568) 
 
(0.833) (0.870) 
Dec_90s 1.204** 
 
0.819 0.480 
 
(0.594) 
 
(0.875) (0.996) 
Dec_2000s -0.845* 
 
-0.769+ -0.729+ 
 
(0.447) 
 
(0.472) (0.488) 
RS 
 
-0.254 -0.369 -0.210 
  
(0.211) (0.876) (0.925) 
MS 
 
-2.196 -2.081 -2.241 
  
(1.734) (2.006) (2.049) 
ES 
 
-0.238*** -0.062 0.118 
  
(0.035) (0.834) (0.857) 
SAS 
 
0.636*** 0.345 0.445 
  
(0.209) (0.269) (0.335) 
Type_of_Host_C  
  
0.060 
    
(0.054) 
_cons -0.82 2.638+ 1.819 1.918 
 
(0.568) (1.722) (2.007) (2.042) 
N 50 51 50.000 50.000 
F . . . . 
ll -89.192 -86.238 -83.440 -83.381 
aic 186.383 180.477 180.880 182.763 
Asterisks remark the level of significance: 15%, * 10%, ** 5% and *** at one percentile level of significance. 
The negative significant effect of ES motives on the relationship can be traced back into 
profit maximising behaviour of such firms with incentives to reduce costs by either 
investing in places with lower civil liberties or repress civil liberties at their current 
existing production locations. On the other hand the positive significant effect of SAS 
motives on the relationship between civil and political liberties can be traced back into the 
incentive of firms with such motives to maximise the innovative capability and motivation 
of their labour force. 
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Examining model 3, which tends to explore the effect of both sets of variables we find 
that data from post 2000s still has a negative significant effect on the relationship between 
civil liberties and FDI. We also observe the same effects of the motivations on the 
relationship reported, however the findings are insignificant. Exploring model 4, we find a 
change of sign in the value reported for ES motives, indicating the effect of host country 
on efficiency seeking behaviour of firms in the context of civil liberties and FDI.  
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter focuses on the effect of institutional factors as well as political and civil 
liberties (factors forming the general democratic environment of nations) on FDI and sets 
out to investigate the literature that have taken into account the effect of the Civil, political 
and institutional environment (of either host, home, or both host and home countries) on 
FDI flows. The aim is to provide a greater understanding of the existing knowledge in 
regard to the effects of the aforementioned factors on FDI as well as exploration of the 
gaps there may be in the literature. In doing so we adopt meta-analysis methods in our 
exploration in order to examine whether there are systemic biases introduced to the 
literature through the common choices made in terms of scale and study properties (i.e. the 
choice of country level analysis, data range and decade influences; etc.). The main 
contribution of this research is inclusion of all the elements of the studies that have 
considered the effect of civil and political liberties or some explicit or implicit measures of 
these concepts in determining the determinants of FDI, in order to investigate whether 
there are specific trends not only in the results produced, but also whether there are factors 
that contribute to production of certain set of results. A second contribution of this part of 
the research is that it takes into account the factors such as firms’ motivation and the 
decades of analysis which in turn both have been generally neglected in the meta analysis 
conducted on the literature as well as FDI literature, with some exceptions including the 
works of Busse (2004), Dunning (1988), and Dunning and Lundan (2008).  
In terms of study characteristics we find that the use of panel data has generally 
provided significant results when considering the relationship between institutional factors 
and FDI. In terms of the scale of measures used, our analysis on the literature exploring the 
effect of political, civil, democratic, or institutional factors on FDI activity shows that 
measures such as democracy that have a more aggregate construct, generally lead to 
provision of low magnitude and often insignificant results which in fact are manifestations 
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of combined mixed effects packaged together, since their (in this case democracy) sub 
measures (civil and political liberties) in most cases pick up contrasting effects. We also 
find that the use of data from various decades leads to provision of different sets of results 
in terms of both influences of different factors on FDI as well as the incentives of MNEs in 
their decision towards the types of investments undertaken. The latter as well documented 
by Busse (2004) is the product of the changes both in markets as well as firms’ motives 
(incentives) which in a way shapes the way firms coordinate their activities. Therefore the 
consideration of aggregate data over a number of decades seems thoroughly hazardous.  
Also as expected, we find that firms’ motivations have influence on their behaviour and 
FDI activity. For instance examining the effect of the firms’ motivations on the 
relationship between civil liberties and FDI, we find that ES motives as expected have a 
significant and negative effect on the relationship while SAS motives have a positive 
significant effect on it. The negative significant effect of ES motives on the relationship 
can be traced back into profit maximising behaviour of such firms with incentives to 
reduce costs by either investing in places with lower civil liberties or repress civil liberties 
at their current existing production locations. On the other hand the positive significant 
effect of SAS motives on the relationship between civil and political liberties can be traced 
back into the incentive of firms with such motives to maximise the innovative capability 
and motivation of their labour force. The motivations while conditional to the element of 
time and subject to change seem to provide good information about the micro processes 
that lead to progression of macro activities of sectors and firms within them. On the other 
hand since the literature is vastly populated with studies that use country level analysis it 
seems that consideration of firm level and sectoral level data would be fruitful. 
Another finding is related to the choice of home and host countries taken into account in 
the analysis. We find that the choices of host country is important in the design of the 
research as it has generally been a significant factor on the relationship between FDI and 
factors considered here (institutional factors, democracy, civil and political liberties). 
Finally, we find a negative significant effect of Market seeking and Strategic Asset 
Seeking motivation of firms on the relationship between political liberties and FDI. The 
exploration of the latter and provision of some explanation for it would be of interest for 
the future research. 
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The overall view of the findings of the Meta-Analysis conducted in this chapter informs 
the formation of the theoretical framework of chapter 4, by validating the existence of the 
effect of motivations on the FDI, not only in a conceptual aspect but also, as set of factors 
that have consistently and significantly have shown to influence the relationship between 
civil and political liberties and FDI. In particular, our theoretical model builds on 
transaction cost theory by analysing the effect of the existing level of civil liberties and 
political rights on the cost structure of MNEs abroad and thereby their decision with 
respect to FDI. In our empirical investigation all FDI motivations as set forward by 
Behrman (1974) are considered as explanatory variables that help explaining FDI activity 
by drawing on micro drivers of FDI activity. Furthermore, the meta-analysis provided in 
this section, provides support for the view advocated by a few including Blonigen (2005), 
that, consideration of disaggregated data provides more detailed information with regard to 
specific effects of civil and political liberties on FDI activity in various sectors. The 
theoretical model of chapter four, distinguishes between industries based on their 
labour/capital share of production. The empirical investigation of chapter 7 undertakes the 
examination of the effect of civil and political liberties on FDI, both in an aggregated (total 
FDI) and disaggregated (sectoral) manner. The sectoral analysis of effect of civil and 
political liberties on FDI activity in various sectors is conducted by dividing industries into 
two main sectors of manufacturing and services.    
The meta-analysis conducted in this chapter, also underscores the importance of: the 
choice of host countries; and the effect of time on the findings. Our sample of host 
countries is chosen in the way that it embodies an extensive number of countries that 
includes developed, developing and less developed countries, and thereby avoids selection 
bias, and allows the generalization of findings. Furthermore, one of the results of our Meta-
analysis suggests that the time span of data influences the relationships reported. In order 
to avoid provision of results that are conditional to time, and by nature not generalizable, 
our empirical database spans from 1990 to 2009, providing data on FDI activity for two 
decades.  
This chapter provided a review of the literature that have considered the effect of 
institutions, democracy, civil and political liberties on FDI, and showed that the literature 
remains inconclusive on the effect of civil and political liberties on FDI. The Meta-analysis 
provided useful information with regard to: the effect of firms’ motivations on the 
92 
 
relationship between civil and political liberties and FDI; the importance of using 
disaggregated data in analysis of FDI activity; the effect of the window of time from which 
data is extracted, and other characteristics of research design on the empirical results, and 
by doing so informs the development of the theoretical model of chapter 4, and the 
empirical investigation of chapter 7.   
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Chapter 4 : Theoretical Model 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter reviewed the literature on the effect of civil liberties and political 
rights on FDI activity, and showed that the literature on the effect of civil and political 
liberties on FDI continuous to be inconclusive due to the existence of mixed findings on 
the subject. This chapter builds upon: the IB theory, in particular the motivations of FDI 
introduced by Behrman (1974) and later on reviewed by Dunning and Lundan (2008); 
Comparative Capitalism, in particular Varieties of Capitalism framework introduced by 
Hall and Soskice (2001); and Organization Theory of Coase (1937) further developed by 
North (1990) with the intention to construct a theoretical framework that would allow 
examination of the effect of civil liberties and political rights on FDI in an explicit manner.  
In this chapter we theoretically explore the effect of the civil liberties and political 
rights on the initial cost of FDI and thereby FDI activity. The models provided build upon 
the works of Grout (1984), Hart and Moutos (1995) and Adam and Filippaios (2007). It is 
assumed that the decision of FDI is influenced by the initial cost of investment into the 
designated host country. Therefore, firms are considered to bargain with employee 
representatives (labour unions) in the host country before deciding upon their investment 
abroad, in order to obtain full information with regard to the initial costs of investment. 
The incentive of the representatives of the MNE is to bargain over wages in order to reduce 
the initial and recurrent cost of production. The negotiation over the initial cost of 
production is undergone with the knowledge that the union representatives might have the 
incentive to revisit the bargaining process after the investment is made, with the intention 
to bargain over higher wages, thus a “non-binding contract” (Grout, 1984) is negotiated 
between the firm and entity. The incentive of unions, in the presence of unemployment in 
the market entails two main elements of negotiation over wages and employment. We 
theoretically show that in the presence of unemployment in the market, the utility function 
of national unions and sectoral unions would be similar. Therefore the utility function of 
unions (irrespective of their level) translates to a type of function that embodies both 
elements of wages and labour recruitment. Furthermore, incorporating the VoC framework 
we distinguish between different types of unions based on their market economies and 
other characteristics. The distinction provides four main types of unions, namely; Nordic, 
94 
 
Liberal, Coordinated, and other unions, relating to Northern, LME, CME, and other types 
of market economies.  
Our view of the civil liberties is in line with that adopted by Freedom House in 
provision of data on the concept. Reviewing the subcomponents of the civil liberties 
concept from the questionnaire62 used for collection of data on civil liberties by Freedom 
House, civil liberties embody a number of factors including: Freedom of expression and 
belief, Association & organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy & 
individual rights. Therefore, the level of civil liberties is assumed to be directly related to 
the union power, granted by the institutional government in the host countries. It is 
considered that in the absence of civil liberties, the individuals do not have the ability to 
express their opinions, due to lack of Freedom of expression and belief. Furthermore, in 
the absence of civil liberties, employees do not have the right to form entities (i.e. labour 
representatives and unions) that would express their opinions and advocate their rights due 
to restrictions on Association & organizational rights. Therefore in the countries with high 
repression of civil liberties, firms are able to conduct their activities without worrying 
about renegotiation of wages or employment. In contrast in the presence of civil liberties 
employees are free to form unions, and express their rights and thus influence the activity 
of the firms. In the study of FDI activity we have considered the effect of civil liberties to 
be channelled through unions (labour representatives).  
Our view of the political rights is in line with that adopted by Freedom House in 
provision of data on the concept. Reviewing the subcomponents of the political rights 
concept from the questionnaire63 used for collection of data on civil liberties by Freedom 
House, political rights embody a number of factors including: Electoral process and 
political pluralism & participation. Therefore, it is considered that in countries with low 
level of political rights, the low quality of electoral process, and low degree of political 
pluralism and participation tends to result in the governing body that is not representative 
of the people. Consequently it is assumed that the low level of political rights is directly 
related to the radical changes in policies. The policies that affect the FDI activity vary from 
those relating to trade, to those relating to the access to capital and taxes. Since our design 
is mainly devoted to explore the effect of civil and political liberties on FDI activity 
through bargaining processes that would alternate the cost structure of the foreign firms 
                                                          
62 The questionnaire used for collection of data on civil liberties, by Freedom House is provided in Appendix 6.4. 
63 The questionnaire used for collection of data on civil liberties, by Freedom House is provided in Appendix 6.4. 
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abroad, the political rights are considered to be affecting FDI activity through taxes 
imposed on foreign firms. The low level of political rights in the host countries would 
allow the presence of governments with low degree of representativeness that is a product 
of low level of political pluralism and weak electoral process. In such countries, 
governments are able to adopt rent extraction strategies that assign higher taxes on foreign 
firms in order to extract rent from them. In line with arguments provided by Olson and 
McGuire (1995), it is assumed that the less democratic (lower level of political and civil 
liberties) governments, which are generally not representative, are more prone to 
imposition of policies and taxation systems that are in line rent extraction. Therefore, the 
effect of the level of political rights in the model is accounted for through taxes on the 
MNEs. Moreover, this chapter provides two models that account for taxes on income, as 
well as taxes on profits. The two models were discussed and elaborated and a number of 
theoretical findings were produced based on which a set of hypotheses are derived that are 
going to be empirically tested in chapter seven.  
The theoretical model developed in this chapter is novel. However, it shares a number 
of similarities with the conceptual model provided by provided by Adam and Filippaios 
(2007). In order to distinguish between the models provided in this chapter and that 
provided by Adam and Filippaios (2007), the distinctions are noted as follows:  First, the 
host markets are not assumed to be fully competitive markets and thus our model allows 
for presence of unemployment in the host markets. Second, since the assumption of full 
employment in the host markets is relaxed, a welfare wage is introduced to account for the 
effect of the level of welfare wage on the wage bargaining process. Third, the models 
provided take into consideration two types of taxation systems, namely: taxes on profit, 
and taxes on income. Fourth, the incorporation of the VoC into our framework allows us to 
draw comparisons between the way bargaining processes are conducted when various 
MNEs and host markets from different types of economies are considered. The integration 
of VoC framework into IB theory and its incorporation into a transaction cost based 
theoretical model is a novel contribution of our model. Fifth, it is assumed that non-union 
employees and union employees (both types of labour) are present in the market. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Sections 4.2 and 4.3 introduce MNEs 
and Unions, their assumptions and profit functions. Section 4.4 provides a static game 
theoretical model that considers the effect of civil liberties and political rights on FDI 
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through wages, and taxes on income, respectively. The game theoretical model is then 
developed further to provide the minimum level of capital that has to be invested by MNE 
for the FDI to take the place. The sensitivity of FDI, based on cost of investment, to the 
level of civil liberties and political rights are explored and the comparative statistics and 
testable hypothesis are derived and discussed.  
In order to explore the effect of political rights on FDI, we consider an alternative game 
theoretical model that considers taxes to be applied to profit rather than income. 
Subsequently the Nash equilibrium, comparative statistics and testable hypothesis, are 
provided and discussed.  Due to limitations in terms of space, we refrain from providing 
the material related to this model in the core text, and instead provide them in the 
appendix4.4.a. Section 4.6 discusses the limitations of the theoretical model, and proposes 
a number of avenues for further research. Finally, section 4.8 provides some concluding 
remarks on the theoretical investigation. 
4.2. Static Game between the Firm and the labour (trade) Union 
This research considers that in most cases, before an MNE undertakes FDI, it performs 
a set of activities in order to obtain a set of information in regards to the host country’s 
market. This set of information would entail the taxes imposed on MNEs in the product 
market, the general product market environment (in terms of competition, number of 
producers, the composition of producers, etc.), information with regard to the cost of 
labour which is obtained through a number of channels (in many cases there are standard 
wages set in sectors and industries), and a information on a number of other factors that 
might affect the production and profit of the firm in the host market.  
It is assumed that after obtaining the preliminary set of information, if the investment 
opportunity is comparatively attractive, MNEs proceed to communicate with different 
parties affecting their prospective investment in host country, namely, they discuss their 
tax structure, initial cost of investment, and their bargain over their labour costs with 
unions in the target market. The attractiveness of the opportunity to invest is related to the 
firms’ motivation of investment. As discussed in chapter 2 and 3, we consider firms to be 
motivated by four main motives of Resource Seeking (RS); Market Seeking (MS); 
Efficiency Seeking (ES); and Strategic Asset Seeking (SAS). Our theoretical model in this 
chapter mainly focuses on ES motives by considering the wage bargaining process 
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between firm and labour representatives, and thereby the wage setting to be the 
determinant of the FDI activity. Consequently the effect of civil liberties on FDI activity is 
considered through the influence of civil liberties on the unions’ bargaining power, and the 
effect of political rights on FDI is considered through the effect of taxes applied to MNE in 
the foreign market.  
4.2.1. Assumption with regards to Nature: 
Markets are assumed to be imperfect. The flow of information is assumed to be 
symmetric. The employment is assumed to be relative, and the assumption of full 
employment is relaxed. Wages are assumed to have a range of  𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∈ [𝑤𝑎,𝑊] where 
𝑤𝑎is the minimum wage earned by those not working, and 𝑊is the maximum wage earned 
in the market. It is assumed that there exists an average wage in the market denoted by 
(𝑊𝐴𝑣). The bargained wage is considered to be 𝑤𝐵 > 𝑤𝑎, and the average wage paid in the 
market is 𝑤𝑎 < 𝑊𝐴𝑣 ≤ 𝑊. It is assumed that MNE bargains with National Union 𝑈𝑁and 
autonomous union 𝑈𝐴separately. It is assumed that there is no flow of information between 
the unions, and the market is considered to be neutral with regards to entry of the MNE. 
Finally, firm and unions are considered to be risk neutral.  
4.2.2. MNEs’ Assumptions and Considerations 
Before embarking upon our discussions on the MNEs, it is necessary to review the 
definitions64 of FDI, and MNE. The widely accepted definition of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) is provided in appendix 1.1. According to the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, FDI occurs whenever a U.S. citizen, organization, or affiliated group takes an 
interest of 10 percent or more in a foreign business entity.65 IMF (1993)66 defines FDI as 
“investment that involves a long-term relationship reflecting a lasting interest of a resident 
entity in one economy (direct investor) in an entity resident in an economy other than that 
of investor. The investors’ purpose is to exert a significant degree of influence on the 
management of the enterprise resident in the other economy”.67 
                                                          
64 Definition of Foreign Direct Investment and related concepts to FDI are all provided in Appendix 1.1. 
65 Charles W.L. Hill (International Business; competing in global market place, sixth ed., p.238) 
66 Balance of Payments Manual, 5th edition (BPM5) 
67 The OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, 3rd edition, is fully consistent with BPM5. Source: 
OECD (1995), OECD Balance of Payments Manual, 3rd ed., Paris: OECD. 
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Therefore once a firm undertakes FDI, it becomes a Multinational Enterprise68 (MNE). 
It is imperative to note that it is FDI that transforms a domestic firm – irrespective of its 
size and other characteristics- into a multinational enterprise. Dunning et al (1993, p.3) 
defines a Multinational or Transnational enterprise as “an enterprise that engages in foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and owns or, in some way, controls value added activities in more 
than one country.” This is the main definition of a multinational enterprise (MNE), in the 
sense that it is widely accepted in academic and business circles, by data collecting 
agencies such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
UNCTAD’s Division on Investment, Technology and Enterprise Development (DITE), 
and by most national governments and supranational entities. 
The first distinct characteristic of an MNE is that, in contrast to multi-activity or 
diversified firm, MNE access, organize and coordinate the value added activities through 
FDI, across national boundaries. Second is that, MNEs tend to internalize some of the 
foreign markets for the intermediate products arising from these activities.69 Dunning & 
Lundan (2008) argue that these two characteristics- cross border transactions and 
production- are unique to MNEs and that no other institution engages in both of these 
activities.  
Having discussed the definitions of FDI and MNE, we continue by providing the 
assumptions and properties of MNE in this research. It is assumed that MNEs’ (firms) 
objective is to maximise their utility at any given point in time, constrained to the amount 
of information available to them and their level of knowledge at the time.  It is 
acknowledged that the utility function of the firm is defined as the summation of the 
monetary and non-monetary utility functions of the firm. In other words the utility function 
of the firm is not bounded to the traditional profit functional form of revenues after costs. It 
also considers the non-monetary gains such as strategic gains (i.e. market share, market 
positioning, comparative position with respect to competitors, etc.), or financial gains (i.e. 
access to capital, diversifying investment, diversifying institutional risk, reducing 
dependency, etc.) that can be gained by that can be obtained by FDI. However, this 
                                                          
68 The term Transnational was adopted by United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) in 1974 by the 
request of a number of South American countries in order to distinguish between the companies that are domiciled in a 
country in South America who invest in another country in the region (Transnational enterprises), and those companies 
that are originating from outside of the region (MNEs). However, as Dunning & Lundan (2008, p.765) discuss that over 
the years terminological differences between the two terms have become immensely obscure and as a result in recent 
literature these two terms are used interchangeably. In this volume the terms “Multinational” and “Transnational” are 
used interchangeably. 
69 Dunning & Lundan, p.6 
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research generally considers the monetary gains of firms as the representative measure of 
their utility, for two main reasons: first, providing tractable measures for non-monetary 
gains of firms through FDI might not be adequate considering the level of aggregation 
assumed (for the most part) and also the possibility of such measures leading to narrowing 
down the scope of research to specific number of countries and firms for which this data 
can be obtained, which is not in line with the Varieties of Capitalism view adopted earlier); 
second, there is no evidence that the complexity introduced through inclusion of such 
measures, significantly contributes to the model at this level of aggregation.  
It is assumed that Firms’ (MNEs’) objective is to maximise its profit based on the 
amount of information available to it at the time. The firm produces homogenous goods, 
using labour (L), capital (K), and technology (A). ‘K’ is assumed to be the amount of 
capital that firm transfers to a host country in order to conduct FDI. Similarly ‘A’ is the 
firm specific technology that is transferred to the host country by the firm. ‘L’ is the 
number of labourers (employees) employed in the host country.  
The firm’s production function at this stage is considered to be cobb-Douglas. It is also 
assumed that the production function is subject to diminishing returns to scale (therefore 
the first derivate of the production function is considered to be negative).70 Furthermore, 
the productivity of labour is assumed to be constant and observable by the firm, therefore 
there are no issues of; governance, wage/productivity and conflict, are introduced into the 
discussion. Note that by assuming that productivity of work force is constant, and 
observable to the firm, we shy away from including the efficiency wage arguments into our 
theoretical model. The general consensus of the empirical literature on the efficiency wage 
premia is that foreign firms tend to pay higher wages to their employees in comparison to 
their local counterparts, due to their higher productivity, which in turn is the product of 
their “know-how and modern management practices that allows them to compete 
effectively in foreign markets and to offset the cost of coordinating activities across 
different countries”(OECD 2009). It is generally argued that market failures influence 
                                                          
70 Cob-Douglas production function is a type of production function that model situations in which inputs 
can be substituted for each other to produce the same output, but can not be substituted at a constant 
rate. A Cob-Douglas production function; 𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿, 𝐴) = 𝐴. 𝐾𝛾. 𝐿𝜎  is homogenous of degree 𝜀 = 𝛾 + 𝜎, and if 
𝜀 < 1, it is said that the production function is subject to diminishing return to scale. Subsequently 𝜀 > 1is 
the case where there is increasing return to scale while 𝜀 = 1is the case where there is constant return to 
scale. 
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MNEs to pay higher wages (or so called efficiency wages) in comparison to local firms for 
three possible reasons. First is that MNEs pay higher wages in order to reduce worker 
turnover and thereby minimise the risk of their productivity advantage spilling over to 
local firms, and also to motivate workforce as they may face higher monitoring costs 
related to informational problems. Second is that MNEs’ productivity advantages give rise 
to rents that they share with their employees. Finally, the higher wages provided by MNEs 
in comparison to their local counterparts is considered to be the influence of institutional 
factors that give incentives for them to go beyond local labour practices. While introducing 
the efficiency wage considerations to our model could be useful, we refrain from doing so 
in order to keep our theoretical model simple and tractable, leaving the task for the future 
research. 
It is assumed that monetary profits sum up the more tractable part of profit function, and 
that it is the main driver of the firm in its decision with regards to FDI. The main costs of 
firm are considered to be the cost of production, and sunk cost. The cost of production is 
assumed to involve, only the cost of labour. As for the latter, since this section is 
introducing the general static form of the model, the sunk costs are considered to be 
associated with the cost of exiting the market, and the costs associated with the 
operationalization of the project. The latter is mainly because we relax the assumption that 
the firm can start and stop the production without incurring any costs. Thus since the 
continuous production of the firm to the optimal level is a rather simplistic view, we 
consider that the firm takes the cost of start and stopping of production into account when 
considering their cost structure. Therefore the general utility function reduces to the form 
of profit function of the firm and is as follows: 
𝑷 = 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇𝒈𝒐𝒐𝒅𝒔 𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒔 − 𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒔        
( 1 ) 
Therefore the main costs of firm are considered to be the cost of production, and sunk 
cost. The former, the cost of production, is assumed to only involve the cost of labour. 
Sunk costs are generally considered as the investment costs that are not retrievable (or 
recovered one incurred) and by nature they differ from fixed and marginal costs. Here the 
sunk cost that firm bears is mainly the cost of not employing the capital somewhere else 
whilst making a decision (or cost of waiting for the time from the capital is held 
unallocated to the point when the decision is made regarding the investment). It is possible 
to assess the value of this cost in many different ways. Some of these ways are: assessing 
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the value of the investment based on the a comparative analysis of the possible investment 
opportunities that the capital can be invested in (in a specific sector or by a certain type of 
firm); assessing the value of the sunk cost based on the nominal rate of return in a specific 
market at a certain time window; and finally assessing the value of the sunk cost using U.S. 
T-bills as measures of interest free rate of return. Therefore it is possible to write the 
following: 
𝑷 = 𝒀(𝑲, 𝑳, 𝑨) − 𝒘𝑩𝑳 − 𝑪𝒔 ( 2 ) 
 
Where: Y(.) Cob-Douglas Production function 
 K Capital used for production of goods in host country 
 L Labour employed (from host country) 
 A The firm-specific technology used for production 
 𝑤𝐵 The wage paid to host country employees (Assumed all labourers) 
 𝐶𝑠 Sunk Cost 
It is imperative to review the set of assumptions that are made here: First, it is assumed 
that the firm perceives two types of costs when deciding on the investment, the production 
costs and sunk costs. The production cost is assumed to be the cost of employing ‘L’ 
employees who will be paid wage of ‘𝑤𝐵’. The sunk cost as it was mentioned before is 
assumed to be the cost of ‘𝑟’ per unit capital or ‘𝑟. 𝐾’ (the interest rate itself is not 
important since the term diminishes in early stages). Second, it is assumed that firm does 
not perceive any cost related to entry and exit or any barriers to entry and exit for that 
matter. In other words, it is assumed that there are no barriers to entry and exit and that the 
entry and exit are costless. Third, the production function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglass, 
with diminishing rate or return to scale.  Fourth, we are not distinguishing between the 
level at which the bargaining is conducted on MNE side. Consequently this research does 
not take into account the issues introduced through the consideration of the coordination of 
MNEs’ representatives in bargaining with unions. An example of these issues is the 
asymmetry in communication and coordination of entities at MNE side, which is explored 
by Buccella (2011) who take into account the games where both general management of 
the firm and the subsidiary have the option of bargaining with the unions and mainly focus 
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on the level of management of MNE that conducts the bargaining process with the unions. 
In the contrast, this chapter in a similar spirits to the work of Aidt and Tzannatos (2008) 
who consider the level of bargaining and coordination of unions on the bargaining process, 
considers the effect of the level of bargaining on union side on the bargaining process. The 
former will be covered explicitly in the next section.   
In its most primitive form the investment costs in a static game where the bargaining is 
conducted in one period, the project is assumed fully reversible with no transaction costs, 
the set of information is assumed to be symmetric across the firm and other entities,   and 
no cost of entry and exit are assumed, would reduce to the interest free rate return of the 
capital for the time when the capital is not invested anywhere else. In other words, the 
simplest form of the sunk cost is the cost of ‘𝑟’ per unit capital or ‘𝑟. 𝐾’. Thus, it is 
possible to view the production function of MNE as its simplest form as:  
𝑷 = (𝟏 − 𝒕). 𝒀(𝑲, 𝑳. 𝑨) − 𝒘𝑩𝑳 − 𝒓.𝑲 ( 3 ) 
 
Where: Y(.) Cob-Douglas Production function 
 K Capital used for production of goods in host country 
 L Labour employed (from host country) 
 A The firm-specific technology used for production 
 𝑤𝐵 The wage paid to host country employees (Assumed all labourers) 
 𝑟. 𝑘 Sunk Cost 
 𝑡 both taxes paid in host country and home country 
 𝑟 Zero coupon or  interest free tax rate 
Where ‘𝑡’ corresponds to both taxes paid in host country and home country. The 
taxation element in most cases reduces to taxes imposed on the MNE in host country. 
However in some cases MNEs are subject to taxes in home country as well (double 
taxation). The literature on the subject includes the works of Hartman (1985), Slemrod  
(1990), and Hines (1996, 1999) who have explored double taxation, and the works of Xiao 
(2004), and Prasad and Wei  (2007) who have provided evidence of round tripping and 
other means of tax evasion. Since the consideration of bilateral taxes would introduce 
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further complexity into our model; focusing on bilateral taxes would in turn shift our 
attention away from the research question at hand; and that it is enormously difficult to 
find report of the amount of taxes MNEs pay to their home government in cases where 
double taxation is imposed. In this research we assume ‘𝑡’ to be the taxes paid to host 
country’s government. Later on we expand on taxes by considering two different systems 
of taxation: taxes on income and taxes on profits (provided in the appendix 4.4.a). 
Accordingly we explore the bargaining process under each of these taxation systems and 
offer testable hypotheses. 
Omitting the technology factor (Cobb-Douglas production function) for the moment and 
considering that MNEs are subject to taxation in host countries, it is possible to write the 
former as follows: 
𝑷 = (𝟏 − 𝒕). 𝒀(𝑲, 𝑳) − 𝒘𝑳− 𝒓.𝑲 = (𝟏 − 𝒕)𝑲𝒈𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬
𝒅 −𝒘𝑩. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬 − 𝒓.𝑲 ( 4 ) 
where ‘t’ could correspond to both taxes paid in host country and home country. The 
taxation element is taxes imposed on the MNE in host country. Consequently, MNEs’ 
profit function in case of no FDI (bargaining reaches no agreement and FDI doesn’t take 
place) is: 
𝑷 = ?̅? = −𝒓.𝑲 ( 5 ) 
However if an agreement is reached and FDI takes place, the profit function would be: 
𝑷 − ?̅? = (𝟏 − 𝒕)𝒀(𝑲. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬) − 𝒘𝑩𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬 − 𝒓.𝑲 − (−𝒓.𝑲) ( 6 ) 
Hence the main incentive of the firm from the investment is as follows: 
𝑷 − ?̅? = (𝟏 − 𝒕)𝒀(𝑲. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬) − 𝒘𝑩. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬 ( 7 ) 
Where 𝑌(. ) is the Cobb-Douglas production function 
 𝑡 is the taxes imposed on MNE (is assumed to be only host country taxes) 
 𝐾 is the capital needed for the investment considering the cost of FDI 
 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸  is the labour (employees) employed by MNE at host country 
 𝑤𝐵 is the wage that is agreed upon by MNE and union if an agreement is reached 
 ?̅? is the average profit earned by MNE. 
 𝑟. 𝑘 is the sunk cost of the project. 
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It is possible to write equation (7) as follows:  
𝑷 − ?̅? = (𝟏 − 𝒕)𝑲𝒈𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬
𝒅 −𝒘𝑩. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬 ( 8 ) 
Where 𝑔 is the productivity share of capital 
 𝑑 Is the productivity share of labour 
 𝑡 is the taxes imposed on MNE (is assumed to be only host country taxes) 
 𝐾 is the capital needed for the investment considering the cost of FDI 
 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸  is the labour (employees) employed by MNE at host country 
 𝑤𝐵 is the wage that is agreed upon by MNE and union if an agreement is reached 
 
Equation (8) is the profit function that MNE will strive to maximise through the 
bargaining process. Considering the dependency of production to labour, it is possible to 
consider the bargaining process to generally revolve around wage setting. In the next 
section we will discuss the trade unions, their characteristics, utility function and structure. 
Moreover we discuss the differences in the type of labour representations that exist across 
countries that belong to various types of market economies, building on varieties of 
capitalism.  
4.2.3. Labour (Trade) Union  
This section provides a brief review of the literature on trade unions and puts forward 
the definition of the Labour (trade) union, considered in this research. Subsequently the 
objective of labour (trade) union is discussed in order to inform the construction of their 
utility function. The utility function of the trade unions is discussed, and the formulation is 
considered in case of National Unions, and Sectoral Unions. This distinction allows us to 
evaluate and compare incentive of unions that conduct their bargaining over the wages, 
employment and working conditions at the national level with those that conduct their 
bargaining processes at lower levels, in particular, sectoral and industry level labour 
representatives.  
The motivation of the latter is in two folds: first, since our research aims to explore the 
effect of civil and political liberties on FDI, in both aggregated and disaggregated manner, 
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it is imperative to consider both national and sectoral level types of unions in order to 
distinguish between the bargaining processes at different levels. Second, based on the VoC 
approach we have discussed the differences between the ways firms from different market 
economies coordinate their activities. Furthermore, we extended our relational discussion 
over the coordination activity of firms to the market economies within which these firms 
function. Labour (trade) unions from different market economies, similar to firms, are 
considered to share the characteristics of social economic entities in their market economy, 
and thus are considered to differ from one another. Based on this proposition unions can be 
categorised into four main categories, namely; LME unions (Anglo-Saxon unions), CME 
unions (Continental European unions), ‘Nordic unions’ and ‘Other unions’. Considering 
the characteristics of various types of unions which will be discussed in section 4.3., we 
distinguish between unions from various market economies by arguing that in case of 
LMEs, unions bargaining process is mainly kept on individual bases while in CMEs the 
bargaining processes tend to be conducted at industry or sectoral level, and finally in case 
of Nordic market economies the bargaining process is generally performed in a collective 
manner at national level between the national level labour unions and association of 
employers over issues such as: wages, employment and working conditions. Therefore the 
consideration of the effect of the level of analysis, on the incentive structure, and utility 
function of the labour representative is paramount to the structure of our analysis. 
4.2.3.1. A Background on the literature 
Surveying the literature on economic theory of trade unions Johnson (1975, p.23) wrote 
“… the absence of a solid theoretical foundation has handicapped the economic analysis of 
trade unions and has surely contributed to its decline in relative attention”. However a 
general exponential growth in the theoretical economic literature on the subject is observed 
during 1970-1980s [refer to Oswald (1985) for a relevant survey]. The literature on trade 
unions, in general investigates the issues related to specifying the unions’ constraints and 
preferences, commonly motivated by the idea that the micro-foundations of markets  have 
some influence on their macroeconomic issues and hence macroeconomic analysis [i.e. 
Farber (1986)]. Following the progresses made, the post 1980s literature on the subject has 
been developed further by eliminating the barriers between labour economics and other 
sub-disciplines of economics such as international trade theory and industrial economics.  
Such advancements, mainly the establishment of a dialogue between labour and industrial 
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economics, in part led to increasing interests in the theoretical analysis of labour unions 
and thereby  labour markets institutions and  structures. The “shift away from the 
competitive paradigm as an organizing framework for the analysis of labour markets, 
together with a renewed emphasis on bargaining” (Addison and Schnabel 2003, p.45), as 
Pencavel (1991) discusses, resonates with much earlier works in labour economics, an 
example of which is the work of Commons (1934). It is important to note that the purely 
economic analysis of unions such as those put forward by Cole and Postgate (1963), and 
Pelling (1987), while useful, remain necessarily partial, as the analysis of unions would by 
no means be close to relative completeness unless the social, institutional, political and 
historical aspects of the markets are taken into account. However by nature, every research 
conducted on the subject would be constrained to elements of energy and time, thus in 
order to provide illuminating results through the scientific inquiry, one has to make 
decisions in regard to the way these factors are introduced and treated in the investigation. 
In part we discuss these71 aspects through Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) view, where 
social, political, institutional, and other factors of markets are mapped out in an aggregate 
way, resulting in provision of a grand perspective in regard to markets and the way the 
actors coordinate in them.72   
In determining the behaviour and decision of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) in host 
markets, we argue that the objective of unions and the factors that influence their capacity 
and in a way influence the way they conduct their bargaining with MNEs, has some 
influence on the cost structure of the investment both in terms of level and composition. 
Therefore, in this section, markets are viewed based on the VoC perspective in order to 
capture an aggregate notion of the way the markets coordinate. Along with the latter 
(macro view), the micro foundation of the markets are introduced through an investigation 
of the constraints and coordination activities of Unions in markets, with the intention that 
such factors would provide some information on the way the bargaining processes are 
influenced and driven as a result of the institutions (formal and informal rules) of the 
markets.  
Before proceeding further, it is useful to review the definition of union, as that is 
considered in this research. According to Webb and Webb (1920) a trade union is defined 
as “a continuous association of wage-earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving 
                                                          
71 social, institutional, political and historical 
72 A review of the Varieties of Capitalism Framework is provided in chapter 2. 
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the conditions of their working lives (of their employment).” More recent definitions are in 
the same wave length with the definition put forward above. Labour (Trade) Unions, 
emerge in most countries and in a collective manner, represent the interests of employees 
(labour), irrespective of the stage of unionization or the ideological orientation. (Addison 
and Schnabel 2003, p.172)  
In the earliest theoretical works of Dunlop (1944), Leontief (1946), Fellner (1949) and 
Cartter (1959), that arguably established the theoretical economic foundation of the labour 
unions the general assumption was that unions similar to any other economic actor are 
profit maximising entities or optimizing agents that optimise their relative labour demand 
function constraints (through which they maximised their utility function)73. In contrast to 
the former, others such as Ross (1948) maintain that the “nature of unions militated against 
a simple precise representation of their objectives within a mathematical optimizing 
model” (Addison & Schnabel, 2003, pp.48). Other scholars including Pencavel (1991); 
Flanagan et al. (1993) and Booth (1995) further investigate the political models of unions 
and comment on the poor development of the literature on the subject.  
In general labour (trade) unions are considered as organizations of workers that are 
formed to achieve common goals of the employees (labourers) in terms of wage, 
employment and employment conditions. In spite of their seemingly common incentive, it 
is imperative to note that the institutional channels and arrangements through which unions 
strive to improve the lives of their members vary widely across countries and types of 
markets that they are residing in (i.e. Liberal Markets, Coordinated Markets). Moreover the 
extent of their actions propagates differently in different countries and markets depending 
on the institutional environment. In some cases, the actions of unions are merely restricted 
to their members while in others they seem to affect the non-union members as well as 
union members through variety of channels and mechanisms (i.e. thread effects, legal 
extensions). The evidence on union effect varies from markets where they have minor 
impacts (i.e. American Unions), to markets where their impact alters the sectoral or overall 
market labour costs and prices of goods and hence influencing the welfare of consumers 
and in an extreme cases are capable of impacting the macroeconomic performance.  
                                                          
73 For instance Dunlop (1944) considers unions with; U=w.l form utility function, where “U” is the union’s utility, “w” is 
the wage per worker and “l” stands for labour.  Thus the union is considered to be maximising its utility through their 
relative wage/employment constraints.  
108 
 
Considering the definitions put forward, union’s goals are in a sense considered to be 
bargaining over the wages, employment and employment conditions of the labour. In an 
economic sense however, as Addison and Schnabel (2003) discuss that “labour (trade) 
union’s incentives are similar to any other organization”. In other words union’s incentives 
similar to any other economic organization are in line with their economic performance. 
Based on this view, the unions and firms seem to have competing interests.  
Considering the former, the economic literature used to investigate the effect of unions 
on firms (through productivity), by focusing on the adverse effects associated with 
‘featherbedding’ and other efficiency damaging work. However, the progresses made, led 
to generation of a new view, mainly that the presence of unions to some extent is fruitful 
for the market and all its participants through their so called efficiency-enhancing role. In 
this view, the union and firm are considered to have complimentary interests and the 
analysis requires considering both shared as well as conflicting interests of firms and 
unions. The example of such frameworks is the ‘Harvard School’ (Freeman and Medoff 
1984) framework that analyses the efficiency enhancing role of unions. Harvard school 
framework discusses four main channels through which unions act as efficiency enhancing 
actors. These channels are mainly; (a) a “shock effect which reduces managerial X-
inefficiency; (b) morale effect; (c) better flow of information and coordination between the 
employees and managers; and finally (d) improved use of voice in the context of 
potentially sub-optimal exit”(Addison & Schnabel, 2003, p.46).  
The main contribution of the Harvard School framework is the provision of the ‘new 
view’ of the unions as the efficiency enhancing actors that improve the efficiency of the 
firms by providing a better voice mechanism that enhances the flow of information and 
coordination in the firm. Therefore it is possible to view the unions as actors that enhance 
the efficiency of firms and thereby strengthen their productive capability. On the other 
hand they act as potential monopoly powers that extract rent through bargaining over 
wages, work conditions and working hours (factors that affect employee’s lives).  
In line with our previous arguments of section 4.2.2., regarding the possibility of 
extending this chapters’ theoretical model by consideration of efficiency wages and 
productivity of workforce, future research can extend our theoretical discussion by 
examining the effect of civil liberties through unions extent and level of bargaining, as well 
as the way their structure affects the firms’ coordination activity both with respect to 
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productivity and rent seeking. In this chapter, we largely focus on the bargaining processes 
between firms (MNEs) and labour (trade) unions by considering their efforts in terms of 
wage setting. This is mainly due to the fact that the wage setting plays an important role on 
the firm’s cost structure and therefore influences the cost of investing in a host country 
(both in terms of initial investment as well as the sunk costs). 
Considering the objective functions used for unions, in the literature, two main types if 
functions are generally considered. The first is the Stone-Geary utility function that takes 
the following form:  
𝑼 = (𝒘 − ?̅?)∝(𝒍 − ?̅?)𝟏−∝ ( 9 ) 
 
Where 𝑤 and l: present level of wages and labour respectively. 
?̅?  and 𝑙:̅ reference level of wages and reference level of employment 
α : relative weights that union gives to higher wages negotiated 
 
Early works of Hersoug (1978), Oswald (1979), Corden (1981) and Stewart (1982) 
were among the first works that used the Stone-Geary utility function. Since then the 
specification has been popular due to its tractability and flexibility, while suffering from its 
ad hoc nature. Since the Stone-Geary utility function cannot be adapted to more 
microeconomic type analysis74, other utility functions such as utilitarian utility function 
became fashionable through their early uses in Sampson (1983), Oswald (1982), Calmfors 
(1982) and McDonald and Solow (1981).  The general form of Utilitarian utility function is 
as follows:  
𝑼 = 𝒍𝑬. 𝒖(𝑾𝑨𝒗) + (𝑳𝑻 − 𝒍𝑬). 𝒖(𝒘𝒂) ( 10 ) 
 
Where 
𝑢(. ) : utility function of individual union member 
𝑙𝐸 : number of employed union members 
𝐿𝑇 : Total number of union members(employed and unemployed) 
𝑊𝐴𝑣: Average wage paid to employed union members 
                                                          
74 For instance the Stone-Geary utility function can not be adapted to account for the preferences of the individual union 
members. 
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𝑤𝑎 : Alternative income level (wage) earned by unemployed union members 
The utilitarian utility function is the sum of the utility earned by employed union 
members through their wages, and the utility earned by unemployed members through 
their income by other means (i.e. part time work, welfare payments, etc.).75 
The similarity between the two is that they both provide special cases of rent 
maximization and wage maximisation depending on the way the variables are 
treated.76Another example of microeconomic type utility functions put forward for analysis 
of unions is that of expected utility. Since our objective in this section is to lay the 
groundwork for the theoretical framework in the next sections, and since our research 
considers the bargaining processes between firms and unions, we do not consider the micro 
type utility functions exclusively, in the context of our analysis. Therefore, we shy away 
from expanding further on different types of utility functions used in a microeconomic 
context.  
The two general micro (utilitarian utility function and expected utility types functions) 
and macro (Stone-Geary utility function) utility functions are frequently used in the context 
of labour (trade) union literature. The proponents of micro type utility functions often 
regard macro type utility functions such as Stone-Geary as ad hoc, and argue that it does 
not derive from the preferences of the union members.  
Those in favour of macro utility functions such as Addison and Schnabel (2003, pp.51) 
argue that the “union is more than simply the sum of its parts on account of its political 
nature”. Similarly Arrow’s Impossibility theorem, the discussions out forward by Olson 
(1965) that in general question the rationality of collective action as a representative 
measure of the sum of individual rational actors, the aggregation problems that arise when 
generating a collective utility function based on the summation of individual members’ 
utilities, and finally the very popular view of profit maximizing77 nature of firms that is 
nested on rather macro foundations as opposed to micro ones, are a number of reasons why 
a Stone-Geary type utility function could be well justified, adopted and discussed in length, 
                                                          
75 Note that under the standard assumptions the utilitarian utility function represents the indifferent curves in (w,l)-space 
(which are convex and with downward slopes).  
76 For Stone-Geary α=1/2 and  𝑙=̅1/2 resembles rent maximization behaviour, while in Utilitarian utility function the 
assumption that employees are risk neutral will result in rent maximization. We will observe wage maximisation if in 
case of Stone-Geary utility function ?̅?=0 , and in case of Utilitarian utility function when 𝐿𝑇𝑈 = 𝑙𝑈𝐸 or (when 
membership equals employment).  
77 This assumption could be made implicit or explicit and can be either considered as a strong, semi-strong, or a weak 
assumption. 
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particularly in the context of labour (trade) union research. Therefore evidence from the 
literature suggests that the use of different types of utility functions is generally subjective 
to the research design (whether the author considers the macro view or the micro view) and 
research question. In this research we would like to draw on the institutional differences 
(the channels considered are the existing level of civil and political liberties) between 
different types of economies (VoC) and their influence on the bargaining processes 
between MNEs (firms) and unions in host countries. In order to expand on the latter, as 
mentioned before, Hall and Soskice (2001) provides the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
view that clusters different types of economies based on their market structure and the 
coordination activities of the firms in those markets.  
The level of civil liberties in a host market encapsulates a number of factors such as the 
freedom of expression and belief, association and organizational rights, rule of law, and 
personal autonomy and individual rights. Political rights generally encompass factors such 
as electoral process, electoral pluralism and participation, and functioning of government. 
These measures affect the level of foreign multinationals behaviour in different host 
countries. In the context of FDI, we argue that the level of civil liberties in host countries 
influences the bargaining processes between MNEs and unions (national or autonomous) 
and therefore affects the cost structure of investment as well as the level of initial 
investment that has to be made. Political liberties in host countries also influence the 
behaviour of MNEs. However, the channels through which the levels of political liberties 
affect the cost structure of investment and initial investment level are substantially 
different from civil liberties. The political liberties’ influences can be traced through the 
bargaining processes between MNEs and the regional authorities, or in some cases 
governments, over taxes, security, and a number of other factors. Since such bargaining 
processes are generally held secret, and obtaining data for such analysis would not provide 
enough information to draw conclusions on the effect of political liberties on FDI78, this 
research focuses mainly on the influence of the level of civil liberties on FDI.  
Therefore the consideration of different levels of coordination (VoC) and existing level 
of civil provides some information on the level of investment needed for FDI, as well as 
the cost structure of FDI for the MNEs, which in turns is expected to prove informative on 
the decisions made by MNEs in regard to FDI opportunities in different host countries.  
                                                          
78 Due to problems introduced through the complexity of political interactions in different parts of the world, this research 
focuses mainly on the effect of the level of civil liberties on FDI. 
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4.2.3.2. Unions and the scope of Bargaining 
The previous section reviewed the literature on the unions’ incentives; the types of 
utility functions used to proxy for such incentives, and this research take on the views 
provided. In order to explore the bargaining process between the union and firm, in this 
section we provide an overview of the scope of bargaining, as well as bargaining structure. 
The scope of bargaining consists of the factors (i.e. wages, employment, etc.) that are 
included in the bargaining process between unions and firm. The structure of bargaining on 
the other hand pertains to the issues of product structure and bargaining which consists of 
two main building blocks of internal and external structure of bargaining.  
In order to explore the scope of bargaining, we consider two main approaches often 
considered in the union-firm bargaining process. First, is the ‘right to manage approach’ 
that assumes that in the bargaining process, once wages are set, firms autonomously 
choose employment in order to maximise their profits. In other words, the scope of 
bargaining is mainly restricted to wage setting. In this setting depending on the power of 
union in the bargaining process the outcome could lie on the “labour demand curve where 
it is tangential to the union indifference curve”79 in one extreme (the case where union has 
monopoly power), somewhere in the middle (depending on the relative bargaining power 
of union and firm) or could be competitive equilibrium (in case union has no power). In 
this approach the relative wage preference of union, parameters of labour demand function 
(for instance the slope of labour demand curve is influential in determining the wage-
employment outcome), level of reference wage and relative bargaining power of union, on 
union side, and the elasticity of product demand and the extent of competition and type of 
competition on the firm side, are influential in determining the equilibrium outcome in 
terms of wages and employment.  While this approach is generally popular, perhaps 
because it resembles the so called ‘real-world’ bargaining processes, it has been 
theoretically criticised due to the fact that the bargaining outcomes in terms of their place 
on demand curve resulted from adopting this approach are generally considered inefficient. 
This theoretical dissatisfaction with ‘right to manage’ approach has led to provision of 
‘efficient bargaining’ approach where a so called Pareto optimal (a situation in which one 
of the parties is left better off, without leaving other worse off) is considered through 
                                                          
79 Addison & Schnabel (2003, pp.53) 
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finding a combination of wages and employment along the efficiency locus80 or ‘contract 
curve’. In other words this approach considers that there is an efficient bargaining outcome 
(the outcome is placed on the efficiency locus curve) for the bargaining process between 
the firm and union. It is imperative to note that this so called ‘efficient’ outcome is by no 
means efficient for the society as a whole, but rather a subjective efficient solution for the 
bargaining game provided. 
Considering the two approaches commonly used in the literature, one has to raise the 
question of “which of these approaches are more empirically valid?”. This question is 
discussed in length in Pencavel (1991) and Booth (1995). However the literature on the 
subject falls short of provision of any definitive answers. Following Addison and Schnabel 
(2003) we consider the bargaining structure to consist of ‘internal bargaining structure’ 
and ‘external bargaining structure’. The internal bargaining structure is generally referring 
to the conditions within an organization that affects the bargaining process namely factors 
such as number of unions, bargaining over wages with a firm, the power of any of these 
multiple unions in their bargaining process with the firm, presence of closed shop unions, 
etc. The external environment is on the other hand referring to “institutional conditions 
characterising the bargaining relationships across establishments”81. Therefore the external 
bargaining structure embodies the degree of centralization or decentralization of bargaining 
across firms/unions in a sector, industry, or in a more aggregate form in host country 
markets or in markets that belong to a certain type of economy in terms of their degree of 
coordination and their market structure (VoC; Liberal markets or coordinated markets). 
Factors such as the type of product market competition and industrial structure are among 
those leading to formation of type of external bargaining structures.  
Since the question we are trying to address here is the effect of the existing level of civil 
liberties in host countries on the level and composition of FDI, we only consider the 
external structure of bargaining. The latter apart from reducing the complexity in 
modelling of such relationships, has a very simple economic justification. The idea is that 
since organizations are inherently profit maximising entities (to some respect), they 
understand the cost structure of bargaining processes. Therefore, an MNE bargaining over 
wages and employment would possibly try to deal with a single union, rather than a 
number of unions, in order to reduce the cost of coordinating with different representatives 
                                                          
80 The efficiency locus is the tangency points between firms’ iso-profit curves and union’s indifference curves.  
81 Addison and Schnabel (2003, pp. 62) 
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of different unions. It is possible to consider the opposing argument, stating that 
coordinating with different unions leads to provision of lesser power for each union, which 
in turn puts the firm in a greater bargaining position when bargaining over wages and 
employment. However, we argue that the wages are elastic to a certain level when 
considering labour markets, meaning that the extent of bargain over wages would provide 
the unions the ability to bargain over wages from a normative minimum wage to a 
maximum level of wage paid for a certain type of labour within the sector, industry or 
market. This range differs across types of economies, markets, industries and sectors. We 
consider this from the view point provided by varieties of capitalism, as well as the type of 
bargain structures that exist within different types of economies. In order to expand on the 
latter we provide some information on the types of unions and the level of bargaining 
processes that exist in a number of markets across different economies in order to establish 
the types of bargain generally considered in different types of economies, which are in a 
way part of the institutions that govern the social activities of the societies, and in thereby 
influence the type of economy in terms of coordination as well as structure of markets.  
4.2.3.3. Unions’ Assumptions and considerations 
In this chapter, as discussed earlier, markets are assumed to be imperfect. Therefore, we 
relax the assumption of full employment and adopt a more realistic assumption that there 
exists a certain level of unemployment in the market. Consequently, union members are 
assumed to be consisting of a certain number of members that are employed and the other 
members that are unemployed. The employed union members are assumed to be earning a 
wage equal or higher than the average pay for labour in the labour market. For simplicity, 
it is assumed that the employed members are earning an average wage of (𝑊𝐴𝑣 ). The 
average wage is assumed to be higher than the income that unemployed would obtain. That 
is to say that if an amount 𝑤𝑎 is considered to be the income of an unemployed union 
member, 𝑊𝐴𝑣 > 𝑤𝑎  is assumed to hold. In other words union members would not work 
unless they are paid more than they earn not working. 
The general form of the utility function of the union considering the utilitarian utility 
function discussed in previous section is: 
𝑼 = 𝒍𝑬. 𝒖(𝑾𝑨𝒗) + (𝑳𝑻 − 𝒍𝑬). 𝒖(𝒘𝒂) ( 11 ) 
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Where 
𝑢(. ) : utility function of individual union member 
𝑙𝐸 : number of employed union members 
𝐿𝑇 : Total number of union members(employed and unemployed) 
𝑊𝐴𝑣  : The average wage paid to employed union members 
𝑤𝑎 : Alternative (welfare) income earned by unemployed union members 
Note that since the working conditions of employees are not considered here, the utility 
functional form could be interpreted in crude terms as profit function of the union. In this 
setting, it is considered that unions strive to maximise their profit similar to any other 
economic entity. The expected income of labour union (in case FDI occurs) in a general 
form would be a function of its income and costs as follows:  
𝑬(𝑽) = 𝑳𝑬.𝑾𝑨𝒗 + (𝑳𝑻 − 𝑳𝑬). 𝒘𝒂 ( 12 ) 
The union bargains over wages and employment with MNE. The wage that is bargained 
over would be (𝑤𝐵) which will be set if the parties reach an agreement through the process 
of bargaining. The bargained wage (𝑤𝐵) is assumed to be either equal or above the average 
wage paid. Therefore it is assumed that 𝑤𝐵 ≥ 𝑊𝐴𝑣. The union has the option of bargaining 
with MNE over the wages to the extent that an agreement is reached, in which case the 
utility function of the union would be as follows: 
𝑽 = 𝑳𝑬.𝑾𝑨𝒗 + 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬. 𝒘𝑩 + [𝑳𝑻 − (𝑳𝑬 + 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬)].𝒘𝒂 ( 13 ) 
 
 
Where 
𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸  : is the labour (employees) employed by MNE  
𝑙𝐸 : number of employed union members 
𝐿𝑇 : Total number of union members(employed and unemployed) 
𝑊𝐴𝑣  : The average wage paid to employed union members 
𝑤𝑎 : Alternative (welfare) income earned by unemployed union members 
𝑤𝐵: The wage that is agreed upon by MNE and union if an agreement is reached 
Otherwise union will have the following expected profit  
𝑽 = ?̅? = 𝑳𝑬.𝑾𝑨𝒗 + (𝑳𝑻 − 𝑳𝑬).𝒘𝒂 ( 14 ) 
Therefore 
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 𝑽 − ?̅? = 𝑳𝑬.𝑾𝑨𝒗 ++𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬. 𝒘𝑩 + [𝑳𝑻 − (𝑳𝑬 + 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬)].𝒘𝒂 − [𝑳𝑬.𝑾𝑨𝒗 +
(𝑳𝑻 − 𝑳𝑬).𝒘𝒂] ( 15 ) 
𝑽 − ?̅? = 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬. 𝒘𝑩 − 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬. 𝒘𝒂 = 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬(𝒘𝑩 −𝒘𝒂) ( 16 ) 
 
Where 𝑉 The utility that union earns if an agreement is reached 
 ?̅? The utility that union is earning on average (the utility earned by union if an 
agreement is not reached) 
 𝐿𝑇 The total labour force in the market 
 𝐿𝐸 The employed labour force 
 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸  The labour force which would be employed by the MNE if an agreement is 
reached 
 𝑊𝐴𝑉 The average wage earned by single employee in the market 
 𝑤𝐵 The wage that is agreed upon by MNE and union if an agreement is reached 
 𝑤𝑎 The alternative wage earned by a single union member if not unemployed – 
income of unemployed union members  
In order to explore the union bargaining positions more in depth, we develop more on 
the types of unions discussed in previous section.  
4.3. Varieties of Unions, Union structures, and Union bargain structures (in 
terms of level and extent) 
In this section we explore the level of bargaining and other characteristics of unions in 
different types of economies in order to distinguish between the types of bargaining 
processes that are standard within different markets.   
Gold (1993) and later on Hall (1994) following Due et al. (1991) identify a number of 
different traditions of legal regulations in EU member countries and distinguish three main 
systems, namely; (1) Roman-German system; (2) Anglo-Irish system; (3) Nordic system.  
The authors discuss that in Roman-German82 tradition of legal regulation, constitution 
guarantees a “core of fundamental rights and freedoms, constituting the foundation of 
national industrial relations”83 and state plays a central role in industrial relations. This 
legal system in part translates to provision of comprehensive labour market legislations 
                                                          
82 Examples of countries that have this type of legal systems are Germany, France, Belgium, and Netherlands. 
83 Due et al. (1991, pp.90-91) 
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which are imposed by the state as the general labour market regulations which govern most 
aspect of labour markets, including the employee-employer relations.  Author considers 
Anglo-Irish tradition of legal regulation to be a system in which there is little legislation 
conferring basic rights and state play a very limited role in governing industrial relations in 
general and labour markets as its subset. Therefore, the employee-employer relations are 
conducted in a liberal manner and the agreements are specific to different cases. Finally, 
authors consider the Nordic84 tradition of legal regulation to have a limited role of state in 
industrial relations; however, in this system the labour market agreements are made across 
industries and thus there is a collective bargaining that is conducted between the employers 
and unions and the agreements are imposed in most sectors of the market.  
Hall and Soskice (2001) following the works of Due et al (1991) and Gold (1993) 
explore the labour law policy amongst US, EU member states, and Northern countries, and 
argue that labour laws differ significantly across different countries, so does the 
functionality and coordination activities of employee representatives (unions) and 
employer (or employers’ association). Building on a holistic approach authors provide 
classification of different industrial relations systems and categorize the labour law 
systems into four main categories; “Anglo-Saxon unions”, “Continental European 
Unions”, “Nordic Unions” and “Other Unions”. Authors characterise the “Continental 
European System of labour market” in a setting that is later on referred to as “coordinated 
markets” by Hall and Soskice (2001). In this system of labour market, government 
intervenes in the employees (or employee representative entities) and employers (or 
employers’ associations) interactions and issues by establishing “strong legislative core of 
employee human rights, which provides the basis for agreements as well as a framework 
for discord between unions on one side and employers or employers’ association on the 
other”.85  
The  Anglo-Saxon unions are generally unions that function in countries that are later 
on categorized by Hall and Soskice (2001) as “Liberal market economies”. The examples 
of liberal market economies as it was discussed in chapter 2 are Ireland, United States of 
America, and United Kingdom.86 The authors argue that generally in liberal market 
economies, Anglo-Saxon market regulations (mainly labour market regulation) has led to 
                                                          
84 Examples of such systems are Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
85 “This model was said to be found in EU core countries such as Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy, 
and it is also mirrored and emulated to some extent in the institutions of the EU, due to the relative weight that these 
countries had in the EU until the EU expansion by the inclusion of 10 new Eastern European member states in 2004.” 
86 “In contrast to other EU core countries, these countries first joined the EU in 1973.” 
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provision of limited government legislative role and power in regard to labour (employee), 
and labour representative entities (i.e. labour unions), and employers (or employers’ 
association) issues. Thus, government plays a minor part in interactions between 
employers and employees representative entities. Another characteristic of the “Anglo-
Saxon system of labour market regulation” is that the agreements made between employers 
(i.e. employers’ association) and employee representatives (i.e. unions) are not drawn in a 
collective manner whereby they apply to a number of industries and sectors.87 Therefore in 
liberal markets the government role is minor and agreements between employees or their 
representatives (unions) are in general made between employer and employees’ 
representatives (unions), there are not many cases of collective bargaining agreements 
across sectors. It is worth mentioning that this classification is made in an aggregate form, 
since the union membership level and labour market structures differ amongst these three 
countries to some extent88, it has been suggested that this grouping is made based on 
comparison of different types of labour markets in a spectral manner. 
Nordic labour market regulation is the third type of labour market regulation discussed 
by Gold (1993) and later on Hall(1994). In this system of labour market regulation, 
government has limited legislative role in regard to employee (or employees’ associations) 
and employers’ issues and interactions. This aspect of Nordic labour system is similar to 
that of liberal markets’ labour market regulations (or Anglo-Saxon labour market 
regulation). However, in contrast to Anglo-Saxon system (liberal markets’ labour market 
regulation system), in Nordic system, there exists a network of widespread collective 
agreements that cover most sectors (including the industries within them) in the economy. 
Therefore, in Nordic system, whilst the government plays a minor role in regulating the 
interactions between employers (in this case it’s generally the employers’ association) and 
employees (in this case, it is mainly the employees’ associations; or representative unions), 
through which unions bargain over wages and employment with employers and issue 
collective agreements that are respected in wide range of sectors and industries. This model 
is considered to encompass Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland.89  
                                                          
87 There are rare occasions of specific industries and sectors having the tradition of providing collective agreement 
specific to that industry or sector. However the overview of such collective agreements when whole economy is 
considered shows that in most cases collective agreements are not considered. 
88 With United States taking a more Laissez-Faire approach, in comparison to UK that has some boundary regulations, 
and Ireland that has symptoms of a European liberal labour market regulatory system.  
89 In this set of countries Denmark joined the EU first in 1973, later on Sweden and Finland joined EU in mid-1990s.  
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Table 4—1: Classification of bargaining level based on types of economies - Source: Hall and Soskice 
(2001) 
Type of Economy Bargain between Extent of agreement Government Role 
Liberal 
Employee & 
employer 
Individually Minor 
Coordinated 
National Union & 
employer 
Sectoral Major 
Nordic 
Employers’ & 
Employees’ 
Associations 
Across sectors Minor 
Beyond the classification put forward by Gold (1993), and later on Hall (1994), the 
most recent contributions in economics literature in terms of classifying the markets based 
on their institutional characteristics, structures and socio-political environment, is the work 
of Hall and Soskice (2001) which does not exclusively discuss the differences in the way 
employees’ are represented, but rather adapts a more holistic approach, in which they 
discuss the markets overall and classify them into varieties of capitalism as it was 
discussed in Chapter 2. Drawing on the market characteristics and the employer-employee 
representative interaction in these markets in the next few sections, we examine the 
wage/employment bargaining environment in these markets and provide some insightful 
theoretical findings.  
Based on the view provided above, the degree and extent of bargain differs from a 
liberal to coordinated, to Nordic and hybrid types of economies and host countries with 
such characteristics. A second element that is observed is the existence of different types of 
unions in different types of economies. The literature on the unions which entails the 
works of Gold (1993), Hall (1994) and Hall and Soskice (2001), generally distinguishes 
between national level union, autonomous unions, and in most recent cases (i.e. literature 
on unions in EU) the transnational unions90.   
In this research two main types of unions91 are considered within the markets, namely 
the National Level Labour Unions (NU) and Autonomous Labour Unions (AU) which in 
                                                          
90 The literature on this type of unions is rather scarce and the effects reported are generally low in magnitude and 
insignificant.  
91 The transnational unions are not accounted for, since the literature generally discusses that they are not powerful 
enough in order to influence the labour market to the extent the other two influence.   
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turn proxy for other unions functioning within the labour market (i.e. sectoral unions, 
industry level unions, etc.). This generalization is made chiefly with the intention to reduce 
the complexity of introducing multiple players into game theoretic discussion and the 
issues that would have to be resolved by doing so (mainly introduction of different types of 
asymmetries, the timing of the bargaining processes, etc.), which possibly would have not 
contributed much to this study considering the level of aggregation used in the terminology 
(type of economies, types of union structures, etc.). The definition of labour union adopted 
in this research is in line with the definition provided by Webb and Webb (1920) is in the 
same wave length with the definitions considered in most of the literature on the subject 
and discussed above. Thus, we consider the labour unions goal to be improving the life of 
its members by bargaining over wages, employment and employment condition. Therefore 
this research considers the unions’ incentives and activities are generally in order to; first, 
bargain over wages; two, bargain over the number of jobs that would be bargained for at 
the same time with wages. On another note, factors that entail considerable qualitative 
nature, such as employment condition are not quantitatively tractable. Since this research 
follows the quantitative tradition of social inquiry, such factors are not considered or 
discussed in this research. The next section outlines the labour unions’ utility function, and 
extends the general form to more specific cases (for the case of different types of 
economies). 
4.3.1. The effect of the type of union on their bargaining preferences 
It is assumed that the National Union (U𝑁) puts more weight on the level of 
employment across sectors, and less weight on the bargained average wage since the size 
of MNE is in terms of a recruiting entity is minor compared to the whole market, and so is 
their capital. Thus, national union will be bargaining over 𝐿𝐸with the intention of reducing 
the general level of unemployment with average wage constraints. Therefore, the utility 
function of national union is considered to be as below:  
𝑽𝑵 = 𝑳𝑬.𝑾𝑨𝒗 + 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬. 𝒘𝑩 + [𝑳𝑻 − (𝑳𝑬 + 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬)].𝒘𝒂 ( 17 ) 
𝑽𝑵̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑳𝑬.𝑾𝑨𝒗 + [𝑳𝑻 − 𝑳𝑬].𝒘𝒂 ( 18 ) 
𝑽𝑵 − 𝑽𝑵̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑳𝑬.𝑾𝑨𝒗 + 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬. 𝒘𝑩 + [𝑳𝑻 − (𝑳𝑬 + 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬)].𝒘𝒂 − 𝑳𝑬.𝑾𝑨𝑽 − 𝑳𝑻. 𝒘𝒂 +
𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬. 𝒘𝒂 = 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬. 𝒘𝑩 − 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬. 𝒘𝒂   ( 19 ) 
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Where 𝑉𝑁 The utility that national union earns if an agreement is reached 
 ?̅?𝑁 The utility that national union is earning on average (the utility earned by union 
if an agreement is not reached) 
 𝐿𝑇 The total labour force in the market 
 𝐿𝐸 The employed labour force 
 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸  The labour force which would be employed by the MNE if an agreement is 
reached 
 𝑊𝐴𝑉 The average wage earned by single employee in the market 
 𝑤𝐵 The wage that is agreed upon by MNE and union if an agreement is reached 
 𝑤𝑎 The alternative wage earned by a single union member if not unemployed – 
income of unemployed union members  
On the other hand, it is assumed that the Autonomous Unions (𝑈𝐴) is considered to put 
more weight on the bargained wage within the sector/industry and less weight on number 
of jobs created through the bargaining process (level of unemployment within the 
sector/industry). The autonomous union here considered as sectoral union 92(in general a 
type of union whose contracts with foreign firms does not cover cross sectoral labour 
force). Considering the incentive of the autonomous union, its general utility function is as 
follows:  
𝑽𝑨̅̅̅̅ = 𝑳𝒔. 𝒘𝒂 ( 20 ) 
If an agreement is reached, the utility function would be as follows:  
 𝑽𝑨 = 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬. 𝒘𝑩 + [𝑳𝒔 − 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬]. 𝒘𝒂 ( 21 ) 
Therefore the payoff of reaching an agreement would be:  
𝑽𝑨 − 𝑽𝑨̅̅̅̅ = 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬. 𝒘𝑩 + [𝑳𝒔 − 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬]. 𝒘𝒂 − 𝑳𝒔. 𝒘𝒂 = 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬. 𝒘𝑩 − 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬. 𝒘𝒂  ( 22 ) 
 
Where 𝑉𝐴 The utility that autonomous union earns if an agreement is reached 
 𝑉𝐴̅̅ ̅ The utility that autonomous union is earning on average (the utility earned by 
union if an agreement is not reached) 
                                                          
92 Note that the autonomous union could be any type of non-government union, with different sizes. The only assumption 
here is that the autonomous union does not govern labour union movements across sectors and industries (that it covers 
industry level or sectoral labour force). The latter is merely to distinguish the coverage of the contracts between MNE and 
Union.  
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 𝐿𝑠 Total labour force in the sector (or industry) 
 𝐿𝐸 The employed labour force 
 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸  The labour force which would be employed by the MNE if an agreement is 
reached 
 𝑊𝐴𝑉 The average wage earned by single employee in the market 
 𝑤𝐵 The wage that is agreed upon by MNE and union if an agreement is reached 
 𝑤𝑎 The alternative wage earned by a single union member if not unemployed – 
income of unemployed union members  
The former reduces to 𝑉𝐴 − 𝑉𝐴̅̅ ̅ = 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸 . (𝑤𝐵 − 𝑤𝑎). Note that solving the model for 
national union, and autonomous union with their different preferences in terms of 
employment and wages, produces similar results. The latter has an intuitive reason. The 
reason is that under more realistic market conditions, market frictions, or specifically 
labour market frictions (in this case existence of unemployment in the labour market), 
unions’ behaviour are not characterised by solely bargaining over wages, or employment. 
The bargaining therefore would be over both employment and wages in a manner that 
maximises unions’ utility function. The solution of this theoretical maximisation 
considering the characteristics of each union under the assumption of existence of 
unemployment in the market shows that irrespective of the motivation of the union, they 
would behave in a similar manner. That is to maximise both employment and wages 
(wages are considered to be generally in the proximity of the average wage paid in the 
specific sector). Therefore the value of reaching an agreement for the union (irrespective of 
its type) would be the product of the difference between the utility earned if an agreement 
reached and otherwise as follows:  
𝑽 − ?̅? = 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬.𝑾𝑩 − 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬. 𝒘𝒂 = 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬. (𝒘𝑩 −𝒘𝒂)  ( 23 ) 
Furthermore, our premise was that the level and extent of bargaining process differs 
across various market economies, considering the theoretical results of this subsection, it is 
possible to argue that the behaviour of labour representatives in the presence of 
unemployment would be similar, irrespective of their market economy. Thus in the 
presence of unemployment, US, Norwegian and French unions would have the same 
incentives in their bargaining processes, that is to bargain over both wages and 
employment. Considering the level and persistence of unemployment, future research will 
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be able to develop on the influence of the level of unemployment on the union membership 
and their incentive structure when bargaining with foreign firms.  
The findings of this section limit the applicability of the VoC arguments only to the 
foreign firms. Since the profit function provided for the MNE has a singular general form, 
we proceed with provision of theoretical solutions to the bargaining process in a general 
case, in this chapter, and leave the distinction between the behaviour of firms from various 
market economies to the empirical investigation undertaken in chapter 7. 
4.4. Bargaining Process I (taxes applied to income) 
Since our approach adopts a transaction cost view of the FDI decision, our premise is 
that the firms’ cost structure influences the firms’ decision with regard to FDI. 
Furthermore, in the previous section we showed that in the imperfect markets (in the 
presence of unemployment), the incentive of all unions irrespective of their size and level 
of bargaining, is to obtain higher wages for employed members and obtain employment for 
the unemployed. Consequently we showed that the utility function of national level unions 
that arrange collective bargaining (i.e. Northern unions), is similar to the utility function of 
labour representatives bargaining at industry/sector level (i.e. CME unions) and those 
bargaining at lower levels (i.e. LMEs).  
In this section we provide a theoretical exploration of the bargaining process between 
foreign firms that are interested in investing abroad, and the labour representatives of the 
host country. Firm (MNE) tries to maximise its profit function by bargaining over wages, 
since they generally are a significant part of the cost structure of firm. Similarly, union 
considers the average utility attained by its members and tries to maximise its utility 
function through employment and wages.  Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 4.2.3 aimed that 
providing information with regard to the underlying assumptions of this sections’ 
theoretical exploration.  
The bargaining process is adopting the ‘right to manage approach’ and thus is mainly 
considering the negotiation over wages rather than employment. Therefore, considering the 
‘right to manage approach’, it is assumed that wages are determined through the bargaining 
process, and firm unilaterally determines employment once wages are set. The right to 
manage approach is adopted in the scope of bargaining for three main reasons. A first 
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reason is that right to manage approach closely resembles the way the bargaining processes 
are generally conducted in the real world. The second reason is that right to manage 
approach provides an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. A third reason for choosing 
the right to manage approach is that we assume that in most cases unions’ wage demand 
would not be altered severely by the number of jobs that would be provided by MNE. 
 It is possible to explain the latter in two folds: First; since in most markets that were 
reviewed, the level of unemployment is generally low, unions probably would be 
bargaining over the certain number of employees that could be employed, and their 
position in the bargaining table would not be varying immensely by the number of jobs 
that could be attained. Second; on the firm side, there is a certain number of employees that 
could possibly be hired, the alteration of the wage based on increases in number of 
employment opportunities provided by the firm, since the number of jobs are limited, and 
that firm is assumed to prefer to bargain with only one union, is almost of no significant 
value for the firm. In the presence of unemployment, the bargaining process consequently 
reduces to:  
 
 
Figure 4-1: Schematic view of the Bargaining tree 
    Considering the assumption above, the bargaining is conducted in a way that wages will 
be set and then firm unilaterally decides on employment (right to manage approach). 
Therefore considering the table below, there is a Nash solution to the bargaining problem 
with the following form:  
𝑨𝒓𝒈𝐦𝐚𝐱
𝒘.𝑳
[(𝑽 − ?̅?)𝒂(𝑷 − ?̅?)𝟏−𝒂] ( 24 ) 
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Union and MNE’s 
options and pay 
offs 
MNE 
Accepts the wage (A) Doesn’t accept the wage (D) 
Union 
Accepts 
𝑃 = ?̅? + (1 − 𝑡)𝑌(𝐾. 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸) − 𝑤𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸 
𝑉 = ?̅? + 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸 .𝑊𝐵 − 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸 . 𝑤𝑎 
𝑃 = ?̅? 
?̅? = 𝐿𝐸 .𝑊𝐴𝑣 + (𝐿𝑇 − 𝐿𝐸).𝑤𝑎 
Declines 
𝑃 = ?̅? 
?̅? = 𝐿𝐸 .𝑊𝐴𝑣 + (𝐿𝑇 − 𝐿𝐸).𝑤𝑎 
𝑃 = ?̅? 
?̅? = 𝐿𝐸 .𝑊𝐴𝑣 + (𝐿𝑇 − 𝐿𝐸).𝑤𝑎 
 
The general form of the statement thus is as follows:  
{𝒘∗, 𝑳∗} = 𝑨𝒓𝒈𝐦𝐚𝐱 [
𝒘,𝑳
[𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬(𝒘𝑩 −𝒘𝒂)]
𝒂[(𝟏 − 𝒕)𝑲𝒈𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬
𝒅 −𝒘𝑩. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬]
𝟏−𝒂] ( 25 ) 
For simplicity we refer to [𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸(𝑤𝐵 − 𝑤𝑎)]
𝑎[(1 − 𝑡)𝐾𝑔𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸
𝑑 − 𝑤𝐵. 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸]
1−𝑎as 𝑊. 
Thus:  {𝑤∗, 𝐿∗} = 𝐴𝑟𝑔max
𝑤,𝐿
[𝑊] ( 26 ) 
Where 𝑔 is the productivity share of capital and 𝑔 + 𝑑 < 1 
𝑑 Is the productivity share of labour and 𝑔 + 𝑑 < 1 
𝑡 is the taxes imposed on MNE (is assumed to be only host country taxes) 
𝐾 is the capital needed for the investment considering the cost of FDI 
𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸  is the labour (employees) employed by MNE at host country 
𝑤𝐵 is the wage that is agreed upon by MNE and union if an agreement is reached 
𝑤𝑎 is the income of the unemployed (welfare) 
𝑎 is the bargaining power of the union and 0 ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 1 
1 − 𝑎 is the bargaining power of the foreign firm 
For simplicity refer to (1 − 𝑡). 𝐾𝑔 as 𝑀 and for simplicity all 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸  are referred to as 𝐿. 
𝒅𝑾
𝒅𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬
= 𝒂(𝒘𝑩 −𝒘𝒂). [𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬. (𝒘𝑩 −𝒘𝒂)]
𝒂−𝟏. (𝑴. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬
𝒅 −𝒘𝑩. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬)
𝟏−𝒂 +
(𝟏 − 𝒂). (𝑴. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬
𝒅−𝟏. 𝒅 − 𝒘𝑩). (𝑴. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬
𝒅 −𝒘𝑩. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬)
𝟏−𝒂−𝟏. [𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬. (𝒘𝑩 −𝒘𝒂)]
𝒂
  ( 
27 ) 
Considering  
𝑑𝑊
𝑑𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸
= 0, and solving for 𝑤𝐵, gives  
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 𝒘𝑩 = (
𝒂
𝒂−𝟏
− 𝒅) .
𝟏
𝒂
𝒂−𝟏
−𝟏
.𝑴. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬
𝒅−𝟏 = 𝒂 − 𝒅(𝒂 − 𝟏). (𝟏 − 𝒕)𝑲𝒈. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬
𝒅−𝟏
 ( 28 ) 
 
Similarly  
𝒅𝑾
𝒅𝑾𝑩
= 𝒂. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬. [𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬. (𝒘𝑩 −𝒘𝒂)]
𝒂−𝟏. (𝑴. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬
𝒅 −𝒘𝑩. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬)
𝟏−𝒂 + (𝟏 −
𝒂). (−𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬). (𝑴. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬
𝒅 −𝒘𝑩. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬)
𝟏−𝒂−𝟏. [𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬(𝒘𝑩 −𝒘𝒂)]
𝒂  ( 29 ) 
 
Considering  
𝑑𝑊
𝑑𝑤𝐵
= 0, and solving for 𝑤𝐵, gives 
𝒘𝑩 = 𝒂.𝑴. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬
𝒅−𝟏 +𝒘𝒂. (𝟏 − 𝒂) = 𝒂. (𝟏 − 𝒕)𝑲
𝒈. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬
𝒅−𝟏 +𝒘𝒂. (𝟏 − 𝒂)   ( 30 ) 
 
Considering equation [28] and [30], it is possible to write: 
𝒂 − 𝒅(𝒂 − 𝟏). (𝟏 − 𝒕)𝑲𝒈 = 𝒂. (𝟏 − 𝒕)𝑲𝒈. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬
𝒅−𝟏 +𝒘𝒂. (𝟏 − 𝒂)   ( 31 ) 
 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬 = [𝒘𝒂. (𝟏 − 𝒂).
𝟏
(𝟏−𝒕).𝑲𝒈.𝒅
]
𝟏
𝒅−𝟏
  ( 32 ) 
Substituting [30] (11) into [27] (9) gives: 
𝒘𝑩 = (
𝒂
𝒂−𝟏
− 𝒅) .
𝟏
𝒂
𝒂−𝟏
−𝟏
. (𝟏 − 𝒕)𝑲𝒈([𝒘𝒂. (𝟏 − 𝒂).
𝟏
(𝟏−𝒕).𝑲𝒈.𝒅
]𝟏/(𝒅−𝟏))𝒅−𝟏  ( 33 ) 
𝒘𝑩 = 𝒂.𝒘𝒂.
𝟏−𝒂−𝒅
𝒅
+𝒘𝒂  ( 34 ) 
The two equations (32) and (34) are the first order Nash solutions to the bargaining 
problem provided earlier. However the main task in this section is finding out the 
minimum level of investment that is needed for a project to be set up. In the static model as 
it was mentioned before, the decision is a “now or never” type decision, with no future 
time horizon to provide the option to wait. Therefore, based on the static game, assuming 
no asymmetries, no barriers to entry, no cost of repatriating the capital (no transaction or 
other costs related to transferring the capital), the main elements that are so far discussed 
are the two main elements that the bargaining process is based on, namely; wages and 
number of jobs provided (employment). Equation (32) and (34) provide some measure of 
the Nash solution for the game. Note that since we assumed the “right to manage” 
approach, which generally refers to the situation where the main element of bargain is the 
wages and after the wage setting MNE will unilaterally decide on the number of jobs 
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offered. Although this might seem unrealistic and in contrary with some of the point made 
before, the underlying reasoning is that in most cases number of labour force recruited is 
generally related to the level of production that is desired by the firm. Therefore since level 
of employment has a high elasticity with respect to productivity of the MNE in the foreign 
market and their projected profit as a result, it is assumed that the employment is an 
element that of a lesser importance on the bargaining table. Therefore the wage setting is 
the main element that the parties would be arguing over. At this stage, in order to find the 
minimum capital needed for the project start, it is possible to use the bargained wage, first 
order condition available from equation (28), and substitute it into profit function of the 
MNE [equation (4)] and minimising it based on capital (K) as follows: 
Substituting (28) into (4) gives: 
𝑷 = (𝟏 − 𝒕)𝑲𝒈𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬
𝒅 −𝒘𝑩. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬 − 𝒓.𝑲  ( 35 ) 
𝑷 = (𝟏 − 𝒕)𝑲𝒈. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬
𝒅 − (
𝒂
𝒂−𝟏
− 𝒅) .
𝟏
𝒂
𝒂−𝟏
−𝟏
. 𝑴. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬
𝒅−𝟏. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬 − 𝒓.𝑲  ( 36 ) 
𝑷 = (𝟏 − 𝒕)𝑲𝒈. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬
𝒅. (𝟏 − 𝒂 − 𝒅 + 𝒂𝒅) − 𝒓.𝑲  ( 37 ) 
𝒅𝑷
𝒅𝑲
= 𝒈. (𝟏 − 𝒕)𝑲𝒈−𝟏. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬
𝒅. (𝟏 − 𝒂 − 𝒅 + 𝒂𝒅) − 𝒓  ( 38 ) 
𝒅𝑷
𝒅𝑲
= 𝟎   ( 39 ) 
𝒈. (𝟏 − 𝒕)𝑲𝒈−𝟏. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬
𝒅. (𝟏 − 𝒂 − 𝒅 + 𝒂𝒅) − 𝒓 = 𝟎  ( 40 ) 
𝒓 = 𝒈. (𝟏 − 𝒕). (𝟏 − 𝒂 − 𝒅 + 𝒂𝒅).𝑲𝒈−𝟏. 𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑵𝑬
𝒅
  ( 41 ) 
Substituting (32) into (41) gives: 
 𝒓 = 𝒈. (𝟏 − 𝒕). (𝟏 − 𝒂 − 𝒅 + 𝒂𝒅).𝑲𝒈−𝟏. [(𝒘𝒂. (𝟏 − 𝒂).
𝟏
(𝟏−𝒕).𝑲𝒈.𝒅.𝑨
)
𝟏
𝒅−𝟏]𝒅  ( 42 ) 
Solving the former gives the minimum level of capital that needs to be invested for the FDI 
to occur (project to start): 
𝑲 = [𝒈𝒅−𝟏. (𝟏 − 𝒂 − 𝒅 + 𝒂𝒅)𝒅−𝟏. 𝒘𝒂
𝒅. (𝟏 − 𝒂)𝒅. 𝒓𝟏−𝒅. (𝟏 − 𝒕)−𝟏. 𝒅−𝒅]𝟏/(𝒅+𝒈−𝟏)   ( 43 ) 
Constraints:   0 ≤ 𝑔 < 1; 0 ≤ 𝑑 < 1; 𝑔 + 𝑑 < 1; 𝑟 > 0;  𝑡 > 0; (1 − 𝑡) > 0; 𝑤𝑎 ≥ 0. 
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4.4.1. Comparative Statistics – Testable Hypothesis 
In the previous section we mathematically explored the bargaining process between the 
firm and the union, in case where taxes apply to income, and using the optimal level of 
employment, and labour, worked out the minimum level of capital that has to be invested 
for FDI to occur. In other words, ‘𝐾’ in equation (14) is the initial cost of FDI.  
Furthermore, a simplistic review of the equation (14) indicates that the initial cost of FDI is 
related to factors such as: bargaining power (that is related to the level of civil liberty in the 
host country); sectoral/industry characteristics (in terms of labour/capital share of 
production in the sector/industry); taxes on income (that is considered to reflect the effect 
of the level of political rights in the host country); welfare (alternative wage); and interest 
rates.  
In this section, we would like to investigate the effect of civil and political liberties on 
FDI (our main research question) by exploring the effect of the level of civil liberties and 
political rights on the initial cost of FDI. Therefore our argument builds on the firms’ 
motivations, and in particular the ES motives, in determining the theoretical relationship 
between civil and political liberties and FDI. In other words adopting a transaction cost 
approach, we consider the firm to be mainly motivated by ES motives, and thus sensitive 
to changes in the initial level of capital that has to be invested for FDI to occur. In this 
setting the sensitivity of ‘𝐾’ to civil and political liberties, channelled through bargaining 
power and taxes on income, respectively, determines the theoretical effect of civil and 
political liberties on the level of FDI.  
Moreover, in order to theoretically explore the effect of industry/sector specific 
characteristics on FDI, we consider the effect of the labour and capital share of production 
in various sectors/industries on initial cost of FDI, and considering our transaction cost 
disposition, consequently on FDI. Therefore, our distinction between the industries/sectors 
is mainly driven by their production characteristics.  These mathematical explorations help 
in formulation of a number of hypotheses that will be empirically tested in chapter 7. 
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4.4.6. A. Effect of changes in union power on the bargaining process on the 
minimum capital that needs to be invested for the FDI to occur 
The term ‘𝑎’ in the Nash solution: Argmax [
𝑤,𝐿
𝑊 =(𝑉 − ?̅?)𝑎(𝑃 − ?̅?)1−𝑎] , represents the 
weight (power) given to union and foreign firm through ‘1 − 𝑎’. However, in order to find 
out what exactly gives bargaining power to unions and firms in their bargaining over 
wages and employment (without providing the arguments that are sector or market 
specific), it is possible to review some of the elements that were discussed earlier in this 
section such as extent of the contracts, the level of unionization in the markets (i.e. 
market/sector union density), the institutional elements in the markets and the main factor 
under consideration here, the existing level of civil liberties in the markets. The level of 
civil liberties in a host market as it was discussed encapsulates a number of factors such as 
the freedom of expression and belief, association and organizational rights, rule of law, 
personal autonomy and individual rights. Therefore, the extent to which the civil liberties 
are upheld in the host countries considerably influences whether the labour force would 
have the possibility to voice their opinion and be represented in any form.  
The institutional factors’ influences generally have more to do with how these rights are 
upheld, rather than whether they are represented or not. For instance the existence of high 
level of bureaucracy and the need to fill up lengthy documents and undertaking long 
processes to claim one’s right would have to do more with the “formal and informal rules” 
(institutions) in a specific market or society. Another factor that could be considered here 
is the level of unionization in a market. This factor along with the extent of bargaining 
agreements, are generally factors that could be considered as factors determining the power 
of union on the bargain table. 
To determine the effect of changes in bargaining power ‘𝑎’ on the minimum level of 
capital that has to be invested for the FDI to occur, the derivative of equation (43) with 
respect to ‘𝑎’ has to be considered.  
 
𝒅𝑲
𝒅𝒂
= 𝒈𝒅−𝟏. 𝒘𝒂
𝒅[(𝒅 − 𝟏). (𝒅 − 𝟏). (𝟏 − 𝒂 − 𝒅 + 𝒂𝒅)𝒅−𝟐]. (𝟏 − 𝒂)𝒅 +
𝒈𝒅−𝟏. 𝒘𝒂
𝒅. [𝒅(−𝟏)(𝟏 − 𝒂)𝒅−𝟏. (𝟏 − 𝒂 − 𝒅 + 𝒂𝒅)𝒅−𝟏  ( 44 ) 
Considering the equation above, the rate of change of the minimum capital that has to 
be invested for FDI to occur with respect to the power of union in the bargaining process, 
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will depend on the sign of the equation. Considering that our constraints are: 𝑔 + 𝑑 < 1, 
𝑎 ≤ 1 and 𝑤𝑎, 𝑔, 𝑑, 𝑎 ≥ 0 , the sign of  
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑎
, will depend on the sign of (1 − 𝑎 − 𝑑 + 𝑎𝑑). 
In other words the rate of change of the minimum capital, that has to be invested for FDI to 
occur, to that of union power will be determined by the level of union power, and the 
productivity share of labour in the sector. 
In order to determine the extrema (min and max) of the capital that has to be invested 
for FDI to occur with respect to union power we consider the following:  
𝒅𝑲
𝒅𝒂
= 𝟎 
𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒔 
⇒    𝟐𝒂𝒅𝟐 − 𝟐𝒅𝟐 − 𝟑𝒂𝒅 + 𝟑𝒅 + 𝒂 − 𝟏 = 𝟎  ( 45 ) 
Furthermore since the second derivative of capital with respect to union power is positive, 
we have the minimum level of capital that has to be invested for FDI to occur. Now, 
considering the option of union and firm in the context of bargaining with the following 
Nash solution 
{𝑤∗, 𝐿∗} = 𝐴𝑟𝑔max [
𝑤,𝐿
(𝑉 − ?̅?)𝑎(𝑃 − ?̅?)1−𝑎] =  𝐴𝑟𝑔max [
𝑤,𝐿
[𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸(𝑤𝐵 −𝑤𝑎)]
𝑎[(1 −
𝑡)𝐾𝑔𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸
𝑑 − 𝑤𝐵. 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸]
1−𝑎]  (25) 
It is possible to find the effect of factors that influence the bargaining process on the 
minimum level of capital that has to be invested for FDI to occur with respect to level of 
union power. Considering the case where union has all the power, the productivity of 
labour plays no part in the bargaining process between union and MNE in their wage and 
employment setting, and could obtain any value in the given range  𝑑 ∈ [0.1). 
As 𝑎
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜
→         1 
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑎
= 0 
Union has all the 
power on the 
bargaining table 
Therefore, it is logical to argue that in cases where the level of civil liberties are very high, 
the union solely dictates the level of wages, and thus there is no bargaining process 
between firm and the host countries unions. In such cases it is expected that firms would 
not invest, since unions have all the bargaining power and are capable of determining the 
level of rent extraction (extraction of profits). The table below shows the effect of different 
level of union and MNE power on their bargaining behaviour.  
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Table 4—2: The effect of different levels of union and MNE bargaining power, and sectoral characteristics on the cost 
of FDI 
 𝑎
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜
→         1 𝑑 ∈ [0.1) 
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑎
= 0 Union has all the power 
 
If union has all the power in the bargaining process with MNE, the initial cost of FDI is not sensitive to bargaining power. 
 
  
1
2
< 𝑑 < 1 
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑎
> 0  
 𝑎
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜
→         3/4 𝑑 =
1
2
 
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑎
= 0 
Union has a greater 
power on the 
bargaining process 
  𝑑 <
1
2
 
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑎
> 0  
 
If union has a greater power over the bargaining process in comparison to the MNE, the initial cost of investment is 
sensitive to the level of bargaining power of the union, and increases as the union power increases, irrespective of the 
labour/capital share of production. 
 
  3 − 2√2
2
 < 𝑑 < 1 
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑎
> 0 
If the productivity share 
of labour is more than 
capital, rate of change 
of capital to that of 
union power increases. 
As 𝑎
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜
→         1/2 𝑑
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜
→         
3 − 2√2
2
 
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑎
= 0 
Union and MNE have 
equal power 
  0 < 𝑑 <
3 − 2√2
2
 
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑎
< 0 
If the productivity share 
of labour is less than 
capital, rate of change 
of capital to that of 
union power decreases. 
 
If union and MNE have similar level of bargaining power over the process, the cost of FDI will be sensitive to the level of 
labour/capital share of production. In case of labour intensive sectors we find that cost of FDI will be higher as the 
demand for labour gives the union higher bargaining ability. In contrast, we find that in capital intensive sectors, MNEs 
tend to have a greater power of the bargaining due to the fact that the production is capital intensive, hence we 
observe a lower cost of FDI when investment in capital intensive sectors are considered. 
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1/2 < 𝑑 < 1 
 
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑎
> 0 
If the productivity share 
of labour is more than 
capital, rate of change 
of capital to that of 
union power increases. 
As 𝑎
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜
→         0 𝑑
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜
→         1/2 
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑎
= 0 
Union has no power on 
the bargaining table 
  
 
0 < 𝑑 < 1/2 
 
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑎
< 0 
If the productivity share 
of labour is less than 
capital, rate of change 
of capital to that of 
union power decreases. 
 
If union has no power, the greater the labour/capital share production in the sector, the higher the cost of FDI will be. In 
contrast the results indicate that the greater the capital/labour share of production in the sector, the lower the cost of 
FDI will be. 
 
The set of results provided in the table 4-3 are discussed and below, and a set of 
hypotheses are delivered accordingly.  
First, as mentioned earlier, existence of very high level of civil liberties in the host 
countries, translates to considerable bargaining power in favour of unions in comparison to 
the firm, exposing firms’ cost structure to potential alterations through labour costs. 
Therefore we anticipate that in such cases firms would not undertake FDI, since unions 
have all the bargaining power and are capable of determining the level of rent extraction 
(extraction of profits). However, in cases when re-investment of FDI activity is considered, 
the rate of change of capital to that of union power is zero ( 
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑎
= 0). 
Second, in countries with moderately high level of civil liberties, where the unions have 
a higher bargaining power in comparison to the foreign firms, the minimum capital that has 
to be invested for FDI to occur, tends to have a positive relationship with the union power. 
In other words, the higher the level of union power over the bargaining process, the higher 
the wages set, and thus the costlier the FDI. 
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Hypothesis (1): Civil liberties have a negative effect on FDI through bargaining power 
of unions. 
Firms motivated by efficiency seeking motives, are interested in lowering their 
comparative costs and raising their efficiency. While the repression of civil liberties leads 
to lower power of labour representatives, which in turn translates to lower wages and lower 
marginal costs, however, the repression of liberties in turn leads to lower productivity of 
the work force and return on investment. Therefore, a second effect of civil liberties on 
FDI flows that can be explored in the context of ES FDI is the effect of civil liberties on 
FDI through productivity. Previous scholars such as Adam and Filippaios (2007) have 
conceptually discussed both of these contradictory effects of civil liberties on FDI and 
empirically shown that civil liberties have a non-linear effect on FDI. In this study, we 
provide a theoretical model that relates the effect of civil liberties on FDI activity to union 
power. However, we in contrast to Adam and Filippaios (2007) who conceptually argue 
the existence of the indirect effect of civil liberties on FDI through productivity of the 
labour force, in this study we relate the wage setting and consequently the initial cost of 
FDI to the production share of labour, and sectoral characteristics. In particular we argue 
that the differences in the initial level of capital needed for FDI in labour intensive and 
capital intensive sectors, originate from the fact that MNEs implicitly consider continuity, 
quality and capacity of labour force in terms of production, when bargaining over wages. 
Such sector specific considerations lead to disparities between the wages in different 
industries/sectors. For instance in a capital intensive industry/sector (i.e. manufacturing) 
where the labour force is mobile, easily substitutable, with low level of knowledge, the 
MNEs representatives bargaining over wages would aim to lower the wages up to the 
average industry/sector level wages (or in some cases higher than the average wage) in 
order to enjoy the differential cost of production in comparison to other locations. In 
contrast in a labour intensive industry/sector (i.e. services) where the labour share of 
production is considerably high and the employees are less mobile, not as easily 
substitutable, and have a certain level of knowledge to be able to provide value adding 
services, the MNEs’ representatives would be more flexible in setting the wages in a way 
that it would not dampen the productivity of the work force. The following arguments aim 
to set forward hypotheses raised from our theoretical findings in order to explore the effect 
of civil liberties on FDI activity. 
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Third, in countries with moderate level of civil liberties, the initial cost of FDI is not 
only determined by the level of civil liberties, that provides equal powers for both unions 
and foreign firms on the bargaining process, but also the sectoral characteristics of the 
foreign entity. In particular we find that in the presence of moderate level of civil liberties 
(equal bargaining power allocated to parties through civil liberties), it is the production 
share of labour and capital that influences the bargaining power of unions and foreign 
firms. Consequently we observe that in sectors where the labour share of production is 
higher than capital, the initial cost of FDI is higher, indicating that in sectors with higher 
dependency on human capital, the cost structure of the firms tend to be more sensitive to 
changes in the cost of labour. Therefore the higher effect of civil liberties on bargaining 
process stems from the higher share of labour costs in total costs, in labour intensive 
sectors. Consequently given the argument above, in countries with moderate level of civil 
liberties, we expect the unions to be able to impose a greater threat to the cost structure of 
MNEs through rent extraction in labour intensive sectors (in comparison to capital 
intensive sector), thus raising the initial cost of investment and reducing the overall FDI 
flows. 
Hypothesis (2): The effect of civil liberties on labour intensive FDI (i.e. services FDI) is 
greater than that on capital intensive FDI (manufacturing FDI) in case of free and 
moderately free countries. 
Fourth, in moderately repressed countries with low level of civil liberties, and thus 
limited union bargaining power, the labour representatives have higher power over 
bargaining process in the sectors where labour share of production is greater than that of 
capital. This is mainly due to the fact that higher wages would impose a higher influence 
on cost structure of firms in labour intensive sector (since wages account for higher share 
of cost of production in labour intensive sectors), in comparison to those in capital 
intensive sector. Furthermore, it is possible to interpret this effect through the cost effect of 
productivity level of workforce in sectors where labour share of production is higher than 
capital. However, since we have considered constant productivity, we will not elaborate 
further on the productivity aspect of wages. 
Hypothesis (3): The effect of civil liberties on services FDI (labour intensive 
production) is greater than that on manufacturing FDI (capital intensive production), in 
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case of repressed and moderately repressed countries (since labour intensive sectors have 
higher share of labour costs). 
There is a difference between countries with low level of civil liberty and low union 
representation and the ones with medium level of unionization and civil liberty. In cases 
with medium level of unionization and civil liberty, the intensity of the labour to that of 
capital was as follows:  
Table 4—3: The effect of the level of civil liberty and union representation on the capital needed for the investment 
to take place. 
Low civil lib and union rep Medium civil lib and union rep Cost of FDI 
0 < 𝑑 < 1/2 0 < 𝑑 < (
3 − 2√2
2
≅ 0.1) 
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑎
< 0 
1/2 < 𝑑 < 1 (0.1 ≅
3 − 2√2
2
 ) < 𝑑 < 1 
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑎
> 0 
Note that in countries with medium level of civil liberties, the sectors’ labour share of 
production threshold at which the sign of  
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑎
 changes is lower than repressed countries. 
Indicating that in countries with higher level of civil liberties, a higher level of rent 
extraction is applicable, particularly in case of labour intensive sectors where the firms are 
more sensitive to the level of wages, due to their labour costs accounting for higher share 
of total costs, leaving the labour intensive industries more exposed to higher initial cost of 
FDI. Based on the latter, it is possible to investigate whether in labour intensive sector; the 
higher level of civil liberty discourages FDI. However, the empirical comparative analysis 
of the effect of the level of civil liberties on the FDI inflows of the countries with medium 
level of civil liberties, in two main groups of labour intensive, and capital intensive 
industries is left for future research. 
This section explored the direct effect of civil liberties on FDI through comparative 
power of union and MNE on the bargaining process over wages. The indirect effect of civil 
liberties through productivity of work force is elaborated in industry/sector specific 
distinction based on the industry/sectors’ specific labour and capital share of production. 
The latter allows theoretical exploration of the effect of civil liberties on FDI.  The next 
section explores the effect of political rights on FDI activity through taxes on income. 
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4.4.3. B. The effect of taxes on the minimum level of capital that has to be invested 
for FDI to occur 
The term ‘t’ in our general form of the bargaining problem below, refers to taxes which 
could be considered as an indirect measure of political rights.  
{𝑤∗, 𝐿∗} = 𝐴𝑟𝑔max [
𝑤,𝐿
[𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸(𝑤𝐵 − 𝑤𝑎)]
𝑎[(1 − 𝑡)𝐾𝑔𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸
𝑑 − 𝑤𝐵. 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑁𝐸]
1−𝑎]  (25) 
We consider political rights to embody a number of factors including: Electoral 
process; political pluralism and participation; and functioning of the government. The 
effect of political rights on FDI activity is considered through taxes on income. Our 
premise is that political regimes vary according to the taxes imposed by government, in 
that countries with lower level of political liberties tend to impose higher taxes on foreign 
firms, in comparison to those with higher level of political liberties. In countries with 
higher level of civil and political liberties (democracy), lower than average income median 
voter tends to vote for higher distribution than socially optimum (Persson and Tabellini, 
2000), and thereby increasing the overall tax rates, while the level of taxes imposed on 
foreign firms remain relatively low. In contrast in countries with low level of civil and 
political liberties (non-democratic) higher taxes are commonly imposed on foreign firms 
due to predatory policies rather than pressures for redistribution. As Olson and McGuire 
(1995) argue, in non-democratic regimes (low level of civil and political liberties) the 
“ruler can act like a stationary bandit” with intention to maximise the amount of capital 
that he can extract from the economy.  
Considering rather short life of autocratic rulers this type of predatory policies is 
commonly applied by the autocratic rulers to maximise government revenue in order to 
serve an elite society at the expense of the public. Therefore we assume that the tax rates 
imposed by government are “decreasing functions of political freedom” (Adam & 
Filippaios, 2007), and that countries with low level of political rights often impose higher 
taxes, particularly on MNEs.  
In order to determine the effect of political rights on FDI activity therefore we explore 
the effect of changes in taxes on income applied to the MNEs in foreign country on the 
minimum level of capital that has to be invested for the FDI to occur. To do so we work 
out the derivative of (14) with respected to ‘𝑡’ as follows:  
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𝒅
𝒅𝒕
𝑲 =
𝒅
𝒅𝒕
([𝒈𝒅−𝟏. (𝟏 − 𝒂 − 𝒅 + 𝒂𝒅)𝒅−𝟏. 𝒘𝒂
𝒅. (𝟏 − 𝒂)𝒅. 𝒓𝟏−𝒅. (𝟏 − 𝒕)−𝟏. 𝒅−𝒅]
𝟏
𝒅+𝒈−𝟏)  ( 46 ) 
𝒅
𝒅𝒕
𝑲 = (−𝟏). (−
𝟏
𝒅+𝒈−𝟏
) . (𝟏 − 𝒕)
−𝟏
𝒅+𝒈−𝟏
−𝟏
. [𝒈𝒅−𝟏. (𝟏 − 𝒂 − 𝒅 + 𝒂𝒅)𝒅−𝟏. 𝒘𝒂
𝒅. (𝟏 −
𝒂)𝒅. 𝒓𝟏−𝒅. 𝒅−𝒅]
𝟏
𝒅+𝒈−𝟏  ( 47 ) 
𝒅
𝒅𝒕
𝑲 = (
𝟏
𝒅+𝒈−𝟏
) . (𝟏 − 𝒕)
𝒅+𝒈
𝟏−𝒅−𝒈. [𝒈𝒅−𝟏. (𝟏 − 𝒂 − 𝒅 + 𝒂𝒅)𝒅−𝟏. 𝒘𝒂
𝒅. (𝟏 −
𝒂)𝒅. 𝒓𝟏−𝒅. 𝒅−𝒅]
𝟏
𝒅+𝒈−𝟏  ( 48 ) 
Constraints:   0 ≤ 𝑔 < 1; 0 ≤ 𝑑 < 1; 𝑔 + 𝑑 < 1; 𝑟 > 0;  𝑡 > 0; (1 − 𝑡) > 0; 𝑤𝑎 ≥ 0. 
The sign of 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝐾would be determined by the signs of the following:  
−(𝟏 − 𝒂 − 𝒅 + 𝒂𝒅)𝒅−𝟏. (𝟏 − 𝒂)𝒅  ( 49 ) 
If 
−(1 − 𝑎 − 𝑑 + 𝑎𝑑)𝑑−1. (1 − 𝑎)𝑑 
Will be: 
Outcome 
𝑎 = 1 0 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝐾 = 0 
0 < 𝑎 < 1 −(1 − 𝑑)𝑑−1 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝐾 < 0 
𝑎 = 0 −(1 − 𝑑)𝑑−1 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝐾 < 0 
 
The results show that changes in the taxes on income, in case of repressed, moderately 
repressed and moderately free countries in terms of civil liberties (0 ≤ 𝑎 < 1), have a 
negative effect on the initial cost of FDI, and consequently a positive effect on FDI 
activity. Therefore, in host countries with low, medium and moderately high level of civil 
liberties, increase in the level of political rights leads to lower taxes and higher FDI.  
In contrast to the latter FDI activity tends to be insensitive to the level of taxes on 
income in case of countries with high level of civil liberties. In other words increase in the 
level of political rights in the countries who enjoy higher level of civil liberties, have no 
effect on FDI activity. Therefore, the evidence suggests that the effect of an increase in the 
level of political rights (channelled through taxes) on FDI is positive for most countries, 
with the exception of those with higher level of civil liberties.   
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Hypothesis (4): Political rights have a positive effect on aggregate (total) net FDI flows 
through taxes applied on income and profit. 
4.4.6. C. The effect of Welfare on the Minimum level of capital that has to be 
invested for FDI to occur 
The previous two sections theoretically explored the effect of civil and political liberties 
on FDI and provided a number of hypotheses that will be empirically examined in chapter 
7. This section aims to provide a rather economic exploration of the effect of host countries 
characteristics on the wage setting process. In particular we investigate the effect of the 
host countries’ welfare on the wage setting process. The premise is that the level of welfare 
in the host country influences the industry/sector wages and thereby indirectly influences 
the wage setting process between MNE and unions. Furthermore, since social insurance 
exists, mostly in developed nations with high level of civil and political liberties, it is 
possible to view the effect of welfare wage on the FDI as a by product of high level of civil 
and political liberties. In order to determine the effect of changes in alternative wages 
earned by unemployed (could be interpreted as welfare in some cases) ‘𝑤𝑎’ on the 
minimum level of capital that has to be invested for the FDI to occur, the derivative of the 
(43) with respect to ‘𝑤𝑎’ has to be considered. 
𝒅
𝒅𝒘𝒂
𝑲 =
𝒅
𝒅𝒘𝒂
([𝒈𝒅−𝟏. (𝟏 − 𝒂 − 𝒅 + 𝒂𝒅)𝒅−𝟏. 𝒘𝒂
𝒅. (𝟏 − 𝒂)𝒅. 𝒓𝟏−𝒅. (𝟏 − 𝒕)−𝟏. 𝒅−𝒅]
𝟏
𝒅+𝒈−𝟏) 
(50) 
𝒅
𝒅𝒘𝒂
𝑲 = 𝒅(
𝟏
𝒅+𝒈−𝟏
) .𝒘𝒂
𝒅
𝒅+𝒈−𝟏
−𝟏
. [𝒈𝒅−𝟏. (𝟏 − 𝒂 − 𝒅 + 𝒂𝒅)𝒅−𝟏. (𝟏 − 𝒂)𝒅. 𝒓𝟏−𝒅. (𝟏 −
𝒕)−𝟏. 𝒅−𝒅]
𝟏
𝒅+𝒈−𝟏  ( 51 ) 
Constraints:   0 ≤ 𝑔 < 1; 0 ≤ 𝑑 < 1; 𝑔 + 𝑑 < 1; 𝑟 > 0;  𝑡 > 0; (1 − 𝑡) > 0; 𝑤𝑎 ≥ 0. 
Sign of  
𝒅
𝒅𝒘𝒂
𝑲 , is mainly related to the sing of: −(𝟏 − 𝒂 − 𝒅 + 𝒂𝒅)𝒅−𝟏. (𝟏 − 𝒂)𝒅 ( 52 ) 
If   
−(1 − 𝑎 − 𝑑 + 𝑎𝑑)𝑑−1. (1 − 𝑎)𝑑 
Will be: 
Outcome: 
𝑎 = 1 0 
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑤𝑎
= 0 
0 < 𝑎 < 1 −(1 − 𝑑)𝑑−1 
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑡
< 0 
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𝑎 = 0 −(1 − 𝑑)𝑑−1 
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑤𝑎
 < 0 
Therefore, in countries with high level of civil liberties where the union has all the 
power in bargaining with MNEs over wages and employment, increase in the level of 
alternative wages does not affect the minimum level of capital that has to be invested for 
FDI to occur. Interestingly in case of countries with low level of civil liberties where the 
unions have little, or no power over the bargaining process with MNEs, the rate of change 
of the minimum capital that has to be invested for FDI to occur with respect to welfare 
paid to unemployed is negative. In other words, a rise in the level of alternative income 
earned by unemployed in markets with medium and low level of civil liberties, leads to a 
lower capital to be invested for FDI to occur, and thereby encouraging FDI inflows.  
4.5. Limitations, and Avenues for Further Research 
The static model provides some insights into the way the level of civil liberties 
influences the Inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (IFDI) through channels such as unions 
and labour representation entities. Recent game theory models considering FDI flows, 
generally adopt more time variant models that allow for viewing the decision making 
process in real time considering Real Option (RO), Net Present Value (NPV), and other 
methods available. The main reason why this research has considered a static analysis of 
the effect of civil liberties on IFDI, is that in contrast to other factors affecting FDI flows, 
civil liberties (and more specifically the aspects of civil liberty that we consider here which 
are more related to labour rights and labour voice which are reasonably influential in the 
productivity of the firms), are not very time variant by nature. For instance, the level of 
repression of work force of a certain market is not something that could be changed in a 
matter of a few quarters or even years. Changes in the level of civil liberties that are 
granted for citizens of a certain country similar to other institutional changes generally 
occur gradually in a long period of upheaval and unrest, which is observable by the foreign 
firms. Therefore we are suggesting that in contrast to more time variant models of FDI 
which consider the option to wait, issues of flexibility and etc., analysis of the effect of 
civil liberties on IFDI could be achieved by consideration of a static model.  However, the 
examination of this claim will be left for the future research. 
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Considering the level of political liberty in countries, it is possible to provide similar 
arguments as provided above. However, it is possible to refer to issues of changes in the 
treatment of foreign firms and taxation of foreign firms, by the governing body in the host 
country as the effect of political stability or political certainty in host countries. The 
analysis of the effect of changes in taxes and treatment of foreign firms, therefore, in 
general could possibly gain significantly by adoption of time varying methods that could 
capture the real-time effect of the changes that occur commonly in the political 
environment of the countries and the way they affect foreign firms’ and their investments 
abroad.  
The models provided in this chapter, investigate the effect of civil and political liberties 
on FDI, by incorporating the VoC framework into IB theory. The incorporation of VoC 
framework has allowed distinction between various types of unions. This distinction 
following Hall and Soskice (2001) is mainly based on the level of bargaining processes 
undertaken by firms in various market economies. Section 4.3 theoretically explored 
whether there are any differences between the incentive structure of unions based on the 
level at which they bargain with foreign firms. However, since in the imperfect markets, in 
presence of unemployment, the incentive of national, and sectoral/industry level unions 
reduces to one, the distinction is not pronounced in the theoretical model. The profit 
function of MNEs is kept generic in order to allow generalization of the findings. Future 
research could possibly extend the arguments made here further by exploring the level of 
union density as well as level at which unions bargain with foreign firms.  
Finally, the limitations of our theoretical explorations are as follows: first, we only 
consider the monetary justification of investment and shy away from non-monetary 
motives that might lead to FDI; second, our transaction cost based model would mainly 
view the FDI decision in light of efficiency seeking incentives; third, the theoretical model 
provided is static and considers the FDI decision at a given point in time; fourth, the 
consideration of the effect of civil liberties on taxes is mainly through game theoretical 
argumentation that provides mainly information with regard to extremities (extrema); fifth, 
the consideration of taxes as the only theoretical channel through which political rights 
affect FDI, and the consideration of unilateral taxes. 
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4.6. Concluding Remarks  
In this chapter we theoretically explored the effect of civil liberties and political rights 
on the initial cost of FDI and thereby FDI activity. The models provided build upon the 
works of Grout (1984), Hart and Moutos (1995) and Adam and Filippaios (2007). It is 
assumed that the decision of FDI is influenced by the initial cost of investment into the 
designated host country. Therefore, firms are considered to bargain with employee 
representatives (labour unions) in the host country before deciding upon their investment 
abroad, in order to obtain full information with regard to the initial costs of investment. 
The incentive of the representatives of the MNE is to bargain over wages in order to reduce 
the initial and concurrent cost of production. The negotiation over the initial cost of 
production is undergone with the knowledge that the union representatives might have the 
incentive to revisit the bargaining process after the investment is made, with the intention 
to bargain over higher wages, thus a non-binding contract (Grout, 1985) is negotiated 
between the firm and entity. The incentive of unions, in the presence of unemployment in 
the market entails two main elements of negotiation over wages and employment.  
By incorporating the VoC framework we distinguished between different types of 
unions based on their market economies and other characteristics. The distinction provided 
four main types of unions, namely; Nordic, Liberal, EU, and other unions, relating to 
Northern, LME, CME, and other types of market economies. The differences between 
unions from various types of market economies, were further elaborated into the level at 
which the bargaining process takes place in case of each group. It was discussed that 
Northern firms in general tend to adopt a nation wide negotiations (bargaining processes) 
that embodies all the sectors, while CME unions tend to adopt sector level negotiations. In 
contrast LMEs tend to prefer individual bargaining. Considering the level at which 
negotiations take place we explored the utility function of different types of unions in 
imperfect markets and found out that in the presence of unemployment the incentive and 
utility function of all unions are similar. Thus the VoC contribution in terms of union 
classification showed that in the imperfect markets there are no significant differences 
between the coordination activities of unions that would alter the bargaining process. The 
profit function of MNEs was not tailored to reflect the differences in the way firms from 
different market economies coordinate their activities in order to allow generalization of 
the results. Furthermore, we mentioned that the VoC framework will be used to 
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empirically explore the way in firms from various market economies coordinate their FDI 
activity.  
Our view of the civil liberties is in line with that adopted by Freedom House in 
provision of data on the concept. Consequently we consider that in countries with low level 
of liberties, unions have low (if any) power in representing employees’ voice. Based on the 
latter we explored the effect of civil liberties on FDI through union power. Moreover, we 
consider the level of civil liberties to influence FDI through productivity of work force, 
arguing that in countries’ where civil liberties are repressed, the productivity of work force 
dampens, which in turn results in lower efficiency of production.  
In our view the cost of FDI in the host market, influences the probability of MNEs’ 
investment. Consequently we argue that while foreign firms bargain over lower wages in 
order to increase their return on investment, they tend to consider a sector specific 
threshold, when bargaining over wages, which leads to lower cost of production, as well as 
higher efficiency in terms of production. This is in line with Adam Filippaios (2007) who 
conceptually established a non-linear relationship between civil liberties and FDI and 
empirically showed the existence of such relationship. This research contributes to the 
literature by theoretically relating this non-linearity to the sectoral characteristics arguing 
that in sectors where labour share of production is higher than that of capital, since the 
products are more sensitive to labour input, the wage setting incentive of MNEs is more in 
line with increasing the productivity of work force rather than repressing wages. 
Furthermore, since in labour intensive industries/sectors, labour costs account for a larger 
share of total costs, we find that firms are more sensitive to changes in cost of labour 
(wages) in labour intensive sectors in comparison to capital intensive ones. In contrast we 
argued that in capital intensive sectors, since the production is less reliant on labour input, 
the incentive of MNEs with regard to wage setting is more in line with repressing wages in 
order to gain higher return on investment.    
Our view of the political rights is in line with that adopted by Freedom House in 
provision of data on the concept. Consequently it is assumed that the low level of political 
rights is directly related to the radical changes in policies, in particular tax policies applied 
to MNEs.  In particular building on the earlier works of Olson and McGuire (1995), and 
Adam and Filippaios (2007) we argued that tax rates imposed by government are 
“decreasing functions of political freedom”(Adam and Filippaios 2007), and that countries 
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with low level of political rights often impose higher taxes, particularly on MNEs. 
Consequently we consider taxes on income as the main channel through which political 
rights affect FDI decision. An alternative taxation policy, taxes on profit, is also explored 
and discussed in appendix 4.4., in order to provide a type of sensitivity analysis by 
providing room for comparison.    
The main theoretical model considered in this chapter, therefore explores the effect of 
civil liberties on FDI through union power, whilst account for the effect of political rights 
on FDI through taxes on income. The theoretical exploration of this model investigated the 
sensitivity of FDI with respect to level of civil liberties (union power), political rights 
(taxes on profits), and welfare wages of the host countries. The findings indicate that the 
level of civil liberty affects FDI in a nonlinear manner. In case of counties with high level 
of civil liberties, we find that initial cost of FDI is insensitive to the level of civil liberties, 
while in case of moderately free and repressed countries; it is the dependency of the 
production on labour or capital that determines the level of initial cost of investment. In 
particular we find that in moderately free countries the threshold of the labour share of 
production that influences the cost of initial investment is much lower than repressed 
countries. In other words in moderately free countries, the initial cost of investment even in 
sectors that have a low level of dependency on labour is higher as the threshold is found at 
𝑑 =
3−2√2
2
≅ 1/5. In contrast the threshold of the level of labour intensity that affects the 
initial cost of investment is found at 𝑑 = 1/2. Therefore, we find that the level of civil 
liberty (conceptualized by union power), and the labour share of capital affect the initial 
cost of investment and therefore FDI activity.  
The effect of political rights channelled through taxes, indicate that an increase in 
political rights have a positive effect on FDI in the case of most countries with the 
exception of those with high level of civil liberties (in which case increase in the level of 
political rights has no effect on FDI).  
Finally, the results of the analysis of the effect of welfare wage on the initial cost of FDI 
indicate that in case of countries with highest level of civil liberties – and union 
representation- the welfare wages do not influence initial cost of FDI activity and 
therefore, FDI activity. In contrast the lower union powers in countries with moderately 
high, low, very low, level of civil liberties, including the highly repressed countries, the 
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level of welfare wages negatively affects the initial cost of FDI, and thereby positively 
affect FDI. Our investigation of model (1) helped in providing a boundary to the level of 
investment that has to be made for FDI to occur subsequent to the decision made. For 
instance if there is going to be changes applied to taxes on income, or welfare rate in a host 
country, MNE could possibly take them into account priori and determine the minimum 
level of investment that has to be made for the FDI.  
The second theoretical construct provided in appendix 4.4., models the bargaining 
process between MNE and unions by considering the taxes to be applied to profits of the 
foreign firms. The theoretical exploration of this model investigated the sensitivity of FDI 
with respect to level of civil liberties (union power), political rights (taxes on profits), and 
welfare wages of the host countries. The findings indicate that that if the level of civil 
liberty is high in the host country, the initial cost of FDI is insensitive to the union power. 
In contrast if the level of civil liberty is moderately high, or low, the initial cost of FDI is 
negatively affected by union power. In other words, the level of civil liberties in host 
countries with higher level of liberties does not affect the initial cost of FDI, while the 
level of civil liberties in countries with lower level of liberties tends to attract FDI through 
lower cost of investment that should be made for FDI to occur. Finally, the results indicate 
that the labour/capital share of production has no bearing on the effect of the level of civil 
liberties on initial cost of FDI.A similar pattern is observed when welfare income 
(alternative wages), and political rights are considered. The investigation of the effect of 
political rights through taxes on profits of the foreign firms indicate that in host countries 
with high level of civil liberties, political rights do not affect initial cost of FDI and thereby 
FDI activity. In contrast, in case of moderately free and repressed countries, an increase in 
the level of political right tends to affect the initial cost of FDI in a negative manner, and 
thereby positively influence FDI. Moreover, we find that the effect of political rights on 
initial cost of FDI is not sensitive to the sectoral composition and therefore dependency of 
production to labour. Similarly, the level of alternative wage in host countries with high 
level of civil liberties does not affect initial cost of FDI and FDI activity. However, when 
moderately free and repressed countries are considered, we find that the level of welfare 
wage of these host countries positively affect initial cost of FDI, and thereby influencing 
FDI in a negative manner. Furthermore, the effect of the level of welfare wages of host 
countries on initial cost of FDI is not sensitive to sectoral composition, as we find no 
evidence of the sensitivity of initial cost of FDI to labour/capital share of production.  
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The review of the findings of the two models indicates that when the effect of political 
rights (liberties) on FDI is modelled by taxes on income, in general we find that the labour 
share of production plays a significant role in the bargaining process between MNE and 
labour representatives in the host markets. This influences the minimum initial capital that 
has to be invested for FDI to occur, and in turn affects the FDI activity. In contrast when 
the effect of political rights (liberties) on FDI is modelled by taxes on profit, in general we 
find that labour/capital share of production does not influence the bargaining process, 
initial cost of investment and consequently FDI activity. In all cases we find that the effect 
of civil liberties and political rights on the FDI activity is non-linear as consistently 
observe differences between the way level of liberties affect the investment into countries 
with higher level of liberties, in comparison to those with lower level of liberties.  
Overall, this chapter building on arguments provided in previous sections, driven by the 
scarcity and inconclusiveness of the literature, theoretically explored the effect of the effect 
of civil and political liberties on FDI. The theoretical findings have been illuminating on 
their own merit, and also inspired a number of hypotheses that will be empirically tested in 
chapter 7 in order to test the validity of the findings.  
 
Chapter 5 : Methodology 
5.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters we explored the Economics, Political Science, and International 
Business literature on the effect of civil and political liberties on FDI. We also 
incorporated VoC framework into IB literature and introduced a theoretical model – the 
theory building block of our research. Since the scientific method of inquiry obliges one to 
provide information on the methods used for the scientific inquiry, this chapter aims to 
inform the reader of the thought processes that have led to formation of ideas which in turn 
have become implemented using different research methods. It has been the incentive of 
the author to provide a clear outlook of the processes that have formed the philosophical 
and methodological considerations of the research conducted.  
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The theoretical and conceptual factors that have influenced the research design of our 
thesis are discussed in this chapter as follows: first, the set of research objectives are 
provided and their relevance to methodological philosophies are discussed; second, 
research sample is deliberated through provision of discussions on data collection and data 
handling; third, data analyses methods are reviewed; fourth, the legitimacy of the research, 
and its limitations are discussed; and finally a summary of our methodological choices are 
provided to inform the reader. 
5.2. Research Objectives 
Research objectives enable us to clearly understand the purpose of our study and further 
assist in the direction we investigate research phenomena (Emory and Cooper 1991). The 
objectives of our research are as follows: Firstly, we intend to explore the effect of the 
level of civil liberties, and political rights in host countries on the level of aggregated 
(total) and disaggregated (sectoral) FDI flows into them. Secondly, we aim to explore the 
linearity of the effects of civil liberties and political rights on FDI flows. Thirdly, we 
would like to whether the consideration of the type of market economy from which MNEs 
originate provides some information with regard to their FDI activity. 
These objectives are in general motivated by the recent (past 15 years) shift of the FDI 
scholars’ attention, and consequently the literature toward institutional factors in 
explaining FDI flows. In particular this research is motivated by the works of scholars such 
as Adam and Filippaios (2007) that explore the effect of disaggregated elements of 
institutional environment of societies93, namely the effect of civil liberties and political 
rights on FDI activity. The research objectives arose from review of the relevant academic 
literature that revealed gaps in the context of institutional determinants of FDI, in particular 
civil and political liberties’ effects on FDI. The review of the literature specifically showed 
that the literature on the effect of civil and political liberties on FDI is not only scarce, but 
also that the findings are in most part, inconclusive. Furthermore, we found that most of 
literature has adopted research designs that explore the determinants of FDI in a country 
level context. As reviewed earlier in chapter 1.3, this research aims to explore the effect of 
civil liberties and political rights on aggregated (total) and disaggregated (sectoral) FDI 
                                                          
93 A more detailed discussion is provided on chapter three.  
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flows, investigate whether the effects of civil and political liberties are linear across 
sectors, and finally to explore whether there are differences between the ways firms from 
LMEs and CMEs coordinate their FDI activity.   
5.3. Philosophical Perspectives 
As Saunders, et al. (2000; 2007) discuss, the philosophical perspectives generally relate 
to the assumptions made with regard to the social world and consideration of how it can be 
investigated. The mentioned assumptions include epistemological and ontological 
assumptions that are presumed by the researcher, which in turn provide a number of 
methodological options that can be considered by the researcher in investigating the 
question at hand.  
5.3.1. Epistemological Considerations  
An epistemological consideration is one that “concerns the question of what is regarded 
as acceptable knowledge in a discipline” Bryman and Bell (2003). The epistemological 
choices vary from natural science epistemology, are ‘positivism’, its contrasting view 
‘Interpretivism’  and ‘Realism’ which shares some characteristics of the former. Below we 
briefly discuss the two main epistemological positions; Positivism and Interpretivism.  
Positivism is the “epistemological position that advocates application of methods of 
natural sciences to the study of social reality …” (Bryman and Bell 2003, pp.16-17). It 
entails four main principles: First, principle of phenomenalism which dictates that the 
‘phenomena’ and ‘knowledge’ confirmed by the senses can be chiefly justified as 
knowledge. Second, Principle of deductivism which advocates that the main goal of theory 
is to develop hypotheses that can be tested and thereby allow explanations of the laws to be 
assessed. Third, principle of inductivism, which considers that knowledge, is arrived at 
through the gathering of facts that provide the basis for laws. Fourth the objectivity 
principle, which advocates the view that science, must be conducted in a way that is value 
free and objective (Remenyi, Williams et al. 1998).  
A contrasting epistemological position to positivism is the interpretivism. This view 
advocates that a “strategy is required that respects the differences between people and the 
objects of natural sciences and thus requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective 
meaning of social action” (Bryman and Bell 2003, pp. 18-19). The supporters of this 
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epistemological position maintain that since subject matter of social sciences is people and 
their institutions, and that it is different than the subject matter of natural sciences, it 
naturally requires a different logic of research which reflects the distinction between 
human beings and natural order.  
Our research does not require certain proximity to the phenomenon we explore – since 
we consider the firm as the unit of analysis. Therefore we follow the view that 
organisations exist as concrete entities about which data can be collected (Pugh 1983). 
Following this view, we assume that the data collected reflects an external reality and that 
it can be used to test the hypotheses provided. We follow the deductive principle by 
gathering informative data which later on leads to provision of a theoretical framework 
which is presented in a mathematical manner to explore our research question. The 
frameworks in general contain analytical constructs that are applied to examine the 
collected data (Bryman and Bell 2003). Furthermore, our research empirically tests the 
hypotheses provided and puts forward results and conclusions that are generalizable 
knowledge (Saunders, Lewis et al. 2000). 
5.3.2. Ontological Consideration 
Burrel and Morgan  (1979) consider the ontological considerations to be concerned with 
the reality of the phenomenon that is being investigated. Authors along with Remenyi, et 
al. (1998) put forward two distinct contrasting ontological view points, namely; 
‘Nominalism’ and ‘Realism’. The former, denies the existence of an essential independent 
external reality and thus denying all objectivity, actual or potential (Hacking 1999). The 
latter, Realism, is referred to the position that considers the existence of an external reality 
that is independent of the phenomenon and individual’s appreciation. Bryman and Bell 
(2003) add that realism inherently shares two features of positivism. First is that natural 
and social sciences can and should adopt the same types of approach to the collection of 
data as well as explanations. The second refers to the commitment to the belief that there is 
an “external reality to which scientists submit their attention” (Bryman and Bell 2003, 
pp.17-19). 
A review of works on organization theory provides a number of options for researchers 
to consider different propositions and adopt their ontological assumptions according to the 
manner that best fits their research question. Following this line of thought and the works 
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of Coase (1937) and later on Hall and Hitch (1939), we adopt the view that the firm is the 
basic building block of our analysis and that it has an external reality which is independent 
of the observer. Furthermore we follow Hall and Soskice (2001) by adopting an actor 
based approach in which multiple actors (such as producers, firms, unions, governments, 
etc.) are those populating the greater environment of political economy. In other words 
political economy is viewed as a “terrain populated by multiple actors, each of whom seeks 
to advance his interests in a rational way in strategic interaction with others” [Scharpf 
(1997)]. Hence our ontological view point is based on realism, not nominalism.  
A further breakdown on ontological considerations is possible through consideration of 
constructionism and objectivism. The former as Bryman and Bell (2003pp. 22-24) stress 
that “the social phenomena and their meaning are continually being accomplished by social 
actors. It implies that social phenomena and categories are not only produced through 
social interaction but that they are in a constant state of revision”. The latter, as authors 
argue, is in contrast to the former and refers to the position that social phenomena and their 
meanings have an independent existence that is independent of the actors themselves. This 
research favours the objectivism to constructionism, and adopts an objective approach in 
exploring the research question.  
5.3.3. Theoretical consideration 
A general notion put forward for the term theory is “an explanation of observed 
regularities” (Bryman and Bell 2003, pp.7). Bryman and Bell (2003) provide a set of 
informative discussions on different types of theories that are provided with the intention 
to introduce the social science students to research philosophies. The theories include 
grand theories that operates at a higher level of abstraction and middle range theories [i.e. 
Merton (Merton 1967)] which operate at a lower level of abstraction. In this research our 
main consideration is the deductive theory. Deductive theory “represents the commonest 
view of the nature of the relationship between theory and research”(Bryman 2003). The 
deductive approach in particular refers to the theoretical foundation in which a question is 
opposed, the basis of what is known about the theoretical foundations of the research 
domain, as well as research domain itself are considered, and a number of hypotheses are 
proposed, the proposed hypotheses at a later stage are put into empirical scrutiny in order 
to provide objective, and valid knowledge. A contrasting theory is inductive theory 
involves ‘induction’, as the researcher infers the implications of his/her research findings 
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for the theory that prompted the whole exercise (Bryman 2003, p.12). The distinction is 
that in inductive stance the theory is the outcome of the research while deductive approach 
draws the findings out of theory.  
In this research we follow the inductive theory in providing a mathematical model and a 
traditional deductive theory and approach, by consideration of the theoretical foundations 
of research domain (as mentioned before, we follows the organizational theory that 
considers firm as the building block of analysis, following Coase (1937) who have come 
from an economic tradition), as well as the research domain itself (the literature on the 
topic), in order to provide a theoretical framework, that provides a set of findings which 
are examined through an empirical investigation, and the final findings are treated as 
knowledge in compliance with positivist, objectivist, deductive, assumptions and 
considerations. In particular our research builds on: IB theory on motivations of FDI set 
forward by Behrman (1974); Organization theory of Coase (1937); VoC framework of Hall 
and Soskice (2001), in order to construct a theoretical framework (provided in chapter 4) 
whose explorations provides a set of findings and hypotheses that are examined through an 
empirical investigation in chapter 7. The final findings therefore are knowledge in 
compliance with positivist, objectivist, deductive, assumptions and considerations.  
5.3.4. Methodological considerations 
Jankowicz (1991), Bryman and Bell  (2003), and Saunders et al. (2007) consider 
methodology as the systematic approach toward collection of data so that information can 
be obtained. Remenyi et al., (1988) refers to methodology as the means available to 
research the phenomenon being studied. Furthermore, the research methodological 
considerations, or in other words methodological approaches are determined in relation to 
epistemology and ontology and thereby denote an objective or subjective approach to 
research Burrell and Morgan (1979).  
The first notion to be explored, in this section is the research strategy as a subset of 
methodological considerations. The research strategy is crudely polarised into two main 
strategies; quantitative and qualitative. The qualitative research strategy generally 
emphasizes on words rather than quantification in collection and analysis of data and has 
the following characteristics; first, emphasizes an inductive approach to the relationship 
between theory and research; second, rejects the norms and practices of natural sciences 
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and positivism and instead relies on the way in which individuals interpret their social 
world; third, considers reality to be constantly shifting emergent property of individuals’ 
creation. In contrast quantitative research strategy can be construed as a research strategy 
that emphasizes quantification in collection and analysis of data and has the following 
characteristics; first, entails a deductive approach to the relationship between theory and 
research where the emphasis is placed on testing the theory; second, it has incorporated the 
norms and practices of natural sciences and positivism; third, embodies a view of social 
reality as an external, objective reality (Bryman and Bell 2003, p.28). 
Given the set of assumptions and considerations provided above in terms of 
epistemology, ontology, theoretical and organization views, our research follows a 
deductive approach. The reasons while evident from discussions above are provided here. 
First, our research follows an objective, positivist approach, where the stress is put on the 
empirical testing of the theoretical findings, in order to view them as knowledge. The 
reality is assumed to exist in an external and independent manner from individuals. It is 
assumed that firm as the building block of analysis exists as an external and independent 
entity for which data can be collected in a quantitative manner, and that the data itself 
projects a fragment of the external reality of the firm. Finally, we believe that markets are 
accumulated with firms for which data can be collected, and hence the trends of FDI can 
be analysed as the proxy for a fraction of the external reality of the markets. Finally, as 
Punch (Punch 1998; 2005) discusses, the quantitative research approach is an efficient way 
of understanding and explaining large scale structural features of social life and it provides 
the stance to provide generalizable outcomes (Saunders, Lewis et al. 2000). 
Table 5—1: Key characteristics of Quantitative Research Methods - Source: Saunders et al. 
(2000) 
Characteristics Quantitative 
 
Approach  
 
The role of theory in relation to 
research  
Objectivist 
 
Deductive (testing of theory) 
Epistemological orientation  Positivism 
Ontological orientation Realism 
152 
 
Collection Numerical and standardized data 
Method of analysis Diagrams and statistics 
 
5.4. Sample Description 
5.4.1. Home Countries 
Following the ideology put forward by VoC, provided in section 4.3, we explore 
whether the aforementioned differences between the types of economics in terms of market 
structure, coordination activities of firms within markets and labour laws, reflect some 
information on the way, in broad term institutional factors, and in particular the level of 
civil and political liberties in these markets affect the flow of FDI from and into various 
market economies. In order to explore the effect of the level of civil liberties on FDI flows, 
we consider a wide range of home countries qualifying as LMEs, CMEs and Nordic 
countries which in an aggregate way are considered by Hall and Soskice (2003) to have 
common features in terms of their labour markets. The sample of home countries chosen is 
as follows:  
Table 5—2: Sample of home countries 
Type of Economy 
Liberal Market 
Economy (LMEs) 
Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) 
  Nordic Countries Other EU Countries Other CMEs 
 
United States of 
America (USA) 
Denmark France Japan 
 
United Kingdom 
(UK) 
Finland Germany  
 Ireland Norway Italy  
  Sweden Netherlands  
   Spain  
Consequently thirteen home countries of: United States of America (USA), United 
Kingdom (UK), Ireland, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, Italy, 
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Netherlands, Spain, and Japan, are considered in this research, allowing for a good 
coverage. 
5.4.2. Host Countries 
Considering the choice of host countries, we have considered inclusion of developed, 
developing and less developing countries in order to view the level and composition of FDI 
in these countries considering their characteristics. The latter provides the opportunity to 
examine whether MNEs from certain countries with certain level of civil and political 
liberties at home, prefer to invest in a specific manner. Furthermore, it is possible to 
observe whether different levels of civil and political liberties in host countries have 
influence on the level and composition of investment from the home countries. Taxation on 
income and labour laws, are the main measures that are considered to reflect the effect of 
these factors on the FDI level and composition into these countries. The choice of host 
countries is initially determined by the set of countries for which data was available from 
three main institutional indices sources; Freedom House, ICRG, and Polity IV. Reviewing 
the set of countries for which data is available and omitting the ones for which data is not 
consistently reported in all sources we obtain 140 initial host countries. Appendices 6.1 
and 6.2 contain the list of all home and host countries considered. 
5.4.3. Research Period: 1990-2009 
Since this research intends to find the effect of the level of civil and political liberties on 
the level and composition of FDI flows, the first consideration in terms of the span of the 
data is related to the span of data available for Outward FDI (OFDI). It is imperative to 
note that this research conducts its empirical analysis in two main levels. First, is 
investigation of the effect of civil and political liberties on an aggregate measure of OFDI, 
and the second is the investigation of effect of aforementioned factors on disaggregated 
measures of OFDI.  
The reasoning behind the choice of both aggregated and disaggregated analysis of FDI, 
is that we are interested in finding the effect of civil liberties and political rights on FDI at 
a country level (aggregated FDI) as well as sectoral level (disaggregated FDI). In chapter 
4, we related the strategy that MNE follows in wage setting to the labour/capital share of 
production, and therefore disaggregation of FDI data would allow us to explore the effect 
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of civil liberties on sectors with various levels of labour share of production. The second 
motivation for this choice is the criticism of the aggregated FDI analysis put forward by 
Blonigen (1997) and Kiyota and Urata (2004), who point out that each factor (in our case 
the level of civil and political liberties) has different effects on different industries and that 
using disaggregated FDI data provides a more clear evidence of how each factor impacts 
FDI flows in certain industry level. In other words the impact of the most factors 
considered in the literature on FDI flows are not the same on all industries94 and therefore, 
their effects on different industries offset one another when it is assumed otherwise and 
therefore analyses based on aggregate data does not capture the effect of a certain or a 
number of factors on FDI flows in a thorough manner.  
The meta-analysis of the literature on FDI, provided in chapter 3, supports this 
constructive criticism as we find that in case of the effect of civil and political aspects of 
institutional environment, the literature is populated with studies that report effects that 
vary in range, sign and magnitude. Thus in order to conduct an empirical investigation that 
truly investigates the effect of the level of civil and political liberties, this research 
considers the investigation of the lowest level of data available. The lowest level of data on 
FDI available that is presented based on a singular generalised scale (NACE 1.1) is at 
industry level. This data is provided for all home and host countries mentioned above. 
Considering both sets of data on FDI; aggregate (total OFDI), and disaggregated data on 
OFDI (industry level data), we find that it is possible to construct a sample that spans from 
1990 to 2009. This is mainly based on the duration of time for which industry level data on 
OFDI is available for the set of home countries considered. It is worth mentioning that a 
larger span could be considered, but the due to large number of missing observations, 
consideration of a larger span would not contribute to the analysis. Therefore, the span of 
our sample is from 1990-2009.  
Moreover, in the meta-analysis provided in chapter 3, we showed that the effects 
reported are influenced by the time frame from which the data for the analysis has been 
extracted for. In our meta-analysis we also showed that the effect of time on results is 
significant when decades are used as time frame. Therefore, in this research we have 
chosen a sample that covers 20 years of FDI activity and thus the results of the analysis of 
data over such sample would withstand the effect of time, and would reduce the biases that 
                                                          
94 The impact of exchange rates on FDI flows differs from one industry to another. 
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could be introduced by selection of a shorter period of time. A more detailed description of 
the data on variables considered is provided in the next chapter.  
5.5. Data, Data Characteristics and Data Collection: 
Based on our epistemological, ontological and deductive considerations, we adopt a 
method of data collection that is in line with the quantitative approach. In the quantitative 
research the quantitative data can be collected in a standardised way  (Saunders, Lewis et 
al. 2000).  
The first stage of data collection, apart from the choice of host countries and notions of 
the concepts, measures and variables that were considered in the conceptual model, is to 
review the data and data bases available. Considering the dependent variable, FDI, and the 
independent variables discussed in the previous chapters, our data set entails data on FDI, 
and a set of explanatory variables that proxy for FDI motivations (RS;MS;ES;SAS), 
variables that reflect the level of civil liberties and political rights, variables that proxy for 
macroeconomic characteristics of the host countries, and finally variables that reflect the 
institutional characteristics of the host countries (reflecting on the differences between 
countries in terms of VoC). A preliminary data source review was conducted in order to 
provide some information on the available data sources and their characteristics. The data 
sources include: 
Table 5—3: preliminary data sources 
Concepts\Level Aggregated Disaggregated 
FDI EUROSTAT 
EUROSTAT; Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) 
FDI motivations World Bank (World Development Indices); GMID; EUROSTAT; OECD.STAT 
Macroeconomic factors ILO; IMF; World Bank (World Development Indices) 
Institutional factors ICRG; POLITY IV 
Civil Liberties and Political Rights FREEDOM HOUSE 
Further considerations with regard to data sources include: time span of the data 
provided; level of aggregation (i.e. the sectoral information provided for FDI activity); 
units of data (exchange rate, scale, etc.) and a number of other factors that will be 
discussed further in the following sections.  
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The dependent variable considered is the net FDI flows. In the following section we 
review the FDI data sources, their characteristics and the collection method.  A main 
feature of this study is the examination of the effect of civil and political liberties on FDI in 
a sectoral setting.  Section 5.5 provides some information on the FDI data sources’ sectoral 
provisions and the data available based on sectoral considerations. The independent 
variables, their characteristics, data sources and collection methods are explored in are 
reviewed in the chapter 6 subsection 6.2.3.  
5.5.1. FDI data 
Before proceeding to practicalities it is necessary to review a number of key points that 
binds the following development to a scientific basis. Bryman and Bell (2003, pp.156-158) 
define a concept as a building block of theory that represent the points around which 
business research is conducted. Bulmer (1984, pp.42-44) refers to concepts as “categories 
for the organization of ideas and observations”. The basic definitions provided for the 
concept of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) are provided by Fifth edition of IMF’s 
Balance of Payments Manual (BPM5; IMF, 1993) and the third edition of the OECD’s 
Benchmark definition of Foreign Direct Investment (Benchmark Definition; OECD, 1996). 
The definition is available from appendix 1.1. AS Bryman and Bell (2003, pp.157-159) 
discuss, “if a concept is to be employed in the quantitative research, it will have to be 
measured. Once they are measured, concepts can be in the form of dependent and 
independent variables”. The concept of FDI based on our positivistic approach is measured 
by central banks and a number of governmental dependent and independent organizations 
through a number of procedures and questionnaires. Since the measurements for the 
concepts are provided, it is possible to view FDI as our dependent variable.  
The key factors in choosing the sources for FDI data are of threefold: first, the source 
from which FDI data is extracted must provide detailed information of FDI activity at 
industry level; second, the source from which FDI activity is extracted must provide 
information for all the home countries we have considered; three, the industrial 
classification provided by the source should comply with the other sources of data in order 
to provide the possibility of investigation of FDI flows at industrial level of disaggregation. 
Table below shows the sources of data for the independent variable FDI (flows) and the 
data characteristics:  
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Table 5—4: sources of data for the independent variable FDI (flows) 
 BEA EUROSTAT OECD.STAT World Bank GMID 
FDI Abroad 
(Flows) 
Available Available Available Available Available 
Countries 
More than 140 
countries 
More than 140 
Countries 
Only OECD and a 
few other 
countries (less 
than 70 countries) 
More than 140 
Countries 
More than 140 
Sectoral 
Provisions: 
NAICS95 
NACE 1.196 and 
NACE 1.2 
NACE 1.1 and 
NACE 1.2. 
ISIC97 
Other 
classification98 
Sectoral Levels: 
All levels, 
however some 
indices are 
different than the 
NACE 1.1 
All levels  
only 3 aggregate 
levels 
 
The table 5.5 shows the data sources and their coverage in terms of countries as well as 
sectoral composition of data available. In order to determine which one of the data sources 
above is the suitable choice for the FDI data, it is necessary to explore the industrial 
classifications and their characteristics.   
5.5.1. A. Sectoral Considerations 
There are four main reasons that motivate an industrial exploration of the effect of civil 
and political liberties on FDI. The first two reasons are regarding the effect of host 
countries’ institutional environment on FDI, while the next two provide some information 
about the effect of MNEs’ home institutional environment on their FDI behaviour.  
                                                          
95 North American Industry Classification system (NAICS) is the standard used by the Federal Statistical agencies in 
classifying business establishments for the purpose of collection, analysing, and publishing statistical data related to the 
U.S. business economy (U.S. Department of Commerce). Further information is available from 
www.census.gov/eos/www/naics  
96 NACE is the acronym used to designate the various statistical classifications of economic activities developed since 
1970 by the European Union; it is designed to categorise data relating to “statistical units”, in this case a unit of activity, 
for example an individual plant or group of plants constituting an economic activity such as an enterprise. It provides the 
basis for preparing a large range of statistics (output, inputs to production process, capital formation and financial 
transactions) of such units (source: NACE Rev. 1 introductory note). Further information is available from 
www.Eurostat.com 
97 “International Standard Industrial classification or (ISIC)”. For more information please refer to United Nations (UN) 
Industrial standard classification of all economic activities Revision 4.  
98 Does not comply with NACE, NAICS or World Bank industrial classification 
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We believe that it is essential to investigate the effect of factor(s) on FDI activity in 
various sectors of economy. The reasoning is in line the arguments put forward by 
articulated by Blonigen (1997; 2005) that underscore the importance of using 
disaggregated measures in investigation of determinants of FDI. Blonigen (1997; 2005) 
argues that the effects of factor(s) are not consistently similar in sign or magnitude, on 
FDI, across industries, and that the aggregate considerations would naturally report the 
combination of different and at times opposing effects reported, leaving the general 
outcome of the studies that investigate the effect of one or a number of factors on FDI in an 
aggregate manner (i.e. country level analyses that explore the effect of one of a number of 
factors on FDI considering the whole economy) rather insignificant or in many cases in 
contrast to the results reported from other studies99. In the light of the contrasting results 
reported in the literature, and considering the effect of using aggregate data in exploring 
FDI activity, a sectoral consideration of the effect of factor(s) is imperative to provide 
detailed information on the effects of civil and political liberties on various sectors. A 
second reason for consideration of sectoral analysis is that the effects of different factors 
(i.e. firms’ motivations, level of civil and political liberties) on sectoral FDI are not linear 
across time or countries. In particular in chapter four through the theoretical exploration of 
the effect of civil liberties on FDI, we found that civil liberties tend to be influenced by the 
level of labour share of production in case of most countries (all countries except those 
with highest level of civil liberties). In other words we found that in sectors where labours’ 
input is an essential part of production, labour unions tend to have higher power over 
bargaining process. In contrast we found that in sectors/industries where capital plays a 
greater role in production, unions tend to have less power over bargaining process. 
Therefore in order to empirically investigate the effect of labour/capital share of production 
on the FDI activity, we gather disaggregated FDI data.  
A Third reason for consideration of sectoral analysis is that following Behrman’s (1974) 
taxonomy of firms’ motivations of FDI, we distinguish between different types of 
incentives that drives the FDI activities of firms, namely; Resource Seeking (RS), Market 
Seeking (MS), Strategic Asset Seeking (SAS), and Efficiency Seeking (ES). This 
distinction in a sectoral level analysis provides the opportunity to investigate the effect of 
                                                          
99 A review of the literature on the effect of institutional factors, civil and political liberties, as well as 
democracy on FDI shows that the results of the studies that constitute as the main body of the literature on 
the subject, are generally in contrast to one another and in many cases, insignificant.  
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the level of civil liberties and political rights on the decision of firms investing in various 
sectors (with different incentives with regards to their FDI activity). This in turn helps in 
finding patterns in the way the sectoral composition of countries affect their FDI flows 
from different types of firms from various market economies. 
Finally, the fourth reason that motivates a sectoral investigation of the effect of the level 
of civil and political liberties on FDI is the very nature of these factors. As it was 
mentioned on chapter (4), we consider the effect of civil liberties on FDI through the 
bargaining process between labour representatives and foreign firms in terms of wage 
setting and labour recruitment. This inherently would lead to a focus on sectors in which 
firms’ incentives are more in line with efficiency seeking motives. This would provide the 
opportunity to examine the effect of the level of civil liberties in the host countries on 
sectors that are more reliant on efficiency seeking activities, as well as the effect of the 
level of civil liberties on the investment patterns into sectors that are capital intensive in 
comparison to labour intensive sectors. In order to account for the other types of FDI 
activity it is essential to provide an extensive set of sectors/industries that accommodate 
different types of FDI investment, thus allowing the empirical model to explore the effect 
of civil and political liberties on the FDI activity of firm that coordinate their activities in 
various sectors following different types of motivations. 
The effect of political liberty on FDI was considered to be channelled through tax 
setting on the MNEs’ profit in host country, in the conceptual model. This would apply to 
all firms undertaking FDI. The effect of political liberties on FDI is further on explored in 
an empirical manner by consideration of factors such as the stability of laws and 
regulations, stability of government and other factors that will be reviewed in chapter 6. 
These factors are added with the intention to capture the effect of political liberties on FDI 
in an aggregate manner similar to those provided in the conceptual model. While the effect 
of these factors on different sectors might be different, and as a result might lead to 
different patterns of investment by the firms in various sectors, there has been no study to 
our knowledge to provide such observations. Therefore our investigation on the effect of 
political liberties on FDI in a sectoral manner would provide some information on the 
effect of taxation, and trade restrictions on foreign firms’ FDI activity in various sectors. 
Therefore, in order to investigate the effect of civil and political liberties on FDI, this 
research considers the effect of civil liberties and political rights on aggregated and 
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disaggregated FDI, in order to provide information with regard to the effect of these factors 
on total FDI flows as well as sectoral FDI flows.  This should provide more detailed 
information on the way the level of civil and political liberties affect the level and 
composition of FDI in a sectoral setting, and thus avoid the problems that arise from the 
consideration of the effect of these factors on aggregated FDI flows.   
Considering our sources for FDI data, it is possible to categorize the sources based on 
their sectoral classifications. First source is World Bank, which provides data based on 
International Standard Industrial Classification commonly referred to as ISIC 
classification. The second source of data is the Eurostat that provides FDI data based on 
Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community sectoral 
classification commonly known as NACE. The final source of data is the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) that provides FDI data based on the North American Industrial 
Classification commonly known as NAICS. Furthermore, the data provided based on each 
of these classifications has been under revision. The latter means that a consideration of 
data from one source would not provide one with a full set of data covering an extended 
number of years. At least not without manipulation of indices using concordance tables 
provided for different revisions.  
The information with regard to sources of sectoral FDI data, classifications and the 
considerations made with respect to concordance of the classification of data from different 
sources are provided in Appendix 5.1.  
5.5.1. B. FDI Data Collection  
Considering the discussions made on sectoral data sources (available from Appendix 
5.1), the data on dependent variable (FDI) is extracted from EUROSTAT and BEA for the 
period of 1990-2009. The data from each of the sources is provided in different data set 
named after the original source of FDI data (Eurostat and BEA data sets). 
Considering the Eurostat data set, the choice of home countries are namely: United 
States of America (USA), United Kingdom (UK), Ireland, Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and Japan, as discussed in subsection 
5.4.1 and the choice of host countries are provided in appendix 6.2. The classification of 
the industrial sectors is in line with the NACE Rev.1.1, ISIC Rev.3.1and NAICS 2002, and 
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is discussed in length and provided in appendix 5.1. The initial data set provides FDI net 
flows of the 13 countries abroad into the 140 host countries (list of the countries is 
available from appendix 6.2). 
Regarding BEA data set, the choice of home country is only United States. The 
industrial classification system used is the one proposed in the previous section. The choice 
of host countries is in line with those of Eurostat data set, which are available from 
appendix 5.1. The BEA data set provided the data on U.S. FDI flows abroad and not U.S. 
FDI net flows. In order to calculate net flows we calculated the different across years to 
provide the U.S. FDI net flows in the data set.  
5.5.2. Independent Variables 
In chapter (4) we used a set of concepts such as; average wage, alternative wage, tax on 
profit, bargained wage, in order to provide a theoretical model of a bargaining process 
between MNE and labour representatives in host countries. Considering our positivist 
approach, we believe that these concepts can be measured, their measurements are 
obtainable from a number of sources, and that the measurements proxy for the concepts we 
have considered. Since the concepts are measured, following Bryman and Bell (2003) we 
refer to them as dependent and independent variables. In this case, since our dependent 
variable is FDI, our independent variables are those reviewed in this section.  
5.5.2. A. Preliminary set of Independent variables 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, our set of explanatory variables include variables 
that proxy for FDI motivations (RS, MS, ES, and SAS), variables that reflect the level of 
civil liberties and political rights, variables that proxy for macroeconomic characteristics of 
the host countries, and finally variables that reflect the institutional characteristics of the 
host countries. This is mainly due to the fact that our research considers firm as the unit of 
analysis and that firms motivations are considered to be drivers of their FDI activity. 
Therefore the first set of explanatory variables considered are those that proxy for FDI 
motivation. Since we consider the macroeconomic characteristics of the host countries to 
influence FDI activity, therefore the second set of variables considered are those related to 
the host countries’ macro characteristics. The third set of variables that are essential 
ingredients of our research are civil liberties and political rights indices provided by 
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Freedom House. Finally, we consider the institutional characteristics of the host countries 
to affect their FDI activity, therefore a number of institutional factors are considered as 
explanatory variables. A detailed review of all the measures available for the subgroup 
variables are provided in the next chapter. The decision process in determining the relevant 
measures for the concepts, involves four main criteria which are provided based on their 
priority. First, the measure must reflect the concept in the essence that it is used in the 
literature and conceptual model. Therefore the measure must proxy for the concept. 
Second, source from which the measure is extracted from should cover all the home 
countries and the most extensive set of host countries. Third, the period for which the 
measures’ data is provided for should comply with the period for which the research is 
conducting the empirical investigation for (1990-2009).  Finally, the units of measures 
should be taken into account as to ensure consistency amongst measures.  
5.6. Missing data & related considerations 
The set of missing data is left blank in the excel dataset which is later on transferred to 
STATA 10, for empirical investigation. The observations remarked by (c) indicators in the 
official datasets are the observations that are kept confidential due to the scarce number of 
MNEs in a certain region and sector, as a result, the announcement of the level of net FDI 
flows are kept from public. These values are considered as not reported, and hence are 
reported as blank cells (no values) in the dataset.  It is imperative to note that the difference 
between the case where data is kept confidential, or is not reported is treated differently 
than the case where the net FDI flows is reported “0”, and the blank cells are chosen to 
distinguish between the two.  
5.7. Methodology of Data Analysis 
The combined data set is used in empirically testing the hypotheses provided in chapter 
four, using statistical regression analysis. The empirical methods are briefly introduced in 
the next sections.  
5.7.1. Variable based approach  
The use of variable based approach is prevalent to the quantitative research arena. This 
seemingly fundamental part of quantitative research is referred to as “a unique notion to 
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the quantitative research” (Saunders, Lewis et al. 2000). As mentioned before our variables 
are the reflective measures of the concepts provided in the conceptual framework and 
provide the opportunity of empirically testing the set of hypotheses provided in chapter (4). 
The next section provides some information on the complete dataset used for the empirical 
investigation. 
5.7.2. Dataset and its characteristics 
Our combined dataset includes the aggregate and disaggregate levels of FDI flows from 
thirteen home countries to 140 host countries, with a range that spans from 1990 to 2009. 
This extended span of data provides the opportunity to avoid the problems that are 
generally prone to small data sets. Furthermore the choice of our extensive set of 
explanatory variables that includes measures that proxy for various factors explaining the 
FDI activity, provides us with a dataset that provides a considerable number of 
observations which would lead to provision of statistically valid exercise under the 
assumptions of ceteris paribus.  
Our empirical investigation has a longitudinal design, with the intention to investigate 
the existence of the possible patterns that we conceptually hypothesized in our conceptual 
model of chapter (4). Bryman and Bell (2003, pp.60-61) consider the longitudinal design to 
represent a “distinct form of research design that is typically used to map change in 
business and management research”. Furthermore, our longitudinal design as it is reflected 
by the dataset has a panel type format, in which a randomly selected sample from in this 
case national and international organizations is considered for the analysis. Another 
characteristic of our data is that it is cross sectional, and that it considers FDI flows from 
thirteen countries into 140 countries, making our data a cross-sectional data set that covers 
the measures for the period of 1990-2009. This type of data is generally referred to as 
panel data. We review the characteristics of the dataset more in depth in the next chapter. 
5.7.3. Regression analysis 
The method of analysis is the regression analysis which according to Jankowicz (1991) 
offers more room for generalization of the examined phenomena. The types of regression 
analyses considered, conducted and their characteristics are covered thoroughly in Chapter 
7.  
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5.8. Research legitimacy, Reliability, Validity and Replicability  
Research reliability, validity, causality, generalization and replicability is collectively 
referred to as research legitimacy (Bryman and Bell 2003).  Furthermore, they are 
considered to be the traditional criteria for judging quantitative research (Blaxter, Hughes 
et al. 2001). These elements are discussed in relation with our research in the following 
subsections. 
5.8.1. Reliability 
Reliability relates to the issues of consistency of measures, their stability, inter-
reliability and inter-observer consistency (Saunders, Lewis et al. 2007). It is imperative 
that the measures chosen for the concepts are good proxies for their concepts, are 
consistent, and stable over time. The reliability of measures in some cases can be 
investigated using different sources of data to examine their reliability. This has been the 
case for some of the explanatory variables as well as dependent variable.100In other cases 
since our sources of data are reputable, international organizations (World Bank, 
International Labour Organization, EUROSTAT, etc.) whose data is chiefly used by most 
researchers, we assume that the data provided is reliable. According to Bryman and Bell 
(2003, p.40) the reliability refers to “the question of whether the results of a study are 
repeatable”. Given the sources of data and the standard replicable method of analysis, it is 
possible to repeat this research, as long as the set of assumptions are consistent with ones 
provided in this research both in a conceptual context as well as empirical exercise.  
5.8.2. Validity 
Bryman and Bell (2003, pp.40-42) consider validity of the research to be “concerned 
with the integrity of the conclusions that are generated from a piece of research”.  
Furthermore, they argue that in the quantitative research the question of validity is 
generally related to whether measures chosen as proxies for concepts are good reflectors of 
the concepts. It is worth mentioning that while reliability is a necessary condition for 
validity, it is not sufficient. However, if a measure is considered valid, it is presupposed 
that it is reliable.  
                                                          
100 The assessment of reliability through checking other sources of data has been possible for the variables that have been 
reported by a number of sources. For instance the level of employment is provided by a number of sources that provide 
such opportunity.  
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A number of strategies have been recommended to ensure validity of quantitative 
research. Amongst which use of the multiple data sources (Blaxter, Hughes et al. 2001) 
and combining data from different sources (Remenyi, Williams et al. 1998) are worth 
mentioning.  In the context of this research we have carefully chosen a set of measures that 
are chosen for the concepts, with the intention to provide valid measures for our concepts. 
Furthermore, we use a number of data sources, in order to ensure the validity of our 
empirical investigation. 
5.8.2. A. Internal Validity 
Internal validity refers to issues regarding causality. Bryman and Bell (2003pp.168-169) 
discuss that quantitative researchers in general are concerned with describing how things 
are rather than discussing why things are the way they are. Thus they argue that it is 
imperative to discuss the causes of a phenomenon as well as description of the way it is. In 
the context of this research we explicitly emphasised on the reasons why a certain type of 
incentive and the general factors affecting the investment decisions do influence 
investment patterns and have provided a set of hypotheses in order to examine the validity 
of the idea in an empirical sense.  
5.8.2. B. External Validity 
External validity refers to the issues concerning the generalizability of the findings. 
Bryman and Bell (2003pp.168-169) argue that in the context of quantitative research, “the 
researcher is usually concerned to be able to say that his or her findings can be generalized 
beyond the confines of the particular context in which the research was conducted”. 
Jankowicz (1991) refers to generalizability as the extent of applicability of research 
findings of a research to outside environment in which the research has been conducted. In 
this context we consider our sample representative of the population of firms’ investing 
abroad, at least amongst developed countries. The set of host countries considered also can 
be arguably considered as a representative sample for most countries of the world. 
Therefore, it is expected that considering the boundaries of this research101, we should not 
experience significant sample selection bias, or other issues that might undermine the 
external validity of our research.   
                                                          
101 Our selection of home countries provides a significant generalization boundary by exploring the investment pattern of 
mainly developed countries through FDI. However this investment pattern considers FDI in an extended set of host 
countries which makes the findings externally valid. 
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5.8.3. Replicability 
Saunders, Lewis et al. (2007) argues that it is imperative that the methods taken into 
account in generating a set of findings, in the context of quantitative research, are made 
explicit in order to provide the possibility of replicating a piece of research. The provision 
of explanations with regard to the thought process as well as the decisions made in the 
course of this research that are provided chiefly in this chapter, and frequently in every 
chapter of this thesis is in order to familiarize the reader of all the processes that have 
helped forming this research. It is expected that the replication of the steps undertaken in 
this research given that the set of assumptions put forward are assumed by the replicator, 
leads to generating the same set of results. Apart from these considerations this research 
provides all the datasets constructed as a “replication dataset” for the public in order to 
provide the opportunity to anyone who might wish to replicate the results provided.  
5.8.4. Research legitimacy 
The collection of issues regarding research reliability, validity, causality, generalization 
and replicability are the determinants of research legitimacy (Bryman and Bell, 2003).  
Thus if a quantitative research is valid, and hence reliable, it is generalizable and 
replicable, and explain the causes as well as phenomenon, it is legitimate.  Considering our 
research we provide a legitimate quantitative research that satisfies the aforementioned 
requirements within its boundaries. 
5.8.5. Limitations of the research  
Inherently, research methods are exposed to criticisms and their adoption in conducting 
a scientific inquiry by nature imposes a number of limitations on the research, as well as 
exposing it to a number of weaknesses that should be considered by the researcher.  
Blaxter, et al.(2010) point out that the researchers should be aware of their research’s 
limitations. 
In the case of this research, the quantitative approach in business studies and social 
sciences is criticised for a number of reasons. The first criticism is that a quantitative 
approach applies the methods for researching ‘the natural world’ to the research on human 
beings and the social institutions, and therefore, the quantitative researcher does not 
distinguish the differences between people and social institutions from the ‘the world of 
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nature (Bryman and Bell 2007). The second criticism is that the numerical way of 
describing is much more limited that the more informative narrative (Punch 2005) and that 
the connection between the concepts that are involved in the research and the measures 
developed to explore the subject are generally assumed, and therefore, the measurement 
process of quantitative research possesses “an artificial and spurious sense of precision and 
accuracy” (Bryman and Bell 2007).  The third criticism according to Bryman(2003) is that 
the quantitative research facilitates the collection of a narrow and superficial data. 
Furthermore, Bryman and Bell (2007) argue that the quantitative approach provides a static 
view of life that is independent of the people, by analysis of the relationships between 
variables. According to (Saunders, Lewis et al. 2000) the quantitative approach is more 
appropriate for the macro level analysis rather than micro, since it requires to use large 
samples (Saunders, Lewis et al. 2000). 
In order to account for possible biases, this research as discussed in the earlier sections 
of this chapter, takes advantage of using a large data set which covers the data over twenty 
years, and therefore, avoids small sample biases and explores the phenomenon in a 
continuous manner. The in order to provide a more informative narrative of the research, 
the next section will discuss the variable selection process which aims at choosing 
variables that are the appropriate indicators of the concepts which are developed in the 
previous chapter. Furthermore characteristics of the data are explored in length and a 
number of comparative statistics are provided with the intention to provide a rich narrative 
as well as diverse set of statistical examination in order to explore the relationship between 
variables. The regression analysis is conducted in chapter 7, in order to explore the 
relationship between FDI net flows and a number of variables. The regression analysis 
itself is undergone a number of robustness tests in order to reassure the robustness of the 
results provided and therefore eliminate the possibility of statistical biases and allow for 
generalisation and causality requirements discussed above.  
5.9. Conclusion 
The choice of the philosophical standpoint and research approach affects the choice of 
methods in scientific inquiry and therefore are the cornerstones that this research is built 
upon. This chapter intended to explore the philosophical and methodological 
considerations, debate them, and provide discussions on the sampling and data collection. 
The process of data collection, were further developed by descriptive narrative that 
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provided information with regard to dataset construction, the set of variables, and the home 
and host countries that were considered. Furthermore, the data handling process, methods 
considered for data analysis, the issues related to legitimacy, validity, and reliability were 
discussed along with the limitations of the methods considered.  The next chapter, reviews 
variable selection methods adopted, explores the data characteristics, and provides some 
information with regard to variables chosen to explain FDI activity, in length. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 : Data Characteristics & Empirical Investigation 
6.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the epistemological, ontological, other philosophical 
assumptions and methodological considerations of the research were discussed. A brief 
overview of data collection process was put forward to inform the reader of the processes 
that have led to formation of our dataset. As it was mentioned in section (5.5.2.), the 
selection of independent variables will be discussed thoroughly in this chapter, along with 
some information on sample characteristics. Furthermore, we provide some information on 
the overall data and provide some preliminary statistics with the intention to familiarise the 
reader with the dataset and prepare the groundwork for the empirical investigation of 
dataset.    
This research as discussed in chapter 4, considers the firm as the building block of the 
conceptual model, and hence views the concepts from a firm level point of view. 
Complying with this logic we discuss the factors that explain the FDI activity of the firm 
from an incentive point of view (mainly the established motivations of FDI, namely; 
Resource seeking, Market seeking, Strategic Asset Seeking and Efficiency Seeking 
motivations) in contrast to a purely macro-view which would mainly take into account 
country level factors. However, we include a set of country level variables in order to 
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proxy for the macro-economic factors affecting the investment environment of countries, 
in order to explain FDI activity. The second element that is worth mentioning is that our 
level of analysis is placed at macro level trying to draw on the observable general trends in 
the FDI activity of the firms in a number of countries using both country and sectoral 
considerations. The combination of the micro drivers of FDI activity (motivations of firms 
in investing abroad) as well as countries’ macroeconomic characteristics, institutional 
quality (i.e. Bureaucratic quality), level of civil liberties and political rights provides an 
extensive set of information that would provide some explanations on the composition and 
level of FDI activity. The country specific considerations include institutional variables 
that affect firm’s decision and FDI activity. This chapter is organized as follows: first 
section provides information with regard to data sources, time span of data and the number 
of host and home countries considered. Second section provides some information on the 
general characteristics of data on dependent and independent variables and discusses the 
process of selection of valid variables for empirical investigation. Third section explores 
the normality of the data in order to determine appropriate statistical methods to be used 
for the analysis of data. Consequently we explore FDI activity with regard to a number of 
factors using Anova type tests and by doing so provide some characteristic statistics on 
FDI activity through our preliminary empirical investigations. 
6.2. Variables and their definitions 
6.2.1. General sample description 
The choices of home and host countries were discussed in chapter 5. We have two data 
sets: Eurostat and Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data sets. The data sets differ in 
terms of dependent variables and number of economic sectors (14 sectors in Eurostat data 
set and 15 sectors in BEA data set). However, the independent variables are the same.  
The set of home and host countries are provided in Appendix 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. 
In order to explore the data sets further we continue our description by exploring our data 
in a way that it is represented by variables. Before exploring our data sets however, it is 
possible to discuss the initial data considered for empirical analysis of chapter 7. The data 
includes the observations on FDI activity of 14 countries (U.S. is counted twice since the 
data on U.S. is provided from two sources) over a number of years, 1990-2009, into 140 
host countries. Therefore our data set has the properties of cross sectional data as well as 
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time series data. This type of data is commonly referred to as Panel data. 102 The use of 
Panel data provides this research, the possibility of multi-level analysis (allowing for 
sectoral and country level analyses, as well as comparison between the FDI patterns from 
various types of economies). Furthermore, it allows the author to observe the changes in 
variables in time and across countries, which in turn warrants one with a certain level of 
heterogeneity within sample.  
6.2.2. Dependent Variable 
Following the discussion in chapter 5, in a variable based context our first set of 
variables are the thirteen dependent variables providing data on FDI net investment abroad 
from home countries into 140 host countries (provided in table 6-1).  
Table 6—1: Preliminary list of Home Countries considered from Eurostat 
Variable Variable Code Variable Type Scale/Range Source 
U.S. FDI USFDI Continuous/Ratio  BEA 
U.S. FDI 
US_FDIO_L1_USD 
Continuous/Ratio  Eurostat 
UK FDI 
UK_FDIO_USD_L1_USD 
Continuous/Ratio  Eurostat 
Sweden FDI 
Sweden_FDIO_L1_USD Continuous/Ratio 
 Eurostat 
Spain FDI 
Spain_FDIO_L1_USD Continuous/Ratio 
 Eurostat 
Norway FDI 
Norway_FDIO_L1_USD Continuous/Ratio 
 Eurostat 
Netherlands FDI 
Netherlands_FDIO_L1_USD Continuous/Ratio 
 Eurostat 
Japan FDI 
Japan_FDIO_L1_USD Continuous/Ratio 
 Eurostat 
Italy FDI 
Italy_FDIO_L1_USD Continuous/Ratio 
 Eurostat 
Ireland FDI 
Ireland_FDIO_L1_USD Continuous/Ratio 
 Eurostat 
Germany FDI 
Germany_FDIO_L1_USD Continuous/Ratio 
 Eurostat 
France FDI 
France_FDIO_L1_USD Continuous/Ratio 
 Eurostat 
Finland FDI 
Finland_FDIO_L1_USD Continuous/Ratio 
 Eurostat 
Denmark FDI 
Denmark_FDIO_L1_USD Continuous/Ratio 
 Eurostat 
In in order to explore the extent of FDI data provided for each of the home countries 
considered, table below tabulates the span of FDI data extracted from two main data sets of 
EUROSTAT and Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
                                                          
102 For further discussion on Panel data please refer to Wooldridge (2002) 
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Table 6—2: Preliminary list of Home countries and the span of their FDI data 
Home Country 
Time Span of FDI 
data available 
Home Country 
Time Span of FDI 
data available 
Home Country 
Time Span of FDI 
data available 
U.S. (BEA) 1990-2009 Germany 1990-2009 Finland 1992-2009 
U.S. (Eurostat) 1992-2009 France 1997-2009 Denmark 1998-2009 
U.K. 1992-2009 Netherlands 1993-2009 Norway 1994-2009 
Ireland 2001-2009 Italy 1999-2009 Sweden 1998-2009 
  Spain 1999-2009   
  Japan 1996-2009   
Considering table 6-2, we find that for a number of countries the sample size is about 
half of the desired time span for analysis. Therefore, it is necessary to drop the home 
countries for which the data is considerably limited. Our meta-analysis, provided in chapter 
3, showed that time frame from which data is extracted influences the results of analysis in 
a significant manner, if the data collected is mainly related to one decade. The biases that 
would be introduced by choosing a limited dataset, and the evidence of significant effect in 
case of data that relates to a decade motivates us to drop the home countries for which data 
is far too limited (less than 13 years).The resulting set of home countries are as eight home 
countries.  
Furthermore by reviewing the data provided by EUROSTAT on US FDI, we find that it 
only includes data on aggregated FDI (total FD). Therefore, in order to maintain 
consistency in our analysis we drop the consideration of US FDI data from EUROSTAT 
and instead use the aggregated and disaggregated US FDI data from BEA. The resulting 
sample of home countries considered is provided in table 6-3 (below).  
Table 6—3: List of selected Home countries and the span of their FDI data 
Home Country 
(LME) 
Time Span of FDI 
data available 
Home Country 
(CME) 
Time Span of FDI 
data available 
Home Country 
(Nordic) 
Time Span of FDI 
data available 
U.S. (BEA) 1990-2009 Germany 1990-2009 Finland 1992-2009 
U.K. 1992-2009 France 1997-2009 Norway 1994-2009 
  Netherlands 1993-2009   
  Japan 1996-2009   
Considering the coverage of our sample of home countries, we find that the sample still 
embodies a number of countries representing FDI from various market economies, thus 
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allowing empirical comparison between the FDI activities of firms from different market 
economies. In order to explore the characteristics of the FDI data of this sample of 
countries table 6-4 provides a brief summary of the aggregate FDI data provided on 
dependent variables which include number of observations, mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum values reported. 
Table 6—4: List of Home countries considered 
Source Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
BEA USFDI (total) 1068 2559.172 8541.792 -26702 132749 
Eurostat UKFDI (total) 1202 1274.58 7737.168 -25910 169686.4 
Eurostat Norway FDI(total) 548 244.7106 2054.302 -8261.43 36330 
Eurostat Netherlands FDI(total) 905 810.8281 4467.23 -23432.9 107462.5 
Eurostat Japan FDI (total) 523 1045.105 2780.916 -2632.5 41810 
Eurostat Germany FDI (total) 2653 519.9144 3309.911 -29527.3 87284.45 
Eurostat France FDI (total) 1228 992.6818 4389.329 -24587.1 61824.29 
Eurostat Finland FDI (total) 1212 84.39261 775.2117 -5257.5 14102.22 
In terms of overall level of FDI flows, we find Germany, France, Finland, U.K., and 
U.S. have the most number of observations for the period of 1990-2009. Based on the 
arguments made in chapter 4, we categorised the types of economies into two main types 
of LMEs (i.e. U.S., UK, and Ireland) and CMEs (Japan and EU countries). We further on 
categorised the CMEs based on different types of labour regulations into two main parts of 
northern countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway) and Japan along with other 
European Countries (Germany, France, Netherlands). It is possible to observe the mean 
and standard deviation of these countries’ net FDI flows over 1990-2009. Considering the 
mean FDIO, we find that the U.S, U.K., Japan, and France respectively have higher mean 
FDIO in comparison to other countries for the period of 1990-2009. Similarly reviewing 
the summary of total FDI data from Eurostat we find that U.K., and U.S., the liberal market 
economies, tend to have highest standard deviation, while France, Germany, and Japan, 
CME countries, tend to show less standard deviation in their investment activity.  
The data on industry level FDI data is collected from the two main sources of data 
(EUROSTAT and BEA), and the classification of the industry level data is extensively 
discussed on Appendix 5.1. The data on industry level FDI is classified based on a higher 
level of aggregation than the proposed industry level data provided by any of the two main 
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sources considered (BEA and Eurostat). This is mainly due to low number of observations 
provided in some sectors that would tend to provide an unbalanced panel sample that 
would only be illuminating with regard to a selective number of sectors, rendering the data 
collection and analysis of the other sectors fruitless. The detailed discussion of the 
categorization of the sectors is provided in appendix 5.1. Based on author’s classification, 
the sectors are considered to belong to one of the three groups of sectors, namely: 
Agriculture; manufacturing and services. The classification of all sectors in to the 
mentioned groups allows this research to provide considerable number of observations that 
would allow greater level of statistical confidence in the results. Furthermore, considering 
the extensive span of the time for which the data is collected, the sectoral sample would 
allow the generalization of the results. Further discussion on the sectoral FDI data is 
provided in chapter 7, subsection 7.2.1. 
6.2.3. Independent Variables  
6.2.3. A. Selection of valid measures for the concepts 
As discussed in previous chapter, the provision of valid measures for the concepts is 
imperative for quantitative research mainly due to the fact that it establishes validity and 
consequently legitimacy of the research. In this section we provide some information on 
the selection process that is performed in order to ensure the validity of the measures. We 
also discuss the reasons why these measures are considered as good proxies for the 
concepts.  
The set of home and host countries considered are available from appendices 6.1 and 
6.2 respectively. In order to inform the reader of the independent variable selection process 
in chapter 5, subsection 5.5.2 we discussed a series of concepts for which independent 
variables should be provided in order to explain FDI activity, in a manner that corresponds 
to our conceptual arguments, and theoretical framework. Furthermore, the set of 
independent variables are to be used for empirical analysis of the set of hypotheses 
developed earlier. As a brief reminder, we restate that our research places firm at the centre 
of analysis and therefore view the FDI activity of the firm in the light of firms’ motivations 
first introduced by Behrman (1974). Furthermore, our research aims to explore the effect 
of civil liberties and political rights on FDI activity, thus the relevant indices are to be 
extracted from appropriate sources. Macroeconomics characteristics of the host countries 
are also considered to affect the FDI activity of the firms. Finally, this research considers 
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the institutional factors to influence the FDI activity. The discussion on varieties of 
capitalism provided in chapter 2, and further on elaborated in chapter 4 in provision of the 
theoretical model, established the way institutional characteristics of the certain types of 
market economies affect the coordination activity of their firms and drew distinctions 
accordingly. Therefore, the final set of variables that are to be considered is institutional 
variables that reflect the institutional environment of the countries. Table below provides a 
crude indication of the measures that are considered:  
Table 6—5: Concepts and their related variable sets 
Concepts/Variables Group Related Sub groups of measures available 
Resource Seeking (RS) 
Energy Production 
Energy Reserves 
Market Seeking (MS) 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and related measures 
GDP per Capita and related measures 
Strategic Asset Seeking (SAS) 
Patents and related measures 
Trademarks and related measures 
Tariffs and related measures 
R&D related measures 
Infrastructure and related measures 
Efficiency Seeking (ES) 
Employment 
Unemployment 
Cost of Labour 
Wages 
Economically Active Population 
Minimum wage 
Trade Union Members 
Strikes and Lockouts 
Labour Force by level of Education 
Labour tax contributions 
Labour Productivity 
Macro-economic variables 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 
Real Interest Rate 
Risk Premium  
PPP conversion Measures 
Interest rate related variables 
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Taxes and related measures 
Political Rights  Political rights index from Freedom House 
Civil Liberties Civil liberty index from Freedom House 
Institutional Factors A variety of indicators are available from various sources.  
Considering the table 6-5, we continue by reviewing the initial set of variables that can 
potentially be considered as proxies for the concepts discussed. The decision process in 
determining the relevant variables for the concepts entails four main elements which are 
discussed based on their priority. First, the measure must reflect the concept in the essence 
that it is used in the literature and conceptual model. Therefore the measure must proxy for 
the concept. Second, source from which the measure is extracted from should cover all the 
home countries and the most extensive set of host countries. Third, the period for which 
the measures’ data is provided for should comply with the period for which the research is 
conducting the empirical investigation for (1990-2009).  Fourth, the units of measures 
should be taken into account as to insure consistency amongst measures.  
Adopting the aforementioned decision criteria in selecting the independent variables, the 
valid independent variables are chosen from the preliminary set, discussed in the following 
sections, and provided in appendix 6.3. 
6.2.3. B. Time & Level of Income related Variables 
The first set of independent variables reflects the timing of FDI; years under observation 
(1990-2009); five year dummy, and a decade dummy. These variables are taken into 
account to explore whether there are time effects that influence the FDI level and 
composition, and to provide the possibility of reflecting on concentration of FDI activity 
with reference to various Host countries. In chapter 3, through our Meta-analysis we found 
that there has been a time effect on FDI, which is reflected in the literature, in order to 
provide the possibility of exploring such avenues further these variables are constructed 
and provided in table 6-6.  
Table 6—6: Time related variables 
Variable No. Variable Variable Code Variable Type Scale/Range Source 
1 Time variable Years Interval/Ratio 1990-2009 - 
2 Five year indicator dummy Dum-fiveyear Categorical/Nominal 1=1990-95 - 
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2=1995-2000 
3=2000-04 
4=2005-09 
3 Decade Indicator Dummy Dum-decade Categorical/Nominal 
1=1990s 
2=2000s 
- 
Since the properties of host countries affect the level of FDI attracted by them, we 
consider the host countries’ level of income as one of the country specific variables that 
might influence their FDI activity. The dummy variable constructed, classifies the set of 
140 host countries considered in this research using World Bank index on countries level 
of incomes and classifies all host countries into one of the five classes provided below. 
Table 6—7: Host Country groupings based on their level of income. The classification is based on World Bank’s country 
classification based on income. 
Variable 
No. 
Variable Variable Code Variable Type Scale/Range Source 
4 Dummy variable based on countries’ level of income  
Dum_levelInc Categorical/Nominal 
Upper 
income 
(OECD) =5 
 
Upper 
income 
(Non 
OECD) =4 
 
Upper 
Middle 
income=3 
 
Lower 
Middle 
income=2 
 
Lower 
income=1 
World 
Bank 
6.2.3. C. Macro-economic Variables 
In order to take into account the macro-economic factors that influence the FDI activity, 
we consider a number of variables that include real interest rate, real effective exchange 
rate (which is mainly used for the generation of a consistent data set, in terms of currency 
unit of analysis), taxes imposed on export and import, taxes on profits, taxes on 
international trade and a number of other measures reflecting taxation system of home and 
host countries.  
The first macroeconomic variable considered is exchange rate. Studies that have 
considered the effect of exchange rates on FDI include Froot and Stein (1991), Blonigen 
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(1997), Buch and Kleinert (2006) and Buch and Kleinert (2008). The second set of 
macroeconomic variables considered is related to interest rates and include, real interest 
rates and interest rate lending. The effect of interest rates on FDI is explored in studies 
such as Gross and Trevino, (1996). The third set of macroeconomic variables considered is 
related to taxation. The literature on the effect of taxation of FDI is populated by an 
extended set of studies such as Hartman (1984), Boskin and Gale (1987), young (1989); 
Scholes and Wolfson (1990), Slemrod (1990), Cassou (1997), Billington (1999); 
Broekman and van Vliet (2000), Swenson (1994), Jun (1994), Devereux and Freeman 
(1995), Pain and Young (1996), Shang-Jin Wei (1997), Jun (1994), and Wei (1997).   
A fourth set of macroeconomic variables considered are trade related variables. A 
number of studies including Lipsey and Weiss (1981, 1984), Grubert and Mutti (1991), 
Blonigen (2001), Head and Ries (2001), Swenson (2004) explore the effect of trade on FDI 
activity. Our reasoning for inclusion of trade as one of the determinants of FDI is in line 
with consideration of trade as one of the factors that directly affect macroeconomic status 
of the host countries. Furthermore, we consider trade and trade related variables to have an 
indirect effect on FDI in case of vertical and horizontal FDI where the production is 
accomplished with the intention to export the products to another location, or the 
production of product itself is undertaken through processing different parts of the product 
in different locations with the intention to provide the final products in a certain target 
market. In both case trade and trade related variables are considered to affect FDI activity. 
The macro-economic variables considered are provided in table below, and their 
definitions are available from Appendix 6.3; macro section.   
Table 6—8: Preliminary Macro variables 
Variable 
No. 
Variable Variable Code Variable Type Scale / Range Source 
5 
Real effective exchange rate 
index (2005 = 100) 
exchangerate_realeffective Continuous/Ratio - WB 
6 Real interest rate (%) interest_rate_real Continuous/Ratio - WB 
7 Lending interest rate (%) interest_rate_lending Continuous/Ratio - WB 
8 
Stocks traded, total value (% of 
GDP) 
stktrdtot Continuous/Ratio - WB 
9 Trade (% of GDP) trade_percgdp Continuous/Ratio - WB 
10 
Exports of goods and services 
(annual % growth) 
exp_gdsservs_percanngr Continuous/Ratio - WB 
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11 Other taxes (% of revenue) tx_other_percrev Continuous/Ratio - WB 
12 
Taxes on exports (% of tax 
revenue) 
tx_on_export_perc Continuous/Ratio - WB 
13 
Taxes on goods and services (% 
of revenue) 
tx_goodsservices_percrev Continuous/Ratio - 
 
 
WB 
14 
Taxes on goods and services 
(% value added of industry and 
services) 
tx_goodsservices_percva Continuous/Ratio - WB 
15 
Taxes on income, profits and 
capital gains (% of revenue) 
tx_inc_prof_cg_percrev Continuous/Ratio - WB 
16 
Taxes on income, profits and 
capital gains (% of total taxes) 
tx_inc_prof_cg_perctottx Continuous/Ratio - WB 
17 
Taxes on international trade (% 
of revenue) 
tx_inttrade_percrev Continuous/Ratio - WB 
Note that we have not considered the effect of bilateral tax treaties, or complacency of 
taxation systems on FDI flows. This is mainly due to case specific nature of these factors. 
For a review of the taxation and its effect on FDI, please refer to Blonigen (2005).  
6.2.3. D. Market Seeking (MS) Variables 
Market seeking incentives includes the motivation of firms to invest in the markets 
where market size is considerable, and the economic growth allows a certain level of 
purchasing power of the population to consume the products produced by the firms’ 
manufacturing or service entity. Thus these MS variables are a measure of market size and 
economic growth of the host markets, reflecting a demand factor for production. A number 
of variables are generally used as measures of market size in the literature. The most 
commonly used measures are Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and its related measures 
such as Purchasing Power Parity measure of GDP. The MS variables that are considered 
for empirical investigation in this research are provided in table 6-9, below.  
Table 6—9: Preliminary Market Seeking (MS) variables considered 
Variable 
No. 
Variable Variable Code Scale / Range Source 
18 GDP (constant 2000 US$) GDPUSDCons Continuous/Ratio WB 
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19 GDP growth (annual %) GDPPercAnnlGrwth Continuous/Ratio WB 
20 GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) GDPPrCapitaUSDCons Continuous/Ratio WB 
21 GDP per capita growth (annual %) 
GDPPrCapitaPercAnnlGrwt
h 
Continuous/Ratio WB 
22 
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 
international $) 
GDPPrCapitapppIntlUSDCo
ns 
Continuous/Ratio WB 
23 
GDP, PPP (constant 2005 
international $) 
GDPpppIntlUSDCons Continuous/Ratio WB 
6.2.3. G. Resource seeking (RS) variables 
Recourse seeking103 investors broadly speaking invest abroad to obtain specific 
resources of higher quality at a lower price or cost in comparison to their home country. 
This in a sense relates to firms that chiefly populate energy, mineral, and other resource 
based sectors of the industry. Our preliminary review of the databases104 mentioned in 
chapter (5), provides a number of choices with regards to measures that could proxy for the 
resource seeking motives of the firms, and hence account for the population of firms that 
mainly operate in resource based industries. The preliminary choices and their sources are 
tabulated in the table below. Considering our decision criteria, we review the available data 
and subsequently make a decision regarding appropriate variables that could proxy for 
resource seeking motivation of firms. These factors naturally provide some explanatory 
information in regard to the FDI activity of the firms, in aggregate and disaggregate 
manner.  
Table 6—10: Preliminary Consideration of possible proxies for Resource Seeking motives of MNEs 
Concepts/Sources GMID 
Energy Production 
Annual Refinery Output 
Production of Natural Gas 
Electricity Production 
Production of Crude Oil per Day 
Production of Crude Oil 
Production of Coal 
Production of Biofuels 
Energy Reserves Coal Reserves 
                                                          
103 A review of Resource Seeking (RS) motivations, is provided in chapter 2, subsection; 2.2.3.4.A. 
104These sources include: World Bank, GMID, EUROSTAT, OECD.STAT, BEA and IMF, the other sources IFS , ICRG, 
POLITY IV, ILO,  and Freedom House, do not cover related indices.  
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Oil Reserves 
Natural Gas Reserves 
From these measures, the related data on energy reserves were estimations made on 
some base years and the information was generally provided through reports in a less 
quantitative manner. The remainder is the data from GMID on energy production. Table 
below, provides information on the data.105  
Table 6—11: Preliminary Consideration of Resource Seeking variables and their sources of data 
Concepts/Sources GMID Period Unit 
Resource Seeking 
Motives 
 
Energy Production 
 
Production of Natural 
Gas 
1977-2011 
Millions (mn) of 
tonnes of oil equivalent 
 
Electricity 
Production 
 
1977-2011 
KWh 
 
Production of Crude 
Oil per Day 
 
1977-2011 
thousand barrels per 
day 
 
Production of Crude 
Oil 
1977-2011 
mn tonnes of oil 
equivalent 
 
Production of Coal 
1981-2011 
mn tonnes of oil 
equivalent 
 
Production of 
Biofuels 
2005-2011 
mn tonnes of oil 
equivalent 
Most of the variables provided above cover the target time span (1990-2009) with the 
exception of Biofuel. Thus the RS variables are as follows: 
Table 6—12: Preliminary Resource Seeking (RS) variables considered 
Varia
ble No. 
Variable Variable Code 
Variable 
Type 
Scale / 
Range 
Source 
24 
Production of Crude Oil; 
Volume (million tonnes of 
oil equivalent) 
Prod_CrudeOil 
Continuous/
Ratio 
 GMID 
25 
Production of Natural 
Gas; Volume (million 
tonnes of oil equivalent) 
Prod_Gas 
Continuous/
Ratio 
 GMID 
26 Production of Coal; 
Volume (million tonnes of 
Prod_Coal Continuous/  GMID 
                                                          
105 Appendix B provides the overview of all variables, their range, unit and definition.  
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oil equivalent) Ratio 
27 Production of 
Electricity; Volume 
(KWH) 
Prod_Elec Continuous/
Ratio 
 GMID 
6.2.3. E. Efficiency Seeking (ES) Variables 
Efficiency seeking motives relate to investment activities that are mainly undertaken in 
order to reduce the costs of production. The reader is advised to refer to chapter 2 
(subsection 2.4. 2) for further reading on ES motives. In these sectors, the motivation of 
firm from investing would mainly be due to lower costs of production. The latter would 
potentially be a product of lower wages, easier access to capital, easier access to natural 
resources (reducing the shipping costs), and a number of other factors that would lead to 
lower cost of operating the business. In our conceptual framework we have explicitly taken 
into account the wage bargaining process and the effect of wage structure of host countries. 
The following variables are considered to provide explanatory power in terms of 
explaining FDI activity based on ES motives of firms. 
Table 6—13: Preliminary Efficiency Seeking (ES) variables considered 
Variable 
No. 
Variable Variable Code Scale / Range Source 
28 Cost to export (US$ per container) cost_exp_usd_percont Continuous/Ratio WB 
29 Cost to import (US$ per container) cost_imprt_usd_percont Continuous/Ratio WB 
30 
Customs and other import duties (% of 
tax revenue) 
custom_duti_perctotrev Continuous/Ratio WB 
31 
Compensation of employees (% of 
expense) 
emp_comp_percexpense Continuous/Ratio WB 
32 
Employment in agriculture (% of total 
employment) 
emp_agri_perctotemp Continuous/Ratio WB 
33 
Employment in industry (% of total 
employment) 
emp_indus_perctotemp Continuous/Ratio WB 
34 
Employment in services (% of total 
employment) 
emp_serv_perctotemp Continuous/Ratio WB 
35 Firing cost (weeks of wages) firing_cost Continuous/Ratio WB 
36 Labor force, total lbrforce_t Continuous/Ratio WB 
37 
Labor force with primary education (% 
of total) 
lbr_primeduc_perc_tot Continuous/Ratio WB 
38 
Labor force with secondary education 
(% of total) 
lbr_sndeduc_perc_tot Continuous/Ratio WB 
39 
Labor force with tertiary education (% 
lbr_terteduc_perc_tot Continuous/Ratio WB 
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of total) 
40 
Labor participation rate, total (% of 
total population ages 15+) 
lbr_particip_rate_tot Continuous/Ratio WB 
41 
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people 
ages 15 and above) 
adult_lit_rate_tot Continuous/Ratio WB 
42 
Part time employment, total (% of total 
employment) 
emp_pt_percemp_t Continuous/Ratio WB 
43 
Wage and salaried workers, total (% of 
total employed) 
emp_wgnsale_perc_t Continuous/Ratio GMID 
44 
Wage Per Hour in Manufacturing 
(Local Currency; Constant Prices-Real 
Value) 
wageperhour_manu_usd_fixed Continuous/Ratio ILO 
45 
Minimum Wage (Constant 2011 Prices) 
[GMID] 
wageperhour_usd_fixed Continuous/Ratio OECD 
46 
Productivity per person employed 
(USD) 
productivity_pperson Continuous/Ratio OECD 
47 
Days Not Worked by economic 
activity: Total 
days_not_worked Continuous/Ratio ILO 
48 
Union Members (administrative data); 
Annual 
un_members_admind Continuous/Ratio OECD 
49 
Total Employees (administrative data); 
Annual 
employees_tot_admind Continuous/Ratio OECD 
50 Trade Union Density (OECD.Stat) trade_un_dens Continuous/Ratio OECD 
6.2.3. F. Strategic Asset Seeking (SAS) Variables 
The strategic asset seeking variables are intended to proxy for the SAS motivations106 of 
FDI which generally are related to a number of factors such as quality of infrastructure (in 
terms of roads paved, quality of logistics, etc.), R&D investment, and trade export and 
import platforms of the host countries. In this research we review a number of measures 
available for SAS motives, which are available from Appendix 6.3, SAS section, and 
subsequently choose the following variables provided in table 6-14. 
Table 6—14: Preliminary Strategic Asset Seeking (SAS) variables considered 
Variable 
No. 
Variable Variable Code Variable Type Scale / Range Source 
51 
Air transport, freight 
(million ton-km) 
airtranspfreight Continuous/Ratio  WB 
52 
High-technology exports 
(% of manufactured exports) 
hitech_exp_perc_t Continuous/Ratio  WB 
                                                          
106 For further reading on SAS motives please refer to Chapter 2 (subsection 2.3.4.D). 
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53 
Fixed broadband Internet 
subscribers 
internet_subs_fbrdbnd Continuous/Ratio  WB 
54 Internet users internet_users Continuous/Ratio  WB 
55 
Patent applications, non-
residents 
patent_app_nonres Continuous/Ratio  WB 
56 
Patent applications, 
residents 
patent_app_res Continuous/Ratio  WB 
57 Rail lines (total route-km) infra_raillines_t Continuous/Ratio  WB 
58 
Railways, goods 
transported (million ton-km) 
infra_railwgdstransp Continuous/Ratio  WB 
59 
Railways, passengers 
carried (million passenger-
km) 
infra_railwpasscarried Continuous/Ratio  WB 
60 
Roads, paved (% of total 
roads) 
rdspvdperc_t Continuous/Ratio  WB 
61 Roads, total network (km) rds_network_t Continuous/Ratio  WB 
62 
Research and development 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
rnd_expend_percgdp Continuous/Ratio  WB 
63 
Researchers in R&D (per 
million people) 
rnd_resempl Continuous/Ratio  WB 
Note that not all variables considered above are used in the empirical analysis. The 
discussion on choosing the right regressors to explain FDI activity via regression analysis 
is provided in 7.2.2. The next section provides information with regard to the data on civil 
and political liberties and institutional environment.  
6.2.3. H. Institutional variables 
In chapter 3, through our met analysis, we extensively explored the literature on the 
institutional107 determinants of FDI. The review of the 62 empirical studies from the 
literature informs the reader of a number of institutional data bases that are commonly used 
the frequency of their usage, in the context of institutional determinants of FDI, as shown 
on the table below:  
Table 6—15: Sources used for institutional variables in the literature 
Institutional Data Bases Number of Studies108 
Freedom House 
ICRG 
9 
18 
                                                          
107 The definition of institutions that is considered in this research is provided in appendix1.1. 
108 The studies and their other characteristics are available upon request.  
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Political Risk Service Group (PRS) 
POLITY 
TI 
Business International (Economist Intelligence Unit) 
Kaufmann (1999) 
WBES (world business environment survey) 
World Bank (World Development Report corruption Index) 
German Exporters Corruption index 
(GG)World Bank Good governance Index 
(PITF) Political Instability Task Force  
World Bank 
Euromoney 
UNCTAD Investment Treaty Database 
Economic Freedom Network109 - legal system 
Institutional Investor rating 
Association for Investment Management and Research (Research, 1996) 
GCR (global competitiveness report) - Corruption index 
U.S. State Department Country Reports (Political Terror Scale) 
GCR (Global corporate reporting) 
ISTAT (the National Institute of Statistics of Italy) - POLITICAL DATA 
 
2 
7 
10 
1 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
Departing from a rather observatory perspective, we review the characteristics of the 
data bases and their data characteristics. In other words we explore the way the concepts 
are defined, measures are constructed, and their relevance with regard to real-world 
concepts they proxy for. Furthermore, we provide some information on the methods of 
data collection and generation, used in the process of construction of the indices. Finally 
the validity and span of data, and their applicability to our research is discussed. Since our 
question is regarding the effect of civil and political liberties on the level of composition of 
FDI, our construction inherently takes into account these factors. Therefore, naturally, we 
review the sources of data that provide quantitative data on the level of civil and political 
liberties for our sample. The methodology and ranking of the level of civil and political 
liberties are provided in order to provide a greater understanding of the reasons behind the 
consideration of the mentioned sources. Furthermore, we consider the institutional quality 
of host markets to affect their FDI. Therefore variables that provide information on the 
institutional environment of the countries are considered. Freedom House provides direct 
disaggregated measures of civil liberties and political rights for extensive number of years. 
ICRG provides data on disaggregated measures of institutional environment of the 
countries. Next sub-sections provide information on two main data sources of Freedom 
                                                          
109 See Gwartney et al. (1996, 2000) and Gwartney and Lawson (2003) 
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House, and ICRG. The characteristics of the data provided by these sources and the 
variables chosen for statistical exercises are discussed consequently.  
6.2.3. H.1. Freedom House 
The main source of data on civil liberties and political rights is Freedom House (FH). 
Freedom Houses’ Freedom in the World annual survey evaluates the level of civil and 
political liberties in 195 countries and 14 related and disputed territories. The time 
coverage of data is from 1972 to present. While the FH provides both analytical reports 
and numerical ratings on two main categories of Political Liberty (PL) and Civil Liberty 
(CL), our research mainly uses the numerical ratings on these concepts provided by FH.110 
The methodology of the surveys based on which the numerical and analytical reports are 
constructed are available from the institutions’ website.111  Before exploring the survey and 
the ranking system based on which the Freedom House’s indices are constructed we 
consider the view of freedom that is adopted by Freedom House and question the integrity 
of the questions with regard to the concepts of civil and political liberties.  Political Rights 
ratings are based on the evaluation of three subcategories of electoral process, political 
pluralism and participation, and functioning of government (Freedom House 2011).  
Civil Liberty (CL) ratings are based on the annual surveys conducted by the institution 
on four main categories; freedom of expression, and belief; Association and organizational 
rights; rule of law; and personal autonomy and individual rights.112 These factors are 
derived in large measure from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights113 and thus 
ground the methodology in the standard political rights and civil liberties ideas put forward 
by the declaration as well as their further interpretations in length by Gastil (1982) whose 
definitions of Civil and Political Rights (Liberties) are provided in appendix 1.1. In terms 
of coverage according to the Freedom House the same standards which are derived from 
the Universal declaration of Human Rights and are the sub-constructors of the measures 
                                                          
110 Freedom House provides three main indices; first, is the Political rights index, second civil liberty index and third is 
the Freedom House index (FHI), which is the average of the two indices. The FHI is frequently used as a measure of 
democracy. Since 2006 every edition of Freedom in the World also includes data for the component variables used to 
construct the political rights and civil liberties indices.  
Source: http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.html?id=17&sub=1 
111 Review http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2011/methodology for more notes on methodology. 
112 FH provides explanatory notes on the methodological consideration regarding the construction of the indices on these 
two measures.  
113Available from:  http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ 
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are applicable to “all countries and territories, irrespective of geographical location ethnic 
or religious composition, or level of economic development”. (Freedom House 2013, p.33) 
 We acknowledge that a plethora of work exist on the definition of freedom that vary in 
different aspects [both in terms of the light in which freedom is viewed (i.e. political, civil, 
etc.) as well as the scientific lenses (political science, law, economics, etc.) through which 
it is viewed. However, due to scarcity of consistent measures available to the researchers 
that provide ranking of the level of civil liberties and political rights (liberties) over a 
considerable number of countries; the popularity and the common usage of Freedom House 
data on Civil liberties and Political rights; third, the examination of the data sets and the 
criticisms applied by external users over the years that tend to provide some information on 
the strengths and weaknesses of the data set and assures one that the data sets have gone 
under some type of scrutiny over the years; and finally Freedom Houses’ OECD world 
paradigm view of freedom that is close to the view points based on which Hall and Soskice 
(2001) put forward the Varieties of Capitalism, this research has used Freedom House as 
its chosen database from which the data on civil liberties and political rights are extracted. 
These reasons are as follow: In the next section we explore the ranking system adopted by 
Freedom House in constructing the PR and CL indices. 
6.2.3. H.1.1. Ranking 
Political Rights (PR) ratings is based on the evaluation of the annual surveys that 
consider three main subcategories of electoral process, political pluralism and 
participation, and functioning of government [Freedom In the World, 2011]. Civil Liberty 
(CL) ratings are based on the annual surveys conducted by the institution on four main 
categories; freedom of expression, and belief; Association and organizational rights; rule of 
law; and personal autonomy and individual rights.114The process involves consideration of 
the survey result of the questions provided in each subcategory for each of the two 
concepts. The questionnaire consists of 15 questions on civil liberties, and 10 questions on 
political rights. Each question has a ranking schematic from 0 to 4, where 0 represents the 
smallest degree of freedom and 4 the highest. Please refer to Appendix 6.4 for a review of 
the questions provided in Freedom Houses’ questionnaires in construction of the Political 
rights and civil liberties indices. 
                                                          
114 FH provides explanatory notes on the methodological consideration regarding the construction of the indices on these 
two measures.  
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For each concept respondents assign a score from 1(low level of freedom) to 4 (high 
level of freedom), to the questions provided. The overall score of the subcategory is 
calculated by summation of these score for each category, leading to provision of 
subcategory score range of 0 to 4𝑛, where 𝑛 corresponds to the number of questions 
provided for each subcategory. 115Since there are three questions regarding political rights 
and four questions regarding civil liberty, seven subcategory scores are available. In order 
to create the seven point scale, Freedom House then uses the sub-indicators in constructing 
Political rights and civil liberty scales, ranging from 0 to 40, and 0 to 60, respectively. In 
other words the scaling is conducted through the summation of the rankings of sub-
category scores; for civil liberty it ranges from 0 or (0 × 15 = 0) to 60 or (4 × 15 = 60) 
and for political rights 0 or (0 × 10 = 0) to 40 or (4 × 10 = 40). Appendix 6.5 provides 
some information with regard to Freedom House numerical ranking and their meanings. 
 
6.2.3. H.1.2. Criticisms of Freedom House Data & Related Notes  
The first criticism of Freedom House and its data is related to lack of provision of the 
listing of the sources and detailed explanation of the coding process and rules in sufficient 
detail. However, Freedom house in its recent revisions (post 2006 datasets) has provided 
detailed information on the methodological considerations taken into account in 
construction of the indices, the coding process, and sub component variable scores that are 
used for construction of indices (which are publicly available). The recent versions also 
provide information on particular circumstances 116(i.e. revolutions). 
A second criticism of the data provided by Freedom House data is provided by 
Armstrong II, D. A.  (2011) who investigates the measurement properties of Freedom 
House data scales using Bayesian measurement models (factor analysis and latent class 
analysis). While he finds the sub-indicators reliable indicators of the level of civil liberty 
and political rights, he argues that there is significant “variation hiding in the seven point 
political rights and civil liberties classification”. He continues by adding that the seven 
point scaling system used by Freedom House does not provide significantly reflective 
measures of the concepts. For instance author discusses that some of the countries that are 
                                                          
115 For instance Association and Organizational Rights has 3 questions, thus the overall subcategory score ranges from 0 
to 12 (4x3). 
116 Generally provided in the downloaded files 
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coded in different categories (are considered to enjoy different levels of freedom) are not 
statistically very different and in contrast some countries that are considered to have the 
same level of liberty and classified with similar scores, in fact vary considerably in terms 
of their level of liberties. Therefore, author concludes that such differences can be 
statistically consequential if the comparisons are made based on Freedom House data over 
time or across space and questions the validity of the data for usage in the predictive 
statistical modelling.  
In order to expand on the latter, we have to refer back to the scaling process used by 
FH. The criticism is mainly due to the way FH uses sub-indicators in generating PL and 
CL scales. It is apparent that this scoring mechanism is carried forward with the intention 
of provision of a smooth data set, where insignificant changes are reduced. However, this 
smoothing mechanism leads to omission of the information with regard to differences 
between various PR and CL category memberships across countries, or over time. For 
instance the PR ranking of a country with score of 30 is two, similar to the PL ranking of a 
country with overall score ranking of 34. Note that the latter (second country) is 10% of 
scale more free than the former (country with the score of 30). On the other hand we 
observe that if the overall score of the same country is scored 29 (2.5% of scale range 
different than the one with overall score of 30), its ranking would be three. Therefore the 
changes in the summed score are not reflected consistently in the reported ranking and 
hence, are not very precise measures of CL and PR (or in a general terms, political liberty) 
concepts.   
In order to reduce this systematic inconsistency in the provided measures, “Freedom 
House assigns upward or downward trend arrows to countries which saw general positive 
or negative trends during the year that were not significant enough to result in a ratings 
change” (Freedom House; Freedom In the World, 2013, pp.33). This is in line with the 
idea that the level of civil and political liberties are not prone to drastic shifts in an annual 
window of time, and that the changes in terms of civil liberties and political rights emerge 
across time. Therefore the provision of the signs of upward or downward trend arrows is 
intended to reduce the systematic bias of the scale. However, this systematic bias remains 
considerable in quantitative analysis where the values are considered (and the upward or 
downward trend arrows are discarded). Therefore, when using the Freedom House indices 
on civil and political liberties in a quantitative manner, the researchers should be aware of 
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the aforementioned systematic biases. A proposed remedy is using the sub-indicators 
themselves. The authors of this research have requested for the data on sub-indicators. 
However, the data on sub-indicators is available only for the period of 2006-2013.  
6.2.3. H.1.3. Variables from Freedom House 
As mentioned in the previous section the consideration of subcomponents of civil and 
political liberties, would provide more detailed and less biased information, however due 
to limited span of time for which the data on sub-indicators are provided for (2006-2013), 
we use the data on civil liberties and political rights acknowledging their short comings. 
The list of variables considered is as follows:  
Table 6—16: Preliminary institutional variables considered from Freedom House 
Variable 
No. 
Variable 
Variable 
Code 
Variable Type Scale Source 
64 Political Rights FHPR Categorical/Nominal 1 (Most Free) - 7 (Least Free) FH 
 Electoral Process (Sec A) FHPRA  0 (Most Free) – 12 (Least Free) FH 
 
Political Pluralism and 
Participation (Sec B) 
FHPRB  0 (Most Free) – 16 (Least Free) FH 
 
Functioning of Government 
(Sec C) 
FHPRC  0 (Most Free) – 12 (Least Free) FH 
65 Civil Liberties FHCL Categorical/Nominal 1 (Most Free) - 7 (Least Free) FH 
 
Freedom of Expression and 
Belief (Sec D) 
FHCLD  0 (Most Free) – 16 (Least Free) FH 
 
Associational and 
Organizational Rights (Sec E) 
FHCLE  0 (Most Free) – 12 (Least Free) FH 
 Rule of Law (Sec F) FHCLF  0 (Most Free) – 16 (Least Free) FH 
 
Personal Autonomy and 
Individual Rights (Sec G) 
FHCLG  0 (Most Free) – 16 (Least Free) FH 
The unnumbered variables in the table (6-16) correspond to the sub-indicators that are 
used for construction of Political rights (FHPR) and Civil liberty (FHCL). The 
consideration of these sub-indicators would be very useful since they do not suffer from 
smoothing and scale problems mentioned earlier and consequently would provide the 
opportunity of capturing minor country differences in the sample. However, the data 
corresponding to sub-indicators are only available from 2006 onward. Since our sample 
spans over 1990-2009, inclusion of sub-indicators would lead to provision of results over 
only three years (2006-2009) which would be very short time span and consequently result 
in a considerable reduction in number of observations (since our sample carry annual data 
for dependent variables). Therefore we have not considered the sub-indicators as 
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explanatory variables in our estimations due to two main reasons. First, low number of 
observations and short time span are generally not desirable in statistical analysis due to 
questions in regard to generalization and other problems that small samples generally 
suffer from. Second reason is related to two main considerations in our research; first, our 
analysis provided in chapter 3 suggested existence of a time effect on the flow and 
composition of FDI117, for which an extensive span of time is needed to empirically 
investigate the effect of time on FDI activity; second, is related to the elasticity of the level 
of civil liberty and political rights. A review of the data provided on the indicators and sub-
indicators provided by Freedom House, shows that there exists a level of elasticity between 
the levels of freedom in each year and its subsequent years. This is discussed in detail in 
the end of chapter 4, where we discuss the choice of static versus a dynamic setting in 
modelling the effect of civil liberties and political rights on the level and composition of 
FDI. Considering this elasticity and minor changes in the level of indicators in time, it is 
possible to argue that consideration of a three year period sample with annual frequency 
would provide very limited if any information on the changes in the level and composition 
of FDI in time. Next section provides information on the ICRG institutional variables that 
are considered in this research. 
6.2.3. H.2. International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)  
In order to take into account the effect of the institutional quality of host countries on 
FDI activity, it is essential to take into account valid measures that can proxy for the 
institutional characteristics of countries. One of the most extensive datasets on institutional 
quality is Political Risk Services’ (PRS) International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The 
data set provides ratings on various institutional indicators of 140 countries on a monthly 
basis, and for an additional 26 countries on an annual basis under a different title (ICRG 
methodology is available from PRS website)118. In order to account for the institutional 
quality of the host countries we consider the data provided by ICRG on variables tabulated 
in table 6-17.   
The first three variables considered are Government Stability, socioeconomic condition 
and investment profile indices provided by ICRG, with the range that covers these 
                                                          
117 In chapter 3, through our meta-analysis we found that there seems to be a time effect in FDI movement and 
composition. We considered that in line with the idea that there are changes in global market that result in shifts in level 
and composition of FDI into host countries.   
118 http://www.prsgroup.com/PDFS/icrgmethodology.pdf 
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concepts in a 0-6 number based ranking system (where 0 refers to refers to highest level of 
risk and the progression to 6 indicates lower risk). The Government stability index 
measures government’s strength, popular support and unity. Socioeconomic condition 
index measure is a measure based on three main sub components, namely; unemployment, 
poverty and consumer confidence. This measure reflects the socioeconomic pressures at 
work that could constrain government action or fuel social dissatisfaction (PRS Group 
2011, p.4). Investment profile index provides an assessment of factors affecting the risk to 
investment (three main subcomponents are considered; contract viability, profits 
repatriation, payment delays) that are not covered by other political, economic and 
financial risk components. 
The four remaining variables; corruption, law and order, democratic accountability and 
bureaucratic quality are using a different scale ranging from 0 (highest level of risk) to 6 
(lowest level of risk). Corruption index provides an assessment of the level of corruption 
within political system of a country. ICRG’s corruption index considers financial 
corruption (in the form of demands for special payments and bribes connected with import 
and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans), as 
well as other types of actual and/or potential “corruption in the form of excessive 
patronage, nepotism, job reservations, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties 
between politics and business” (ICRG, Political Risk ranking methodology, 2011, pp. 5). 
“Law and Order” index, is a single component measure constructed using two 
subcomponents ‘Law’ and ‘Order’ which are each measured separately and scaled from 0 
(high quality) to 3 (low quality). The ‘law’ element reflects the level of strength and 
impartiality of the legal system and ‘Order’ element assesses the popular observance of the 
law.  
The Democratic accountability index measures the level of responsiveness of a 
government to its people.  This index is constructed by identification of five main types of 
governance (i.e. democracy, dominated democracy, de facto one-party state, the jury one-
party state, autarchy) and subsequently assigning the higher scores (scores close to 6 which 
reflect higher quality of democratic accountability and lowest level of risk) to dominated 
democracy and the alternating democracies, and lower scores (rankings close to zero) to 
countries that are considered to have an autocratic governance structure. The last variable 
used from ICRG, is the Bureaucracy quality index that reflects the strength of the 
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bureaucratic system of the countries. It is assumed that in the event of an economic shock 
countries with higher quality of bureaucratic system, will adopt policies that minimise the 
impact of the shocks without implementing drastic policy changes and government 
services interruptions. This index thus ranks the quality of bureaucratic system of countries 
from o (high quality and low risk) to 6 (low quality and high risk). Table below tabulates 
the variables that are used from ICRG data based in order to explore the effect of the 
institutional factors on FDI. 
Table 6—17: Institutional (Political Risk) variables available from ICRG; Source ICRG (2011) 
Variable No. Variable Variable Code Variable Type Scale Source 
66 Government Stability gov_stab Categorical/Nominal 
0 (High Risk; Low Quality) 
12 (Low Risk; High Quality) 
ICRG 
67 Socioeconomic Condition socioecon_cond Categorical/Nominal 
0 (High Risk; Low Quality) 
12 (Low Risk; High Quality) 
ICRG 
68 Investment Profile invest_prof Categorical/Nominal 
0 (High Risk; Low Quality) 
12 (Low Risk /High Quality) 
ICRG 
69 Internal Conflict inter_conf Categorical/Nominal 
0 (High Risk; Low Quality) 
12 (Low Risk; High Quality) 
ICRG 
70 External Conflict exter_conf Categorical/Nominal 
0 (High Risk; Low Quality) 
12 (Low Risk; High Quality) 
ICRG 
71 Corruption corrup Categorical/Nominal 
0 (High Risk; Low Quality) 
6 (Low Risk; High Quality) 
ICRG 
72 Military in Politics milit_in_polit Categorical/Nominal 
0 (High Risk; Low Quality) 
6 (Low Risk High Quality) 
ICRG 
73 Religion in politics rel_in_polit Categorical/Nominal 
0 (High Risk; Low Quality) 
6 (Low Risk High Quality) 
ICRG 
74 Ethnic Tensions ethnic_tens Categorical/Nominal 
0 (High Risk; Low Quality) 
6 (Low Risk High Quality) 
ICRG 
75 Law and Order law_order Categorical/Nominal 
0 (High Risk; Low Quality) 
6 (Low Risk High Quality) 
ICRG 
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76 Democratic Accountability democ_account Categorical/Nominal 
0 (High Risk; Low Quality) 
6 (Low Risk High Quality) 
ICRG 
77 Bureaucratic Quality bureauc_qual Categorical/Nominal 
0 (High Risk; Low Quality) 
6 (Low Risk High Quality) 
ICRG 
6.2.4. Variable selection  
In order to choose appropriate explanatory variables from the set of independent 
variables provided in appendix 6.3, we consider the correlation of the variables in relating 
to each concept, to avoid inclusion of multiple variables that relate to the same concept and 
thus problems of multicollinearity. Furthermore, exploration of the available independent 
variables helps in choosing a limited number of covariates to explain the variations in the 
dependent variable and thus enables us to avoid high degrees of freedom and over 
specification. The tables of correlations are provided in appendix 6.6. Consequently the 
final set of independent variables is chosen for empirical investigation based on their level 
of representativeness of their related concepts. The decision criteria on choosing the 
independent variables are based on three main factors: first, one or two independent 
variables are chosen from each factor considered based on the degree to which they 
represent other variables from the same class. In particular the variables correlations with 
one another are considered to find the regressors that represent most information with 
regard to the concept that they proxy for. Second, the chosen variables must entail the most 
number of observations in order to provide a better level of confidence in our statistical 
analysis. Therefore in case where two or more variables show high correlations with other 
variables that proxy for the same concept the variable with highest number of observations 
is chosen as explanatory variable for FDI activity. We continue the discussion on the 
selection of appropriate independent variables, to the next chapter.   
The next section provides some information on the sample characteristics and 
properties. These include the organization of data, range, type, frequency, and the number 
of observations available for the analysis.  
6.3. Preliminary Analysis of Data  
As mentioned earlier, the choice of specific independent variable section will be left to 
the next chapter, where empirical models are constructed based on the theoretical 
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foundations laid, in order to explore the set of hypotheses that have been developed 
through our Meta analysis, as well as theoretical investigation. The remainder of this 
chapter explores the characteristics of the data by exploring the distribution of data on 
dependent variables, and provides some elementary empirical analyses using Anova type 
tests.  
In this section we specifically explore: the distribution of the dependent variable in 
order to determine our choice of statistical analysis; and also test the empirical validity of a 
number of findings, reported in chapter 3, in our Meta analysis section. As mentioned in 
chapter 3, our Meta analysis used the data extracted from literature that investigated the 
effect of civil liberties, political rights, institutions and democracy on FDI activity. The 
data mainly embodied study characteristics such as: data type; the span of data used; the 
effects reported (studies’ regression coefficients were used in the random effect sections); 
and a number of other factors that proxy for characteristics of the studies.  
6.3.1. Normality of distribution of the dependent Variables 
Since most of the parametric methods in statistics consider a certain degree of normality 
in the data, it is important to test the FDI data (dependent variable) in order to make sure 
our statistical exercise is valid. In other words we examine the distribution of the 
dependent variables in order to determine their properties and decide on the estimation 
methods accordingly.  
The datasets are consisting of net FDI flows from 8 countries into 140 countries for the 
period of 1990-2009. Since the observations are available annually for all the countries, we 
have a panel data set (longitudinal data set) for the data span 1990-2009. “Panel data set 
consists of a time series for each cross-sectional member in the data set” [Wooldridge 
(2006)]. Since panel data sets have the characteristic of time series to report the changes in 
time of unit under observation, and also have the characteristic of cross sectional data to 
observe the data from a number of units at a moment in time, they are more prone to non-
normality. There are a number of ways to examine the normality of the dependent 
variables. This section assesses the normality of the indices based on the graphical 
representation of the probability distribution of the observations (i.e. histograms) as well as 
standard tests (i.e. Shapiro-Wilk). The testing on non-normality is conducted using both 
graphical inferences of the histograms of the FDI data, as well as application of Shapiro-
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Wilk test of normality. The process is explained in detail in appendix 6.7. The overall 
judgement is that FDI data is considerably non-linear. Therefore we use logarithmic 
transformation of the data in order to reduce the non-linearity. However, the testing of the 
log linear panel data on FDI still indicates a high level of non-linearity. Therefore we 
consider using non-parametric statistical tools that provide robust statistical results even 
when non-linear data is used. 
6.4. Nonparametric statistics 
In this section we introduce the empirical analysis method used to examine the effect of 
time, host country characteristic (level of income), civil and political liberties, and 
institutional factors on FDI. The motivation of this undertaking lies within a number of 
findings of the Meta analysis of chapter 3, that indicated that time and host country 
characteristics affect the findings of the empirical research exploring the effect of civil 
liberties, political rights and institutional factors on FDI. Furthermore, in line with our 
research question that explores the effect of civil liberties and political rights on FDI, we 
conduct the analysis of the significance of existence of different levels of liberties in host 
countries on FDI. Similarly we consider the effect of various institutional characteristics of 
the host countries on FDI in order to determine whether the proposed source of 
institutional data reflects the effect of institutional differences on FDI activity.  
With this introduction in mind we proceed to introduction of non-parametric Anova 
type test that is used for the preliminary analysis of data. The reasoning behind the choice 
of non-parametric method for analysing the data is that parametric statistics and hypothesis 
testing in general assumes more restrictive set of assumptions than its nonparametric 
counterpart. In particular parametric statistics relies mainly on the distribution of the 
variables in its inference and thus, it is imperative for the researcher to test whether these 
assumptions are met prior to employing parametric statistical methods and tests.  The 
nonparametric statistics and hypothesis testing in comparison entails less restrictive set of 
assumptions. In particular, when using nonparametric methods (or distribution free 
methods) inference is made based on a test statistic whose sampling distribution does not 
depend on the specific distribution from which the sample is drawn. For instance 
parametric variance test, ANOVA, assumes that mutually independent random samples are 
drawn from normal distributions, if and only if, the assumptions are met then a meaningful 
statistical inference of the null hypothesis of equal variances versus the alternative 
196 
 
hypothesis is meaningful. The nonparametric test of variance, Kruskal Wallis, does not 
assume the normality of the data and mainly assumes that the samples come from identical 
continuous distributions. The next section provides a brief explanation of the Kruskal 
Wallis test. The assumptions, process, and inference of the Kruskal-Wallis test is provided 
in detail in appendix 6.8. 
6.5. Preliminary Empirical examination using K-Wallis Test – Eurostat 
In this section we empirically investigate the empirical validity of the Meta analysis 
findings using our data set. In order to do so, we recall some of the findings reported in 
chapter 3, subsection 3.5. First, the Meta analysis revealed that the use of data from various 
decades leads to provision of different sets of results in terms of influences of institutional 
factors, democracy, civil liberties and political rights on FDI as well as the incentives of 
MNEs in their decision towards the types of investments undertaken. The latter, as well 
documented by Busse (2004), is the product of the changes both in markets as well as 
firms’ motives (incentives) which in a way shapes the way firms coordinate their activities. 
In this section we explore whether there are any significant effects of time frame on FDI 
flows. In particular we explore the effect of the window of time on FDI by considering two 
windows of: annual, five-year and ten-year intervals. This investigation would allow us to 
explore whether there are significant changes in the way firms conduct their FDI activity in 
each time frame (i.e. FDI in 1990s in comparison to 2000s). 
Second, in chapter 3 we showed that the choice of host country has a significant effect 
on the relationship between FDI and institutional factors, democracy, civil liberties and 
political rights. In this section we examine whether the choice of host country influences 
FDI activity. In particular we distinguish between host countries based on their level of 
income, using World Banks’ data, and explore whether the pattern of FDI investment 
varies significantly across groups of countries with different levels of income. 
Third, in order to explore whether there are statistically significant differences in the 
flow of FDI over countries with different level of institutional characteristics, we use ICRG 
index on with various institutional measures, and explore whether there are significant 
differences in FDI flows over categorical variables adopting tests of variance (i.e. ANOVA 
and Kruskal-Wallis rank test). Finally, with the purpose of exploring whether there are 
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significant differences in the flow over FDI over various sectors, we conduct Kruskal-
Wallis test using sectoral FDI data. 
The examination of the effect of: time frame; choice of host countries; consideration of 
aggregated measure of democracy in contrast to its disaggregated measures; institutional 
factors; and sectoral characteristics, would enable us to make credible decisions with 
regard to our empirical investigation, and in turn reduce the possible biases that could be 
introduced otherwise. The following subsection provide the results and discussions on 
these preliminary analyses conducted using Kruskal-Wallis test. 
6.5.1. Effect of Time on the net FDI flows 
In chapter 3, we found that the literature on FDI supports the hypothesis of existence of 
a type of time effect on FDI flows. If such time effects exist, it is necessary to choose a 
sample that would be extensive enough to include several time frames, in order to 
investigate the effect of civil and political liberties on FDI. The reasoning is that if the 
sample used for empirical analysis is long enough, the results would not be biased by time 
specific effect, and therefore the results would be generalizable, leaving the findings 
unconditional to changes with respect to time. In order to explore the effect of time on FDI 
activity further we have conducted the K-Wallis test on the annual FDI flows data. Results 
are shown in the table 16-18, below.  
Table 6—18: The results of K-Wallis test for time effects 
 
Country 
 
US (BEA) US UK France Japan Germany Netherlands Finland Norway 
Years Mean FDI 
Mean 
FDI 
Mean 
FDI  
Mean 
FDI 
Mean 
FDI 
Mean FDI   
1990 129.2596 
 
 
  
346.9664    
1991 89.67442 
 
 
  
294.3714    
1992 186.8212 622.4755 346.9643 
  
250.8907 352.9167 -33.6719  
1993 132.8187 1038.867 518.1975 
  
191.2411 204.3182 25.73644  
1994 333.8635 1286.731 525.9259 
  
288.2764 178.2629 108.4 99.375 
1995 287.557 1472.875 258.7186 
  
514.731 132.5815 54.91936 98.30357 
1996 247.0492 1265.648 178.4073 
 
919.8148 658.8624 227.4239 83.19444 278.6875 
1997 394.8812 1540.967 391.0724 620.587 912.0165 584.2553 210.6724 146.2113 334.2593 
1998 338.7533 2072.202 641.3306 624.8218 667.7778 1378.523 294.3039 595.6121 54.92063 
1999 281.4381 3175.556 1284.506 1710.077 714.5268 837.9506 732.101 157.3684 293.7037 
2000 263.7714 1063.2 1660.981 2714.028 1002.694 369.8872 997.9256 509.2798 432.6263 
2001 342.5997 941.8982 269.62 1504.751 1273.838 509.6609 671.6281 252.0875 44.09091 
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2002 876.3291 992.1162 232.7773 383.7081 962.6959 66.63095 242.0661 15.7197 525.6818 
2003 916.3487 1030.179 214.1797 341.1053 879.1482 17.1269 497.7472 -9.09596 154.2857 
2004 295.3703 1607.946 192.3523 127.3788 917.1121 11.34034 83.86224 -0.86107 83.28125 
2005 614.8772 205.8581 367.1277 291.1209 1336.75 144.9289 482.7147 10.21116 290.2344 
2006 1078.662 1639.37 213.7421 326.9861 1501.5 331.6632 1130.625 18.57651 242.5352 
2007 585.7771 3359.936 928.643 493.9145 731.9271 497.2529 167.9732 13.57379 106.583 
2008 636.1576 2246.036 533.4611 443.3636 1454.762 180.9847 164.7588 43.32707 432.8791 
2009 591.6366 2096.348 187.4164 277.9127 435.2478 167.3603 56.75545 8.158574 247.1837 
Total 440.05382 1520.696 444.8243 388.8163 895.524 258.6489 247.5662 33.1208 239.7094 
chi-
squared = 
178.330 
with 19 
d.f. 
86.159 
with 17 
d.f. 
84.337 
with 17 
d.f. 
201.466 
with 12 
d.f. 
86.397 
with 13 
d.f. 
286.560 
with 19 
d.f. 
307.321 
with 17 d.f. 
293.275 
with 17 
d.f. 
36.150 
with 15 
d.f. 
probability 
= 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0017 
chi-
squared 
with ties = 
178.513 
with 19 
d.f. 
86.188 
with 17 
d.f. 
87.248 
with 17 
d.f. 
205.541 
with 12 
d.f. 
86.416 
with 13 
d.f. 
293.826 
with 19 
d.f. 
317.584 
with 17 d.f. 
408.637 
with 17 
d.f. 
38.908 
with 15 
d.f. 
probability 
= 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 
In determining whether there is a time effect we consider the null hypothesis provided 
in the previous section. The results of K-Wallis test then is determined by the value of chi 
squared given the degrees of freedom. The alternative is to look at the 𝑝-value provided 
and if the value is less than 𝑝 < 0.05 (for 95% level of confidence), the null is rejected and 
hence a significant time effect in this case is observed. Note that there are two sets 𝑝-
values and chi squared values are reported. This is due to the fact that in cases where there 
are ties (repeated values in the rank orders), the stated  𝑝-value and chi squared value 
reported for the last two rows (chi_square with ties and probability) are the adjusted 
estimations of K-Wallis test estimated by STATA in order to provide a robust estimation. 
Therefore in cases where the last two rows’ 𝑝-value and chi squared value reported are 
different than the ordinary values reported we consider the values that are adjusted for ties. 
The review of the results show that in all cases the time effect has a significant influence 
on overall FDI flows. Therefore, we reconsider the span of FDI data that is used for 
empirical analysis and argue that since our sample spans for 20 years, the time effects 
would have negligible influence on empirical inference of the results (the factors that have 
a significant effect on FDI, over a the sample that embodies a lengthy time frame, ensures 
us that the effects reported are not conditional to time, ceteris paribus). 
Table 6—19: Results of K-Wallis test for a time effect with five year window 
 Country 
 
US (BEA) UK France Japan Germany Netherlands Finland Norway 
199 
 
years  
 
 
  
   
1=1990-95 175.2638 470.1517  
 
274.3902 208.6726 54.39445 99.375 
2=1995-2000 309.44925 517.802 1007.263 803.534 801.8392 281.296 201.4525 189.754 
3=2000-05 537.48519 329.4774 378.3319 1002.502 83.8525 309.9964 26.94705 254.9517 
4=2005-09 703.98332 506.7839 364.6329 883.9725 250.8962 217.6066 18.61783 257.0652 
Total 440.05382 444.8243 388.8163 895.524 258.6489 247.5662 33.1208 239.7094 
chi-squared = 
9.217 with 
3 d.f. 
66.950 
with 3 d.f. 
82.250 
with 2 d.f. 
11.190 
with 2 d.f. 
179.252 
with 3 d.f. 
171.864 with 
3 d.f. 
180.458 
with 3 d.f. 
21.932 
with 3 d.f. 
probability = 0.0265 0.0001 0.0001 0.0037 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
chi-squared 
with ties = 
9.226 with 
3 d.f. 
69.261 
with 3 d.f. 
83.914 
with 2 d.f. 
11.192 
with 2 d.f. 
183.798 
with 3 d.f. 
177.604 with 
3 d.f. 
251.442 
with 3 d.f. 
23.605 
with 3 d.f. 
probability = 0.0264 0.0001 0.0001 0.0037 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
In the Meta analysis of chapter 3, we also considered the effect of time frame using a 
five year period, on FDI flows. Considering five year time windows, the five year dummy 
variable shows that the time effect still exists in a five-year window. Similarly reviewing 
the results of the effect of time on FDI activity considering ten year time windows indicate 
the presence of time effect for most countries with exception of United States and Japan.  
Table 6—20: Results of K-Wallis test for a time effect with ten year window 
 Country 
 
US (BEA) UK France Japan Germany Netherlands Finland Norway 
years  
 
 
  
   
1990s  513.219 1007.263 803.534 540.1279 266.9354 154.6187 168.1957 
2000s  420.2792 368.2307 912.1654 180.7677 242.1415 22.02414 256.879 
Total 440.05382 444.8243 388.8163 895.524 258.6489 247.5662 33.1208 239.7094 
chi-squared = 
0.983 with 
1 d.f. 
13.096 
with 1 d.f. 
82.108 
with 1 d.f. 
3.631 with 
1 d.f. 
151.280 
with 1 d.f. 
152.230 with 
1 d.f. 
176.639 
with 1 d.f. 
18.652 
with 1 d.f. 
probability = 0.3215 0.0003 0.0001 0.0567 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
chi-squared 
with ties = 
0.984 with 
1 d.f. 
13.548 
with 1 d.f. 
83.769 
with 1 d.f. 
3.632 with 
1 d.f. 
155.115 
with 1 d.f. 
157.314 with 
1 d.f. 
246.122 
with 1 d.f. 
20.075 
with 1 d.f. 
probability = 0.3213 0.0002 0.0001 0.0567 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Therefore, the overall review of the results of the examination of the effect of time on 
FDI activity indicates that time has an effect on FDI activity in all cases where annual, 
five-year or ten-year time windows are considered. Considering the latter our sample that 
spans for 20 years will be long enough to withstand the biases that would be introduced 
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through the effect of time, and thereby would allow us to generalise our empirical findings 
as they would not be influenced by time specific drivers of FDI.  
6.5.2. The effect of Host countries’ level of Income on net FDI flows 
In chapter 3 we showed that the choice of host country has a significant effect on the 
relationship between FDI and institutional factors, democracy, civil liberties and political 
rights. In this section we examine whether the choice of host country influences FDI 
activity. In particular we distinguish between host countries based on their level of income, 
using World Banks’ data, and explore whether the pattern of FDI investment varies 
significantly across groups of countries with different levels of income. The dummy 
variable constructed to proxy for groups of countries with various levels of income is 
employed in the K-Wallis test using the net FDI flows of the eight home countries 
investing in 140 host countries to provide some information with regard to whether there is 
a significant effect of the level of income on net FDI flows. The results provided in table 
6.-21 indicate that for most countries the level of income has a significant effect on the 
level of FDI with the exception of UK and Netherlands. Furthermore we find that upper 
income OECD countries attract the highest level of FDI in contrast to low income 
countries that attract the lowest level of FDI. The Upper Middle income countries attract 
the medium level of FDI in most cases with the exceptions of France, Japan and Finland 
investing more heavily in upper middle income countries in comparison to upper income 
non-OECD countries. Finally, the difference between the level of net FDI flows attracted 
by upper income OCED countries and upper income non-OECD countries is quite 
pronounced.  
Table 6—21: The effect of level of Income (based on World Bank classification) on FDI flows 
 
Country 
Host 
Countries 
based on 
level of 
Income 
US (BEA) US UK France Japan Germany Netherlands Finland Norway 
Low 
income 
 2.04610 27.41751 6.888686 4.82142 0.68543  -0.11255 -4.91410 
Lower 
Middle 
Income 
69.01509 167.32720 62.52354 71.49488 427.25110 33.31074 35.37055 3.38183 -11.15080 
Upper 
Middle 
Income 
138.52846 720.71290 145.96780 99.48329 661.04880 94.23711 79.58113 7.92275 63.87942 
Upper 
Income 
(Non 
OECD) 
225.19630 1126.52000 181.29310 81.07522 422.07730 99.98877 150.74400 3.59440 501.61400 
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Upper 
Income 
(OECD) 
772.17762 3753.20600 645.0009 726.42950 1378.29300 492.74680 340.54760 61.96473 469.53110 
chi-squared 
= 
49.854 with 
3 d.f. 
281.836 
with 4 d.f. 
8.775 with 
4 d.f. 
60.009 with 
4 d.f. 
21.904 with 
4 d.f. 
81.391 with 
4 d.f. 
4.502 with 
3 d.f. 
60.009 with 
4 d.f. 
41.085 with 
4 d.f. 
probability 
= 
0.0001 0.0001 0.067 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.2121 0.0001 0.0001 
chi-squared 
with ties = 
49.907 with 
3 d.f. 
281.935 
with 4 d.f. 
9.078 with 
4 d.f. 
61.171 with 
4 d.f. 
21.909 with 
4 d.f. 
83.448 with 
4 d.f. 
4.650 with 
3 d.f. 
61.171 with 
4 d.f. 
44.169 with 
4 d.f. 
probability 
= 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0592 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.1993 0.0001 0.0001 
6.5.3. Civil and Political Liberties, Democracy, and Institutional Factors 
In this section the effect of: the existing level of civil and political liberties as measured 
by Freedom House; and the institutional quality as measured by ICRG on FDI flows are 
examined. The statistics are provided based on K-Wallis test ran across the set of home 
countries, and the null hypothesis (the null hypothesis is that medians are equal) is 
examined.  
6.5.3. A. The effect of the level of Political Rights and Civil liberties (Freedom 
House index) on FDI 
In order to explore whether existence of various levels of political rights affects FDI 
activity in a significant manner, the data on political rights from Freedom House is 
examined using Kruskal-Wallis test. The effect of the political liberties on net FDI flows is 
significant, as indicated by the table 6-22. Appendix 6.5 provides a brief review of the 
rankings’ of Freedom house and their meaning. In essence all the host countries are ranked 
in a 1-7 scale where the lower the number (closer to one) indicates higher level of liberties 
and in contrast a higher rank (closer to 7) indicates very low level of (or the absence of) 
political freedom. In table 6-22, three main groups of countries are interesting to look at. 
First, is the group of countries that enjoy the highest level of political rights (indicated by 
1). These countries attract the most level of FDI activity as is observable by the mean FDI 
values reported. The second group of countries are those who enjoy a middle range level of 
political freedom (indicated by 3 and 4). Considering this set of countries we find that 
LMEs tend to invest in more repressed countries (countries with ranking of 4). However 
this pattern does not extend across the sample since we find that LMEs invest more heavily 
in countries with a ranking of 4 than 5.   In contrast, CMEs in general tend to invest in 
countries with higher level of political rights. Third group of countries are those who enjoy 
a very low level of political rights (indicated by rank 7). These countries attract a higher 
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than expected (higher than countries with ranking of 4 or 5) in case of LMEs. In other 
LMEs once again show the tendency to invest more heavily in more repressed nations. 
CMEs (with the exception of Germany, Japan and Finland) seem to invest more heavily in 
more politically free countries however the patterns are not linear. The further examination 
of the panel data using regression analysis is provided in chapter seven with the intention 
to investigate the effect of political rights on FDI. 
Table 6—22: The effect of Political Rights (Freedom House index) on FDI flows 
 
Country 
Level of 
Host 
Countries’ 
Political 
Rights 
(FH) 
US (BEA) US UK France Japan Germany 
Netherland
s 
Finland Norway 
1 694.55443 3268.111 598.4153 606.5559 1265.364 424.4189 320.5568 51.19762 431.787 
2 199.68493 812.2922 107.6909 87.92126 569.5488 62.84652 12.69603 3.768374 7.409251 
3 77.22471 509.4263 59.91743 102.4858 387.9039 87.59684 225.5729 5.397531 111.1193 
4 175.84033 426.1281 75.17266 38.86785 293.3308 33.03779 104.254 2.814569 150.6494 
5 53.81519 107.2668 76.43016 66.2385 198.6027 3.621948 29.20735 0.880433 -8.09524 
6 57.380744 227.0024 177.7773 170.8316 143.8061 110.7665 114.7524 14.07039 116.0833 
7 260.52632 545.7169 195.3262 134.0357 1770.858 140.1073 112.286 31.96276 2.702703 
chi-squared 
= 
48.175 with 
6 d.f. 
180.075 
with 6 d.f. 
16.832 with 
6 d.f. 
50.981 with 
6 d.f. 
55.977 with 
6 d.f. 
26.800 with 
6 d.f. 
10.302 with 
6 d.f. 
13.175 with 
6 d.f. 
28.279 with 
6 d.f. 
probability 
= 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0099 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.1125 0.0403 0.0001 
chi-squared 
with ties = 
48.226 with 
6 d.f. 
180.139 
with 6 d.f. 
17.426 with 
6 d.f. 
52.030 with 
6 d.f. 
55.991 with 
6 d.f. 
27.470 with 
6 d.f. 
10.643 with 
6 d.f. 
18.340 with 
6 d.f. 
30.474 with 
6 d.f. 
probability 
= 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0078 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.1001 0.0054 0.0001 
In order to explore whether existence of various levels of civil liberties affect FDI 
activity in a significant manner, the data on civil liberties from Freedom House is 
examined using Kruskal-Wallis test. The effect of the civil liberties on net FDI flows is as 
indicated by the table 6-23, significant. Appendix 6.5 provides a brief review of the 
rankings’ of Freedom house and their meaning.  
Table 6—23: The effect of Civil Liberties (Freedom House index) on FDI flows 
 
Country 
Level of 
Host 
Countries’ 
Civil 
Liberties 
(FH) 
US (BEA) US UK France Japan Germany 
Netherland
s 
Finland Norway 
1 902.4825 3958.451 693.9429 620.6591 1428.639 437.3681 358.5025 54.46584 517.7324 
2 307.53793 1599.454 284.2523 322.5229 524.6977 245.4815 139.7795 23.96733 54.43678 
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3 121.83444 604.2106 70.59816 57.61652 545.7315 51.90529 83.05007 6.156188 174.4439 
4 116.79665 415.4223 79.63234 56.58716 388.6936 36.12198 99.47847 0.137742 -9.7449 
5 122.63369 328.8046 160.7454 197.7966 179.4991 107.4508 142.4757 14.27991 101.9976 
6 324.24464 473.0619 153.9276 134.7327 1873.013 156.1434 106.4683 36.32603 3.842364 
7 78.358744 111.8665 55.29752 23.20006 449.0653 39.94291 64.26587 1.252395 3.214286 
chi-squared 
= 
45.702 
with 6 d.f. 
149.642 
with 6 d.f. 
5.004 with 
6 d.f. 
52.420 
with 6 d.f. 
27.982 
with 6 d.f. 
19.921 
with 6 d.f. 
16.369 
with 6 d.f. 
15.981 
with 6 d.f. 
24.661 
with 6 d.f. 
probability 
= 
0.0001 0.0001 0.5433 0.0001 0.0001 0.0029 0.0119 0.0139 0.0004 
chi-squared 
with ties = 
45.750 
with 6 d.f. 
149.694 
with 6 d.f. 
5.180 with 
6 d.f. 
53.498 
with 6 d.f. 
27.988 
with 6 d.f. 
20.419 
with 6 d.f. 
16.911 
with 6 d.f. 
22.246 
with 6 d.f. 
26.575 
with 6 d.f. 
probability 
= 
0.0001 0.0001 0.5209 0.0001 0.0001 0.0023 0.0096 0.0011 0.0002 
Considering the effect of civil liberties on FDI flows we find a significant effect that in 
an overall manner indicates that countries with higher level of civil liberties tend to attract 
more FDI. However, similar to the previous paragraph we find a nonlinear patter in the 
FDI investment across countries with different levels of freedom (i.e. the countries that are 
ranked 6 seem to attract more FDI than those with a ranking of 5 for a number of 
countries). In order to explore the later in length we will explore the observed pattern and 
nonlinearity by conducting regression analyses in chapter 7. The next subsection examines 
whether the existence of various levels of democracy in the host countries significantly 
affects FDI. The results will be discussed in the light of the results provided for civil and 
political liberties.  
6.5.3. B. The effect of ICRG indicators on net FDI flows 
In this section we consider the effect of institutional factors using ICRG indicators on 
net FDI flows from 8 home countries into the 140 host countries, in order to examine 
whether there is a significant effect of institutional quality variables of the ICRG variables 
on the net FDI flows. These considerations as well as other preliminary tests conducted in 
section 6.5 are provided in order to help in choosing the appropriate regressors in our 
regression analysis, and familiarising one with the data set and its properties. The results of 
K-Wallis tests are available from Appendix 6.9. The results of K-Wallis tests indicate that 
in general all ICRG indicators have a significant effect on net FDI flows in case of most 
countries119 with the exception of Norway (for which all indicators are insignificant with 
the exception of socioeconomic condition indicator).  
                                                          
119 The exceptions include insignificant effects reported for: Democratic accountability in case of Germany; Ethnic 
tensions and law and order in case of Japan; and Government Stability in case of US (Eurostat). 
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6.5.3. C. Effect of sectoral composition of FDI on the net FDI flows 
Apart from the time and country specific effects, we would like to examine whether 
there is a sectoral effect on the net FDI flows of the home countries. Appendix 6.10 
provides the results of the K-Wallis tests. The results of K-Wallis test of the effect of 
economic activity on FDI indicate that there is a significant effect of sectoral environment 
of the countries’ on FDI in all cases with the exception of Norway. In other words we find 
that the sectoral composition has a significant effect on the net FDI flows and that level of 
FDI differs from a sector to the other in case of each of the home countries with the 
exception of Norway.  In order to explore the latter further, in chapter 7 through regression 
analysis we explore the propensity of different types of economies, and in a more 
disaggregated manner the home countries, to invest in certain sectors via FDI.  
The sectoral consideration affords one the opportunity to model the investment pattern 
of the home countries based on a priori knowledge of sectors in which they invest in and 
thus provides one with more detailed information of the variables that would affect the 
incentive of firms in the certain types of industries based on their characteristics. For 
instance Germany has the highest level of net FDI flows in real estate and renting and 
business activity, financial intermediation, and manufacturing. Firms in each of these 
sectors have a certain types of motives in investing abroad. The manufacturing firms’ 
incentives based on the IB literature would be more related to efficiency seeking,  
resources seeking, or strategic asset seeking incentives which could be stimulated by the 
proximity to cheap labour, easier access to resources, or  the proximity to target markets. 
Thus when considering a certain sector it is possible to construct a model that theoretically 
embodies these factors and examine whether such models fit the data better than the 
popular country level models generally used in the literature. Furthermore, in a more 
aggregate level it is possible to categorise sectors in three main classes of agriculture, 
manufacturing, and other business activities (which includes financial intermediation), in 
order to explore the possibility of constructing models for each of these sub-sectoral 
compositions. The latter similar to the sectoral consideration allows one to produce more 
theoretically specific models that could provide better empirical results and therefore 
produce better fit.  
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6.6. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter a number of measures that could be used as proxies for the concepts 
discussed in chapter 4 (theoretical model) and 3 (Meta analysis), were considered. 
Appropriate variables related to these measures were considered, discussed and organized. 
As for dependent variables they were discussed in length and the final set of variables were 
chosen and presented. The independent variables similarly were explored and a number of 
explanatory variables were chosen and were discussed. Further discussions on explanatory 
variables are provided in the next chapter, before the empirical analysis of FDI activity. 
Later on we discussed the characteristics of the data on dependent variables. This has 
been mainly driven by the statistical properties of the empirical instruments that can be 
used for the analysis. We found that the data on dependent variables were not distributed 
normally. Thus we discussed and chose the appropriate non-parametric Anova-type test 
called Kruskal Wallis test in order to provide a number of preliminary estimations. These 
estimations entailed using the K-Wallis test on dependent variables and a number of 
moderating factors that were considered120 to have an influence on the dependent variables.  
The main motivation from the empirical analysis of the effect of time, country’s level of 
income, civil and political liberties and institutions on FDI, are based on the findings of the 
Meta analysis of chapter 3. Therefore in order to avoid introduction of biases (i.e. time 
effect) into our empirical analysis of our panel data in chapter 7, we explored the effect of 
these factors on FDI to examine the presence of significant effects. The latter in turn 
informs our choices in terms of span of data, time, host countries and other factors that 
might affect our empirical results. This helps us to avoid the influence of the biases on the 
statistical inference, and results, and allows our empirical results to be generalizable 
through out time. 
The preliminary empirical analyses conducted in this chapter indicated that in most 
cases time, host countries’ level of income, level of civil liberties and political rights 
(based on Freedom House), and quality of institutions (based on ICRG) have significant 
effect on net FDI activity of the home countries considered. The investigation of the effect 
of macroeconomic variables on FDI is omitted from the discussion due to two main 
reasons: first, the macroeconomic variables are not provided in a categorical manner that 
                                                          
120 Please refer to chapter 3 and 4 for more explanation on some of these factors (i.e. time). 
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would allow the use of Kruskal Wallis test; second, the macroeconomic variables are 
commonly used in the literature as variables that reflect host countries characteristics, and 
therefore building on the literature we leave the analysis of these explanatory variables to 
the next chapter in order to be able to explore them in a panel setting that would allow a 
greater understanding of their effect on FDI flows. In the next chapter we discuss the 
regression analysis method adopted and the empirical results related to a number of 
empirical models considered, the theoretical considerations involved and the findings.  
 
Chapter 7 : Empirical Investigation 
7.1. Introduction 
The purpose of regression analysis is to explore the relationship between dependent 
variable and the explanatory variables. In reality the dependent variable cannot be fully 
predicted by explanatory variables, instead the response for a fixed value of each 
explanatory variable is a random variable that summarizes the behaviour of the dependent 
variable for the fixed values of the explanatory variables using a measure of central 
tendency.  The measures of central tendency typically vary from those that consider the 
measure of central tendency to the mean or average value of the population; those that 
consider the measure of central tendency to the median or the middle value of the sample; 
and a third group that consider the measure of central tendency to mode or the most 
frequent or likely value in the sample. Traditional regression analysis generally considers 
the measure of central tendency to the mean of the sample and summarizes the relationship 
between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables by describing the mean of 
the response for each fixed value of the predictors using a function that is generally 
referred to as the conditional mean of the response. (Hao and Naiman 2007)  
The underlying processes of many regression models including; linear, non-linear and 
multiple regression models is based on modelling and fitting the conditional-mean function 
is used models. Furthermore, the use of conditional mean models has contributed to the 
provision of least squares and maximum likelihood estimators. In ideal conditions the 
conditional mean models have a number of attractive properties that have made them 
popular in the past. These include the capability of these models in providing complete and 
“parsimonious description between the covariates and response distribution”, their straight 
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forward calculations and interpretation. The consideration of mean as the measure of 
central tendency however introduces some inherent limitations for the conditional mean 
models and regressions. The first limitation of conditional mean models is that since mean 
is considered as the measure of central tendency, the non-central locations cannot be 
readily explored by these models. These non-central locations are often, in the context of 
social sciences, the very points where the interest of the research resides, and since the 
central-mean models poorly accommodate the possibility of exploring the more non-
central locations, they are not the best instruments to explore the research question in 
depth.   The second limitation of the conditional-mean models is related to their 
assumptions. The assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity are often violated in the 
real world context. Considering the former, the existence of Skewness and Kurtosis in the 
empirical data is all too prevalent to be ignored. In many cases, social scientists apply a 
number of data manipulation techniques (smoothing, filtering, erasing the outliers, etc.) to 
normalise the data. These techniques in some cases lead to provision of normalised data 
which in essence has lost a considerable amount of information which are in reality related 
to the research question at hand, which in turn provides researcher with data that is less 
informative, and in some cases non-informative with regard to the research question. 
Similarly considering the homoscedasticity assumption, in many cases the assumption is 
violated in which case the adoption of conditional mean models with mean as their 
measure of central tendency leads to failure in “capturing informative trends in response 
distribution”. The third limitation is related to way the consideration of mean as measure of 
central tendency (using central mean models) shifts the attention away from the 
observation of the properties of the whole distribution. The consideration of conditional 
mean models does not allow the researcher to go beyond the location and scale effects of 
the explanatory variables on the dependent (response) variable and thereby limits the 
ability of researcher in exploring the way changes in explanatory variables affect the 
dependent variable’s shape of distribution. Therefore the adoption of central mean models 
limits the exploration of the researcher by focusing the attention on the central location and 
consequently the other properties of distribution and the effect of the covariates on the 
distribution of the response variable remain unexplored to a great extent.   
An alternative to the central mean regression models is the central median regression 
model. The median regression models has all the abilities of the conditional mean 
regression models, with the added benefit of using median instead of the mean which 
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enables the median regression models to be capable of performing well in cases where the 
data is highly skewed, in contrast to the conditional mean regression models. This is 
mainly the product of the choice of the measure of central tendency. In essence the median 
is the quantile that refers to the central location of distribution. Hao and Naiman (2007) 
refer to the “𝑝th quantile as the value of the response below which the proportion of the 
population is𝑝”. Following this consideration, it is possible to view the median regression 
model as a “special case of quantile regression model where the conditional .5th quantile121 
is modelled as a function” of explanatory variables.  
The Quantile Regression Model (QRM), first introduced by Koenker and Basset (1978), 
considers the changes in the conditional quantile of the dependent variable associated with 
the changes in the explanatory variables, in contrast to the conditional mean regression 
model that considers the change in the mean of the dependent variable associated with the 
changes in the explanatory variables. Therefore in the context of QRM conditional 
quantiles are functions of explanatory variables. 
QRMs have a number of advantageous over the traditional conditional mean models. 
Frist, they provide the possibility of exploring the full distribution of dependent variable, 
and the effect of the changes in the covariates on the response variable through the whole 
distribution by provision of a set of equally sized quantiles that not only characterize the 
central location of distribution, but also the shape of the conditional distribution. 
Furthermore, by minimization of a generalized measure of distance using algorithms based 
on linear programming, QRMs offer easy and good fit. The third advantage is related to the 
possibility of application of QRMs to data without applying major data manipulation 
techniques, which is a by-product of the underlying assumptions of QRMs. In order to 
expand on the latter and inform the reader of the assumptions and processes that entail the 
quantile regression models, appendices 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 provides a brief overview of 
quantiles, quantile functions, and their properties.  
7.2. Practical Notes on the regression analysis 
In this section we discuss the choice of software used for the empirical analysis, the 
transformation conducted on dependent and independent variables, and the process of 
                                                          
121 Quantile is the generalized term used to generalize the terms such as percentile, decile, quintile, and 
quartile. (Hao and Naiman, 2007) 
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choosing regressors. The software used is STATA which is commonly used in economics 
and IB literature for carrying the empirical analysis. The relevant commands in STATA are 
“qreg” for quantile regression and “bsqreg” for bootstrap quantile regression. The 
hypothesis testing follows the standard process as in each case a hypothesis is put forward 
and empirically tested. The standard measure of goodness of fit in our case is the pseudo 
R-square produced by the software.  
7.2.1. Dependent Variables 
In this section we review the dependent variables considered for empirical investigation. 
As discussed in Appendix 5.1, subsections 5.1.C and 5.1.E, due to lack of industry level 
data on independent variables, we refrain from analysis of industry level analysis, instead 
the analysis of aggregate sectors is considered. The aggregation of sectors is in line with 
classification of World Bank in dividing sectors based on the type of products and services 
production activities carried out in each sector. Based on the classification provided in 
appendix 5.1.C and 5.1.E, all sectors are combined into three main sectors of 
manufacturing, services and agriculture. In order to explore the theoretical propositions of 
chapter 4, the following dependent variables are constructed and used.  
Table 7—1: Dependent Variables Summary 
Sector Source Variable STATA Obs 
Total BEA log(US FDI) lUSFDItot 801 
Total Eurostat log(UK FDI) lukfditot 925 
Total Eurostat log(Germany FDI) lgermanyfditot 1648 
Total Eurostat log(Netherlands FDI) lnetherlandsfditot 704 
Total Eurostat log(France FDI) lfrancefditot 938 
Total Eurostat log(Japan FDI) ljapanfditot 442 
Total Eurostat log(Finland FDI) lfinlandfditot 480 
Total Eurostat log(Norway FDI) lnorwayfditot 206 
Manufacturing BEA log(US manufacturing FDI) lUSFDImanu 2803 
Manufacturing Eurostat log(UK manufacturing FDI) lukfdimanu 586 
Manufacturing Eurostat log(Germany manufacturing FDI) lgermanyfdimanu 622 
Manufacturing Eurostat log(Netherlands manufacturing FDI) lnetherlandsfdimanu 422 
Manufacturing Eurostat log(France manufacturing FDI) lfrancefdimanu 582 
Manufacturing Eurostat log(Japan manufacturing FDI) ljapanfdimanu 129 
Manufacturing Eurostat log(Finland manufacturing FDI) lfinlandfdimanu 293 
Manufacturing Eurostat log(Norway manufacturing FDI) lnorwayfdimanu 3 
Services BEA log(US services FDI) lUSFDIserv 2395 
Services Eurostat log(UK services FDI) lukfdiserv 1410 
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Services Eurostat log(Germany services FDI) lgermanyfdiserv 1491 
Services Eurostat log(Netherlands services FDI) lnetherlandsfdiserv 1101 
Services Eurostat log(France services FDI) lfrancefdiserv 1355 
Services Eurostat log(Japan services FDI) ljapanfdiserv 0 
Services Eurostat log(Finland services FDI) lfinlandfdiserv 431 
Services Eurostat log(Norway services FDI) lnorwayfdiserv 8 
Considering the low number of observations provided for sectoral FDI in case of Japan, 
and Norway, we refrain from sectoral analysis of FDI on these two countries. Furthermore, 
in view of the minor differences between Eurostat data classification and BEA data 
classification, and with intention to provide a sectoral analysis we have constructed a more 
aggregated classification that would rectify the difference between the data bases. Our 
classification classifies all sectors into four main classes as follows: Total FDI, 
Manufacturing FDI, Services FDI, and Agriculture. This classification is provided for two 
main reasons: first, the data for singular sectors is not extended enough to allow 
meaningful statistical regression analysis; second, the provision of aggregate measures of 
industries dissolves the minor differences that exist between the two classification systems 
of NAICS and NACE used in classifying the FDI activity of firms in United States and 
Europe. The classification scheme is as follows:  
Table 7—2: Sectoral aggregation layout 
Data source: Eurostat 
Classification: NACE 1.1 
Aggregate Sectoral 
Measure 
Data source: BEA 
Classification: NAICS 
Aggregate Sectoral 
Measure 
Total Total All Industries Total 
Agriculture and Fishing Agriculture Mining & Utilities Manufacturing 
Mining and Quarrying Manufacturing Total Manufacturing Manufacturing 
Manufacturing Manufacturing Food Manufacturing 
Electricity, Gas and Water Manufacturing 
Primary & Fabricated 
metals 
Manufacturing 
Construction Manufacturing Chemicals Manufacturing 
Trade and Repairs Services Industrial Machinery Manufacturing 
Hotels and Restaurants Services Electrical Equipment Manufacturing 
Transports, Storage & 
Communication 
Services Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 
Financial Intermediation Services Other Manufacturing Manufacturing 
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Real Estate, Renting & 
Business Activity 
Services Wholesale Services 
Computer & Related 
Activities 
Services Depository Institutions Services 
Research & Development Services Finance Services 
Other Business Activities Services Services Services 
  Other Industries Services 
Using the classification system above we have combined the data from different sectors 
to build two levels of analyses. First is the analyses of Total (aggregated FDI), and the 
second is the analyses of sectoral FDI using two main sectors of Manufacturing and 
Services. The choice of the two main sectoral groups is due to the fact that the low number 
of observations for agriculture sector did not allow an empirical investigation of this 
singular sector. Therefore we only provide the results of the sectoral empirical analyses 
using manufacturing and services sectors in section 7.3.2.  
An overview of data shows a shift from the manufacturing industry into services in post 
2000s. Furthermore we have omitted Norway and Japan from our sectoral empirical 
investigation, due to low number of observations provided and the limited time span for 
which the data is provided. The number of observations for each country in the two 
considered sectors of manufacturing and services (given our adoption of logarithmic 
dependent variable which on its own led to reducing the number of observations to half) is 
tabulated. 
Table 7—3: Mean net FDI flows of 8 home countries into 140 host countries from 1990 to 2009 in two 
sectors of manufacturing and services 
Home Countries 
Manufacturing  
Mean Net FDI Flows 1990-2009 
 (millions USD) 
Services  
Mean Net FDI Flows 1990-2009 
(Millions USD) 
USA (BEA) 4.139964 4.932041 
USA (Eurostat) N/A N/A 
UK 4.76659 3.91193 
Germany 3.760392 3.849769 
Netherlands 4.402011 3.741129 
France 3.314165 3.812426 
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Japan 4.132935 0 
Finland 4.097883 2.368999 
Norway 4.213492 3.556921 
The exploration of the results provided in section 7.3 and Appendices 7.6-7.12, affords 
us the opportunity to investigate the effect of motivations of foreign firms, along with 
consideration of country factors including macroeconomic characteristics, civil liberties, 
political rights, and institutional quality on FDI activity of MNEs from our set of home 
countries (USA, UK, Germany, Netherlands, France, and Finland) into the sample of 140 
countries from 1990 to 2009. By doing so we explore the effect of variables on 
manufacturing and services FDI and investigate whether any of the variables affect the 
sectoral FDI in a different manner. Furthermore, we compare the effects reported for 
sectoral FDI with those reported for aggregate (total) FDI flows in order to determine the 
effect of the level of aggregation used for FDI flows on the results. 
Following the latter, we review the behaviour of the firms, considering the firms’ home 
countries’ type of economy and try to find patterns in the way firms from liberal market, 
and coordinated market economies conduct their FDI activity, and comment on similarities 
and differences in a sectoral context. This helps us to explore the effect of market structure 
of MNEs on their sectoral FDI activity in manufacturing and services sector.  Furthermore, 
we consider the way different variables affect net FDI flows considering the sectoral 
properties of firms. The behaviour of the firms in manufacturing, and services sectors are 
explored and the findings are compared with the behaviours observed when aggregate FDI 
flows are investigated in order to determine the effect of the level of aggregation used for 
FDI flows on the results. Therefore our sectoral analysis uses the data on FDI flows from 
six home countries into 140 countries from 1990 to 2009. The sample on total FDI flows 
however includes the aforementioned eight home countries data for the span of 1990-2009. 
The next section reviews the explanatory variables and their data. 
7.2.2. Independent variables 
In order to choose between the set of explanatory variables for our regression analysis, 
we have conducted pairwise correlation tests (available from appendix 6.6), and reviewed 
the summary of variables, that include information on the number of observations. This in 
turn will help in choosing variables from each group of explanatory variables that: have 
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considerable level of correlation with other variables in their associated group that proxy 
for a certain concept; and also entail the most number of observations. Therefore pairwise 
correlation of the explanatory variables discussed in each section of 6.2.3, provided in 
appendix 6.6, which entail MS, ES, RS, SAS motives and Institutional variables are 
conducted in order to provide some information regarding the best proxy for certain set of 
regressors. For instance, considering Resource seeking motives, we have estimated the 
pairwise correlation of the production of crude oil, natural gas, electricity and biofuel. This 
provides some information on the correlation between these variables and helps in 
choosing one of the variables in a way that the chosen variable is the best representative of 
the concept, and carries the information for the RS motives with a considerable number of 
observations. The final set of independent variables that is used in the empirical 
investigation of this chapter is provided in appendix 7.1. Furthermore a closer review of 
the independent variables selected, provided in appendix 7.1, indicates that some of the 
covariates are highly correlated with others. In order to reduce the degree of linear 
dependence of the independent variables we have orthogonalized the variables that are 
highly correlated. While the Quantile Regression Analysis (QRM) does not apply rigid set 
of assumptions with regard to independent variables, we have strived to use independent 
variables that have a considerably low level of correlation with one another in order to 
produce robust results. The orthogonal variables are a special case of linearly independent 
variables (Rodgers, Nicewander et al. 1984).  A review of the Appendix 7.1 shows that 
variables such as total stock traded as a percentage of GDP (lstktrdtot); investment in 
research and development (lrnd); and infrastructure indicator the airfreight transport 
(lairfreight) are highly correlated with Gross Domestic Product (lgdp). In order to reduce 
the linear dependence of these variables we have orthogonalized them with respect to GDP 
variable. The orthogonalized variables’ (indicated by provision of ‘O’ before the variable 
name) correlations with other independent variables considered in the empirical models, 
are provided in appendix 7.1. The next section provides information with regard to the set 
of hypotheses that are considered in this chapter, and the relevant empirical models devised 
to analyse the credibility of the models made.  
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7.2.3. Review of the claims and hypotheses 
This section intends to provide a brief reminder of the theoretical findings of chapter 
four, along with the hypotheses developed. The hypotheses will be further elaborated in 
order to provide the specific set of hypotheses that will be tested in this chapter. 
The theoretical model provided in chapter 4, explored the effect of civil liberties and 
political rights on FDI. The effect of civil liberties on FDI was considered to be channelled 
through the power of labour representatives on bargaining power, and consequently wage 
setting. The evidence suggested existence of an overall non-linear effect of civil liberties 
on FDI in most cases (exceptions include countries with very high level of civil liberties, 
and those with highest repression of civil liberties). Therefore, a non-linear effect of civil 
liberties on FDI is reported. The theoretical model of chapter 4 set forward the following 
set of hypotheses:  
Hypothesis (1): Civil liberties have a negative effect on aggregate (total) net FDI flows 
through bargaining power of unions. 
The effect of political rights on FDI was considered through taxes. The results indicated 
that in host countries with low, medium and moderately high level of civil liberties, 
increase in the level of political rights leads to lower taxes and higher FDI. In contrast to 
the latter FDI activity tends to be insensitive to the level of political rights (taxes on 
income) in case of countries with high level of civil liberties. Therefore, the overall effect 
of political rights on FDI flows is considered to be positive.122 
Hypothesis (2): Political rights have a positive effect on aggregate (total) net FDI flows 
through taxes applied on income and profit. 
Moreover, our theoretical framework showed that considering the sectoral 
characteristics tend to provide more information with regard to the way the bargaining 
power of unions and firms are distributed. In particular we showed that in sectors where 
the labour share of production is larger than capital, firms tend to be more sensitive to 
                                                          
122 We refrain from investigating the insensitivity of FDI flows into Free Countries to the level of political rights 
channelled through taxes. This is mainly due to limited number of observations available on FDI flows from our set of 
home countries, the further break down of which would render low number of observations rendering statistical inquiry 
unreliable. Therefore, the investigation of the latter is left for further researches on the topic.  
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wages because they account for a higher share of cost of production, therefore unions tend 
to have a greater power over the bargaining process in comparison to their counterparts in 
capital intensive sectors. The overall evidence indicated that in the presence of civil 
liberties that allow labour representation, the sectoral characteristics, namely the ratio of 
labour to capital share of production, in most cases influence the bargaining power of the 
unions, and thereby affects the cost of investment abroad and consequently FDI flows. 
Hypothesis (3): The effect of civil liberties on labour intensive FDI (i.e. services FDI) is 
greater than that on capital intensive FDI (manufacturing FDI) in case of free and 
moderately free countries. 
Fourth, in moderately repressed countries with low level of civil liberties labour 
representatives have lower power over bargaining process, however, due to higher 
sensitivity of the firms’ cost structure to the cost of labour in labour intensive sectors 
(wages account for a greater share of cost of production) labour representatives tend to 
have higher bargaining power when negotiating for wages in labour intensive sector, in 
comparison to their counterparts in capital intensive sector. Therefore an increase in the 
level of civil liberties would affect the bargaining processes in the labour intensive sector 
in a more noticeable way than in capital intensive sectors. 
Hypothesis (4): The effect of civil liberties on services FDI (labour intensive 
production) is greater than that on manufacturing FDI (capital intensive production), in 
case of repressed and moderately repressed countries. 
After the review of the set of hypotheses set forward by theoretical model of chapter 4, 
we discuss a few details that have influenced our empirical research and findings. First, the 
intermediating effect of labour /capital share of production on the influence of civil and 
political liberties on FDI is mainly observable in case of countries with medium or low 
level of civil liberties; we distinguish between the countries with different levels of 
liberties in our sample. In fact the review of the seven scale ranking system used by 
Freedom House in provision of the results indicates that the case of medium level of civil 
liberties (𝑎
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜
→         
1
2
 ), is not quite distinct. Therefore in order to consider the countries 
with medium and low level of civil liberties we categorize countries based on their level of 
civil liberties, using Freedom House rankings.  
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The original categorization of countries based on their level of civil liberties is inspired 
by the original work of Adam and Filippaios (2007) who categorize host countries with 
ranking or 3 and lower for free and moderately free countries, and those with ranking of 4 
and higher as moderately repressed and repressed countries. However, due to low level of 
observations the results of the regressions using Adam and Filippaios (2007) categorization 
suffer from lack of statistical credibility.  
Therefore, a second categorization is undertaken by categorizing the countries with 
ranking of less than 3 as free and moderately free countries, and those with ranking of 3 
and higher as moderately repressed and repressed countries. Table below shows the two 
categorizations discussed. Further discussions on the latter will be provided in section 7.3.3 
and 7.3.4. 
Table 7—4: The outlook of the way host countries are categorized based on their level of civil liberties using 
Freedom House rankings 
Host countries categorization based on their 
level of Civil Liberties using Freedom 
House ranking 
Adam and Filippaios (2007) Author’s categorization 
Free and Moderately Free 𝐹𝐻𝐶𝐿 ≤ 3 𝐹𝐻𝐶𝐿 < 3 
Moderately Repressed and Repressed 𝐹𝐻𝐶𝐿 ≥ 4 𝐹𝐻𝐶𝐿 > 3 
Second, we consider the aggregate of services sector to proxy for the type of sector 
whose production is more reliant on labour input (labour share of production is higher than 
capital; 𝑑 > 𝑔). Similarly aggregate of manufacturing sector is assumed to proxy for the 
type of sector whose production is more reliant on capital (capital share of production is 
higher than labour; 𝑔 > 𝑑). Based on this assumption we view the effect of civil liberties 
on these sectors in order to evaluate hypotheses 4 and 5.  
Third, building on VoC framework, we argue that the differences in the ways in which 
firms from various market economies coordinate their FDI activity affects their behaviour 
in terms of FDI investment. Therefore we investigate whether the FDI activity of the firms 
from LMEs differ significantly from those of CMEs and Northern countries. This 
investigation is carried out for total FDI flows, by consideration of the factors that affect 
the FDI from the firms that originate from the groups of countries that account for LMEs 
(UK and US); CMEs (Germany; Netherlands; France; Japan); and finally Northern 
countries (Norway and Finland). The sectoral FDI flows in comparison considers only six 
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of the eight countries represented above by dropping Japan and Norway due to low number 
of observations reported for these countries.  
Finally, considering the VoC framework we consider the macroeconomic and 
institutional characteristics of the host countries to affect the FDI activity of the firms from 
various market economies in a different manner. The investigation of the effect of the 
relevant independent variables are expected to provide some detailed information on the 
effect of these factors on the FDI investment from various market economies both in case 
of total FDI flows, as well as sectoral FDI. 
In general the overview of the next section is as follows: first, the hypotheses related to 
total FDI flows are examined by consideration of the following models:  
Table 7—5: Regression models considered for the empirical investigation 
Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 
Log(GDP) Log(GDP) Log(GDP) Log(GDP) Log(GDP) Log(GDP) 
OLog(production of 
Electricity) 
OLog(production of 
Electricity) 
OLog(production of 
Electricity) 
OLog(production of 
Electricity) 
OLog(production of 
Electricity) 
OLog(production of 
Electricity) 
Log(Interest rate 
lending) 
Log(Interest rate 
lending) 
Log(Interest rate 
lending) 
Log(Interest rate 
lending) 
Log(Interest rate 
lending) 
Log(Interest rate 
lending) 
OLog(Wage per 
Hour) 
OLog(Wage per 
Hour) 
OLog(Wage per 
Hour) 
OLog(Wage per 
Hour) 
OLog(Wage per 
Hour) 
OLog(Wage per 
Hour) 
OLog(tax on income 
total) 
OLog(tax on income 
total) 
OLog(tax on income 
total) 
OLog(tax on income 
total) 
OLog(tax on income 
total) 
OLog(tax on income 
total) 
OLog(Airfrieght) OLog(Airfrieght) OLog(Airfrieght) OLog(Airfrieght) OLog(Airfrieght) OLog(Airfrieght) 
Log(trade as a 
percentage of GDP) 
Log(trade as a 
percentage of GDP) 
Log(trade as a 
percentage of GDP) 
Log(trade as a 
percentage of GDP) 
Log(trade as a 
percentage of GDP) 
Log(trade as a 
percentage of GDP) 
OLog(total Stock 
traded value as a 
percentage of GDP) 
OLog(total Stock 
traded value as a 
percentage of GDP) 
OLog(total Stock 
traded value as a 
percentage of GDP) 
OLog(total Stock 
traded value as a 
percentage of GDP) 
OLog(total Stock 
traded value as a 
percentage of GDP) 
OLog(total Stock 
traded value as a 
percentage of GDP) 
 Civil Liberties  Civil Liberties Log(R&D_exp) Log(R&D_exp) Log(R&D_exp) 
 Political Rights Political Rights  Civil Liberties Civil Liberties 
  bureauc_qual  Political Rights Political Rights 
  gov_stab   bureauc_qual 
  law_order   gov_stab 
     law_order 
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As it is observable from the table, two main basic models are considered in this section. 
Both of the basic models considered, embody independent variables that reflect firms’ 
motivations, and macroeconomic factors, with the difference that the second model (model 
2.1) takes into account investment on research and development as one of the variables that 
take into account SAS FDI. Whilst the number of observations on research and 
development is fairly low in contrast to other independent variables, this research considers 
this factor to affect SAS FDI. Consequently both models are provided to allow 
comparisons and relevant discussions.  
In general our empirical investigation starts with a model that embodies independent 
variables that reflect firms’ motivations, as well as macroeconomic factors (model 1.1 & 
2.1), then we add civil liberties and political rights to the basic model (model 1.2 & 2.2), 
and finally institutional variables (model 1.3 & 2.3). This is carried out by providing the 
results and relevant discussions of the regressions for LMEs, CMEs and Northern 
Countries, respectively. Moreover, the empirical investigation of sectoral FDI is carried out 
by consideration of the full models (model 1.3 and 2.3). Due to limited word count applied 
to the PhD doctoral thesis, we refrain from providing the results and discussion of the 
results of models 2.1-2.3 in the text. Consequently the results of these models are provided 
in appendices7.5 and 7.6. Furthermore, in order to provide a sensitivity analyses where we 
only control for civil liberties, and not the channel through which its effects are passed on 
to the bargaining processes (wages), we consider models 1.3 and 2.3 without including 
wage covariate. The results of sensitivity analyses where we are controlling for civil 
liberties and omitting wages, in order to pin down the effect of civil liberties on FDI 
through wages, is provided in appendix 7.10. The results are in line with those reported for 
the full model including both variables. 
The examination of the effect of the level of civil liberties on FDI flows however is 
conducted only on model 1.3 due to low number of observations that results from splitting 
our sample into different groups based on the level of civil liberties. Furthermore, due to 
low number of observations of ES related variable, wage per hour, it is omitted from the 
empirical results provided in sections 7.3.3 and 7.3.4. However, the results of sensitivity 
analysis using the original model 1.3 using both Adam and Filippaios (2007) and the 
authors’ categorization of the countries based on their levels of civil liberties are provided 
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in appendices 7.11-7.13. The overall results reported in these cases with regard to the 
effect of civil and political liberties on FDI are in line with the results reported.  
7.3. Empirical exercise 
This section empirically investigates hypotheses 1 and 2, provided in the previous 
section. In order to do so we explore the net (total) FDI flows from 8 home countries into 
140 host countries from 1990 to 2009 using six basic models (available from table 7-5) 
entailing variables that reflect firms’ motivations, host countries’ level of civil liberties, 
political rights, institutional quality,  and  macroeconomic characteristics.  
7.3.1. Total net FDI flows 
The three regressions provided in table 7-7, cover the LMEs (US and UK) total FDI 
flows from 1990-2009. Of firms’ motives, the effect of Market seeking motives reflected 
by market size (GDP) shows a positive significant effect on both LMEs’ FDI flows for the 
period, across all models. This suggests Market Seeking (MS) behaviour of firms from 
LMEs. Considering the effect of Resource seeking motives reflected by production of 
electricity we find a negative effect reported for US in all models while the effect is 
reported to be significant in model (1.2) and (1.3) therefore, we consider the existence of 
resource production entities in the host country to have a negative effect on US FDI, 
indicating the competitive nature of US firms in terms of market entry, when resource 
seeking motivations exists. Therefore, we argue that US firms behave based in such a 
significant resource seeking behaviour that existence of resource production entities in the 
host markets has a negative effect on US FDI. Furthermore, considering the effect of 
Resource seeking motives reflected by production of electricity we find an insignificant 
positive effect on UK FDI, which following the same logic translates to lower resource 
seeking activity undertaken by British firms. In fact a review of the sectoral composition of 
UK FDI (provided in table below) shows that the RS FDI accounts for only a minor part of 
countries’ FDI abroad. 
Table 7—6: Breakdown of British net FDI flows in to our set of 140 countries for the period of 1990-2009, based on 
economic activity. 
Economic Activity Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total UK FDI 925 5.276535 2.230783 0.105361 12.04171 
220 
 
Agriculture and Fishing UK FDI 15 1.340285 1.352896 0.105361 4.174387 
Mining and Quarrying UK FDI 108 4.59397 2.157265 0.105361 9.078441 
Manufacturing UK FDI 366 5.330245 1.875845 0.223144 10.67848 
Electricity, Gas and Water UK FDI 26 3.653169 2.639661 0.105361 8.909235 
Construction UK FDI 86 2.921178 1.647139 0.105361 7.682482 
Trade and Repairs UK FDI 263 4.142224 1.990675 0.105361 9.77835 
Hotels and Restaurants UK FDI 55 3.19701 2.17111 0.105361 7.715347 
Transports, Storage & 
Communication 
UK FDI 184 3.951259 2.096689 0.105361 11.3183 
Financial Intermediation UK FDI 240 4.962819 2.290362 0.223144 10.72119 
Real Estate, Renting & 
Business Activity 
UK FDI 266 3.825616 1.970179 0.105361 8.884988 
Computer & Related 
Activities 
UK FDI 94 3.032279 1.746777 0.105361 6.648749 
Research & Development UK FDI 17 2.08333 2.272083 0.223144 6.907755 
Other Business Activities UK FDI 291 3.417212 1.944044 0.105361 8.252251 
The effect of efficiency seeking motives on FDI activity is captured through ‘wage per 
hour’. Wage per hour has a positive and significant effect on UK FDI in all models. This 
suggests that higher wages tend to affect UK FDI investment abroad in a positive and 
significant manner. The effect of wage per hour on US FDI however indicate a negative 
insignificant effect with the exception of model 1.1, suggesting that US firms are more 
sensitive to wages than their British counterparts, and thus show a greater ES behaviour in 
their FDI activity.  
The effect of Strategic Asset Seeking (SAS) motives on FDI activity is captured through 
the consideration of the effect of the quality of transportation in the host countries 
(lairfrieght) on total FDI activity. The results indicate presence of a positive effect of SAS 
motives on LMEs’ FDI in all the models with significant results reported only in case of 
UK FDI. The latter indicates that the quality of transportation and in general the host 
countries’ infrastructure has a significant and positive effect on UK firms’ FDI, while the 
effect is reported to be weaker in case of US FDI. 
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The effect of macroeconomic environment of host countries on FDI is considered using 
the interest rate lending variable and the trade related variables (trade percentage of GDP 
and Stock traded as a percentage of GDP). Interest rate lending shows an overall 
insignificant effect on LMEs’ FDI, with positive effect reported in case of US and a 
negative effect reported in case of UK FDI. The overall effect of taxes on income and 
profit on FDI flows is positive and significant on LMEs’ FDI across models. The overall 
effect of the first trade related independent variable, trade as a percentage of GDP is a 
positive and significant effect on LMEs’ FDI flows. Therefore we consider trade to have a 
significant affect on LMEs’ FDI. The consideration of the second trade related variable, 
stock traded as a percentage of GDP, similarly shows an overall significant and positive 
effect on LMEs’ FDI. 
The effect of the host countries’ level of civil liberties on LMEs FDI is negative and 
significant in all cases. This is in line with the hypothesis (1) provided in section 7.2.3. 
Since the higher level of civil liberties translates to higher costs through labour rights and 
bargaining processes as discussed in chapter 4123, the higher level of civil liberties appears 
to have a negative effect on net FDI flows of all home countries considered. Therefore 
considering the effect of the level of civil liberty in the sample of 140 host countries on the 
net FDI flows from LMEs, we find evidence supporting the view of Coates et al.  and in 
contrast to studies that have found a positive relationship between the level of civil liberties 
and FDI including Coughlin et al.(1991) and those who have found a positive insignificant 
relationship such as Blanton and Blanton . 
The effect of the host countries’ level of political rights on LMEs’ FDI is positive and 
significant in most cases. This is in line with hypothesis (2) provided in section 7.2.3. 
Therefore we find that higher political rights in the host countries positively affect LMEs’ 
net FDI flows. Our finding supports the view of Jensen (2003), Addison and Heshmati 
(2003), Sethi, et al. (2003), Wheeler and Mody (1992) and Adam and  Filippaios (2007) 
who reported a positive relationship between the level of political liberties of the host 
countries on the FDI, and in contrast to the findings of Asiedu (2001) and Li and Resnick 
(2003). 
                                                          
123 Considering the criterion provided by Freedom House available from Appendix 6.4, civil liberties components which 
entail the rights to associate, which translates to representation of labour and bargain over the wages, among other civil 
related factors provided. 
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The effect of the host countries’ institutional environment on FDI activity is considered 
through consideration of independent variables on government stability; law and order; and 
bureaucratic quality. The results indicate that government stability has a positive and 
significant effect on total FDI flows from LMEs, at 1%. Bureaucratic quality tends to have 
a positive effect on LMEs FDI with significant effect reported only in case of UK FDI. 
Finally, considering the effect of law and order on LMEs FDI we find a positive and 
significant effect of law and order on US FDI, while the effect reported for UK FDI is 
negative and insignificant. Therefore, the overall evidence on institutional quality suggests 
that better institutional environment of host countries positively affect FDI from LMEs, in 
support of the evidence provided by Lipsey (1999), Campos and Kinoshita (2003) and in 
contrast to findings of others such as Click (2005). 
Table 7—7: Estimation of determinants of LMEs’ aggregated FDI 
Table 7-7 
Estimation of Determinants of LMEs’ FDI (Total FDI) 
Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 
Variable 
name 
STATA label US UK US UK US UK 
GDP lgdp 
1.093*** 0.804*** 1.182*** 0.965*** 1.006*** 0.841*** 
(0.104) (0.123) (0.107) (0.095) (0.083) (0.108) 
Production 
of 
Electricity 
Olprod_elec 
-0.389 0.009 -0.496** -0.057 -0.834*** -0.014 
(0.308) (0.198) (0.238) (0.217) (0.264) (0.202) 
Interest rate 
lending 
lintrstRL 
-0.208 -0.065 -0.015 0.313* 0.273* 0.248 
(0.372) (0.216) (0.149) (0.180) (0.153) (0.174) 
Wage per 
hour 
Olwageph 
0.099 0.301*** -0.080 0.152* -0.112 0.160* 
(0.155) (0.105) (0.149) (0.082) (0.171) (0.092) 
Taxes on 
income 
(total) 
ltxinctot 
0.928*** 0.784*** 0.514 0.401 0.716** 0.424* 
(0.316) (0.298) (0.376) (0.261) (0.309) (0.254) 
Air freight Olairfreight 
0.191 0.322* 0.268 0.610*** 0.132 0.406*** 
(0.138) (0.171) (0.199) (0.133) (0.129) (0.122) 
Trade 
percentage 
of GDP 
ltradepgdp 
0.489 0.367 0.657*** 0.578*** 0.468*** 0.477* 
(0.311) (0.281) (0.232) (0.199) (0.152) (0.255) 
Stock traded 
(total) 
Olstktrdtot 
0.693** 0.697*** 0.645** 0.646*** 0.267 0.387*** 
(0.306) (0.112) (0.310) (0.182) (0.184) (0.120) 
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Political 
Rights 
FHPR   
0.474** 0.248 0.448*** 0.244*** 
  
(0.216) (0.198) (0.138) (0.084) 
Civil 
Liberties 
FHCL   
-0.726*** -0.590*** -0.653*** -0.533*** 
  
(0.255) (0.226) (0.183) (0.126) 
Government 
Stability 
gov_stab     
0.129* 0.198*** 
    
(0.077) (0.058) 
Law & 
Order 
law_order 
 
   
0.375*** -0.087 
    
(0.094) (0.127) 
Bureaucrati
c Quality 
bureauc_qual 
 
   
0.109 0.446** 
    
(0.190) (0.186) 
Constant _cons 
-27.283*** -19.353*** -28.435*** -17.476*** -27.258*** -22.455*** 
(4.262) (4.327) (3.819) (4.840) (2.875) (3.336) 
N 287.000 318.000 283 314.000 314.000 351.000 
Pseudo R2 0.3031 0.2744 0.3328 0.3088 0.3588 0.4219 
Note: t-statistics are provided in parentheses. Asterisks denote the statistical level of significance; those with *** 
reflecting significance at %1; ** %5; and * %10. Source: Author’s estimations in STATA 
The three regressions provided in table 7-8, cover the CMEs (Germany; Netherlands; 
France; and Japan) total FDI flows from 1990-2009. Of firms’ motives, the effect of 
Market seeking motives reflected by market size (GDP) shows a positive significant effect 
on all CMEs’ FDI flows for the period, across all models. Thus the evidence suggests a 
significant Market Seeking (MS) behaviour in CMES’ FDI activity. Considering the effect 
of Resource seeking motives reflected by production of electricity we find a negative and 
significant effect on CMEs’ FDI across all models. Therefore, we find that existence of 
resource production entities in the host markets affects the FDI from CMEs in a significant 
manner, suggesting a strong Resource Seeking behaviour in CMEs FDI.  
Of ES independent variables, the results of the basic model (model 1.1) show that ‘wage 
per hour’ has an overall positive on FDI flows in all cases. Furthermore, the results suggest 
that wages have a positive and significant effect on Dutch FDI in models 1.1 and 1.3. 
Therefore, it is possible to argue that wages have a positive effect on most CMEs’ FDI. 
The intuitive reason behind this effect is the type of ES motive that targets productivity 
rather than cost cutting by provision of higher wages in comparison to local wages, for 
employees in the host countries in order to ensure a greater level of productivity. Thus, it is 
possible to argue that overall, CMEs’ FDI behaviour is influenced by ES motives.  
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The SAS independent variable that reflects the quality of transportation, air freight 
(lairfrieght), shows an overall negative and significant effect on German and French FDI. 
The effect of quality of transportation on Dutch FDI is similarly negative but insignificant 
in most cases (models 1.1 and 1.3). However quality of transportation has a significant and 
positive effect on Japanese FDI in all cases. Since the host countries quality of 
transportation affects the production activity of the affiliates, a possible explanation lies on 
the differences between the coordination activity of the German and French affiliates (and 
in a weaker level in case of Dutch firms) with those of Japanese firms. It is possible to 
relate this effect to the types of activities that CME firms undertake in their foreign 
affiliates. The activities of firms from Japan appear to be more production based as the 
research and development is mainly centralised in the home countries, the production of 
goods and services is outsourced to other locations where firms take advantage of lower 
costs. In contrast the firms from Germany and France show a rather decentralised structure 
in which the research and development can be conducted in locations other than the home 
country and thus they favour the expenditure on research and development as well as 
production in host countries. Since the quality of infrastructure of the host countries does 
not affect the research and development activities of the firms, and that countries with 
better infrastructure and potential for investment are generally dominated by the firms from 
Japan for the production of goods and services, the quality of infrastructure of the host 
countries appears to have a negative effect on net FDI flows of the firms from Germany 
and France. This proposition will be further examined in models 2.1-2.3 where host 
countries’ investment in R&D is added to the empirical model as an independent variable. 
   Of the macroeconomic variables, the effect of host countries’ interest rate lending on 
French and Japanese FDI is positive and insignificant. The effect of interest rate lending 
on Dutch FDI is positive and significant, while an overall negative effect is reported in 
case of German FDI. The second macroeconomic variable, taxes on income and profit and 
capital gains (percentage of total taxes), has an overall insignificant negative effect on 
most of CMEs’ firms except Japanese firms for which an insignificant positive effect 
reported. Finally, the last group of macroeconomic variables are the trade related variables. 
The first trade related variable, trade as a percentage of GDP, is reported to have an 
overall positive and significant effect on all CMEs’ FDI. The second trade related variable, 
stock traded as a percentage of GDP, has a positive and significant effect on Dutch and 
French FDI in models 1.2 and 1.3, indicating an overall positive and significant effect on 
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FDI from these countries. The effect of stock traded as a percentage of GDP on German 
FDI is continuously positive and insignificant across models. Similarly the effect of stock 
traded as a percentage of GDP on Japanese FDI is positive and insignificant in models 1.1 
and 1.2, indicating an overall positive insignificant effect on Japanese FDI. 
The overall effect of civil liberties on CMEs’ FDI flows is negative and significant in 
most cases, similar to the effects observed in case of LMEs, and in line with hypothesis (1) 
provided in section 7.2.3. Therefore our findings support the view of Coates et al.  and in 
contrast to studies that have found a positive relationship between the level of civil liberties 
and FDI including Coughlin et al.(1991) and those who have found a positive insignificant 
relationship such as Blanton and Blanton . 
The results of the empirical investigation of the effect of political rights on CMEs’ FDI, 
is positive in case of Dutch, French and Japanese FDI, with significant effect reported for 
Japanese FDI at 1%. Furthermore, the effect of the level of political rights in the host 
countries on German FDI is reported to be negative and insignificant. Therefore the overall 
evidence suggests a positive effect of political rights on CMEs’ FDI with the exception of 
German FDI. This overall positive effect is in line with hypothesis (2) provided in section 
7.2.3. Our findings thus are in support of the view of Jensen (2003), Addison and Heshmati 
(2003), Sethi, et al. (2003), Wheeler and Mody (1992) and Adam and Filippaios (2007) 
who reported a positive relationship between the level of political liberties of the host 
countries on the FDI, and in contrast to the findings of Asiedu (2001) and Li and Resnick 
(2003). 
Of the institutional variables, the results of model 1.3 shows that government stability 
has a positive effect on German and Dutch FDI net flows, while the effect reported for 
France and Japan is negative with significant effects reported for Japan at 10%. The effect 
of bureaucratic quality of the host countries is reported to be insignificant and positive on 
all CMEs with the exception of French. Furthermore, the effect of law and order on 
CMEs’ FDI tends to be positive with significant results reported only for German and 
French FDI at 1%. Therefore, the overall effect of institutional variables on FDI flows 
indicates presence of an asymmetric effect that is in line with the findings of Aleksynska 
and Havrylchyk (2012) who exploring the role of institutional distance on the FDI show 
that institutional distance has an asymmetric effect on FDI depending on whether investors 
choose countries with better or worse institutions. 
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Table 7—8: Estimation of determinants of CMEs’ aggregated FDI 
Table 7-8 
Estimation of Determinants of CMEs’ FDI (Total FDI) 
Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 
Variable name STATA label Germany 
Netherland
s 
France Japan Germany 
Netherland
s 
France Japan Germany 
Netherland
s 
France Japan 
GDP lgdp 
1.093*** 0.971*** 1.156*** 1.251*** 1.351*** 1.276*** 1.301*** 1.008*** 1.334*** 1.265*** 1.183*** 1.050*** 
(0.056) (0.198) (0.116) (0.164) (0.073) (0.117) (0.125) (0.136) (0.083) (0.108) (0.117) (0.114) 
Production of 
Electricity 
Olprod_elec 
-0.450*** -0.626*** -0.768*** -0.449* -0.405*** -0.774*** -0.671*** -0.754*** -0.506*** -0.812*** -0.802*** -0.546* 
(0.112) (0.216) (0.216) (0.237) (0.128) (0.121) (0.186) (0.205) (0.167) (0.191) (0.246) (0.328) 
Interest rate 
lending 
lintrstRL 
-0.381*** -0.101 0.003 0.193 -0.050 0.390** 0.220 0.215 0.194 0.583*** 0.356** 0.397 
(0.092) (0.455) (0.298) (0.171) (0.135) (0.186) (0.267) (0.263) (0.191) (0.182) (0.169) (0.277) 
Wage per 
hour 
Olwageph 
0.329*** 0.394** 0.419*** 0.245 0.153 0.194 0.176 0.091 -0.001 0.206* 0.156 -0.021 
(0.102) (0.168) (0.134) (0.167) (0.116) (0.144) (0.116) (0.110) (0.103) (0.124) (0.127) (0.152) 
Taxes on 
income (total) 
ltxinctot 
0.620*** 0.260 0.240 0.497** -0.270 -0.695* -0.316 1.083*** -0.314 -0.460 -0.018 0.648 
(0.196) (0.647) (0.241) (0.210) (0.171) (0.359) (0.286) (0.354) (0.205) (0.301) (0.283) (0.402) 
Air freight Olairfreight 
-0.676*** -0.142 -0.420*** 0.406*** -0.267*** 0.167* -0.177** 0.505** -0.342*** -0.022 -0.242** 0.529** 
(0.086) (0.149) (0.090) (0.156) (0.103) (0.085) (0.090) (0.222) (0.090) (0.191) (0.121) (0.246) 
Trade 
percentage of 
GDP 
ltradepgdp 
1.296*** 0.695* 0.976*** 0.954*** 1.562*** 1.400*** 1.166*** 0.700*** 1.279*** 1.324*** 0.834*** 0.630** 
(0.215) (0.388) (0.194) (0.256) (0.164) (0.228) (0.305) (0.251) (0.198) (0.228) (0.276) (0.246) 
Stock traded Olstktrdtot 0.123 0.325* 0.566*** 0.130 0.099 0.412*** 0.501*** 0.114 0.026 0.346*** 0.543*** 0.126 
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(total) (0.132) (0.185) (0.194) (0.180) (0.138) (0.131) (0.176) (0.191) (0.097) (0.113) (0.210) (0.186) 
Political 
Rights 
FHPR     
-0.164 0.015 0.197 0.462*** -0.046 0.036 0.285 0.460*** 
    
(0.123) (0.072) (0.137) (0.124) (0.071) (0.129) (0.185) (0.156) 
Civil Liberties FHCL     
-0.327** -0.573*** -0.706*** -0.296* -0.385*** -0.546*** -0.679*** -0.248 
    
(0.142) (0.090) (0.208) (0.155) (0.079) (0.147) (0.176) (0.202) 
Government 
Stability 
gov_stab         
0.095* 0.097 -0.085 -0.091* 
        
(0.050) (0.060) (0.063) (0.054) 
Law & Order law_order 
 
       
0.389*** 0.163 0.358*** 0.030 
        
(0.098) (0.112) (0.119) (0.148) 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
bureauc_qual 
 
       
0.164 0.139 -0.194 0.345 
        
(0.167) (0.209) (0.165) (0.509) 
Constant _cons 
-29.844*** -23.733*** -30.064*** -34.344*** -34.142*** -31.386*** -32.067*** -29.166*** -36.041*** -34.147*** -29.362*** -29.312*** 
(1.739) (6.591) (3.874) (5.573) (2.154) (3.347) (4.776) (4.775) (3.273) (3.499) (3.887) (3.730) 
N 445 481 352 418 240 474 346 410 233 457 341 407 
Pseudo R2 0.4593 0.4161 0.2899 0.4132 0.3391 0.4718 0.3824 0.4572 0.3743 0.5028 0.3858 0.4671 
Note: t-statistics are provided in parentheses. Asterisks denote the statistical level of significance; those with *** reflecting significance at %1; ** %5; and * %10 
Source: Author’s estimations in STATA 
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The three regressions provided in table 7-9, cover the Northern countries (Norway and 
Finland) total FDI flows from 1990-2009. Of firms’ motives, the effect of Market seeking 
motives reflected by market size (GDP) shows a positive significant effect on all Northern 
Countries’ FDI flows for the period, with the exception of Norway in model (1.1) for 
which the effect is reported to be positive and insignificant. Thus the evidence suggests a 
significant Market Seeking (MS) behaviour in Northern countries’ FDI activity. 
The effect of Resource seeking motives reflected by production of electricity show a 
negative and insignificant effect on Northern countries’ FDI across all models. Therefore, 
we find that existence of resource production entities in the host markets affects the FDI 
from Northern countries in a negative and insignificant manner, suggesting a weaker 
Resource Seeking behaviour in Northern countries’ FDI in comparison to CMEs. 
Of ES independent variables, wage per hour has a positive and insignificant effect on 
Finish FDI while a negative insignificant effect reported in case of Norwegian FDI. Similar 
to the evidence observed in case of CMEs, we find that Finish FDI is affected in a positive 
and insignificant manner by wage per hour, while the effect of wages on Norwegian FDI is 
more in line with the observed effect in case of United States, indicating that Northern 
firms’ adopt different strategies when wages are considered.  
The effect of SAS variable, reflecting the quality of transportation, air freight, has a 
negative significant effect on Finish FDI across models while an overall positive 
insignificant effect of the host countries’ quality of institutions is reported in case of 
Norwegian FDI. Therefore, based on the arguments made earlier, we consider the Finish 
firms to have a more decentralised structure through which they outsource some of their 
R&D activity to their foreign affiliates, whilst in contrast Norwegian firms are considered 
to have a more centralised structure that chiefly allocates production activities to their 
foreign affiliates.  
Of macroeconomic independent variables, we find the interest rate lending to have a 
negative insignificant effect on Finish FDI, and a positive significant effect on Norwegian 
FDI. The second macroeconomic variable, taxes on income and profit, shows a negative 
effect on all Northern FDI with significant effects reported mainly for Finish firms, 
suggesting that the level of host countries’ taxes negatively affect Northern FDI (similar to 
the effect observed for French and Dutch FDI). Considering trade related independent 
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variables, trade as a percentage of GDP shows a positive and significant effect on Finish 
FDI, while the effect is generally insignificant on Norwegian FDI with the exception of 
model 1.2. The second trade related variable, stock traded as a percentage of GDP, 
similarly shows a positive significant effect on Finish FDI, and a positive insignificant 
effect on Norwegian FDI. The overall effect of trade related variables are similar to those 
observed in case of LMEs and CMEs. 
The effect of civil liberties on Northern countries’ FDI is negative with significant 
results reported only in case of Norway, indicating that higher level of civil liberties affect 
FDI flows from Norway in a negative and significant manner, while the effect observed is 
weaker in case of Finland. The findings are in line with hypothesis (1) and the results are 
similar to those observed in case of CMEs and LMEs, and in favour of findings of  Coates, 
et al. (2010) and in contrast to studies that have found a positive relationship between the 
level of civil liberties and FDI including Coughlin, et al.(1991) and those who have found 
a positive insignificant relationship such as Blanton and Blanton . 
The effect of political rights on Finish FDI is insignificant and negative while a positive 
significant effect is reported for Norwegian FDI. The results in case of the effect of host 
countries’ level of political rights on Norwegian FDI are in line with hypothesis (2) 
provided in section 7.2.3, supporting of the view of Jensen (2003), Addison and Heshmati  
(2003), Sethi, et al. (2003), Wheeler and Mody (1992) and Adam and Filippaios (2007). 
The insignificant negative effect of level of political rights on Finish FDI is in favour of the 
findings of Asiedu (2001) and Coates, et al. (2010) who have found an insignificant 
negative relationship. Finally our overall findings with regard to the effect of political 
rights on Northern FDI are in line with the findings of Li and Resnick (2003) who have 
reported both positive and negative influences. Therefore, we find evidence of non-linear 
effect of the host countries’ level of political rights on Northern FDI, and in the view of our 
set of home countries, we find that while political rights in general have a positive effect 
on FDI flows into host countries (as predicted by our theoretical arguments), the effects are 
non linear across countries, as evidenced by the negative effects reported in case of 
German and Finish FDI.  
Of institutional variables, we find government stability to have a positive significant 
effect on Finish FDI, while a negative and insignificant effect is reported in case of 
Norwegian FDI. The effect of bureaucratic quality is positive in case of both Finish and 
230 
 
Norwegian FDI, while the significant effect is observed only in case of Norway. Finally, 
the effect of law and order on Northern countries’ FDI is reported to be insignificant 
across countries, with a positive effect reported for Finish FDI, and a negative effect 
reported in case of Norwegian FDI. The overall effect of institutional factors on Northern 
countries’ FDI is much weaker than CMEs. Considering our initial arguments in favour of 
using disaggregated FDI flows in section 7.2.3, we claimed that the use of disaggregated 
data enables one to provide detailed information on the effect of determinants of FDI flows 
in case of each industry/sector. Consequently we will revisit the findings of this section in 
section 7.3.2 in order to compare the effects observed in this section with those provided 
from a sectoral analysis in order to investigate whether such considerations provide better 
understanding of the forces that affect FDI flows. 
Table 7—9: Estimation of determinants of Northern aggregated FDI 
Table 7-9 
Estimation of Determinants of Northern FDI (Total FDI) 
Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 
Variable 
name 
STATA label Finland Norway Finland Norway Finland Norway 
GDP lgdp 
0.884*** 0.608 1.283*** 0.891*** 1.374*** 0.783** 
(0.135) (0.414) (0.214) (0.320) (0.131) (0.338) 
Production of 
Electricity 
Olprod_elec 
-0.099 -0.518 -0.127 -0.579 -0.089 -0.666 
(0.222) (0.509) (0.337) (0.558) (0.278) (0.505) 
Interest rate 
lending 
lintrstRL 
-0.768 0.628 -0.436 0.775* 0.140 1.370** 
(0.564) (0.641) (0.430) (0.449) (0.489) (0.582) 
Wage per 
hour 
Olwageph 
0.566** 0.189 0.322 -0.069 0.317 -0.174 
(0.286) (0.445) (0.264) (0.302) (0.278) (0.231) 
Taxes on 
income 
(total) 
ltxinctot 
-0.680 -0.355 -1.630*** -0.950 -1.649*** -1.783*** 
(0.542) (0.497) (0.443) (0.899) (0.405) (0.633) 
Air freight Olairfreight 
-0.749*** -0.023 -0.528* 0.341 -0.701* 0.126 
(0.178) (0.439) (0.272) (0.484) (0.375) (0.423) 
Trade 
percentage of 
GDP 
ltradepgdp 
1.301*** 1.326 1.927*** 1.515** 1.954*** 1.211* 
(0.430) (0.864) (0.511) (0.739) (0.389) (0.710) 
Stock traded 
(total) 
Olstktrdtot 
0.681 0.787 0.773*** 0.767** 0.650* 0.540 
(0.490) (0.503) (0.248) (0.382) (0.357) (0.470) 
231 
 
Political 
Rights 
FHPR 
  -0.237 0.284 -0.055 0.824* 
  (0.371) (0.545) (0.367) (0.429) 
Civil 
Liberties 
FHCL 
  -0.384 -0.972* -0.543 -1.226*** 
  (0.404) (0.512) (0.356) (0.445) 
Government 
Stability 
gov_stab     
0.236*** -0.061 
    
(0.083) (0.195) 
Law & Order law_order 
 
   
0.057 -0.054 
    
(0.195) (0.462) 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
bureauc_qual 
 
   
0.511 1.333** 
    
(0.365) (0.660) 
Constant _cons 
-21.275*** -16.814 -30.720*** -22.343* -38.330*** -20.337* 
(5.293) (16.070) (7.215) (12.705) (4.894) (11.229) 
N 250 119 245 118 243 118 
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.1387 0.2568 0.2318 0.2876 0.2773 
Note: t-statistics are provided in parentheses. Asterisks denote the statistical level of significance; those with *** 
reflecting significance at %1; ** %5; and * %10. Source: Author’s estimations in STATA 
The results of the regression analyses of aggregated FDI using models 2.1-2.3 and the relevant 
discussions are provided in appendix 7.5.  
7.3.2. Sectoral net FDI flows 
One of the characteristics that most of the studies exploring determinants of FDI share 
is that they examine the relationship between various factors and FDI using national level 
FDI. Blonigen (2005) as well as Kiyota and Utara (2004) point out the importance of the 
using disaggregated FDI data. The reasoning behind the latter is that various variables have 
different effects on FDI in different industries and that using disaggregated FDI data 
provides a more clear evidence of how variables impact FDI flows in certain industry 
level. In other words the impact of variables on FDI flows is not the same in all 
industries124 and therefore, their effects on different industries offset one another when it is 
assumed otherwise and therefore analyses based on aggregate data does not capture the 
effect of variables on FDI flows in a thorough manner. Blonigen (2005) argues that effect 
of variables on country level FDI is ambiguous. The consideration of effect of 
determinants of FDI in a sectoral manner by no means is new. For instance, Froot and 
                                                          
124 The impact of exchange rates on FDI flows differs from one industry to another. 
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Stein (1991), Blonigen (1997), Stevens (1998), Klein and Rosengren (1994), Sazamani, 
Yoshimura and Kiyota (2003) and Kiyota and Urata (2004) examine the impact of 
exchange rate movements on FDI, using disaggregated FDI data125 in order to provide a 
more thorough  examination of the impact of exchange rates on FDI flows.  
In this section we explore the effect of our set of variables put forward in the previous 
section in a sectoral context in order to distinguish between various effects of our 
explanatory variables on FDI flows. This is in line with our theoretical arguments made in 
chapter (4) with regard to the effect of civil liberties and political rights on labour intensive 
versus capital intensive sectors. The regressions provided in table 7-10, empirically explore 
the manufacturing and services net FDI flows from our set of home countries into 140 host 
countries for the period of 1990-2009, using regression model 1.3, discussed in section 
7.2.3. Of firms’ motives, the effect of Market seeking motives reflected by market size 
(GDP) shows a positive and significant effect on all countries’ manufacturing FDI flows. 
This suggests a significant Market Seeking (MS) behaviour of all firms when 
manufacturing FDI is considered. Considering services FDI, we find an overall significant 
positive effect of MS motives on all countries, except Finland for which the results indicate 
an insignificant positive effect. 
Considering the effect of Resource seeking motives reflected by production of 
electricity we find a negative significant effect in case of German manufacturing FDI while 
the reported effect on other countries tend to be insignificant and negative in all cases with 
the exception of FDI from British and Finish firms. In contrast the review of the effect of 
production of electricity on our set of home countries’ services FDI, we find a negative and 
significant effect reported in all cases, with the exception of Finland for which the effect 
reported is positive and insignificant. Interestingly, the results indicate a greater RS 
behaviour in services FDI, in comparison to manufacturing FDI. The further exploration of 
the latter could be carried out by considering tradable, versus non-tradable composition of 
the products and services, produced in these sectors, however, considering the limits of this 
research we leave this to the future researches on the subject.   
Of ES variables, we find wage per hour to have a positive and significant effect on 
CMEs’ manufacturing FDI, while the effect on LMEs’ manufacturing FDI is negative and 
                                                          
125 In case of Kiyota and Urata (2004) paper both aggregated and disaggregated data is considered and the results still 
confirmed that a depreciation of host country currency attracts FDI. 
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insignificant. Considering the effect of ES variables on services FDI, we find a negative 
effect of wage per hour, on Finish and Dutch services FDI, while the effect on other 
countries is positive, but significant only in case of UK, German and French services FDI. 
The overall effects reported indicate that the influence of wage per hour on manufacturing 
FDI is different than that observed for services FDI with the exception of Germany and 
France, for which the effects are similar across sectors. 
Considering the SAS variable, air freight on manufacturing FDI we find a positive 
effect reported on LMEs’ manufacturing FDI while the effect is negative in case of US 
CMEs’ and Northern firms with significant results reported only in case of Finish 
manufacturing FDI. Considering the effect of air freight on services FDI we find a positive 
effect reported for LMEs services FDI, however, the effect is only significant in case of US 
firms. In contrast we find a negative effect of air freight on CMEs’ services FDI with 
significant results reported only in case of Germany. The overall evidence indicates that 
the effect of quality of infrastructure is positive on LMEs, with significant effect reported 
only in case of US sectoral FDI. Furthermore, we find a negative insignificant effect of 
quality of infrastructure on Northern firms across sectors. This confirms the arguments 
made in the previous section with regard to the centralization/decentralization and the 
types of activities that are undertaken in foreign affiliates of MNEs. Consistent with our 
earlier arguments we find that US firms show a more centralised structure that is consistent 
across sectors. This centralised structure mainly allocates production activities to the 
affiliates abroad taking advantage of cost differentials while the R&D activity tends to be 
chiefly undertaken at the home country. In contrast we find Finish firms to show a rather 
decentralised structure that tends to outsource its R&D to its affiliates in the host countries. 
The evidence from German and Dutch firms is not conclusive as we observe various 
effects reported in different sectors. However, the indication from French FDI shows a 
decentralised structure of French firms’ coordination activities across sectors. 
Of macroeconomic variables, the effect of interest rate lending is positive on LMEs’ 
and Northern and Dutch manufacturing FDI with significant results reported for US and 
Finish manufacturing FDI. In contrast we observe a negative and insignificant effect of 
interest rate lending on German and French manufacturing FDI. Considering the effect of 
interest rate lending on services FDI, we find a positive effect reported for LMEs’, 
German, French and Northern which is significant only in case of German services FDI, 
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while a negative insignificant effect is reported for Dutch services FDI. The results 
demonstrate that the effect of interest rate lending on most CMEs’ FDI varies by sectoral 
consideration. 
The second macroeconomic variable, taxes on income and profit, has a positive effect 
on Dutch and LMEs’ manufacturing FDI with significant results reported in case of US 
manufacturing FDI. In contrast we observe a negative effect of taxes on German, French 
and Finish manufacturing FDI, with significant results reported for Finish manufacturing 
FDI at 10%. Considering the effect of taxes on services FDI, we find a positive effect 
reported for LMEs which is significant only in case of US services FDI, while the effect on 
other countries’ services FDI is negative and significant. The overall results thus 
demonstrate that services FDI is more sensitive to taxes in comparison to manufacturing 
FDI. Furthermore, the effect of taxes is negative and significant on Finish FDI across 
sectors, indicating a significant effect of taxes on Finish FDI. The effect of taxes on most 
countries’ sectoral FDI is similar across sectors, with the exception of Dutch sectoral FDI. 
It is possible to take the opportunity to point out that in several cases, so far, we have 
observed that the effect of variables on sectoral FDI of the same countries differs due to 
various differences that exist between sectors. These differences in turn influence the 
coordination activity of the firms, and thus result in various effects observed across sectors. 
Therefore, our findings so far support the argument made by Blonigen (2005) that 
consideration of disaggregated FDI flows, allows a more concise exploration of 
determinants of FDI. In particular our sectoral level of aggregation has provided evidence 
on the way the same variables affect the FDI from firms from the same country abroad, in 
contrasting ways.  
The third group of macroeconomic variables are trade related variables. The effect of 
trade as a percentage of GDP on manufacturing FDI is positive on all countries’ 
manufacturing FDI with significant results reported in case of US, Finish and Dutch 
manufacturing FDI. Considering the effect of trade as a percentage of GDP on services 
FDI, we find a positive effect on all countries’ services FDI with significant results 
reported for UK, German and Dutch services FDI. 
The effect of stock traded as a percentage of GDP on manufacturing FDI from all 
countries is positive and significant only in case of Dutch and Finish manufacturing FDI. 
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Considering the effect of stock traded on services FDI we find an overall positive 
significant effect, with insignificant results reported only for US services FDI. 
The effect of civil liberties on manufacturing FDI is negative in all cases, and 
significant in case of LMEs and French manufacturing FDI providing support for the 
findings of Coates et al. (2010). In contrast a positive insignificant effect is reported in case 
of German manufacturing FDI providing support for the findings of Coughlin, et al. 
(1991), Pournarakis and Varsakelis (2004) and Blanton and Blanton (2007). Furthermore, 
considering the effect of civil liberties on services FDI we find a negative and significant 
effect on all countries’ services FDI confirming the findings of Coates et al. (2010). The 
results of the effect of civil liberties on sectoral FDI indicate the existence of a non-linear 
relationship at sectoral level in case of German sectoral FDI. This finding is in support of 
the findings of Asiedu and Lien (2011), Adam and Filippaios (2007), Li and Resnick 
(2003) and our theoretical findings, and in contrast to our earlier empirical findings that 
considered the effect of civil liberties on aggregate (total) net FDI flows. Furthermore the 
effect of civil liberties on services FDI flows is considerably greater than manufacturing 
sector, providing empirical support for the theoretically established effect of sectoral 
characteristics, namely the ratio of labour versus capital intensity of production in a 
specific sector, on sectoral FDI flows. In particular we show that the effect of civil liberties 
on FDI flows is intermediated by the ratio of labour to capital intensity of sectors, therefore 
the existence of a non-linear effect of civil liberties on FDI flows is expected considering 
the characteristics of the sectors in which FDI is considered.  
Considering the effect of political rights on manufacturing FDI, we find a positive 
effect reported for LMEs’, Dutch and French manufacturing FDI with significant results 
reported only for UK and French manufacturing FDI. This is in line with hypothesis (2) 
provided in section 7.2.3 and in support of the findings of Jensen (2003); Addison and 
Heshmati (2003), Sethi, et al. (2003), Wheeler and Mody (1992) and Adam and Filippaios 
(2007). In contrast we find an insignificant negative effect of political rights on German 
and Finish manufacturing FDI abroad, providing support for the view of Asiedu (2001) and 
Li and Resnick (2003). The effect of political rights on services FDI is positive and 
significant on FDI from all countries with exception of insignificant results reported for 
German and Dutch services FDI. Therefore the results empirically support the findings of 
Jensen (2003), Addison and Heshmati (2003) on existence of a significant positive effect 
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and the results of Wheeler and Mody (1992) and  Sethi, et al. (2003) on existence of 
positive insignificant effect of political rights on FDI. Therefore, the overall results of the 
effect of political rights on sectoral FDI empirically demonstrate the existence of a non-
linear effect of political rights on sectoral FDI flows in line with findings of Li and Resnick 
(2003). 
Of institutional variables, the effect of government stability on manufacturing FDI is 
positive in case of LMEs’, and French manufacturing FDI, with significant results reported 
for LMEs’ manufacturing FDI. In contrast we find a negative insignificant effect of 
government stability on German, Dutch, and Finish manufacturing FDI. The effect of 
government stability on services FDI is positive and significant in case of LMEs’ services 
FDI. The effect reported for CMEs’ and Northern FDI ranges from a positive insignificant 
effect reported for French and Finish services FDI and negative insignificant effects 
reported for German and Dutch services FDI. Therefore, government stability shows a 
positive significant effect on LMEs, while the evidence from CMEs sectoral FDI while 
linear across sectors, tends to be insignificant. Finally the effect of government stability on 
Finish sectoral FDI is non-linear. 
The effect of the second institutional factor, bureaucratic quality on LMEs is positive 
and insignificant, while a negative and insignificant effect reported in case of CMEs. 
Finally the effect of bureaucratic quality on Northern countries’ representative, Finland, is 
positive and significant. Considering the effect of bureaucratic quality on services FDI is 
positive in case of all countries, with the exception of a negative insignificant effect 
reported for UK services FDI. Furthermore, the effect of bureaucratic quality is significant 
only in case of US services FDI. The evidence suggests that the effect of bureaucratic 
quality on British and CME sectoral FDI varies across sectors.  
The effect of the third institutional variable, law and order on manufacturing FDI is 
positive in all cases with the exception of an insignificant negative effect reported in case 
of UK manufacturing FDI. Furthermore, a significant and positive effect of law and order 
is reported in case of German and Finish manufacturing FDI. The effect of law and order 
on services FDI is positive on FDI from all home countries with the significant results 
reported for British and German services FDI. The overall evidence suggests that the effect 
of law and order on all countries is positive with the exception of British sectoral FDI for 
which the effects vary across sectors. Therefore the overall results of the institutional 
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variables indicate that the effect of various aspects of institutional environment of host 
countries affect FDI from various market economies in different ways. Furthermore, we 
find that the effects in some cases are non-linear across sectors. The latter explains the 
provision of mixed results on the effect of institutional variables on FDI flows. 
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Table 7—10: Estimation of determinants of home countries’ sectoral FDI 
Table 7-10 
Estimation of Determinants of Sectoral FDI (All countries) 
Manufacturing (Model 1.3) Services (Model 1.3) 
Variable 
name 
STATA 
label 
US UK Germany Netherlands France Finland US UK Germany Netherlands France Finland 
GDP lgdp 
1.094*** 0.930*** 0.743*** 0.478** 0.677*** 1.604*** 0.954*** 1.023*** 1.150*** 0.912*** 1.198*** 0.241 
(0.097) (0.124) (0.234) (0.222) (0.178) (0.182) (0.073) (0.117) (0.115) (0.179) (0.121) (0.213) 
Production 
of 
Electricity 
Olprod_ele
c 
-0.112 0.111 -0.184 -1.024* -0.351 0.220 -0.741*** -0.404* -0.600*** -0.971*** -0.721*** 0.131 
(0.088) (0.325) (0.513) (0.575) (0.343) (0.244) (0.118) (0.238) (0.166) (0.288) (0.202) (0.431) 
Interest rate 
lending 
lintrstRL 
0.664*** 0.366 -0.153 0.009 -0.269 0.745** 0.190 0.196 0.363** -0.158 0.449 0.375 
(0.160) (0.290) (0.579) (0.405) (0.266) (0.357) (0.134) (0.160) (0.157) (0.118) (0.291) (0.296) 
Wage per 
hour 
Olwageph 
-0.181 -0.064 0.750*** 0.839*** 0.493** 0.350 0.023 0.244** 0.273** -0.195 0.428*** -0.511* 
(0.129) (0.170) (0.262) (0.305) (0.216) (0.232) (0.096) (0.105) (0.127) (0.134) (0.137) (0.261) 
Taxes on 
income 
(total) 
ltxinctot 
0.628*** 0.081 -0.040 0.105 -0.362 -2.262*** 0.341* 0.114 -0.786** -1.075*** -0.894*** -1.222*** 
(0.233) (0.508) (0.612) (0.848) (0.457) (0.544) (0.181) (0.366) (0.339) (0.305) (0.314) (0.293) 
Air freight Olairfreight 
0.166 0.165 -0.014 -0.201 -0.178 -0.697** 0.208** 0.352 -0.501*** -0.058 -0.306 -0.370 
(0.145) (0.347) (0.313) (0.391) (0.182) (0.271) (0.085) (0.230) (0.142) (0.170) (0.210) (0.311) 
Trade 
percentage 
of GDP 
ltradepgdp 
0.500*** 0.121 1.056 1.131* 0.704 1.708*** 0.248 0.548** 1.018*** 0.491 0.979*** 0.227 
(0.188) (0.457) (0.734) (0.584) (0.503) (0.455) (0.157) (0.225) (0.292) (0.361) (0.311) (0.529) 
Stock 
traded 
(total) 
Olstktrdtot 
0.204 0.488 0.308 0.535* 0.098 1.112*** 0.280 0.405* 0.519*** 0.562*** 0.562* 0.779** 
(0.188) (0.380) (0.428) (0.288) (0.340) (0.331) (0.191) (0.211) (0.147) (0.100) (0.333) (0.302) 
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Political 
Rights 
FHPR 
0.150 0.373* -0.117 0.262 0.418** -0.083 0.225** 0.275* 0.056 0.188 0.293* 0.520* 
(0.102) (0.225) (0.349) (0.368) (0.174) (0.260) (0.090) (0.158) (0.204) (0.237) (0.154) (0.289) 
Civil 
Liberties 
FHCL 
-0.256** -0.786** 0.192 -0.346 -0.792*** -0.172 -0.468*** -0.798*** -0.360* -0.777*** -0.786*** -0.669** 
(0.124) (0.304) (0.414) (0.486) (0.261) (0.303) (0.103) (0.164) (0.203) (0.253) (0.224) (0.276) 
Governmen
t Stability 
gov_stab 
0.250*** 0.156* -0.193 -0.030 0.140 -0.024 0.128* 0.117** -0.083 -0.016 0.035 0.036 
(0.066) (0.083) (0.191) (0.147) (0.087) (0.101) (0.076) (0.054) (0.059) (0.058) (0.085) (0.131) 
Law & 
Order 
law_order 
0.038 -0.120 0.697** 0.342 0.082 0.358* 0.039 0.175* 0.397*** 0.014 0.183 0.235 
(0.042) (0.175) (0.353) (0.331) (0.191) (0.186) (0.048) (0.106) (0.114) (0.132) (0.142) (0.252) 
Bureaucrati
c Quality 
bureauc_qu
al 
0.138 0.183 -0.904 -0.868 -0.160 0.810** 0.478*** -0.013 0.062 0.202 0.211 0.449 
(0.137) (0.367) (0.614) (0.605) (0.315) (0.344) (0.154) (0.174) (0.234) (0.225) (0.317) (0.441) 
Constant _cons 
-32.447*** -22.370*** -19.473* -12.340 -16.474** -43.475*** -24.889*** -28.191*** -29.965*** -18.266*** -31.153*** -4.736 
(3.558) (5.372) (10.286) (8.823) (7.518) (5.359) (2.478) (3.466) (3.905) (6.168) (4.181) (6.590) 
N 1268.000 360.000 363.000 222.000 350.000 175.000 987.000 847.000 887.000 607.000 806.000 296.000 
Pseudo R2 0.1611 0.1925 0.0735 0.0984 0.1328 0.4027 0.2322 0.2233 0.17 0.1539 0.2054 0.1323 
Note: t-statistics are provided in parentheses. Asterisks denote the statistical level of significance; those with *** reflecting significance at %1; ** %5; and * %10.  
Source: Author’s estimations in STATA 
The results of the regression analyses of disaggregated FDI using models 2.1-2.3 and the relevant discussions are provided in appendix 7.3.  
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7.3.3. Sensitivity Analysis of the Effect of the level of Civil Liberties on Total FDI 
This section investigates the effect of civil liberties and political rights on FDI flows 
into two groups of countries: (1) countries with high and moderately high level of civil 
liberties; and (2) countries moderately low and low level of civil liberties. The main 
motivation is to explore the factors that influence the investment into free and moderately 
free countries in comparison to those affecting FDI flows into moderately repressed and 
repressed countries. In particular we would like to empirically examine the theoretical 
findings of chapter 4, through empirical investigation of hypotheses 1 and 2 where groups 
of countries with distinct disparities with regard to the level of civil liberties are 
considered. The latter can be viewed as sensitivity analysis of the findings and discussion 
of section 7.3.1. The investigation is carried out in aggregate level (total FDI flows) as well 
as disaggregated level (sectoral level) following the structure of this research. The 
classification of countries based on their level of civil liberties is carried out by 
consideration of the Freedom House rankings.  
This section’s investigations are inspired by Adam and Filippaios (2007) paper that 
considers countries with civil liberties’ rankings of less than or equal to three as free and 
moderately free countries (𝐹𝐻𝐶𝐿 ≤ 3), and those with civil liberties’ rankings of greater or 
equal to four, as moderately repressed and repressed countries (𝐹𝐻𝐶𝐿 ≥ 4). The 
description of the meaning of the ranking of countries based on their level of civil liberties 
provided by Freedom House is provided in the Appendix 6.5.  
The initial empirical investigation of aggregate and sectoral FDI using model 1.3126, and 
Adam and Filippaios (2007) categorization indicates a low number of observations on net 
FDI flows for countries with low level of civil liberties, particularly in case of sectoral 
FDI, resulting in lack of statistical confidence in the results. With the intention of provision 
of consistent categorization of countries across various levels of aggregation, we adopt a 
more flexible categorization based on which countries with civil liberties’ rankings of less 
than three are considered as free and moderately free countries (𝐹𝐻𝐶𝐿 < 3), and those 
with civil liberties’ rankings of greater than three are considered as moderately repressed 
and repressed countries (𝐹𝐻𝐶𝐿 ≥ 3). This categorization allows provision of more 
                                                          
126 Model 2.3 is not considered in the sensitivity analysis due to low number of observations available for Investment in 
Research and Development (lrnd). 
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balanced samples, where each group entails a considerable number of observations on net 
FDI flows for empirical analysis. Furthermore, whilst our alteration of categorization 
allows for more number of observations for FDI in both group of countries when 
aggregated and disaggregated FDI flows are considered, we find that a number of 
independent variables suffer from low number of observations. This leads to a significant 
reduction in the number of observations, since STATA automatically drops the 
observations for which the values are not available for all variables. The variable that 
suffers from considerably low number of observations is wage per hour (Olwage). 
Consequently, with the intention to provide a consistent analysis across various levels of 
FDI activity, we consider a variation of model 1.3 that excludes the ES variables from our 
empirical analysis in this section. The results of these considerations are the regression 
models tabulated in table 7-11.  
Table 7—11: Models used for Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity Analysis Model 
1.3; Adam & Filippaios 
(2007) categorization 
Sensitivity Analysis Model 
1.3; Author’s categorization 
Sensitivity Analysis Model 
1.3 variation; Adam & 
Filippaios (2007) 
categorization 
Sensitivity Analysis Model 
1.3 variation; Author’s 
categorization 
Civil Liberties ≤ 3 &  
Civil Liberties ≥ 4 
Civil Liberties < 3 &  
Civil Liberties > 3 
Civil Liberties ≤ 3 &  
Civil Liberties ≥ 4 
Civil Liberties < 3 &  
Civil Liberties > 3 
Log(GDP) Log(GDP) Log(GDP) Log(GDP) 
OLog(production of 
Electricity) 
OLog(production of 
Electricity) 
OLog(production of 
Electricity) 
OLog(production of 
Electricity) 
Log(Interest rate lending) Log(Interest rate lending) Log(Interest rate lending) Log(Interest rate lending) 
OLog(Wage per Hour) OLog(Wage per Hour) OLog(tax on income total) OLog(tax on income total) 
OLog(tax on income total) OLog(tax on income total) OLog(Airfrieght) OLog(Airfrieght) 
OLog(Airfrieght) OLog(Airfrieght) 
Log(trade as a percentage of 
GDP) 
Log(trade as a percentage of 
GDP) 
Log(trade as a percentage of 
GDP) 
Log(trade as a percentage of 
GDP) 
OLog(total Stock traded 
value as a percentage of 
GDP) 
OLog(total Stock traded 
value as a percentage of 
GDP) 
OLog(total Stock traded 
value as a percentage of 
GDP) 
OLog(total Stock traded 
value as a percentage of 
GDP) 
Civil Liberties Civil Liberties 
Civil Liberties Civil Liberties Political Rights Political Rights 
Political Rights Political Rights bureauc_qual bureauc_qual 
bureauc_qual bureauc_qual gov_stab gov_stab 
gov_stab gov_stab law_order law_order 
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law_order law_order   
Note that the results of the empirical models that use authors’ categorization of civil 
liberties based on Freedom House ranking are reported in this section while the results of 
regression models that use Adam and Filippaios (2007) categorization of civil liberties 
based on Freedom House are reported for readers’ information in the appendix 7.11 and 
7.13. 
 Moreover, with the intention to provide consistent empirical exploration, we do provide 
the results of the original regression model 1.3, in the appendix 7.12. It is worth 
mentioning that while the results of analysis using the original model suffer from low 
number of observations that undermine the credibility of statistical inference, they are 
consistent with respect to those observed in case of model 1.3 variations provided in table 
7-12, and in particular in terms of the effect of civil liberties on FDI activity. 
Having discussed the main empirical models that are considered in this section we 
proceed to discussing the empirical results of the sensitivity analysis of the effect of civil 
liberties, in order to further explore the non-linearities observed. In particular we conduct 
our empirical inquiry in both aggregate and sectoral levels, in order to provide a consistent 
analysis in this chapter. 
The regressions provided in table 7-12, cover the home countries aggregate FDI flows 
from 1990-2009. The results are not fully discussed in this section due to the limitations 
applied to the length of this research. However, with the intention to provide the reader 
with the full discussion on the results provided in table 7-12, the relevant discussions are 
available from appendix 7.7. In this section however, we mainly focus on the effect of civil 
and political liberties on aggregated FDI flows into host countries with various levels of 
civil liberties. 
The effect of civil liberties on FDI into host countries with higher level of civil liberties 
is negative and significant in case of firms from all home countries, with the exception of 
Finish FDI for which the effect is reported to be negative and insignificant. Furthermore, 
considering the effect of civil liberties on FDI into host countries with lower level of civil 
liberties we find that the effect is negative and insignificant in case of most countries with 
the exception of negative significant effects reported for US and Finish FDI into host 
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countries with lower level of civil liberties. The results are in support of our theoretical 
findings and in line with hypothesis 1. Therefore our empirical investigation of the effect 
of civil liberties on aggregate FDI flows into two groups of countries with different levels 
of civil liberties, are in favour of existence of a negative effect and in support of the 
findings of Coates et al. . However, we find that the aggregate FDI flows are more 
sensitive to changes in the level of civil liberties in the group of host countries with high 
and moderately high level of countries in comparison to those with lower level of civil 
liberties. In case of countries with low level of civil liberties, we find significant negative 
effect of an increase in the level of civil liberties, on US and Finish FDI, while the effect is 
insignificant and negative in case of other home countries.  
The effect of political rights on FDI into host countries with higher level of civil 
liberties is positive and insignificant in case of all countries with the exception of German 
and Finish FDI. The effect of political rights on FDI into host countries with low level of 
civil liberties is positive and insignificant in case of LMEs and France, while in contrast we 
observe a negative effect in case of CMEs’ (with the exception France) and Northern FDI. 
Therefore the overall evidence suggests that in contrast to our theoretical finding, and 
hypothesis 2, the effect of political rights on FDI into host countries with various levels of 
civil liberties is non-linear. Furthermore, we find that the effects are symmetric across 
groups in all cases with the exception of Dutch FDI. In particular we find that Dutch FDI is 
positively affected by political rights in countries with higher levels of civil liberties, while 
the effect is negative in case of host countries with lower levels of civil liberties. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that the effect of political rights on LMEs FDI is positive 
and insignificant, indicating that LMEs tend to invest in countries with higher level of 
political rights, irrespective of their level of civil liberties. This is in line with findings of 
Jensen (2003), Addison and Heshmati (2003), Sethi, et al. (2003), Wheeler and Mody 
(1992) and Adam and Filippaios (2007) who reported a positive relationship between the 
level of political liberties of the host countries on the FDI. In contrast we find a negative 
insignificant effect of the level of political rights on German and Finish FDI, across 
groups, indicating that German and Finish firms tend to invest in politically repressed 
countries, irrespective of their level of civil liberties. This is in line with the findings of 
Asiedu (2001) and Li and Resnick (2003), who have reported a negative effect of political 
rights on FDI. 
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Table 7—12: Estimation of determinants of home countries’ aggregated FDI into host countries with various levels of civil liberties 
Table 7-12 
Estimation of Determinants of Total FDI (Model 1.3) 
Countries with high and moderately high level of civil liberties 𝐹𝐻𝐶𝐿 < 3 Countries with moderately low  and low level of civil liberties 𝐹𝐻𝐶𝐿 ≥ 3 
Variable 
name 
STATA 
label 
US UK Germany Netherlands France Finland US UK Germany Netherlands France Finland 
GDP lgdp 
0.834*** 1.022*** 1.270*** 1.284*** 1.272*** 1.494*** 0.758*** 0.845*** 1.210*** 0.574** 0.922*** 2.353*** 
(0.256) (0.141) (0.086) (0.120) (0.103) (0.234) (0.188) (0.147) (0.074) (0.249) (0.082) (0.585) 
Production 
of 
Electricity 
Olprod_ele
c 
-0.659** -0.030 -0.582*** -0.927*** -0.967*** 0.185 -0.282 -0.226 -0.187 -0.576 0.036 0.175 
(0.315) (0.224) (0.130) (0.156) (0.204) (0.312) (0.244) (0.305) (0.202) (0.385) (0.514) (0.901) 
Interest rate 
lending 
lintrstRL 
-0.363 0.234 0.163 0.402* 0.183 -0.166 0.338* 0.431** 0.291 0.736* 1.945*** 1.588 
(0.348) (0.185) (0.160) (0.233) (0.274) (0.489) (0.176) (0.202) (0.246) (0.392) (0.613) (1.131) 
Taxes on 
income 
(total) 
ltxinctot 
0.982 0.414 -0.966*** -0.282 -0.396 -2.515*** -0.044 -0.026 -0.050 -0.644* 0.501 -0.425 
(0.612) (0.405) (0.287) (0.217) (0.355) (0.453) (0.228) (0.269) (0.112) (0.338) (0.438) (0.595) 
Air freight Olairfreight 
0.152 0.559** -0.003 -0.078 -0.071 -0.417 -0.320* 0.212 -0.272 0.492 0.072 1.705 
(0.279) (0.220) (0.130) (0.144) (0.102) (0.348) (0.179) (0.208) (0.171) (0.333) (0.286) (1.117) 
Trade 
percentage 
of GDP 
ltradepgdp 
0.471* 1.159*** 1.427*** 1.450*** 1.237*** 2.094*** 1.825*** 0.671** 1.400*** 0.588 0.848** 1.589** 
(0.272) (0.330) (0.284) (0.424) (0.318) (0.692) (0.346) (0.274) (0.173) (0.489) (0.410) (0.796) 
Stock 
traded 
(total) 
Olstktrdtot 
0.438 0.331*** 0.197 0.490*** 0.218* 0.950** -0.187 0.403* -0.111 0.201 0.165 0.886 
(0.428) (0.126) (0.126) (0.185) (0.127) (0.373) (0.242) (0.233) (0.140) (0.294) (0.304) (0.597) 
Political 
Rights 
FHPR 
0.019 0.315 -0.016 0.208 0.495 -0.604 0.134 0.021 -0.065 -0.075 0.514 -0.015 
(0.456) (0.303) (0.445) (0.473) (0.454) (0.564) (0.111) (0.207) (0.105) (0.135) (0.357) (0.238) 
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Civil 
Liberties 
FHCL 
-0.882** -0.648*** -0.249* -0.766*** -0.698*** -0.345 -0.321** -0.077 -0.047 -0.173 -0.615 -0.651* 
(0.411) (0.203) (0.128) (0.208) (0.203) (0.536) (0.158) (0.376) (0.164) (0.221) (0.537) (0.383) 
Governmen
t Stability 
gov_stab 
0.182** 0.187** 0.006 0.149* -0.049 0.143 0.102* 0.157* 0.128** 0.253*** 0.011 -0.273 
(0.088) (0.079) (0.054) (0.077) (0.055) (0.109) (0.058) (0.093) (0.058) (0.079) (0.132) (0.233) 
Law & 
Order 
law_order 
0.049 -0.296*** 0.092 0.106 -0.031 0.156 0.313** -0.214 0.155 0.118 0.576*** 0.316 
(0.222) (0.095) (0.116) (0.153) (0.133) (0.159) (0.134) (0.165) (0.102) (0.215) (0.178) (0.407) 
Bureaucrati
c Quality 
bureauc_qu
al 
0.605** 0.638*** 0.225 0.150 0.325* 0.383 -0.253 0.337 0.063 -0.431 -0.350 -1.061** 
(0.303) (0.179) (0.174) (0.285) (0.189) (0.365) (0.156) (0.233) (0.125) (0.325) (0.325) (0.401) 
Constant _cons 
-22.526*** -29.542*** -30.594*** -35.537*** -31.744*** -37.132*** -22.496*** -22.315*** -35.219*** -13.134 -31.058*** -64.147*** 
(6.811) (4.921) (3.311) (4.502) (3.981) (7.352) (6.418) (4.356) (2.701) (8.429) (4.701) (18.458) 
N 204.000 248.000 313.000 265.000 303.000 205.000 187.000 218.000 310.000 147.000 202.000 80.000 
Pseudo R2 0.3903 0.4456 0.4186 0.4224 0.5384 0.3086 0.2662 0.3347 0.514 0.2157 0.345 0.4748 
Note: t-statistics are provided in parentheses. Asterisks denote the statistical level of significance; those with *** reflecting significance at %1; ** %5; and * %10. 
Source: Author’s estimations in STATA 
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7.3.4. Sensitivity Analysis of the Effect of the level of Civil Liberties on Sectoral FDI 
This section investigates the effect of civil and political liberties on sectoral net FDI 
flows from our set of home countries (US, UK, Germany, Netherlands, France, and 
Finland) into 140 host countries which are grouped into two sets of countries: (1) host 
countries with high or moderately high level of civil liberties (𝐹𝐻𝐶𝐿 < 3); and (2) host 
countries with moderately low and low level of civil liberties (𝐹𝐻𝐶𝐿 ≥ 3). The motivation 
is to investigate the effect of civil and political liberties on sectoral FDI flows into groups 
of host countries with various levels of civil liberties, in order to examine the theoretical 
findings of chapter 4. In particular we are investigating the hypotheses 3 and 4 discussed in 
section 7.2.3. 
The regressions provided in table 7-13, cover the home countries sectoral FDI into host 
countries with high and moderately high level of civil liberties, flows from 1990-2009. The 
results are not fully discussed in this section due to the limitations applied to the length of 
this research. However, with the intention to provide the reader with the full discussion on 
the results provided in table 7-13, the relevant discussions are available from appendix 7.8. 
In this section however, we mainly focus on the effect of civil and political liberties on 
aggregated FDI flows into host countries with various levels of civil liberties. 
The effect of civil liberties on LMEs’ sectoral FDI into host countries with higher level 
of civil liberties is negative and significant. The evidence on the effect of civil liberties on 
CMEs’ manufacturing FDI shows a negative and insignificant effect ton German and 
French manufacturing FDI, while the effect reported in case of Dutch manufacturing FDI 
is in contrast, positive and insignificant. The effect of civil liberties on CMEs’ services FDI 
is negative and significant on Dutch and French FDI, while a negative insignificant effect 
is ported in case of German services FDI into host countries with higher level of civil 
liberties. Considering the Northern sectoral FDI into host countries with higher level of 
civil liberties, we find a positive insignificant effect reported in case of Finish 
manufacturing FDI, while in contrast a negative and significant effect is reported in case of 
Finish services FDI into host countries with higher level of civil liberties.  
The overall evidence suggests that increases in the level of civil liberties in the host 
countries with higher level of civil liberties act as a deterrent to sectoral FDI from LMEs. 
Furthermore the negative effect of civil liberties on LMEs’, Dutch and French FDI across 
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sectors, indicates that there are no differences in the way civil liberties affect LMEs’ FDI 
into sectors with greater labour share of production in comparison to those with higher 
capital share of production, in contrast to our theoretical findings of chapter 4 and 
hypothesis 3. Consequently we refute the hypothesis 3, and find the evidence in support of 
the findings of Coates et al. . However, the sectoral analysis of the CMEs’ (with the 
exception of Germany) and Northern FDI demonstrates that civil liberties has a greater 
effect on FDI into sectors with higher labour share of production (services) in comparison 
to sectors with greater capital share of production (manufacturing), thus providing 
evidence in support of the hypothesis 3.  
Furthermore, the effect of civil liberties on services FDI is negative supporting the 
findings of Coates et al. , while the review of the effects observed in case of manufacturing 
FDI indicates both positive insignificant effect (case of Dutch and Finish manufacturing 
FDI) and negative effects (case of LMEs, Germany and France) with significant results 
reported  only for LMEs, giving support to the findings of Coates et al.  in case of LMEs, 
Germany and France, and the works of Asiedu and Lien (2011), Adam and Filippaios 
(2007), and Li and Resnick (2003) in case of Dutch and Finish FDI. Therefore considering 
LMEs’ and Germany’s sectoral FDI into host countries with higher level of civil liberties, 
we find a symmetric negative effect across labour and capital intensive sectors, in contrast 
to our theoretical findings which leads to refuting hypothesis 3, while the evidence on 
Dutch, French and Finish sectoral FDI into host countries with higher level of civil 
liberties suggests a greater influence of civil liberties on labour intensive sector, in line 
with our theoretical findings, and in support of hypothesis 3. The comparison on the effect 
of civil liberties on sectoral FDI flows into host countries with higher and lower levels of 
civil liberties are made in section 7.3.4, in order to provide a better understanding of the 
effect of civil liberties on FDI flows. 
The effect of political rights on US manufacturing FDI into host countries with higher 
level of civil liberties is positive and insignificant across sectors, while the effect reported 
in case of UK manufacturing FDI is consistently negative across sectors, and significant 
only in case of UK manufacturing FDI. The effect of political rights on CMEs’ sectoral 
FDI into host countries with higher level of civil liberties is positive and insignificant with 
the exception of a positive and significant effect reported in case of French services FDI. In 
contrast a non-linear effect of political rights on Northern FDI is observed with a negative 
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and insignificant reported for Finish manufacturing FDI, and a positive and significant 
effect is reported in case of Finish services FDI.  
Therefore the overall evidence suggests that the effect of political rights on U.S. and 
CMEs’ sectoral FDI into host countries with higher level of civil liberties.is positive and in 
line with hypothesis 2. In contrast, the review of the effect of political rights on UK 
sectoral FDI indicates the presence of a negative effect in line with the findings of Asiedu 
(2001) and Coates et al. (2010). However, the review of the effect of political rights on 
Northern FDI, shows that the effect is reported to be insignificant and negative on 
manufacturing FDI, while a positive and significant effect is reported in case of Finish 
services FDI. This non-linear effect of political rights on FDI is in line with the findings of 
Li and Resnick (2003) who have reported both positive and negative influences of political 
rights on FDI.  
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Table 7—13: Estimation of determinants of home countries’ sectoral FDI in host countries with high and moderately high level of civil liberties 
Table 7-13 
Estimation of Determinants of Sectoral FDI (All countries); countries with high and moderately high level of civil liberties 𝐹𝐻𝐶𝐿 < 3 
Manufacturing (Model 1.3) Services (Model 1.3) 
Variable 
name 
STATA 
label 
US UK Germany Netherlands France Finland US UK Germany Netherlands France Finland 
GDP lgdp 
1.216*** 0.814*** 0.550 -0.013 0.408* 1.497*** 0.847*** 1.076*** 1.119*** 0.882*** 0.958*** 0.668*** 
(0.125) (0.158) (0.358) (0.421) (0.212) (0.184) (0.092) (0.141) (0.142) (0.188) (0.129) (0.231) 
Production 
of 
Electricity 
Olprod_elec 
0.048 0.168 0.149 -1.026 -0.994*** 0.140 -0.711*** -0.516** -0.488** -1.163*** -1.047*** 0.459 
(0.199) (0.280) (0.577) (0.701) (0.320) (0.303) (0.147) (0.203) (0.209) (0.233) (0.300) (0.284) 
Interest rate 
lending 
lintrstRL 
0.619*** 0.417* -0.579 0.027 -0.474** 0.712** -0.725** 0.617** 0.149 -0.100 0.049 0.096 
(0.231) (0.229) (0.720) (0.586) (0.223) (0.323) (0.283) (0.261) (0.327) (0.182) (0.355) (0.234) 
Taxes on 
income 
(total) 
ltxinctot 
0.334 0.495 -0.212 0.959 0.868 -1.919*** 0.626** -0.393 -0.747* -0.738 -0.495 -1.361*** 
(0.270) (0.554) (0.686) (1.304) (0.624) (0.567) (0.281) (0.382) (0.383) (0.548) (0.659) (0.411) 
Air freight Olairfreight 
-0.050 0.232 0.437 -0.405 -0.180 -0.217 0.254* 0.416* -0.318** -0.040 0.111 -0.752** 
(0.165) (0.255) (0.404) (0.593) (0.203) (0.298) (0.138) (0.242) (0.140) (0.224) (0.159) (0.353) 
Trade 
percentage 
of GDP 
ltradepgdp 
0.612*** -0.042 0.647 0.056 0.850** 2.471*** 0.511* 0.550 1.048*** 0.807** 1.254*** 0.969* 
(0.224) (0.530) (0.770) (0.811) (0.378) (0.440) (0.273) (0.352) (0.322) (0.371) (0.385) (0.540) 
Stock 
traded 
(total) 
Olstktrdtot 
0.095 0.479* 0.496* 0.676 0.247 0.759** -0.011 0.455** 0.432** 0.370* 0.257* 0.860*** 
(0.268) (0.248) (0.255) (0.556) (0.214) (0.364) (0.192) (0.209) (0.170) (0.221) (0.146) (0.214) 
Political 
Rights 
FHPR 
0.348 -0.895** 0.244 0.003 0.764 -0.155 0.094 -0.332 0.391 0.998 0.847* 1.704** 
(0.249) (0.412) (0.814) (1.673) (0.495) (0.782) (0.271) (0.586) (0.509) (0.648) (0.438) (0.745) 
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Civil 
Liberties 
FHCL 
-0.768*** -0.836*** -0.100 0.619 -0.413 0.221 -0.861*** -0.755*** -0.640 -1.259*** -0.888** -0.562* 
(0.242) (0.318) (0.626) (0.746) (0.359) (0.397) (0.202) (0.212) (0.490) (0.242) (0.361) (0.287) 
Governmen
t Stability 
gov_stab 
0.025 0.111 -0.190 0.099 -0.011 0.051 0.048 0.085 -0.073 -0.117* 0.078 0.103 
(0.060) (0.082) (0.188) (0.193) (0.109) (0.082) (0.055) (0.073) (0.048) (0.067) (0.092) (0.103) 
Law & 
Order 
law_order 
0.037 -0.478*** 0.389 0.157 -0.317 0.048 -0.244* -0.095 0.057 -0.075 -0.453** 0.472 
(0.151) (0.168) (0.406) (0.278) (0.204) (0.233) (0.130) (0.182) (0.188) (0.184) (0.189) (0.290) 
Bureaucrati
c Quality 
bureauc_qu
al 
0.441* 0.146 -0.749 -0.035 0.401 1.066*** 0.692*** 0.501** 0.300 0.538* 0.639** -0.231 
(0.246) (0.311) (0.719) (0.700) (0.319) (0.398) (0.183) (0.235) (0.271) (0.324) (0.305) (0.587) 
Constant _cons 
-34.309*** -16.470*** -10.286 -1.552 -13.757** -45.489*** -20.578*** -28.012*** -28.158*** -20.201*** -25.650*** -19.346** 
(4.099) (6.098) (13.379) (14.426) (6.028) (5.640) (3.118) (4.956) (4.199) (4.948) (5.706) (7.579) 
N 881.000 321.000 301.000 192.000 289.000 158.000 710.000 770.000 740.000 542.000 656.000 272.000 
Pseudo R2 0.1574 0.2072 0.071 0.0504 0.0504 0.4275 0.2242 0.2176 0.1688 0.1585 0.2239 0.1179 
Note: t-statistics are provided in parentheses. Asterisks denote the statistical level of significance; those with *** reflecting significance at %1; ** %5; and * %10 
Source: Author’s estimations in STATA 
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The regressions provided in table 7-14, cover the home countries sectoral FDI into host 
countries with moderately low and low level of civil liberties, flows from 1990-2009. The 
results are not fully discussed in this section due to the limitations applied to the length of 
this research. However, with the intention to provide the reader with the full discussion on 
the results provided in table 7-14, the relevant discussions are available from appendix 7.9. 
In this section however, we mainly focus on the effect of civil and political liberties on 
aggregated FDI flows into host countries with various levels of civil liberties. 
The effect of civil liberties on US sectoral FDI into host countries with lower level of 
civil liberties is negative and insignificant in case of US manufacturing FDI while a 
positive insignificant effect is reported for US services sector. Similarly we observe an 
asymmetric effect in case of UK sectoral FDI into host countries with lower level of civil 
liberties with a negative insignfincat effect observed in case of UK manufacturing FDI and 
a positive insignificant effect reported for UK services sector. The influence of civil 
liberties on CMEs’ manufacturing FDI tends to be positive for Germany, and negative for 
Dutch and French manufacturing FDI, and insignificant in all cases. Considering the effect 
of civil liberties on CMEs’ services FDI, we find a positive insignificant effect on all 
CMEs’ FDI across sectors. The influence of civil liberties on Northern FDI into host 
countries with lower level of civil liberties is negative and insignificant across sectors. 
Thus the overall evidence suggests that civil liberties has a symmetric effect on FDI from 
Germany and Finland across sectors, while in contrast an asymmetric effects are reported 
for all other countries across sectors, emphasising that firms’ behaviour vary across 
sectors, and consequently their FDI behaviour. Therefore we find that consistent with our 
earlier arguments, the effect of civil liberties and political rights among many other factors 
that influence FDI activity, vary across sectors. Hence, we argue that a through analysis of 
factors influencing the FDI activity should use dissagregated data in order to shed more 
light on micro drivers of FDI activity in order to explain the aggregate of these influences 
on macro level and thereby explain FDI activity. 
Moreover, the comparison of the effect of civil liberties on FDI into capital intensive 
(manufactruing) and labour intentsive (services) sectors, would allow us to investigate the 
hypothesis 4 provided in section 7.2.3. The overall review of the effects reported  show 
that they are all insignificant across sectors and countries. Furthermore an increase in the 
level of civil liberties in manufacturing sector (capital intensive sector) affects FDI from 
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US, Netherlands, France and Finland in a negative manner, while FDI from UK and 
Germany are affected in a positive manner. The latter indicates that an increase in the level 
of civil liberties will have a negative insignifcant effect on the manufacturing FDI from 4 
out of 6 home countries considered. Reviewing the effects reported in case of services 
(labour intensive) sector show that an increase in the level of civil liberties in services 
sector would affect FDI from UK and Finland in a negative manner while FDI from US, 
Germany, Netherlands, and France (CMEs) are affected in a positive manner, 
demonstrating that an increase in the level of civil liberties has a negative effect on the 
services FDI from firms from 2 out of 6 home countries considered. Therefore, we do not 
find empirical support for hypothesis 4, demonstrating that the effect of civil liberties on 
services FDI (labour intensive production) is greater than that on manufacturing FDI 
(capital intensive production), in case of repressed and moderately repressed countries. 
Hence, we refute the hypothesis 4. 
Furthermore, comparison between sectoral FDI into host countries with high and low 
level of civil liberties allows us to investigate the FDI activity further. Considering the 
manufacturing sector, and consulting tables 7-13 and 7-14 we find that the effect of civil 
liberties on manufacturing FDI into host countries with higher level of civil liberties is 
greater in case of LMEs, with significant and nagative results reported for US and UK 
manufactruing firms. In comparison, the results from LMEs’ manufacturing FDI into host 
countries with low level of civil liberties indicates presence of insignificant effects that are 
negative in case of US, and positive in case of UK manufacturing FDI. Thus increase in the 
level of civil liberties in host countries irrespective of their level of civil liberties deters US 
FDI, providing support for the findings of Coates et al. . However, the effect is more 
significant in countries with higher level of civil liberties. UK manufacturing FDI similarly 
shows a negative significant effect when host countries with higher level of civil liberties 
are considered. However, an increase in the level of civil liberties, in host counties with 
lower level of civil liberties, affects UK manufacutirng firms in an insignificant and 
positive manner, indicating a non-linear effect of civil liberties across groups of countries 
with different levels of civil liberties, in support of the findings of works of Asiedu and 
Lien (2011), Adam and Filippaios (2007), and Li and Resnick (2003). Similarly, we 
observe a non-linear effect of civil liberties on German, Dutch and Finish FDI 
manufacturing FDI into two groups of countries with different levels of civil liberties. 
However, the effect of civil liberties on French manufacturing FDI, is linear, insignificant 
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and negative across sectors giving support to the findings of Coates et al. . Thus we 
observe a non-linear effect of civil liberties on UK, German, Dutch and Finish 
manufacturing FDI, while a linear and negative effect is observed in case of US and French 
manufacturing FDI.  
Examination of the services FDI flows into the two groups of host countries with 
various levels of civil liberties shows that civil liberties have a greater effect on services 
FDI into host countries with higher level of civil liberties. Furthermore, the results indicate 
that the effect of civil liberties on services FDI into host countries with higher level of civil 
liberties is consistently negative, while in contrast civil liberties have a negative effect on 
only two countries of UK and Finland when countries with lower level of civil liberties are 
considered. Comparing the results suggests that civil liberties affect US, German, Dutch, 
and French services FDI in a non-linear manner, giving support to the findings of Asiedu 
and Lien (2011), Adam and Filippaios (2007), and Li and Resnick (2003). In contrast the 
effect of civil liberties on UK and Finish FDI is linear and negative, in support of the 
findings of Coates et al. . Threfore, the comparative analysis of the findings of the two 
sectors shows that in most cases the effect of civil liberties on sectoral FDI is non-linear.  
The effect of political rights on manufacturing FDI flows from UK, France, 
Netherlands, and Finland into host countries with low level of civil liberties is insignificant 
and positive, and in support of the findings of Wheeler and Mody (1992) and  Sethi, et al. 
(2003), while the effect on German and US manufacturing FDI is reported to be 
insignficant and negative, suporting the findings of Asiedu (2001) and Coates et al. (2010).  
In contrast the effect of political rights on services FDI flows into host countries with low 
level of civil liberties is insignificant and negative in all cases with the exception of 
German services FDI for which a positive insignificant effect is reported. Therefore the 
overall evidence suggests existance of a non-linear effect of political rights on sectoral FDI 
for most countries except US. Furthermore, the effect of political rights on manufacturign 
FDI is generally positive and in line with hypothesis 2 and findings of Wheeler and Mody 
(1992) and  Sethi, et al. (2003), while the effect of political rights on services FDI is 
insignificant and negative, in line with the findings of Asiedu (2001) and Coates et al. 
(2010). Thus, it is possible to argue that the sectoral composition of the data that is used by 
the researcher in empirical analysis of the effect of institutional factors, civil liberties and 
political rights on FDI, influences the findings of the research. Therefore, it is credible to 
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speculate that most of the researches that have found a positive effect of political rights on 
FDI activity, have used aggregate data that draw a great deal more from manufacturing 
sector than services, and vice versa. However due to limitation of this research, the further 
examination of this claim is left for future research. 
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Table 7—14: Estimation of determinants of home countries’ sectoral FDI in host countries with moderately low and low level of civil liberties 
Table 7-14 
Estimation of Determinants of Sectoral FDI (All countries); countries with  moderately low and low level of civil liberties 𝐹𝐻𝐶𝐿 ≥ 3 
Manufacturing (Model 1.3) Services (Model 1.3) 
Variable 
name 
STATA 
label 
US UK Germany 
Netherland
s 
France Finland US UK Germany 
Netherland
s 
France Finland 
GDP lgdp 
1.030*** 1.241*** 1.324*** -0.568 1.068*** 2.000*** 0.983*** 0.959*** 1.155*** 0.844** 0.622*** 1.941 
(0.119) (0.172) (0.309) (0.499) (0.273) (0.555) (0.125) (0.180) (0.149) (0.327) (0.204) (5.151) 
Production 
of 
Electricity 
Olprod_elec 
-0.494 0.559 0.156 -0.677 -0.826 -1.329 -0.397 0.043 0.382 0.245 -0.620 -4.060 
(0.352) (0.497) (0.724) (1.413) (0.954) (1.198) (0.310) (0.403) (0.882) (0.828) (1.002) (27.043) 
Interest rate 
lending 
lintrstRL 
0.933*** 1.732** 0.767 -3.379 1.457 1.615 0.603*** 0.140 1.684*** 1.741** 0.993 -1.262 
(0.180) (0.850) (0.916) (2.281) (1.056) (1.226) (0.169) (0.302) (0.354) (0.840) (0.902) (7.149) 
Taxes on 
income 
(total) 
ltxinctot 
0.028 -0.593 0.153 -0.344 -0.059 -0.401 0.208 0.255 -0.331 -0.744 -0.340 -1.569 
(0.427) (0.500) (0.631) (0.755) (0.550) (1.115) (0.285) (0.157) (0.991) (0.580) (0.386) (3.390) 
Air freight Olairfreight 
0.343* -0.793 -0.427 -0.539 0.105 0.776 0.004 -0.035 -0.594* 0.334 -0.127 -0.993 
(0.182) (0.527) (0.545) (1.659) (0.910) (1.646) (0.207) (0.247) (0.338) (0.481) (0.801) (5.164) 
Trade 
percentage 
of GDP 
ltradepgdp 
1.275*** 2.428*** 2.309*** 0.033 0.134 1.916 1.330*** 1.316** 1.367*** 2.303*** 2.017** 6.765 
(0.291) (0.632) (0.756) (1.792) (1.323) (1.844) (0.325) (0.513) (0.502) (0.815) (0.908) (21.937) 
Stock Olstktrdtot -0.165 0.756* -0.345 -0.242 0.296 0.581 0.030 0.647 1.071* -0.461 -0.214 0.534 
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traded 
(total) 
(0.232) (0.416) (0.558) (1.457) (0.652) (1.083) (0.262) (0.408) (0.574) (0.748) (0.427) (1.451) 
Political 
Rights 
FHPR 
-0.026 0.033 -0.389 0.077 0.490 0.180 -0.107 -0.151 0.234 -0.102 -0.210 -0.489 
(0.155) (0.325) (0.752) (0.653) (0.382) (0.551) (0.141) (0.148) (0.273) (0.518) (0.262) (5.785) 
Civil 
Liberties 
FHCL 
-0.011 0.221 0.756 -0.077 -0.733 -0.020 0.033 -0.124 0.251 0.019 0.597 -0.550 
(0.208) (0.631) (1.008) (1.634) (0.707) (1.279) (0.271) (0.339) (0.537) (0.946) (0.646) (14.744) 
Governmen
t Stability 
gov_stab 
0.147** 0.135 -0.313 -0.247 0.290 -0.205 0.078 -0.169* -0.248** -0.094 -0.286 -0.638 
(0.065) (0.135) (0.296) (0.280) (0.302) (0.508) (0.058) (0.088) (0.112) (0.158) (0.243) (5.587) 
Law & 
Order 
law_order 
0.214** -0.036 0.964 0.728 0.242 0.495 -0.173 0.347 0.273 0.199 0.755*** -0.782 
(0.097) (0.217) (0.754) (0.602) (0.440) (0.621) (0.109) (0.215) (0.314) (0.530) (0.229) (13.072) 
Bureaucrati
c Quality 
bureauc_qu
al 
-0.281 0.536 -0.194 -1.398 0.355 -0.801 0.200 -0.640** 0.422 0.058 -0.978* -4.671 
(0.179) (0.385) (1.384) (0.874) (0.926) (0.562) (0.213) (0.291) (0.558) (0.681) (0.544) (23.395) 
Constant _cons 
-32.929*** -45.366*** -46.266*** 31.469 -33.636*** -60.665** -30.084*** -27.409*** -38.708*** -31.487*** -23.317** -48.456 
(3.586) (6.959) (13.651) (24.891) (12.600) (25.461) (3.420) (7.171) (6.424) (11.812) (9.336) (110.090) 
N 668.000 107.000 99.000 64.000 106.000 45.000 498.000 205.000 265.000 157.000 242.000 44.000 
Pseudo R2 0.1465 0.2359 0.1987 0.267 0.1766 0.5895 0.1524 0.2119 0.1689 0.1396 0.1111 0.3598 
Note: t-statistics are provided in parentheses. Asterisks denote the statistical level of significance; those with *** reflecting significance at %1; ** %5; and * %10. The values marked in red 
indicate low number of observations, which in turn indicate that the results are not statistically reliable. 
Source: Author’s estimations in STATA 
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7.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter we empirically investigate explanatory power of our independent 
variables stemming from the firms’ FDI motivations, macro-economic characteristics, 
institutional quality, level of civil liberties and political rights of the host countries, on our 
dependent variable which reflects net FDI flows. The main purpose of this exercise is to 
examine the empirical validity of our theoretical findings of chapter 4. In this spirit, 
following the arguments made in chapter 4, the analysis is conducted in two main levels of 
aggregation; country level total FDI flows, and sectoral FD flows.  
The examination of the effect of independent variables on aggregate FDI flows is 
carried out through analysis of two, three-stage regressions. In each set of regressions the 
primary model is populated with traditional variables that have been used extensively in 
the literature in explaining FDI activity, namely: independent variable that proxy for firms’ 
motivations of FDI, and host countries’ macroeconomic variables. Then institutional 
variables are added to the model and the explanatory power of model, and independent 
variables are reviewed with regard to FDI flows. Finally, we include civil liberties and 
political rights as explanatory variables for FDI flows, following our discussions in chapter 
four, and examine the effect of them on FDI activity. The two sets of regressions differ in 
that, the second set of regressions includes investment in research and development, that is 
considered to proxy for SAS motives of FDI activity. However, since the number of 
observations is low for R&D variable, we have enclosed it as an auxiliary analysis that 
provides some information with regard to the way MNEs coordinate their FDI activity 
abroad.  
The examination of the effects of firms’ motivations and macroeconomic characteristics 
of host countries on aggregated net FDI flows, show that motivation of firms influence net 
FDI flows differently across markets economies (LMEs and CMEs) and countries. In 
particular we find that firms from LMEs, CMEs, and Northern countries, tend to be 
influenced by market seeking, efficiency seeking and resource seeking variables in a 
similar manner, while the effect of strategic asset seeking on FDI flows of LMEs and 
CMEs is significantly different. The differences in the way Strategic Asset Seeking (SAS) 
motives affect firms from LMES and CMEs were explored in the light of the differences in 
the way firms from different market economies coordinate their activities. We find that 
firms from LMEs tend to coordinate their research and development activities in a 
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centralised manner and outsourcing their production activities abroad while the evidence 
from CME show that they coordinate their activities in a more decentralised manner and 
thus their FDI investment does not have emphasis only on production and includes 
research and development activities.  
The overall results of the empirical examination of aggregate FDI flows (total FDI) 
show that motivations of FDI, macroeconomic characteristics of host markets, their 
institutional environment as well as the level of civil liberties and political rights affect the 
total FDI flows. Furthermore, we find that the effects in case of host countries’ taxes, 
investment in Research and development and infrastructure on FDI vary across firms from 
different types of market economies and that the consideration of the type of economy 
from which firms originate provides more detailed information with regard to their total 
FDI activity. We also show that the effect of level of civil liberties on total FDI flows is 
considerably different than the effect of political rights in the host markets on total FDI 
flows. The effect of the level of political rights on total FDI flows is generally positive 
supporting the findings of  Jensen (2003), Addison and Heshmati (2003), Sethi et al. 
(2003), Wheeler and Mody (1992) and Adam and Filippaios (2007). In contrast to this 
positive effect, we also find an insignificant negative effect of political rights on German 
and Finish127 FDI abroad, providing support for the view of Asiedu (2001) and Li and 
Resnick (2003). Therefore the overall results of the effect of political rights on sectoral 
FDI empirically demonstrate the existence of a non-linear effect of political rights on 
sectoral FDI flows in line with findings of Li and Resnick (2003).  The effect of civil 
liberties on total FDI is generally negative and in most cases significant, supporting the 
findings of Coates et al. (2010).  
Considering the effect of institutional quality of the host countries on total FDI flows, 
we find dominating evidence in favour of a positive effect supporting the findings of 
Lipsey (1999) and Campos and Kinoshita (2003), indicating that in general firms tend to 
invest in host countries with higher institutional quality. However, the contrary evidence 
on negative effects reported in a number of cases, raises the question on whether the 
positive effect of institutional quality of host countries is generalizable. We argue that the 
overall effect of institutional variables on FDI flows indicates presence of an asymmetric 
                                                          
127 German and Finish firms coordinate their activities in a decentralised manner.   
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effect, at least in a number of cases, that is in line with the findings of Aleksynska and 
Havrylchyk (2012) who exploring the role of institutional distance on the FDI show that 
institutional distance has an asymmetric effect on FDI depending on whether investors 
choose countries with better or worse institutions. It is also possible to relate our findings 
to those of Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) who find that the relationship between ill-
functioning institutions128 and FDI is modified by the country of origin of the FDI.   
The examination of the effects of firms’ motivations and macroeconomic characteristics 
of host countries on sectoral net FDI flows, show that motivation of firms influence net 
FDI flows differently across sectors as well as markets economies (LMEs and CMEs). In 
particular we find that while all firms show MS dominating behaviour in their sectoral FDI 
activity, their ES behaviour varies considerably across sectors. Furthermore, RS, and MS 
behaviour of firms is similar across sectors if the quality of transportation is considered, 
while consideration of expenditure in R&D indicates that firms SAS and ES behaviour 
varies across sectors. The differences in the behaviour of the firms’ FDI activity in various 
sectors stems from the fact that they coordinate their activities according to the sectoral 
characteristics. Consequently we find evidence supporting Blonigen (2005) arguments that 
analysis of aggregate FDI flows provides information with regard to the combination of 
affects reported for combination of sectors/industries. Since the empirical our results 
provide evidence on asymmetric, and in many cases, the non-linear effects of variables on 
FDI flows across sectors, the consideration of disaggregate FDI flows would allow one to 
gain a better understanding of the micro drivers of the industry and sectoral FDI. 
Therefore, we argue that it is necessary to explore the more disaggregated measure of FDI 
flows (i.e. industry of sectoral FDI flows) in order to provide a detailed and meaningful 
view of the way firms invest abroad and the factors that influence their behaviour.   
Moreover, we find that civil liberties and political rights affect sectoral FDI flows in 
different ways. The majority of the results of sectoral analysis with respect to the effect of 
civil liberties and political rights on FDI are in line with those reported for aggregated FDI. 
The effect of civil liberties on sectoral FDI for most countries across sectors tends to be 
negative, in support of hypothesis (1) in provided in section 7.2.3 and the findings of 
Coates et al. (2010). However we find that the effect of civil liberties on Dutch and Finish 
                                                          
128 Corruption is the institutional literature is often referred to as ill-functioning institutions, indicating that in the absence 
of well functioning institutions, corruption arises as auxiliary informal ways of coordination of activities that are not 
addressed in a healthy manner by the current institutional structure of the host countries. 
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manufacturing FDI when Investment on R&D in the host countries is considered, and the 
positive effect of German manufacturing FDI in the model 1.3, indicate the existence of a 
positive effect of civil liberties on sectoral FDI in line with the findings of Coughlin, et al. 
(1991) , Pournarakis and Varsakelis (2004) and Blanton and Blanton (2007). Therefore the 
overall results of the effect of civil liberties on sectoral FDI are in line with the findings of 
Asiedu and Lien (2011), Adam and Filippaios (2007), Li and Resnick (2003) and our 
theoretical findings, and in contrast to our aggregate empirical findings that suggested the 
existence of a sole negative effect. Therefore the results provide first empirical support for 
the theoretically established effect of sectoral characteristics, namely the ratio of labour 
versus capital intensity of production in a specific sector, on sectoral FDI flows. In 
particular we show that the effect of civil liberties on FDI flows is intermediated by the 
ratio of labour to capital intensity of sectors, therefore the existence of a non-linear effect 
of civil liberties on FDI flows is expected considering the characteristics of the sectors in 
which FDI is considered.  
Furthermore, the effect of political rights effect on sectoral FDI flows is generally 
positive, in line with hypothesis (2) provided in section 7.2.3 and in support of the findings 
of Jensen (2003), Addison and Heshmati (2003), Sethi et al. (2003), Wheeler and Mody 
(1992) and Adam  and Filippaios (2007). In contrast to this positive effect, we also find an 
insignificant negative effect of political rights on German and Finish129 manufacturing FDI 
abroad, providing support for the view of Asiedu (2001) and Li and Resnick (2003). 
Therefore the overall results of the effect of political rights on sectoral FDI empirically 
demonstrate the existence of a non-linear effect of political rights on sectoral FDI flows in 
line with findings of Li and Resnick (2003). The effect of institutional quality of host 
countries on sectoral flows is in general in line with the findings reported for aggregate 
FDI as we observe that firms generally tend to invest in host countries with higher 
institutional quality, with a few exceptions indicating that the effect of institutional 
variables on sectoral FDI flows are subject to consideration in various cases as the results 
are not conclusive in all cases.   
Considering the effect of institutional quality of the host countries on LMEs’ sectoral 
FDI flows, we find dominating evidence in favour of a positive effect supporting the 
                                                          
129 German and Finish firms coordinate their activities in a decentralised manner.   
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findings of Lipsey (1999), Campos and Kinoshita, Y. (2003), indicating that in general  
LMEs tend to invest in host countries with higher institutional quality. However, the 
contrary evidence on negative effects reported in case of CMEs’ and Northern sectoral 
FDI, suggest that institutional variables have an asymmetric effect, at least in a number of 
cases. The latter is in line with the findings of Aleksynska and Havrylchyk (2012) who 
exploring the role of institutional distance on the FDI show that institutional distance has 
an asymmetric effect on FDI depending on whether investors choose countries with better 
or worse institutions. It is also possible to relate our findings to those of Alvaro Cuervo-
Cazurra (2006) who finds that the relationship between ill-functioning institutions130 and 
FDI is modified by the country of origin of the FDI.   
In order to explore the non-linearities observed in terms of the effect of civil liberties 
and political rights on FDI flows, we provide two sets of sensitivity analysis. The 
sensitivity analysis affords us the opportunity to group countries with various levels of 
liberties in order to explore, and compare the investment behaviour of firms into each 
group of countries. The sensitivity analyses are conducted on both aggregate and 
disaggregate FDI flows using an empirical model that is slightly altered. In particular the 
model used for sensitivity analyses excludes ES variables and one of the SAS variables 
(expenditure on R&D), in order to allow provision of higher number of observations for 
the analyses, and consequently ensuring the credibility of the statistical results provided.  
A more detailed investigation of the effect of civil liberties on FDI into host countries 
with higher level of civil liberties is negative and significant in case of firms from all home 
countries, with the exception of Finish FDI for which the effect is reported to be negative 
and insignificant. Furthermore, considering the effect of civil liberties on FDI into host 
countries with lower level of civil liberties we find a negative and insignificant effect in 
case of most countries with the exception of negative significant effects reported for US 
and Finish FDI into host countries with lower level of civil liberties. The results are in 
support of our theoretical findings and in line with hypothesis 1. Therefore our empirical 
investigation of the effect of civil liberties on aggregate FDI flows into two groups of 
countries with different levels of civil liberties, is in favour of existence of a negative effect 
and in support of the findings of Coates et al. . However, we find that the aggregate FDI 
                                                          
130 Corruption is the institutional literature is often referred to as ill-functioning institutions, indicating that in the absence 
of well functioning institutions, corruption arises as auxiliary informal ways of coordination of activities that are not 
addressed in a healthy manner by the current institutional structure of the host countries. 
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flows are more sensitive to changes in the level of civil liberties in the group of host 
countries with high and moderately high level of countries in comparison to those with 
lower level of civil liberties. In case of countries with low level of civil liberties, we find 
significant negative effect of an increase in the level of civil liberties, on US and Finish 
FDI, while the effect is insignificant and negative in case of other home countries.  
The effect of civil liberties on sectoral FDI flows into two groups of countries with 
various levels of civil liberties suggest that civil liberties have a non-linear effect on 
sectoral FDI flows into countries with various level of civil liberties. In particular, we find 
that the effect of civil liberties on sectoral FDI into repressed countries is much weaker 
than that observed in case of countries with higher level of civil liberties. We also find civil 
liberties to have a positive insignificant effect on most countries’ (exceptions: UK and 
Finland) services FDI into repressed countries, in contrast to the results for services FDI 
into countries with higher level of civil liberties. Furthermore, the empirical evidence 
demonstrates that the effect of civil liberties is intermediated by the sectors’ ratio of 
labour/capital share of production in countries with higher level of civil liberties. In other 
words we find that the higher the ratio of labour/capital share of production, the greater the 
sensitivity of the firms to changes in wages which can be altered through changes in the 
level of civil liberties, and therefore the greater effect of civil liberties on FDI flows into 
host countries with higher level of civil liberties. However, we do not find empirical 
evidence supporting the existence of such intermediating effect in case of countries with 
lower level of civil liberties. Therefore our proposition with regard to the effect of the ratio 
of labour/capital share of production on the effect of civil liberties on sectoral capital flows 
into host countries with lower level of civil liberties whilst theoretically just, remains 
empirically unsupported. This perhaps is related to the level of civil liberties of the group 
of host countries that are considered as those with lower level of civil liberties. A possible 
interpretation of the latter is that the level of civil liberties are so low in the group of 
repressed and moderately repressed countries, that the distinction between the effect of 
civil liberties on capital intensive, versus labour intensive sectors is not very pronounced. 
However, further analysis of the effects observed is left to future research.  
Moreover, we find that civil liberties have a symmetric effect on FDI from Germany 
and Finland across sectors, while in contrast an asymmetric effects are reported for all 
other countries across sectors, emphasising that firms’ behaviour vary across sectors, and 
263 
 
consequently their FDI behaviour. Therefore we find that consistent with our earlier 
arguments, the effect of civil liberties on sectoral FDI flows into countries’ with various 
levels of civil liberties, vary across sectors. Hence, we argue that a through analysis of 
factors influencing the FDI activity should use dissagregated data in order to shed more 
light on micro drivers of FDI activity in order to explain the aggregate of these influences 
on macro level and thereby explain FDI activity.  
The overall evidence on the effect of civil liberties on aggregate FDI flows in general 
gives support to the existance of a negative effect of civil liberties on FDI flows 
irrespective of the level of civil liberties of host countries (i.e. free or repressed) 
considered, giving support to the findings of Coates et al. . However, the analyses of the 
effect of civil liberties on sectoral FDI flows indicates that the effect of civil liberties is not 
symmetric and linear across sectors, for all countries, emphasising the sector specific 
coordination activities of firms that influences their preferences and FDI activity. Our 
empirical investigation of the effect of civil liberties on aggregate FDI flows into two 
groups of countries with different levels of civil liberties, are in favour of existence of a 
negative effect and in support of the findings of Coates et al. (2010). Furthermore, we find 
that the effect of civil liberties on sectoral FDI into host countries with various levels of 
civil liberties is non-linear and asymmetric for most countries providing more detailed 
evidence on the way firms invest in free and moderately free host countries in comparison 
to moderately repressed and repressed countries. Therefore empirical investigation of the 
effect of civil liberties on sectoral FDI, and on sectoral FDI into host countries with various 
levels of civil liberties, give support to the findings of  Asiedu and Lien (2011), Adam and 
Filippaios (2007), Li and Resnick (2003) who have found the effects to be non-linear. In 
particular we argue that the sources of this non-linearity is related to sector specific 
characteristics, the type of home country that MNEs’ originate from, as well as host 
countries’ specific characteristics such as level of natural resources. 
A more detailed investigation of the effect of political rights on FDI flows by 
consideration of aggregated FDI flows into two groups of countries with various levels of 
FDI shows that the effect of political rights on FDI into host countries with higher level of 
civil liberties is positive and insignificant in case of all countries with the exception of 
German and Finish FDI. The effect of political rights on FDI into host countries with low 
level of civil liberties is positive and insignificant in case of LMEs and France, while in 
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contrast we observe a negative effect in case of CMEs’ (with the exception France) and 
Northern FDI. Therefore the overall evidence suggests that in contrast to our theoretical 
finding, and hypothesis 2, the effect of political rights on FDI into host countries with 
various levels of civil liberties is non-linear, giving support to the view of Asiedu (2001) 
and Li and Resnick (2003). 
The effect of political rights on aggregated FDI flows into host countries with various 
levels of civil liberties, in contrast to our theoretical finding, is non-linear. The lack of 
empirical evidence in case of host countries with lower level of civil liberties is attributed 
to the lower level of civil liberties in the repressed countries that naturally makes it 
difficult to examine the intermediating effect of the labour/capital share of production on 
the relationship between civil liberties and FDI flows. We also find that the effects are 
symmetric across groups in all cases with the exception of Dutch FDI. In particular we find 
that Dutch FDI is positively affected by political rights in countries with higher levels of 
civil liberties, while the effect is negative in case of host countries with lower levels of 
civil liberties. Furthermore, the results suggest that the effect of political rights on LMEs 
FDI is positive and insignificant, indicating that LMEs tend to invest in countries with 
higher level of political rights, irrespective of their level of civil liberties. This is in line 
with findings of Jensen (2003), Addison and Heshmati (2003), Sethi, et al. (2003), Wheeler 
and Mody (1992) and Adam and Filippaios (2007) who reported a positive relationship 
between the level of political liberties of the host countries on the FDI. In contrast we find 
a negative insignificant effect of the level of political rights on German and Finish FDI 
across groups, indicating that higher level of political rights deters sectoral FDI from 
German and Finish firms, irrespective of their level of civil liberties. This is in line with the 
findings of Asiedu (2001) and Li and Resnick (2003), who have reported a negative effect 
of political rights on FDI. 
The exploration of the effect of political rights on disaggregated FDI flows into host 
countries with various levels of civil liberties, provides empirical evidence in support of a 
non-linear effect of political rights on sectoral FDI flows, in line with findings of Li and 
Resnick (2003).  
Furthermore, we find that the effect of political rights on sectoral FDI in each group tends 
to be asymmetric. Thus, it is possible to argue that the sectoral composition of the data and 
the choice of host countries that are considered for empirical research influence the 
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findings of the research. Therefore, it is credible to speculate that most of the researches 
that have found a positive effect of political rights on FDI activity, have used aggregate 
data that draw a great deal more from either host countries with higher level of civil 
liberties, or manufacturing sector. However due to limitation of this research, the further 
examination of this claim is left for future research.  
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Chapter 8 : Concluding Remarks 
8.1. Introduction 
In this chapter we summarise the arguments made, the developments that allowed 
theoretical and empirical investigations of the research question, research findings, and the 
research limitations. Furthermore, we discuss this researches’ contribution, and set forward 
a number of immediate avenues for the future research. 
8.2. Summary of Thesis Argument  
In the introduction of this research we suggested that the effect of civil liberties and 
political rights on FDI activity is far from conclusive. In support of our original claim 
chapter 3 reviewed the literature that empirically investigates the effect of institutional 
factors, democracy, civil liberties and political rights on FDI flows and showed that indeed, 
the literature on the effect of civil and political liberties on FDI is inconclusive. 
 In the light of the globalization of markets in recent decades, the disparities in the 
economic prosperity of nations are often a matter of concern. One of the factors that 
stimulate the economic growth of the nations is the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 
Therefore we believe that further exploration of the factors that influence the FDI activity 
of countries would benefit the greater understanding of the factors that influence nations’ 
economic growth, and consequently the global economic development, as a whole.  
The determinants of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), both in terms of the level of FDI 
as well as its composition have been of great debate over the past seventy years. The recent 
strand of literature on the effect of institutional quality of the host countries on their FDI 
inflows has focused on the disaggregated measures that constitute the institutional quality 
of the host countries, mainly civil liberties and political rights. However, in spite of 
existence of numerous studies on the topic, the literature on the effect of political and civil 
liberties on FDI is far from being conclusive. For instance, authors such as Huntington and 
Dominguez (1975), Wintrobe (1998), and Greider (1998) provide discussions and evidence 
in favour of the idea that multinational enterprises (MNEs) tend to invest in countries with 
low level of liberties (countries with high levels of repression) while others such as Olson 
(1993), McGuire and Olson (1996), and Ursprung and Harms (2001) provide discussions 
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and evidence contrary to the later arguing that MNEs invest more in countries where 
democratic rights of people are respected. Others such as Przeworski, Limongi, and Voigt 
(2003) argue that none of the two arguments is convincing. Recent studies including Li and 
Resnick (2003), Adam and Filippaios (2007), and Asiedu and Lien (2011) tend to provide 
evidence in favour of existence of non-linear relationships between the two.  
Since the literature on the effect of civil liberties and political rights (liberties) on FDI is 
inconclusive, we investigate the effect of civil liberties and political rights (liberties) on 
FDI. The objectives of our research are as mentioned in chapter 1 subsection 3, as follows: 
Firstly, we explore the effect of the level of civil liberties, and political rights in host 
countries on the level of aggregated (total) and disaggregated (sectoral) FDI flows into 
them. Secondly, we examine the linearity of the effects of civil liberties and political rights 
on FDI flows. Thirdly, we examine whether the consideration of the type of market 
economy from which MNEs originate provides useful information with regard to their FDI 
decision and behaviour (whether there are differences between the ways firms from LMEs 
and CMEs coordinate their FDI activity).   
To achieve this we first examined the factors that might influence the findings of our 
research by conducting a Meta analysis of the literature that has empirically explored the 
effect of institutions, democracy, civil liberties, and political rights on FDI.  
To investigate the effect of civil liberties and political rights on FDI flows, we built a 
theoretical model that considers the civil liberties to affect FDI activity by influencing the 
bargaining process between MNEs and the local labour representatives, while the effect of 
political rights is considered to be channelled through taxes imposed on MNEs in the host 
markets. The level of civil liberties is assumed to be directly related to the labour rights in 
establishing entities to represent employees. Consequently we consider that in countries 
with low level of liberties, unions have low (if any) power in representing employees’ 
voice. Based on the latter we explored the effect of civil liberties on FDI through union 
power. Moreover, we consider the level of civil liberties to influence FDI through 
productivity of work force, arguing that in countries’ where civil liberties are repressed, the 
productivity of work force dampens, which in turn results in lower efficiency of 
production.  
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In our view the cost of FDI in the host market, influences the probability of MNEs’ 
investment. Consequently we argue that while foreign firms bargain over lower wages in 
order to increase their return on investment, they tend to consider a sector specific 
threshold, when bargaining over wages, which leads to lower cost of production, as well as 
higher efficiency in terms of production. This is in line with Adam and Filippaios (2007) 
who conceptually established a non-linear relationship131 between civil liberties and FDI 
and empirically showed the existence of such relationship. This research contributes to the 
literature by theoretically relating this non-linearity to the sectoral characteristics arguing 
that in sectors where labour share of production is higher than that of capital, since the 
products are more sensitive to labour input and that labour share of production cost is 
considerable, MNEs tend to be more sensitive to the wages. In contrast we argued that in 
capital intensive sectors, since the production is less reliant on labour input and that the 
labour share of cost of production is comparatively lower than that observed in case of 
labour intensive sectors, the incentive of MNEs tend to be less sensitive to the wages. 
Therefore we find that MNEs in the sectors where the labour share of production is higher 
than capital, since wages constitute a larger share of firms’ cost, wages tend to play a 
greater role on the cost of FDI and therefore FDI flows. In such setting the level of civil 
liberties that enhances the ability of employees to bargain over higher wages play a greater 
role on FDI decision and flows, in sectors where the labour share of capital is higher than 
capital.   
It is considered that in countries with low level of political rights, the low quality of 
electoral process, and low degree of political pluralism and participation tends to result in 
the governing bodies that are not representative of the people. Consequently it is assumed 
that the low level of political rights is directly related to the radical changes in policies, 
specifically in terms of tax policies applied to MNEs.  Consequently we consider taxes on 
income as the main channel through which political rights affect FDI decision. However, 
the incorporating political rights into our theoretical model through consideration of taxes, 
shows that there are no distinct effect of political rights through taxation on FDI flows. 
Furthermore, in this research we draw on the institutional differences (the channels 
considered are the existing level of civil and political liberties) between different types of 
                                                          
131 Other studies that have discussed the non-linearity of the effect of civil and political liberties include Asiedu and Lien (2011), and Li 
and Resnick (2003) 
. 
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economies (VoC) and their influence on the bargaining processes between MNEs (firms) 
and unions in host countries. In order to incorporate the latter into our theoretical model, 
we consider the anatomy of different types of market economies provided by Hall and 
Soskice (2001) in the theory of Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) that clusters different types 
of economies based on their market structure and the coordination activities of the firms in 
those markets. By doing so we develop a theoretical bridge between International Business 
and political science that allows us to take into account the characteristics of the MNEs’ 
home market economy characteristics with regard to coordination of firms’ activities, when 
theoretically exploring their bargaining behaviour and FDI activity.  
Moreover, in our theoretical model, we distinguish between the coordination activity of 
the firms in the labour intensive sectors and capital intensive sectors. The latter allows the 
possibility of exploring the coordination activities of firms in sectors where the labour 
share of production is higher than that of capital as opposed to those with higher capital 
share of production. This genuine consideration allows this research to extend its analysis 
to sectoral FDI. Our reasoning is that understanding of the FDI activity requires knowledge 
of micro processes that form industry/sector level FDI, the combination of which 
accumulates to be aggregate FDI. Therefore in line with that of Blonigen (2005), we argue 
that a closer examination of the factors that influence the disaggregate FDI flows is 
imperative to our overall understanding of FDI activity. The theoretical model provided 
allows us to set forth a number of hypotheses that are empirically tested in a quantitative 
manner.   
8.3. Summary of Thesis Research Findings  
This section reviews the main findings of this research. Firstly, considering the results 
of empirical investigation of aggregated FDI flows, we find that the effect of civil liberties 
on aggregate FDI flows is negative and in line with the findings of Coates, et al. (2010). 
Similarly, the effect of political rights on aggregate FDI flows is positive and in line with 
the findings of Jensen (2003), Addison and Heshmati (2003), Sethi, et al. (2003), Wheeler 
and Mody (1992) and Adam and Filippaios (2007).  
Secondly, considering the results of empirical investigation of sectoral FDI flows, we 
find that the effect of civil liberties on sectoral FDI is non-linear in support of the findings 
of Asiedu and Lien (2011), Adam and Filippaios (2007), Li and Resnick (2003) and our 
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theoretical findings, and in contrast to our earlier empirical findings that considered the 
effect of civil liberties on aggregate (total) net FDI flows. Furthermore, the effect of civil 
liberties on services FDI flows is considerably greater than manufacturing sector, 
providing empirical support for the theoretically established effect of sectoral 
characteristics. In particular we show that the effect of civil liberties on FDI flows is 
intermediated by the ratio of labour to capital intensity of sectors, therefore the existence of 
a non-linear effect of civil liberties on FDI flows is expected considering the characteristics 
of the sectors in which FDI is considered. Similarly, the effect of political rights on 
sectoral FDI flows is non-linear in line with the findings of  Li and Resnick (2003) who 
have reported both positive and negative influences of political rights on FDI flows. In 
particular we find a positive effect of political rights on sectoral FDI flows of all countries 
giving support to the findings of Wheeler and Mody (1992) and  Sethi, et al. (2003), and 
Asiedu (2001) and Coates, et al. (2010), with the exception of German and Finish 
manufacturing FDI. Thus the overall findings indicates the existence of positive 
insignificant, positive, and negative insignificant effect of political rights on sectoral FDI 
flows of our set of home countries into 140 developed, developing and less developed  
countries. 
Thirdly, we find that the effect of civil liberties on aggregate FDI flows into two groups 
of countries with different levels of civil liberties is in general negative, in support of the 
findings of Coates, et al. (2010). Furthermore, the evidence suggests that aggregated FDI 
flows are more sensitive to changes in the level of civil liberties in the group of host 
countries with high and moderately high level of civil liberties in comparison to those with 
lower level of civil liberties. Furthermore, we find that the effect of political rights on 
aggregate FDI flows into host countries with various levels of civil liberties is non-linear.  
While political rights and civil liberties are separate components of democracy, there is 
a certain level of dependency between the level of political rights and civil liberties in the 
societies.132 The latter indicates that in many cases societies that enjoy higher level of civil 
liberties, often have higher level of political rights. Furthermore, our conceptual arguments 
and theoretical model indicate that higher level of political rights tend to promote FDI 
flows at least in aggregate level, by promoting a number of factors such as lower level of 
taxes and greater stability of governments, while higher level of civil liberties tend to 
                                                          
132 For further reading on this claim please refer to (Ariel BenYishay & Roger Betancourt, 2013) on related discussions. 
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influence the wage bargaining processes by affecting labour rights, and level of labour 
representation and consequently raises the cost of labour in the host markets, thereby 
negatively affecting FDI flows, in an aggregate level. Therefore, our finding is intuitive in 
that in societies with higher level of civil liberties, higher level of political rights influence 
FDI flows in a positive manner. In contrast to the latter and in line with the arguments 
provided, in societies with lower level of civil liberties, increase in the level of political 
rights would influence the governing bodies, as well as civil liberties, and thus affects FDI 
flows in a non-linear manner, in that higher level of political rights leads to lower taxes, 
whilst it leads to higher level of liberties, in particular civil liberties, that influence FDI 
flows in a negative manner. Therefore, a non-linear effect of political rights on FDI flows 
into host countries with various levels of civil liberties is expected.    
Fourthly, we find that the effect of civil liberties on sectoral FDI into host countries 
with various levels of civil liberties is non-linear and asymmetric for most countries 
providing more detailed evidence on the way firms invest in free and moderately free host 
countries in comparison to moderately repressed and repressed countries. Therefore 
empirical investigation of the effect of civil liberties on sectoral FDI, and on sectoral FDI 
into host countries with various levels of civil liberties, give support to the findings of  
Asiedu and Lien (2011), Adam and Filippaios (2007), Li and Resnick (2003) who have 
found the effects to be non-linear. In particular we argue that the sources of this non-
linearity is related to sector specific characteristics, the type of home country that MNEs’ 
originate from, as well as host countries’ specific characteristics such as level of natural 
resources.  
The exploration of the effect of political rights on sectoral FDI flows into host countries 
with various levels of civil liberties provides empirical evidence in support of a non-linear 
effect of political rights on FDI activity, in line with findings of Li and Resnick (2003). 
Furthermore, we find that the effect of political rights on sectoral FDI in each group of host 
countries with various levels of civil liverties, is asymmetric. Thus, it is possible to argue 
that the sectoral composition of the data and the choice of host countries that are 
considered for empirical research influence the findings of the research. 
In the fifth place, considering the effects of institutional quality on aggregated and 
disaggregated FDI flows, we find dominating evidence in favour of a positive effect 
supporting the findings of Lipsey (1999), Campos and Kinoshita (2003), indicating that in 
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general firms tend to invest in host countries with higher institutional quality. However, the 
contrary evidence on negative effects reported in a number of cases, raises the question on 
whether the positive effect of institutional quality of host countries is generalizable. We 
argue that the overall effect of institutional variables on FDI flows indicates presence of an 
asymmetric effect, at least in a number of cases, that is in line with the findings of 
Aleksynska and Havrylchyk (2012) who exploring the role of institutional distance on the 
FDI show that institutional distance has an asymmetric effect on FDI depending on 
whether investors choose countries with better or worse institutions. It is also possible to 
relate our findings to those of Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) who finds that the 
relationship between ill-functioning institutions133 and FDI is modified by the country of 
origin of the FDI.   
In the six place, the examination of the effects of firms’ motivations and 
macroeconomic characteristics of host countries on aggregated net FDI flows, show that 
motivation of firms influence net FDI flows differently across markets economies (LMEs 
and CMEs) and countries. In particular we find that firms from LMEs, CMEs, and 
Northern countries, tend to be influenced by market seeking, efficiency seeking and 
resource seeking variables in a similar manner, while the effect of strategic asset seeking 
on FDI flows of LMEs and CMEs is significantly different. The differences in the way 
Strategic Asset Seeking (SAS) motives affect firms from LMES and CMEs were explored 
in the light of the differences in the way firms from different market economies coordinate 
their activities. We find that firms from LMEs tend to coordinate their research and 
development activities in a centralised manner and outsourcing their production activities 
abroad while the evidence from CME show that they coordinate their activities in a more 
decentralised manner and thus their FDI investment does not have emphasis only on 
production and includes research and development activities.  
Moreover, the examination of the effects of firms’ motivations and macroeconomic 
characteristics of host countries on sectoral net FDI flows, show that motivation of firms 
influence net FDI flows differently across sectors as well as markets economies (LMEs 
and CMEs). In particular we find that while all firms show MS dominating behaviour in 
their sectoral FDI activity, their ES and RS behaviour vary considerably across sectors. 
                                                          
133 Corruption is the institutional literature is often referred to as ill-functioning institutions, indicating that in the absence 
of well functioning institutions, corruption arises as auxiliary informal ways of coordination of activities that are not 
addressed in a healthy manner by the current institutional structure of the host countries. 
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Furthermore, SAS behaviour of firms is similar across sectors if the quality of 
transportation is considered, while consideration of expenditure in R&D indicates that 
firms SAS behaviour varies across sectors. The results of the sectoral analysis of FDI flows 
in two main sectors of manufacturing and services shows that firms in manufacturing 
sector behave differently in pursuing their RS FDI, while we observe a weaker and rather 
partial134 evidence of the latter in case ES FDI. The differences in the behaviour of the 
firms’ FDI activity in various sectors stems from the fact that they coordinate their 
activities according to the sectoral characteristics. Consequently we find evidence 
supporting Blonigen (2005) arguments that analysis of aggregate FDI flows provides 
information with regard to the combination of affects reported for combination of 
sectors/industries. Since the empirical results provide evidence on asymmetric, and in 
many cases, non-linear effects of variables on FDI flows across sectors, the consideration 
of disaggregate FDI flows would allow one to gain a better understanding of the micro 
drivers of the industry and sectoral FDI. Therefore, we argue that it is necessary to explore 
the more disaggregated measure of FDI flows (i.e. industry of sectoral FDI flows) in order 
to provide a detailed and meaningful view of the way firms invest abroad and the factors 
that influence their behaviour.   
In the seventh place, the examination of the effects of firms’ motivations and 
macroeconomic characteristics of host countries on aggregated and disaggregated net FDI 
flows, show that motivation of firms influence net FDI flows differently across markets 
economies (LMEs and CMEs) and countries. In particular we find that firms from LMEs, 
CMEs, and Northern countries, tend to be influenced by market seeking, efficiency seeking 
and resource seeking variables in a similar manner, while the effect of strategic asset 
seeking on FDI flows of LMEs and CMEs is significantly different. The differences in the 
way Strategic Asset Seeking (SAS) motives affect firms from LMES and CMEs were 
explored in the light of the differences in the way firms from different market economies 
coordinate their activities. We find that firms from LMEs tend to coordinate their research 
and development activities in a centralised manner and outsourcing their production 
activities abroad while the evidence from CME show that they coordinate their activities in 
a more decentralised manner and thus their FDI investment does not have emphasis only 
on production and includes research and development activities. In other words, we find 
                                                          
134 We find that the ES behaviour of firms from most countries vary across sectors with the exception of Germany and 
France. 
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that LME firms tend to have a more centralised structure that centralises the R&D 
activities of the firms at the home country and allocates production activities to the 
affiliates abroad taking advantage of cost. In contrast we find Northern firms to show a 
rather decentralised structure that influences these firms to allocate some of their R&D 
activities to its affiliates in the host countries. The evidence from CME firms is weaker, but 
indicative of a more decentralized structure than their LME counterparts. 
8.4. Research Limitations 
One of the limitations of this research is that we mainly consider the factors that affect 
the monetary motivations of the firms. In other words we have investigated the effect of 
civil liberties and political rights on the cost structure of foreign firms in providing the 
results. In many cases the value of firm specific assets cannot be fully translated into 
quantitative concepts. For instance in case of larger MNEs, in many cases FDI takes place 
based on competitor motives, rather than basic IB motives relating to different sectoral 
productions. Factors such as competition are much harder to quantify unless a specific case 
is considered. Therefore, this study provides a simple model that mimics some but not all 
factors that affect MNEs’ FDI decision. Furthermore, in case of the effect of political rights 
on FDI, we considered the effect of political rights through its effects on taxes on income 
and profits. However, political rights’ effect on FDI flows could be reviewed in a variety 
of ways. For instance it is possible to view the effect of political rights on FDI through the 
effect of political repression on life time of governments in repressed countries, and in turn 
the safety of the investment in repressed countries. Therefore, further research on the effect 
of political rights on FDI especially in sectoral context would be fruitful. Moreover, the 
nonlinearities on the way civil liberties and political rights affect FDI flows in groups of 
countries with various levels of liberties could be further explored in a sectoral context in 
order to provide more information on the effect of these factors on FDI flows. Finally, the 
effect of external factors such as time, and countries’ level of income should be considered 
in empirical investigation of FDI activity. In particular the analysis of the effect of time on 
FDI activity could be useful in determining the general trend of investment activity in 
different economic cycles. This would help determining the way different factors affect 
FDI in different sectors in time. Furthermore, the analysis of the effect of time on FDI 
activity would provide some information on the way the landscape of investment activity 
changes in time and in turn shapes the economic activity across countries.  
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The analysis of the effect of civil liberties and political rights on sectoral FDI activity 
has not been carried out before, in spite of popular advocacy for the use of disaggregated 
measures of FDI in determining the determinants of FDI activity. Perhaps this is mainly 
due to lack of available and extensive data on sectoral FDI. In the case of this research two 
main resources were used in order to provide comprehensive information on FDI activity 
that would allow analysis of sectoral FDI. However, in spite of the efforts made, the 
number of observations for most sectors did not allow singular sectoral investigation and 
thus the author has produced specific manufacturing and services FDI data in order to 
provide labour and capital intensive sectoral comparisons.  
Moreover, the observable differences between the sectoral classification of North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS), Standard Industrial Classification 
system (SIC), and European Classification (NACE) makes it tremendously difficult for the 
researchers to obtain sectoral data that is consistent across countries, and thus discourages 
detailed sectoral analysis.  
Another problem that discourages sectoral analysis is the scarcity of data for most 
countries over a considerable length of time. While the data used in this research covers the 
period of 1990-2009, for most countries the data provided generally covers 1996-2009, 
which in turn limits the time span over which the empirical investigation is carried out. 
Moreover, the frequency of data in general provides limited possibilities for statistical 
inference. In this research the annual data is used for FDI analysis. In this research the 
annual net aggregated FDI flows of 8 home countries, and disaggregated FDI flows from 6 
home countries into 140 host countries is considered, however, in most cases firms from 
each home country tend to invest in a selected number of countries, and their FDI is 
generally conducted in a selected number of sectors leaving the researcher with a low 
number of observations overall, in spite of consideration of all sectors, and an extensive 
number of years. Access to data with higher frequency would help in provision of detailed 
analysis on FDI flows, particularly in case of sectoral FDI. Moreover, it is imperative to 
note that consideration of firm level data in studies similar to ours would be immensely 
informative, however due to lack of access to extensive firm level data (both in terms of 
firm level data from a number of home countries, as well as data that is consistent for a 
long period of time), we could not pursue a firm level analysis.  
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The short coming of our theoretical model in explanation of the non-linear effect of 
political rights on sectoral FDI perhaps stems from the way that we have theoretically 
introduced the political rights into our theoretical model. In our theoretical model political 
rights are assumed to be affecting FDI activity through taxes on income and profit. 
However, it is possible to review the effect of political rights on FDI activity through 
consideration of different factors that embody the political rights index, namely: electoral 
process; political pluralism & participation; and Functioning of Government. Whilst 
consideration of political rights in the light of its encompassing elements would benefit the 
analyses of the effect of political rights on the FDI activity, due to lack of detailed data on 
these sub-components we would not be able to empirically test our theoretical findings. 
Thus, this research has followed the specification introduced by Adam and Filippaios 
(2007).135  
8.5. Research Contributions 
8.5.1. Contributions to Research 
This research contributes to the literature by incorporating Varieties of Capitalism 
framework into FDI literature and providing a novel theoretical model that explores the 
effect of civil liberties and political rights on FDI activity. The effect of civil liberties is 
explored in our theoretical model through wage setting and employee recruitment, while 
the effect of political rights on FDI is examined through its effects on taxes on profit and 
incomes. Moreover, we theoretically show that the effect of civil liberties on FDI 
behaviour of firms is influenced by sectoral characteristics. This theoretical finding is 
empirically validated. 
By incorporating VoC framework into our model, we distinguish between the FDI from 
various market economies based on the existing differences between the coordination 
activities of firms within them. Consequently we distinguish between the firms from 
LMEs, CMEs, and Northern countries, based on their coordination activities, market 
structures, and home countries differences and explore the ways in which MNEs from 
different market economies coordinate their FDI activities. This allows bridging the IB 
theory with political science which in turn allows the researcher to draw on the economic 
                                                          
135 Since the scope of this research is rather limited due to word count, we do not make any further alterations to explore 
the non-linear effect of political rights on manufacturing FDI, and leave the latter to the future research. 
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and political characteristics of the home countries from which MNEs originate in 
explaining their coordination of FDI, and thereby their FDI behaviour. Furthermore, our 
empirical results indicate that the behaviour of firms from various market economies is 
indeed different from one another in most cases. Therefore, this research contributes to IB 
literature by incorporating VoC into IB literature and thereby allowing for a new avenue 
through which arguments from the older tradition of political science can inform, and 
influence our exploration of determinants of FDI.  
The overall empirical evidence from analyses of the effect of civil liberties and political 
rights on FDI flows demonstrates that while the effects of these factors on aggregate net 
FDI flows are seemingly linear, further exploration of the effect of these factors on 
disaggregated FDI, and the sensitivity analysis of the effect of political rights on 
aggregated FDI flows into host countries with various levels of civil liberties, suggest that 
the effect of civil and political liberties are inherently non-linear on FDI flows. This 
research contributes to the literature by theoretically relating this non-linearity to the 
sectoral characteristics arguing that in sectors where labour share of production is higher 
than that of capital, since the products are more sensitive to labour input, the wage setting 
incentive of MNEs is more in line with increasing the productivity of work force rather 
than repressing wages. In contrast we argued that in capital intensive sectors, since the 
production is less reliant to labour input, the incentive of MNEs with regard to wage 
setting is more in line with repressing wages in order to gain higher return on investment.    
Furthermore, our empirical investigation contributes to the literature by considering the 
effect of firms’ motives, as well as host countries’ level of civil liberties, political rights, 
institutional quality, and macroeconomic characteristics, on aggregated (total) and 
disaggregated (sectoral) FDI in order to provide detailed information on the effect of civil 
liberties and political rights on total as well as sectoral FDI flows. Furthermore, we 
empirically establish the existence of non-linear effects of civil liberties and political rights 
on FDI flows and argue that the seemingly linear effects observed in case of aggregated 
FDI flows are the by products of summation of the non-linear sectoral/industry level 
effects which in turn lead to loss of informative data on the way these factors influence 
FDI flows in detail. Our empirical investigation also confirms that ratio of labour to capital 
share of production acts an intermediating factor that influences the relationship between 
civil liberties and disaggregated FDI flows. 
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The empirical investigation method used in this research is based on Bootstrap 
estimation of Quantile Regression Models (QRM). The choice of empirical method is 
mainly motivated by non-normality of the data. Since the non-normality entailed both 
Skewness and Kurtosis, and that in general social scientist is interested in exploring the 
abnormalities in the general patterns, we strived to avoid extensive data manipulation. 
Unfortunately the literature on FDI is generally populated by studies that continue to use 
the same specifications and methods in their design. The non-normality observed in the 
data indicates that in many cases the use of conditional mean models (i.e. OLS, Maximum 
Likelihood models, etc.) would result in provision of statistically meaningless results. 
Thus, it is imperative for researchers and practitioners to avoid adopting empirical methods 
based on their popularity, and to investigate the sufficiency and efficiency of their 
statistical methods with respect to their data. Thus, this research contributes to the 
literature by questioning the common methods of statistical inquiry and adopting one that 
is more adequate for statistical analysis of panel FDI data for the given period. This in 
effect should inform and influence the subsequent studies, and encourage questioning of 
the traditional practices and views in the literature.  
Finally, since the literature on the effect of host countries’ level of civil liberties and 
political rights on FDI is still in its infancy, provision of studies such as ours sheds more 
light on the topic and by doing so elevates the level of understanding, and promote further 
considerations and policy related discussions that can potentially provide a basis for 
practical policy decision making in the future. 
8.6. Recommendations 
This research provides its analyses on aggregated and sectoral FDI flows. The future 
research on sectoral FDI flows perhaps can take the examination of the drivers of FDI into 
lower levels of disaggregation by exploring the factors that influence more detailed 
sectoral, or industry level FDI. Furthermore, in this study the analyses of the sectoral FDI 
are conducted using variables that reflected motivations of FDI at country level. It is 
recommended that the future studies use variables that reflected motivations of FDI at 
sectoral/industry level. For instance, it is possible to use the ratio of sectoral growth value 
added as a percentage of GDP, to the GDP, as a measure of market size instead of the 
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traditional GDP or GDP per capita, in order to provide more detailed information of the 
FDI activity.  
In line with these recommendations the future research on the effect of civil and 
political liberties on FDI is advised to use sub-indicators (sub-categories) of civil liberties 
and political rights to further examine their effect on FDI activity. This would help 
determining the how various aspects of these concepts influence FDI activity. 
Furthermore, this research showed that firms from various market economies coordinate 
their activities in differently, and that as a result the way they coordinate of their FDI 
activity, varies. However, in many cases we find that there are considerable differences 
between the ways UK firms coordinate their activities in comparison to their US 
counterparts. Perhaps a further distinction could be made in case of UK, as a hybrid market 
economy that is influenced and has inherently formed through both European and 
American experiences.  
The evidence from the effect of quality of transportation along with the mixed effects 
provided for a number of other variables on services FDI in general gives support to the 
idea that the firms’ FDI activity and behaviour in services sector are rather more complex 
in comparison to manufacturing sector. In particular we argue that the current literature 
trying to explain services FDI using Behrman (1974) taxonomy of firms’ motivations, 
institutional differences between various types of market economies (VoC), and 
macroeconomic factors, falls short of provision of credible explanations of the reasons why 
firms’ services FDI behaves in such a peculiar manner. Perhaps, future research on sectoral 
FDI could provide a more extensive analysis on the subject building on the current. 
Overall, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been considered as one of the factors that 
significantly influence the economy of countries through affecting the balance of 
payments, increasing employment, transfer of technology and resources. While the effect 
of FDI on economic growth of countries is still debated136 both in aggregate and 
disaggregate manner, nevertheless the existence of its effect on economies is widely 
accepted. Further investigation of the drivers of FDI mainly in sectoral context would 
provide useful information with regard to factors that influence different types of FDI 
activities in host countries.  
                                                          
136 Alfaro et al. (2005) 
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Moreover, the observable differences between the sectoral classification of North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS), Standard Industrial Classification 
system (SIC), and European Classification (NACE) makes it tremendously difficult for the 
researchers to obtain sectoral data that is consistent across countries, and thus discourages 
detailed sectoral analysis. Future research on the possible statistical methods that could be 
applied to provide data sets that could accommodate meaningful statistical indices from 
various classification systems, especially over time, could tremendously benefit the future 
economic research on sectoral and industry level analyses. 
Globalization has on its own merit affected the economic activity of the countries across 
the world, while the enhancements in information technology in turn have made it possible 
for firms to coordinate their activities in a more efficient way. In this setting it is easier for 
firms to outsource their activities to other countries in order to gain a competitive 
advantage and in turn improve the economic advancements of the less developed nations. 
Therefore, in the world of today, it is essential for most countries to integrate into the new 
economic system that is forming, in order to be able to enhance their economic activity and 
ensure better economic future. FDI as one of the factors that has a great potential to 
contribute to economic activity of the countries, particularly in case of developing and less 
developed countries can play a significant role in improving the economic condition of 
nations and help in alleviating the significant differences observed in terms of equality 
across the world. Therefore, further research on FDI activity especially in terms of their 
sectoral determinants, as well as their compositional effect on foreign nations’ growth 
would provide useful information that would inform policy making.   
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